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OF THE

ARMY IN INDIA COMMITTEE, 1912.

VOLUME II.

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.



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VOLUME II.

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MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

6th Meeting—Friday, the 31st May 1912.

Colonel A. H. Bingley, C.I.E., and Major W. H. Jackson of the General Staff Branch, Headquarters Staff of the Army in India, attended as witnesses and were examined.

EVIDENCE OF COLONEL BINGLEY AND MAJOR JACKSON.

1. PRESIDENT.—It has been stated, Colonel Bingley, that during a period of over thirty years little has been done to improve our communications through the Khyber. What, in general terms, is the present state of the roads from Peshawar to Kabul and from Quetta to Kandahar as compared with what it was in 1878-80?

2. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Well sir, in 1878-80, at the time of the Afghan War, the road to Kabul was at the outset a camel track but was gradually improved into a cart-road. After the Afghan War and until 1907 when the Amir visited India, the roads leading from India to Afghanistan steadily deteriorated. But in 1907 the Amir began to take great interest in motoring, and this has resulted in the improvement of roads in Afghanistan generally. The Peshawar-Kabul road is now a good road throughout, and it is now possible to motor from Jamrud straight through to Kabul.

3. PRESIDENT.—Can a motor go up under its own power?

4. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes. A Mr. Dolphin had recently to take up some six-ton motors to Kabul and he was able to get them through without much difficulty. (Colonel Bingley here read an extract from Mr. Dolphin's report.)

5. SIR P. LAKE.—Does that apply to the road the whole way?

6. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes. We ourselves of course have first-hand knowledge regarding that portion of the road which runs from Jamrud to Landi Kotal.

7. SIR W. MEYER.—Does the Peshawar-Kabul road go beyond Kabul or does it terminate there?

8. COLONEL BINGLEY.—The motor road passes through Jabal-us-Sirāj, a palace which the Amir has built north of Kabul, to Gulbahar on the main road to the Khawak Pass.

9. PRESIDENT.—How did they get the motors over the Lataband Pass?

10. COLONEL BINGLEY.—They avoided it. I must explain that when we were in Afghanistan in 1878-80 we used the road that ran from Lataband to Butkhak. The Amir has abandoned that for a new road which takes a bend south and goes over the Balutok Pass.

11. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you anything in the shape of a map of Afghanistan showing the roads?

12. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes, I have a new and I think very clear map* which distinguishes between motor roads and camel tracks and between metalled and unmetalled roads.

* Not reproduced.

13. PRESIDENT.—The great difficulty in road-making in Afghanistan is the insufficiency of water to consolidate the metal. Consequently, if any considerable traffic goes over a road, it cuts up very rapidly. The Amir may be able to run a little traffic over it, perhaps once or twice a week, but for war

purposes we should have a great many vehicles going over it. You are not aware whether the tyres of these lorries of which Mr. Dolphin speaks are rubber ?

14. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes, sir ; solid rubber tyres.

[Colonel Bingley then gave some particulars regarding the road. Width 20 feet ; width of metalled portion 16 feet, gradients varying from 1 in 17 to 1 in 100. He emphasized the fact that the information had been derived from Mr. Dolphin who is a trained civil engineer.]

15. SIR W. MEYER.—How long have these roads been in their present state ?

16. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Not more than two or three years. They are made by forced labour. The alignment is good.

17. PRESIDENT.—Do the natives, owing to these improved roads, use carts at the present time, or do they as heretofore rely for their own internal traffic on camels and mules ?

18. COLONEL BINGLEY.—The latter ; the only carts used at present are those belonging to the Amir.

19. PRESIDENT.—During the second Afghan War did we employ many carts along the road to Gandamak ?

20. COLONEL BINGLEY.—We employed hired bullock carts. During the war we improvized some pony carts for use on the road between Gandamak and Kabul.

21. PRESIDENT.—Then on the Kohat line I see from the map that there is practically nothing in the shape of a motor road. We of course made a cart road from Thal to Teri Mangal, at the base of the slope of the Peiwar Kotal, during the war. Beyond that point things remain *in statu quo* except that the Amir has apparently made cart roads from Kabul to Kushi and down to Altimur.

22. COLONEL BINGLEY.—The Amir's roadmaking programme includes a project for a motor road from Kabul to Kandahar and thence round to Herat. This road was completed as far as Shahjui, 183 miles, in 1911, and the remaining 128 miles to Kandahar should be finished this summer.

23. PRESIDENT.—Are the roads other than the motor roads, generally speaking, good ?

24. COLONEL BINGLEY.—No sir. They remain as bad as ever. We do not know exactly how far the roads have progressed, but the Amir is having them gradually improved according as he can impress the necessary labour.

25. SIR W. MEYER.—May we take it that the roads other than the Amir's motor roads are unmetalled tracks, probably mostly in a bad condition ?

26. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I should imagine so. The Amir told Mr. Dolphin that his subjects were opposed to the construction of railways. He was therefore trying to improve communications in Afghanistan by constructing roads suitable for motor traffic.

27. PRESIDENT.—All we can say is that the roads, with the exception of such motor roads as have been constructed by the Amir, have changed but little since the last Afghan War. Have any steps been taken to bridge rivers except on motor roads ?

28. COLONEL BINGLEY.—No. On the motor roads, the more important bridges are being built by Burn and Co. of Calcutta.

29. SIR P. LAKE.—I have called for special reports on roads through the Khyber as far as our border line.

30. THE PRESIDENT.—Trials of motor lorries on certain frontier roads were carried out during Lord Kitchener's Commander-in-Chiefship. The lorries had a most destructive effect on the roads ?

31. COLONEL BINGLEY.—That is so. The lorries tried were of a very heavy type. Those the Amir uses are much lighter and more suitable.

32. SIR W. MEYER.—For what purposes does the Amir use these motors?

33. COLONEL BINGLEY.—They only went up to Kabul four months ago. The Amir's idea, however, is to organize a parcel service between Kabul and Peshawar. One car is fitted up for the conveyance of *Zanana* passengers. Nine motor lorries are to be employed on this service.

34. SIR W. MEYER.—Then apparently he is not going to throw the service open to the public?

35. PRESIDENT.—You are aware, Colonel Bingley, that in Afghanistan there is very little water, and that what there is is used for irrigation and is highly valuable. Afghanistan does not export very much?

36. COLONEL BINGLEY.—No cereals are exported; it is rather the other way. The imports into Afghanistan are considerable.

37. PRESIDENT.—The result is that the cultivable capacity of Afghanistan is fully utilized by its inhabitants. In that case is it possible for them to supply any grain or fodder for the use of an army?

38. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I should think they would find it difficult to do so.

39. PRESIDENT.—The point I wish to make is that this proves that there is but little surplus grain or produce in the country for supporting any force that may enter it.

40. SIR R. SCALLON.—What do the Powindas bring down to India?

41. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Wool, carpets, etc., but no food stuffs.

42. PRESIDENT.—They bring wool, carpets, asafoetida, grapes, melons, and nuts.

43. SIR W. MEYER.—How are the troops which, under the plans of operations, are intended to advance on Kabul, to be fed?

44. COLONEL BINGLEY.—In the ordinary manner—that is, on supplies from India passed up along the lines of communication.

45. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think you could get supplies in the country?

46. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Some, but not many.

47. SIR W. MEYER.—From what sources do we obtain our information with regard to events in Afghanistan?

48. COLONEL BINGLEY.—From the Foreign Department and the Amir's European employés. We also employ secret agents of our own.

49. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you find that your agents' information is often unreliable?

50. COLONEL BINGLEY.—We do sometimes, but some of our men are fairly reliable and we attach value to their reports.

51. SIR W. MEYER.—We keep a diplomatic agent at Kabul. Do you get anything from him?

52. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Not much. He reports direct to the Foreign Department. The present agent has no military knowledge: he is not trained to observe from a military point of view, and cannot do anything without being watched.

53. SIR W. MEYER.—What patterns of guns does the Amir possess?

54. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Various patterns—amongst others a certain number of Krupp guns and howitzers. He manufactures some himself. A great fault is the large variety of types in use. But he has enough good guns to equip all his batteries. Most are kept in arsenals.

55. SIR W. MEYER.—Could you give us a statement showing the various classes of guns?

56. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Certainly.

57. SIR W. MEYER.—You shew 90,000 regular troops in Afghanistan. What is their organization?

58. COLONEL BINGLEY.—In brigades of all arms. I would prefer to give the information required on paper as I cannot give details off-hand. I shall be able to give fairly full particulars.*

59. SIR W. MEYER.—Has the character of the training of the troops improved of late?

60. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Undoubtedly; they have now got Turkish instructors.

61. SIR W. MEYER.—Is the Turkish instructor a good class of man?

62. COLONEL BINGLEY.—He is efficient.

63. PRESIDENT.—How many instructors are there?

64. COLONEL BINGLEY.—About twenty.

65. SIR W. MEYER.—The employment of these instructors is a recent experiment, is it not?

66. COLONEL BINGLEY.—It began in 1906. The number employed has increased gradually.

67. SIR W. MEYER.—Are the Afghans taking to the instructors kindly?

68. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I think so.

69. SIR W. MEYER.—General Duff in 1907, when giving evidence before the Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, spoke of the Afghans as being capable of only delaying our advance to Kabul by seven days. Do you concur in that?

70. COLONEL BINGLEY.—It is very hard to say. I think that their troops are of a certain military value and that their efficiency is increasing.

71. SIR W. MEYER.—Does not past history tell us that the more these people are trained the less formidable they become? They are more accustomed to guerilla methods?

72. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes, there is a good deal in that, but it is to be remembered that in future the Afghans will have their irregular troops better armed, and a backing of regular troops which they did not have before.

73. PRESIDENT.—What is the period of service in the regular army?

74. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I think it varies from about three to twenty-four years. The Amir does not adhere to any hard and fast regulations, he changes his mind constantly.

75. PRESIDENT.—There is no obligation on these men to rejoin the colours; he therefore has no system of forming a reserve, and all the 90,000 men are in the ranks at the present time.

76. SIR R. SCALLON.—When you give us the numbers of men, etc., Colonel Bingley, could you also give us the distribution of the army?

77. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes, sir.

78. SIR W. MEYER.—What are they armed with?

79. COLONEL BINGLEY.—The Kabul brigades have Lee-Netfords, the rest have Martinis; but their armament is somewhat miscellaneous.

80. SIR W. MEYER.—What is the value of their officers as compared with our own British and native officers?

* Colonel Bingley subsequently supplied the Committee with "Notes on the Military Resources of Afghanistan, 1912" which has been printed as Appendix II.

81. COLONEL BINGLEY.—They are professional soldiers, but their standard of training is low.

82. SIR W. MEYER.—Do they exercise any influence over their men?

83. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes, I think we may say that they do, and that they are brave but unskilled.

84. SIR W. MEYER.—And compared with our native officers?

85. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I should say in knowledge inferior; in leading equal, and even better in some cases.

86. SIR R. SCALLON.—Have they any eminent leaders?

87. COLONEL BINGLEY.—We know of no really capable leaders; the Amir does not wish to create them, he is afraid.

88. SIR W. MEYER.—Has the Amir a Commander-in-Chief?

89. COLONEL BINGLEY.—His son, Inayatullah Khan, is the titular Commander-in-Chief, but the Amir exercises most functions himself. Nasrullah Khan is the man in power at present.

90. PRESIDENT.—Do the Afghans manufacture cordite?

91. COLONEL BINGLEY.—We are informed that they do. We know that they have the requisite plant and that one of the Turkish officers is experimenting with it. But we do not believe that he has succeeded in overcoming the difficulties of manufacture. That is a point upon which we are anxious to obtain information.

92. SIR W. MEYER.—Can they make Martinis?

93. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes, excellent ones.

94. SIR W. MEYER.—Can they turn them out as good as those made in our own factory?

95. COLONEL BINGLEY.—The quality of the rifles made is very creditable; they are serviceable weapons, though not quite up to the standard of ours.

96. SIR R. SCALLON.—What proportion do the various patterns bear to each other?

97. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I should say Martini rifles still form the bulk of the weapons. Sniders are being gradually eliminated. The regulars have Lee-Metfords and Martinis.

98. SIR P. LAKE.—Can you say exactly what the bulk of the armament consists of?

99. COLONEL BINGLEY.—We have no exact data. We know what is reported to be stored in the arsenals, but I would not vouch for the accuracy of the information. I will furnish particulars in my statement.

100. PRESIDENT.—Has the Amir any machine guns?

101. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes sir, but I cannot say exactly how many. My statement will give all particulars available.

102. PRESIDENT.—From what I have read about the arms which are imported by the Persian Gulf, I gather that they generally go to Kabul in the first instance. These being modern rifles accompanied by ammunition, what amount of the latter is exported from Europe?

103. COLONEL BINGLEY.—There are two kinds of rifles, a cheap kind and a better kind; with each of the former about 100 rounds are sent.

104. PRESIDENT.—These cartridges are filled with cordite?

105. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes, as a rule, but the cordite is of foreign manufacture.

106. PRESIDENT.—Smokeless?

107. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes, sir.

108. PRESIDENT.—Does the Amir use these rifles himself or distribute them ?

109. COLONEL BINGLEY.—There seems to be no definite policy with regard to the matter, but so far as we know he allows the rifles to be sold to the public.

110. SIR W. MEYER.—Does the Amir import guns through British India to any extent ?

111. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes ; he has done so on several occasions. He got some Krupp guns at one time, and Nordenfeldt and Hotchkiss guns at another.

112. SIR W. MEYER.—We make no objection ?

113. COLONEL BINGLEY.—No, sir.

114. SIR W. MEYER.—Does he import rifles and small-arms ?

115. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes, usually in parts : the Customs authorities in Bombay keep a record of all imports. They are passed through duty free.

116. SIR W. MEYER.—Suppose we got information that a consignment of 20,000 was coming through, would we let it go ?

117. COLONEL BINGLEY.—There might be a reference about it, but I do not think any objections would be raised.

118. PRESIDENT.—Some years ago, when our relations were strained, we stopped the importation of arms through British India ; then, when relations improved, we gave permission and also presented the Amir with guns.

119. SIR W. MEYER.—It has been pressed on the Amir on various occasions that it would be advantageous to have British officers in Afghanistan to advise and watch ?

120. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I do not think so ; but I understand that the present Amir did discuss the question with Lord Kitchener during his visit to India in 1907. I do not think, however, that any definite agreement was arrived at.

121. SIR W. MEYER.—It has always been one of the difficulties of the situation, has it not, that we have no information as to what is going on on the Russian frontier, and it has been suggested that the Amir should allow British officers to go up to Kabul ?

122. COLONEL BINGLEY.—It has often been discussed. Our knowledge of current events, local politics and the state of the roads would be enormously increased if the suggestion could be carried out.

123. PRESIDENT.—I suggest that such a proposal was made shortly after Abdur Rahman was made Amir, and his answer was that it would be impossible for him to ensure the lives of any British officers who might be sent to Kabul. That at any rate was the excuse he made.

124. SIR P. LAKE.—Do you know anything about the price of rifles on the frontier ?

125. COLONEL BINGLEY.—The price is constantly varying. I think that at present it stands at about Rs. 100—300 for a Martini, and from Rs. 500—1,000 for a Lee-Metford. The price varies according to make.

126. SIR W. MEYER.—How do the tribesmen raise the money ?

127. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I cannot say. A raid into British territory is helpful.

128. SIR R. SCALLON.—Is the Amir supposed to have a regular agency for supplying the tribes with rifles ?

129. COLONEL BINGLEY.—No, but we think he has latterly been selling them some.

130. SIR R. SCALLON.—Muscat rifles?

131. COLONEL BINGLEY.—No, obsolete rifles such as Sniders. But caravans laden with rifles go up from the Mekran coast through Kandahar to Kabul, and the Amir must know that these arms are there sold to the tribesmen.

132. SIR R. SCALLON.—It seems extraordinary that the tribesmen are able to obtain so much money to spend on the importation of rifles.

133. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I suggest that there must be a considerable profit in the gun-running trade. Of course the number of rifles imported from the Persian Gulf has diminished enormously during the past year. I can give figures showing the change.

134. SIR W. MEYER.—Does that reflect upon the tribes?

135. COLONEL BINGLEY.—It will, but has not done so yet.

136. SIR W. MEYER.—Do recent incidents in Khost tend to show that the Afghan army is very efficient?

137. COLONEL BINGLEY.—We have not got very full accounts, but I do not think they do.

138. PRESIDENT.—Have the Afghans an organized transport system?

139. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Their transport system, or the lack of one, is their weak point. We understand that the delay in suppressing the revolt in Khost was due to this deficiency. They do not maintain any transport except at Kabul, Kandahar and Herat. The Amir has lately been importing mules, but we understand these are intended for mountain batteries. He has also imported some bullocks for use with his carts.

140. SIR W. MEYER.—This deficiency would be very important in case of war with the Amir?

141. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes, but there is no real lack of transport in the country.

142. PRESIDENT.—True, but the Afghan drives his transport into the recesses in the hills if he thinks it is likely to be requisitioned.

143. SIR P. LAKE.—The Amir is supposed to have created certain granaries and stores. Can any reliance be placed on the report?

144. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes, there are big granaries at certain places in which grain is stored for issue to troops. We have been told that these reserves have to be maintained on a certain fixed scale, but do not place much reliance on the story, because when the Khost business came on we learned that the Amir had to buy grain in all directions.

145. PRESIDENT.—Has the Amir constructed any defence works in northern Afghanistan?

146. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes, sir, he has, more especially at Kabul and Deh-Dadi; but they are not forts in the European sense; they are more like fortified serais, and could not resist modern artillery.

147. PRESIDENT.—That they are not capable of resisting medium or heavy guns is of minor importance, because it would be difficult to bring such guns up.

Considerable advances have been made in railway construction along the North-West Frontier since 1880. Can you give a short summary of the lines constructed since then?

148. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I think I could best explain that by submitting a map showing how the railways stood at the time of the Afghan War and how they stand now. Our railhead on the northern line was first of all at Jhelum and then was extended to Rawalpindi. By the end of June 1879 railhead had been pushed on to Sibi on the southern line where it remained to the end of the operations. Our railheads are now at Jamrud, Kohat,

and Chaman. From Kohat to Thal there is a 2' 6" line, and from Thal to Parachinar a metalled cart-road.

149. PRESIDENT.—To give lateral communication along the Indus we have also constructed a line from Attock to Darya Khan?

150. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes, sir.

151. SIR W. MEYER.—Does your map show merely frontier lines or developments in the interior communications of India leading to the frontier? Would it not be advisable to prepare a similar map showing the development of lines in the interior?

152. PRESIDENT.—Yes.

153. COLONEL BINGLEY.—There has also been a great deal of doubling of lines.

154. SIR W. MEYER.—You might also add to your map some figures giving the total mileage of the additional railways which have been constructed since 1880.

155. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes, sir.

156. SIR W. MEYER.—Can you give us any idea of the time it would take to mobilize the whole of the nine divisions and eight cavalry brigades of the Field Army?

157. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I would rather not answer that question now. I have only just taken over and am not intimately acquainted with mobilization details.

158. SIR W. MEYER.—You have, no doubt, studied Sir Beauchamp Duff's evidence before the Mowatt Committee of 1907. Referring to the changes that had been made by Lord Kitchener, Sir Beauchamp Duff said that Lord Kitchener's plan was to make each divisional area self-contained. He admitted that the Peshawar Division did not come up to that standard because the cantonment at Torsappar had been dropped, but thought that every other division had, or shortly would come up to that standard. He laid stress on the difficulty of moving troops from one division to another when the moves came within the purview of Army Headquarters. He quoted 1897. As far as I can make out, every division—not merely Peshawar—will have to draw troops from some other divisional area?

159. COLONEL BINGLEY.—It is certainly the case with the 1st and the 5th Divisions, and for internal defence with some of the others.

160. SIR W. MEYER.—How far do you think General Duff's view is justified?

161. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I think that had Lord Kitchener's scheme been carried to completion, it would have conferred considerable advantages. The scheme has been arrested; it was partially stopped while Lord Kitchener was still in India.

162. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think the interruption of the scheme will materially handicap us in mobilization arrangements?

163. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes. It adds enormously to the smoothness of mobilization if you have got a complete organization thought out beforehand.

164. PRESIDENT.—Sir William Meyer says that Sir Beauchamp Duff spoke of the confusion that arose in 1897-98 about the mobilization of troops on the North-West Frontier. Are you aware that any confusion arose?

165. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I would not call it "confusion." I should put it this way, if, say, the 1st Division had in 1897 been complete in every respect, and could have moved out on service without any movements of troops from other divisional areas, its mobilization would have been carried out with greater smoothness.

166. PRESIDENT.—As far as I recollect—I was then Chief Staff Officer in the Punjab—the mobilization arrangements were regulated by Army Headquarters. Is it the case that the time it takes to mobilize a force depends upon the time required to provide the force with second-line transport? Is it also the case that it takes considerable time to collect this transport?

167. COLONEL BINGLEY.—It does. We have now got registered camel corps which expedite the collection of animals. Even so, however, it takes considerable time, say 30 days.

168. PRESIDENT.—Is it the case that to equip your troops for field service, and to send them considerable distances by rail, is comparatively such a short process that you can collect the troops required long before you can collect the transport?

169. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes, as a rule.

170. PRESIDENT.—That shows that the delay that occurred under the old system was not due to not having the troops concentrated on the spot.

171. SIR W. MEYER.—A great deal of stress has been laid on the fact that the old mobilization arrangements produced only four divisions, whereas the Kitchener scheme produced nine; but did not the old scheme merely look on these four as what could be put into the field at once?

172. COLONEL BINGLEY.—In a way that is true, but there were then only four divisions equipped with all requisites for service.

173. SIR W. MEYER.—How many are fully equipped now?

174. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Seven I should think.

175. SIR W. MEYER.—Do not some lack mountain guns, and some transport?

176. PRESIDENT.—When was the old Mobilization Committee first constituted? I would suggest that it was first constituted in 1887 with Sir Frederick Roberts, who at the time was Commander-in-Chief, as its President. Among its members were Sir George Chesney, Military Member of Council, Sir Edwin Collen, Secretary to Government in the Military Department, the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General and others, and the Secretary was a late Military Member of Council, Sir Edmond Elles. Do you remember what its scheme was? You are aware that it proposed the mobilization of five divisions—two for the northern line, two for the southern line and the fifth to reinforce either line as circumstances might dictate? Are you aware that at that time steps were taken to erect mobilization stores and provide all mobilization equipment for this force of five divisions? How did the number fall to four divisions?

177. SIR W. MEYER.—I said four taking the figure from the General Staff Memorandum; Sir Beauchamp Duff repeatedly talked of four divisions.

One more word about the Kitchener scheme. It was prepared in a great hurry, was it not?

178. COLONEL BINGLEY.—No, sir; with great deliberation. I may however add that as Lord Kitchener's tenure of office in India was limited, he naturally wished to see his scheme carried to completion before he left the country.

179. SIR W. MEYER.—Nevertheless the fact remains that it had not been nearly completed when he left?

180. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes, but he naturally thought that his scheme would be completed eventually, and did not anticipate the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Convention, or the financial stringency due to loss of opium revenue, etc.

181. SIR W. MEYER.—But is it not a fact that there were large lapses on the amounts that were granted for the carrying out of the scheme?

182. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes, but this was due in large measure to delays in getting things through. There was also the question of barracks; you cannot put troops into places until you have provided accommodation for them.

183. PRESIDENT.—Precisely, that is one of the things I had in my mind. The system of concentrating troops on the frontier is not popular amongst the men, is it? Down-country troops are not fond of Peshawar, I understand?

184. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I think the dislike of the down-country troops for frontier or up-country stations is now an exploded idea.

185. PRESIDENT.—I cannot see the advantage of massing troops on the frontier so long as the collection of transport with which to equip them is such a slow process.

186. COLONEL BINGLEY.—One advantage is that troops on the frontier are trained under local conditions; they become accustomed to the climate and the people, and have to look after their rifles, etc.

187. PRESIDENT.—If you adopt this principle, should not the regular army at Home be quartered and trained outside the United Kingdom?

188. COLONEL BINGLEY.—One of the functions of the army is to defend the United Kingdom itself.

189. PRESIDENT.—I do not think the argument conclusive, if regard is had to the practice prevailing elsewhere.

190. COLONEL BINGLEY.—The Indian army is recruited from so many classes that perhaps the need is more urgent here.

191. SIR W. MEYER.—One of the great objects of the Kitchener scheme was that the troops should be commanded in war by the Generals who commanded them in peace; could that have been carried out?

192. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes, I think so. At any rate in the case of divisions and infantry brigades.

193. PRESIDENT.—What is the period of tenure of the appointments of divisional and brigade commanders?

194. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Four years.

195. PRESIDENT.—As units may be away from the frontier for fifteen or twenty years, the advantage gained by putting troops there is only a very temporary one.

196. SIR W. MEYER.—Take the question of the command of internal defence troops, is it not possible that some of the Field Army commanders may be drawn off for the purpose?

197. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I do not think it likely. With reference to the question regarding concentration on the frontier, it has occurred to me to put the matter in another way. You cannot say there has been any special massing of troops on the frontier. The 1st and 4th Divisions have been partially completed with their troops, but so have several others.

198. PRESIDENT.—You refer to the system of divisional areas? A certain small area was taken for the Peshawar Division and it followed from that that you had to put more troops into that small area than were required for local purposes. Thus, for instance, considerable expense has been incurred in concentrating a brigade at Nowshera, and similarly at Quetta—troops that cannot move until they get their second line transport. Unless these troops are required to be so distributed for peace purposes, I cannot understand how the expenditure incurred can be regarded as reproductive from a military point of view.

199. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I suggest that every frontier has a greater density of troops.

200. SIR W. MEYER.—Sir Beauchamp Duff, before the Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1907, talked of making railways from

Peshawar to Kabul and from Quetta to Kandahar, and estimated a very rapid rate of construction, in some cases of about a mile a day. Would it not be a much more lengthy affair?

201. COLONEL BINGLEY.—The engineering difficulties would be very great. It would be quite impossible on the northern line, but on the southern line such a rate of construction is, in the opinion of experts, not unreasonable.

202. PRESIDENT.—As regards the southern line (I have been over it three times) are you aware that there are some heavy gradients between Quetta and Kandahar? Have you been to Chaman? There is a stiff *kotal* where we had a cavalry action during the first part of the Afghan War. Besides, there are several considerable streams to cross. How long do you think it would take to prolong the railway from Chaman to Kandahar?

203. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I could not say. The official estimate is, I believe, three months.

204. PRESIDENT.—Before we left Kandahar a careful railway survey was made by engineers of the line between Chaman and Kandahar. Are you aware whether the survey is in existence?

205. COLONEL BINGLEY.—It was destroyed by fire. There is no duplicate, but a fresh section of the line was afterwards compiled from field-book notes made at the time of the original survey. This section is now in the records of the Railway Board.

206. SIR W. MEYER.—Taking the case of possible hostility with Russia, I think the Kitchener scheme presupposed the rapid advance of Russia and assumed that we should have to race hard to get to Kabul first. Do you not think that estimate a little overdrawn?

207. COLONEL BINGLEY.—It is easier for the Russians to get to the foot of the Hindu Kush than for us to get there.

208. SIR W. MEYER.—Why was it thought that the Russians would rush for Kabul in this way instead of occupying Afghan-Turkistan and strengthening themselves there?

209. COLONEL BINGLEY.—They would have to occupy Afghan-Turkistan in any case. It is generally accepted, I think, that if you occupy an enemy's capital you strike a decisive blow at his power.

210. SIR W. MEYER.—It is not always so in oriental countries. Burma is an instance?

211. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes, but that was a case of dealing with a country step by step.

212. SIR W. MEYER.—Would it be necessary for us to race for Kabul in this rapid way lest the Russians should get there first?

213. COLONEL BINGLEY.—It would be a good thing to attempt.

214. PRESIDENT.—Take the case of South Africa. The war did not end with the occupation of Pretoria. You were speaking of a rapid advance to the base of the northern slope of the Hindu Kush, but that was not the point at issue, the point was as to their being able to get over the Hindu Kush. They could not get to Kabul without a long march.

215. COLONEL BINGLEY.—The construction of a railway to the foot of the Hindu Kush would enable them to feed their troops.

216. PRESIDENT.—The Russians have been contemplating the railway to Termez for thirty years.

217. COLONEL BINGLEY.—A Royal Engineer officer travelled in Central Asia last year and was given considerable facilities for seeing things. An officer of the Russian General Staff, who spoke freely, was detailed to accompany him. This officer tells me that the Termez extension is likely to be started soon. The reason is that the navigation of the Oxus is becoming more difficult.

218. SIR W. MEYER.—Some years ago a Russian officer, observing things in India, might have reported that we were pushing on railways to Parachinar, etc. Is it not possible that something may happen to delay the Russian lines?

219. COLONEL BINGLEY.—It is, of course, possible.

220. SIR W. MEYER.—Has Russia collected much material for the railway to the Oxus?

221. COLONEL BINGLEY.—We know that they have collected some, but I do not think a very large quantity has been collected.

222. SIR W. MEYER.—I suggest that without the railway to Termez the Russians are in a worse position than we are?

223. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I agree.

224. PRESIDENT.—Have we not railway material stored at Chaman?

225. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes; broad gauge and bridging material.

226. SIR P. LAKE.—If you are going to contemplate pushing on railways rapidly, a good deal depends upon having timber and material readily available. That would be difficult for us and also for the Russians. We might consult some engineering expert?

227. PRESIDENT.—Yes.

228. SIR W. MEYER.—In the event of our being engaged in war with Afghanistan with Russia neutral or friendly, do you think it would be necessary to push on to Kabul?

229. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I think it would be more than ever desirable to get there, or if not to Kabul, at any rate to Jalalabad.

230. SIR W. MEYER.—Some strategists hold it would better to occupy Kandahar?

231. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Kandahar is certainly more accessible, and perhaps it would be a better plan in certain circumstances.

232. SIR W. MEYER.—Would the tribes in that case be less irritated than if we struck at Kabul?

233. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I think it would probably cause less tribal irritation.

234. PRESIDENT.—If you were to advance beyond Jalalabad, is it not the case that the tribes would be placed in an awkward position? And in an advance to Kabul, do you not secure the advantage of controlling the tribes by getting in behind them?

235. COLONEL BINGLEY.—That is so.

236. SIR W. MEYER.—In the event of the Amir preaching a *jihad*, how far would he be able to raise a general combination of the tribes?

237. COLONEL BINGLEY.—His influence to that end would be very great. The tribes would probably follow him as their spiritual leader.

238. PRESIDENT.—Do you ever find that these tribesmen ignore their own interests in such a case or sacrifice them for the purposes of religion?

239. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I think the 1897 rising was a case in point.

240. SIR W. MEYER.—Was not the blaze largely due to the initial reverse in the Khyber?

241. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I would term it a contributory cause.

242. SIR W. MEYER.—You think that had the Khyber been held the war would have ensued nevertheless?

243. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes. The Turco-Greek War helped to fan the flame. The present war between Italy and Turkey may have the same effect. It is said to be the talk of all the bazars from north to south.

244. SIR W. MEYER.—Then the Muhammadan gets excited in either case; whether his co-religionists be successful or otherwise?

245. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Much more so in the latter case.

246. SIR W. MEYER.—Did you find that the defeats of the Turks in the Russian War of 1877-78 exercised any influence in India?

247. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I have not studied the matter. Of course news did not travel so fast in those days as it does now. Moreover, we were posing then as champions of Islam, at present we are not.

248. PRESIDENT.—Have we any reason to suppose that in the Indian army the feelings of loyalty and confidence in the strength, justice, and stability of the British Government have weakened?

249. COLONEL BINGLEY.—No, sir, I think that if you take the army as a whole you may safely say that there is no section of the Indian community that is more attached to Government. Undoubtedly various individuals have been influenced by sedition, but, taking it as a whole, the army is thoroughly loyal. The reason is, apart from matters like *esprit de corps*, etc., that the men are in constant touch with their British officers whose relations with them present an example of the best relations that you can have between European and native. If we could only have these relations throughout India, such a thing as disloyalty would be impossible. But one cannot ignore the fact that India is going through a period of change and that this affects the army. The army is drawn from the agricultural classes and the grievances of the latter affect the troops. When the soldier goes back to his village on furlough he comes into contact with the people and hears all they say. In this way any agitators who may get at the agricultural population indirectly get at the troops. The evil is mitigated to a certain extent by the fact that the men go back to their regiments and talk to their officers who are able to put things fairly right. But a certain amount of the poison may remain. An important point to bear in mind is that the soldier is a cultivator and that any agrarian disturbance affects him. I may quote, as an illustration, the discontent which was aroused over the rejected Punjab Canal Colonization Act of 1907. The agitators stirred up the civil population and the feeling of irritation against the Government extended to certain of the troops.

250. SIR W. MEYER.—What was the result of the Government's vetoing of the Act?

251. COLONEL BINGLEY.—The agitation calmed down, but I think the general opinion was that the Government had been frightened.

252. PRESIDENT.—At that time was the army disloyal?

253. COLONEL BINGLEY.—A good many regiments were, we may say, tainted. I know that the efforts of the agitators were directed towards tampering with the loyalty of the army and that they met with some measure of success.

254. SIR R. SCALLON.—Did it affect recruiting?

255. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes. It was a crusade against the Government and Government service, and the agitators persuaded many men to refuse to enlist. The spread of education among the fighting classes in India has had the effect of lowering the status of military service. For instance, one finds that many native officers now prefer that their sons should enter civil employment or become pleaders, etc., whereas formerly they encouraged them to enter the army.

256. SIR W. MEYER.—What do you mean by the term 'seditious'?

257. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Anti-British.

258. SIR W. MEYER.—Theoretically merely ?

259. COLONEL BINGLEY.—No, I think the agitators wish to have a greater voice in the management of their own affairs, and that a national spirit is being evolved among them.

260. SIR W. MEYER.—Is there anything seditious in that, as we understand “sedition” ?

261. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Their whole idea is “India for the Indians.” The more moderate of them say they hope India will enjoy the same degree of independence as our self-governing Dominions possess. It is a matter of opinion whether this is a reasonable aspiration.

262. SIR W. MEYER.—It does not follow because an individual would like the employment of Indians extended, that he is antagonistic to the British Raj ?

263. COLONEL BINGLEY.—It goes far beyond that. An examination of the writings and speeches of these political agitators discloses the fact that they have studied the methods of the French and Italian revolutionists. They incite the people to anarchy and violence and make invidious comparisons—comparing the British to the Mughals.

264. SIR W. MEYER.—When people use the term “seditious” do they not use it with a double meaning ? Thus, whilst one individual may be hostile to British rule altogether, another may simply want some parts of the existing system modified ?

265. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I think that we recognize in India a moderate party, but there are a great many people who get carried away by their enthusiasm and wish to see all their aspirations fulfilled. The whole underlying idea is provincial autonomy—the Punjab for the Sikhs, Bengal for the Bengalis, etc.

266. SIR W. MEYER.—You could have autonomy within British rule ?

267. COLONEL BINGLEY.—A study of the literature of the subject, and of the speeches of the agitators, does not lead to much hope of a tolerant spirit. Reformers are swept off their feet and become extremists. Moderate parties are not common in India. I do not think the army is subject to many of the influences which tend to make other people disloyal.

268. SIR W. MEYER.—Might it not have been said with equal good faith on the eve of the Mutiny that the army was loyal ?

269. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes, but the difference between the state of affairs now and at the time of the Mutiny is that every Commanding Officer was then persuaded that, although others might go wrong, his own men would be faithful. Commanding Officers are now kept informed of what is going on, and no longer run the risk of falling into a fool’s paradise as in 1857.

270. SIR W. MEYER.—The army is a mercenary force. Is it not possible that if it thought it could rule the country without an alien Government, it might try to get rid of the latter ?

271. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes.

272. SIR W. MEYER.—Is it not possible that there might be another temptation to put matters to the test, for example, the idea that perhaps the British soldier is not so superior to the Indian soldier as the latter had hitherto imagined ?

273. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I think it is possible.

274. SIR W. MEYER.—Was there any real or imaginary ground for that idea in the experience of 1897 ?

275. COLONEL BINGLEY.—There may have been, but on the whole I think the Indian sepoy has a great respect for the British soldier.

276. PRESIDENT.—In 1897 the superiority of the British soldier was exemplified rather than the reverse.

277. SIR W. MEYER.—In the General Staff “Appreciation of the external and internal situation in India” stress is laid on the fact that the armed police, on whom much reliance was placed under the Kitchener scheme, are now to be regarded as far less loyal than the army.* Is that your view too?

278. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I would like to modify it to this extent. There is no doubt that during the last three or four years the police have been put to extreme tests and that they have emerged from the ordeal very creditably.

279. SIR W. MEYER.—There is a distinction between the armed and the ordinary watch and ward constable?

280. COLONEL BINGLEY.—There is of course a difference in equipment, but I think they are all trained in the same way. In any case the policeman cannot be compared with the soldier. The only dangerous element in the police would be those who happened to be armed at the time.

281. SIR W. MEYER.—The General Staff Appreciation lays stress on the untrustworthiness of the police;* would it be correct to assume that this idea was based on a communication from the Punjab Government? Another reference to what appears to be the same communication is to be found in a note by Sir Malcolm Grover. The two, that is the General Staff Appreciation and General Grover’s note, do not appear to agree.

282. COLONEL BINGLEY.—The wording of the General Staff Appreciation on this point does not, perhaps, put the matter in quite the right light. Lord Kitchener, when drawing up his scheme for the redistribution of the army, reckoned on a large number of police being available to assist the regular troops in maintaining internal security. Then, later, Sir Louis Dane, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, suggested that to place reliance on the police for this purpose would be to place reliance on a broken reed.

283. PRESIDENT.—Why was not the scheme revised at once? No revision was proposed nor was any communication addressed to local Governments until the beginning of this year. Yet on the authority of Sir Louis Dane, say about 1908, an important inference was drawn by the General Staff which appears to have been ignored until February 1912. The Committee would like to know what argument led to the conclusion regarding the police recorded in the General Staff Appreciation.

What arrangements exist for obtaining information regarding the spread of sedition, firstly in India generally and secondly in the army? How far do the civil and military authorities co-operate in giving effect to these arrangements?

284. COLONEL BINGLEY.—The police in each province have a criminal investigation section and it is their duty to make enquiries about sedition locally. They report to the Criminal Intelligence Department at Simla. The latter co-ordinates the information thus received, and also employs its own secret agents whom it maintains for the purpose of making special enquiries. These agents are highly paid men. They are very often, whilst working down in the provinces, shadowed by the local police who imagine them to be agitators.

A special section of the General Staff at Army Headquarters deals with all information received regarding sedition. Major Jackson, who is in charge of this section, goes every week to the Criminal Intelligence Department and looks through their files and brings back notes of the information he collects. Every month the special section prepares two summaries; one is a secret summary for the special information of General Officers Commanding, the other contains extracts from the summary of native press items, and is sent to Commanding Officers in order that they may be kept informed of what is going on. In addition to this work, Major Jackson has, for the last two years, gone to every division in India and lectured to officers on the aims and objects of the Arya Samaj

* This opinion was subsequently modified. *Vide* revised “Appreciation of the external and internal situation in India” by the General Staff, which forms an Appendix to the Committee’s Report.

and other organizations, their motives and methods, etc., and has warned Commanding Officers as to what they should be careful about. In this way a great deal of knowledge has been circulated. Furthermore, in order to correct the false impressions which are disseminated amongst sepoys through the medium of the native Press, Lord Kitchener started a paper, the object of which is to inculcate sound ideas regarding current questions among the native troops. The paper (the *Fauji Akbar*) has now a circulation of over 6,000 copies a week and is being read not only in the army but also by the outside public. I should add that last year His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief introduced a system of tours for senior officers of Indian regiments, who are thus given opportunities of learning about the men of whom their units are composed.

285. SIR W. MEYER.—Who write the articles in the paper ?

286. COLONEL BINGLEY.—The editor and occasional native contributors. I have written a few.

287. SIR W. MEYER.—I suggest that, considering the nature of the information they receive, and the sources from which it is derived, the police are liable to take sombre views ?

288. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes, but you have got to rely on them for information.

289. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you take their statements for what they are worth ?

290. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes. The Criminal Intelligence Department also discounts much of the information it receives. We get the weekly police abstract published by local Governments, and although one may not believe implicitly all that is stated therein, it gives one a line to follow. For instance, if information is received of the opening of a branch of the Arya Samaj at any place, it is passed on to Commanding Officers of units quartered in that locality, who, if they feel that some of their men have leanings that way, are thus enabled to anticipate mischief.

291. MAJOR JACKSON.—In any case of doubt I go over to the Criminal Intelligence Department, who can form a very accurate estimate of the degree of reliability that can be placed upon any piece of information.

292. SIR W. MEYER.—When Major Jackson goes round lecturing, does he put himself into communication with Deputy Commissioners and Collectors ?

293. MAJOR JACKSON.—General Officers Commanding invite civil officers to the lectures and the Criminal Intelligence Department invites police officers.

294. SIR W. MEYER.—I suggest that it would be better to go round beforehand and let the Deputy Commissioners and District Superintendents of Police know what was going to be said ?

295. MAJOR JACKSON.—That would entail delay.

296. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you take any steps, Major Jackson, to make the acquaintance of seditionists ?

297. MAJOR JACKSON.—I do not do so officially.

298. SIR W. MEYER.—Would it not be a good thing to do so ?

299. MAJOR JACKSON.—I lay myself out to get information from any native with whom I come into contact. As I do not travel as an official making enquiries, I find that I can pick up a good deal of information.

300. PRESIDENT.—Will natives speak to you freely ?

301. MAJOR JACKSON.—Yes, sir, they look upon military officers as having nothing to do with police work.

302. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing you had had a similar organization in years gone by, would you not have discovered unsatisfactory tendencies in like measure then ?

303. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Quite likely.

304. SIR W. MEYER.—To some extent are not the circumstances now brought to notice due to the fact that the Press is better organized ? You and your officers are on the look out for things ?

305. COLONEL BINGLEY.—There is overwhelming evidence to show that in the Deccan, the Punjab, and Bengal there is a distinct nationalist movement directed against British rule. Take that Punjab leaflet which compared the lot of British and Indian soldiers, pointing out how the former lived in palatial barracks while the latter lived in tumble-down huts ; how very inferior the rations and pay of the natives were when compared with those enjoyed by British soldiers, and asked the native soldiers how they could allow themselves to be slaves to the alien. This leaflet was circulated to regiments. I only quote it as an instance. The conciliatory action of Government and the King's visit have had a good effect, but the change due to these cannot be regarded as permanent.

306. PRESIDENT.—You make considerable mention of the seditious newspapers ; but are you aware that in Lord Lytton's time these papers were so violent that a Press Act was passed ?

307. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes, sir ; but that Press Act was repealed.

308. SIR W. MEYER.—You are not prepared to say then that the state of affairs now is not so bad as in 1907 ?

309. COLONEL BINGLEY.—No, I am not prepared to say that, but I would say things have changed. The seditionists are adopting new methods. The spread of education is naturally increasing the aspirations of the people ; and the seditionists, adjusting their tactics to circumstances, are still pursuing the same object, but in a less conspicuous way.

310. SIR W. MEYER.—Had you experience of the state of things in 1897 ?

311. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes, I was in India.

312. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you say that the state of things in 1912, as regards present dangers, is worse ?

313. COLONEL BINGLEY.—In 1897 the trouble was more or less confined to the Deccan ; it is more widespread now.

314. SIR W. MEYER.—In 1903 when Lord Kitchener held that the sky was clear, had he not before him the experience of 1897 ?

315. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I do not think he ever held that the sky was clear ; at any rate, he realized that it might at any moment become overcast.

316. SIR W. MEYER.—Your position in short is that circumstances have changed so much during the last few years that Lord Kitchener's scheme requires revising ?

317. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I think it wants revising in certain details, and I think Lord Kitchener would be the first to recognize the fact.

318. SIR W. MEYER.—Lord Kitchener was here in 1907 ; did he then see cause to modify his plans ?

319. COLONEL BINGLEY.—His idea was that an organization which would be suitable for an advance across the frontier would be equally useful for internal defence. I think there is a wrong impression about the internal defence scheme. The Kitchener scheme contemplated nine divisions as a maximum effort.

320. SIR W. MEYER.—Did Lord Kitchener warn the authorities that he might not be able to act up to that maximum ?

321. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I cannot say whether he wrote any minute or letter to that effect, but he recognized that a considerable change had taken place in the situation. It was in a great measure due to his representations that strong measures were taken in the Punjab. In the event of our having to cross the frontier now we should probably have to reconsider how many divisions we should send forward and how many we should keep back. It is possible we might have to keep more back than was contemplated under Lord Kitchener's scheme. We have always been given to understand that in the event of a serious war India might have to hold her own for one year, and of course Lord Kitchener's scheme was based on that idea.

322. SIR W. MEYER.—I gather that, if in 1907 such a contingency had arisen, Lord Kitchener could not have put his nine divisions into the field ?

323. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Of course the nine divisions could not have been put into the field straight away.

324. SIR W. MEYER.—What is your opinion, Major Jackson, as to unrest now as compared with what it was in 1907 ?

325. MAJOR JACKSON.—We realize that we have had unrest in India and in the army before. The pendulum has swung backwards and forwards. Some movements have been spontaneous. The methods of the agitators in 1907 alarmed the Government to such an extent that the agitators were put away. They now cloak their methods under the guise of social progress and using all sorts of societies as stalking horses, try to get at the troops. These methods are probably just as efficacious as more direct methods, and, moreover, they add to the difficulty of getting hold of the agitators and convicting them of their crimes. As an instance, I may mention that in Poona a movement was started some time ago for the ostensible purpose of saving the people from drink. Agents were sent all over the country to preach, but instead of preaching temperance they told the people that the Indian Government was trying to bring about their degeneration, and that drink was the instrument wherewith they hoped to fulfil their fell design. The thing more or less fizzled out, but the police had to protect the liquor license holders, a fact which gave colour to the statements of the "temperance" missionaries. I may add that the anti-kine-killing propaganda has also a political object.

326. PRESIDENT.—I suggest that the common sense of the people will finally assert itself ?

327. MAJOR JACKSON.—The people are now prejudiced and suspicious.

328. SIR W. MEYER.—Is not the excise revenue of India constantly increasing ?

329. MAJOR JACKSON.—It is.

330. SIR W. MEYER.—In spite of the taxes, the people drink, therefore it seems that the preaching of the agitators has not had much effect ? Have you any information as to who the leaders are ?

331. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes, in every case.

332. PRESIDENT.—Is not the danger of combination against British rule largely counteracted by the rivalries and religious differences of the various classes ?

333. COLONEL BINGLEY.—It is, undoubtedly. But the factor that comes out strong is that, although the classes are divided, they are always ready to unite whenever it is a case of European *versus* Indian. The first case that occurs to me is that of the behaviour of the Gaikwar at Delhi. The whole native Press was full of it. Many of the Muhammadan papers expressed great sympathy with him, in spite of his being a Hindu.

334. PRESIDENT.—Is there any "innate antipathy" between Asiatics and Europeans ? When the British lived in closer contact with the people they were on very friendly terms with each other. The adventurers who came out were very good friends with the natives.

335. COLONEL BINGLEY.—These were individual friendships. If one reads the native papers, one cannot fail to find evidence of antipathy on the side of the natives.

336. PRESIDENT.—It appears doubtful whether the feeling can last, in view of the racial differences of the various classes?

337. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I certainly think that these differences do greatly assist British rule, but there are other influences at work against us.

338. PRESIDENT.—Is there any evidence to show that the Turco-Italian War has had any effect on Indian Muhammadans?

339. COLONEL BINGLEY.—It is exciting them very much. They are subscribing money for the help of the Turkish wounded. There is a paper called the *Zamindar*, published in Lahore, which is gaining a large circulation by its sensational war news, and is lashing up Muhammadan feeling to a great extent.

340. SIR W. MEYER.—Do Hindus take an interest in the war?

341. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Some sympathize with the Muhammadans; others laugh at them and say "You support the British Government, this is the result; they are not supporting your co-religionists".

342. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you any evidence that the feeling is spreading to Muhammadans in the army?

343. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes, I recently met a native officer belonging to one of the regiments of the Frontier Force, he had been reading the *Zamindar* and had accepted every word in it as absolute truth. He said that he did not understand how England could allow the Muhammadans to be baited in the way they were. He told me of the atrocities that the Italians were supposed to have committed on Arab women. He spoke of the effect this has had in the bazars and on the men.

344. SIR W. MEYER.—The inference to be drawn is that the Muhammadans are more dangerous than the Hindus; for they may be swayed by a series of circumstances outside India about which we might be powerless?

345. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes.

346. PRESIDENT.—Apart from the question of religious fanaticism, the Muhammadan is a loyal person.

347. SIR W. MEYER.—Would the Muhammadans go against us in the event of a general rising?

348. COLONEL BINGLEY.—It is difficult to say. I think that in such a case they would not go against us. Muhammadan sentiment would be against the Sikhs and Hindus.

349. SIR W. MEYER.—In what circumstances, Major Jackson, do you consider we should have to fear a movement against us by both Muhammadans and Hindus?

350. MAJOR JACKSON.—Although Muhammadans and Hindus are at variance, both from religious and political standpoints, the Muhammadan regards himself as an "Indian", and thus has common ground to stand upon with the Hindu. *Vis-à-vis* British supremacy, both Hindus and Muhammadans regard themselves as "Indian", and circumstances may at any time appeal to common instincts, or give rise to the same fears or antipathies, so as to cause all diversities to be, for a time, forgotten. On most public questions Indians range themselves against the British.

Again on religious grounds, Hinduism and Islam have a common rival in Christianity, and indeed a more dangerous rival than either Hinduism to Islam, or Islam to Hinduism. Past history shows clearly that, on common religious antipathies and apprehensions, Hindus and Muhammadans will readily unite. The annulment of the partition of Bengal, in which the Muhammadans imagined that their interests had been sacrificed to appease Hindu agitation,

had as one of its results, a serious proposal that Muhammadans should join the Hindus (for whose benefit their interests had been sacrificed) in order to carry on the agitation against the British Government. This proposal emanated from some of the Muhammadan leaders, and the idea was warmly welcomed by the Hindus.

There is also the possibility of Government interfering injudiciously in Hindu-Muhammadan riots.

351. SIR W. MEYER.—That would be of a purely local nature.

352. PRESIDENT.—Is there any evidence to shew whether the Sikhs have so far succumbed to the teachings of political agitators as to render them unworthy of implicit trust?

353. COLONEL BINGLEY.—It is a very hard question to answer. To bring forward definite evidence is very difficult, but undoubtedly there are movements among the Sikhs which are weakening their loyalty to the British Raj, and one is this development of a national policy which aims at the Punjab for the Sikhs and the restoration of the Sikh nationality as it was in the days of Ranjit Singh. The idea has been to some extent strengthened by the pronouncement of the Government of India about provincial autonomy. From a military point of view the Sikhs are suffering from "swelled head". They have an idea that the Empire depends upon them.

354. SIR W. MEYER.—Is it a wise policy to enlist so many Sikhs? Ought we to restrict their numbers in the army?

355. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I think we ought to restrict their numbers, and it could be done without offending their susceptibilities in any way. At present we cannot get enough Sikh recruits; the ravages of plague have reduced the number of women, and the men have great difficulty in finding wives. This has reduced the birthrate. Later on the number of lads fit for enlistment will be insufficient for our requirements.

356. SIR W. MEYER.—Do I understand your point to be that we could reduce the number of Sikhs by saying we cannot recruit sufficiently from them?

357. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes. I may say that some of the Punjab regiments have themselves suggested it.

358. SIR W. MEYER.—When you take Sikh recruits now, do you make enquiries as to their connection with the Tat Khalsa?

359. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I think you might get no recruits at all if you made too many enquiries on this point.

360. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing it was considered desirable to reduce the Sikhs in the army, where would you begin?

361. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I would suggest beginning with class regiments.

362. PRESIDENT.—I think that might result in the creation of ill-feeling, as these regiments have great traditions.

363. COLONEL BINGLEY.—This is a matter upon which the Adjutant-General might be consulted.

364. PRESIDENT.—Is there any evidence that the Arya Samaj, Tat Khalsa, the Chitpavan Brahmans, or other agencies have made attempts to tamper with the loyalty of the troops? How far are the leaders of these organizations connected with any seditious propaganda?

365. MAJOR JACKSON.—There is abundant evidence.

366. SIR R. SCALLON.—Have they affected the value of the sepoy to the Indian Government?

367. MAJOR JACKSON.—Not yet, thanks to the influence of the British officer.

368. COLONEL BINGLEY.—About the Arya Samaj, we think that the nature of its activities is exemplified by its propaganda among the Jats. The Jats have always been regarded as socially inferior to the Rajputs. The Arya Samaj tells them they are just as good. It also appeals to them as agriculturists and asks them to join the anti-kine-killing agitation. By these and kindred means they get hold of a class and then indoctrinate them with their political views.

The propaganda of the Arya Samaj is not so successful in the Deccan, and its influence there is not so great. The Poona Brahmans would join hands with its supporters, however, on the point of nationalism or anti-kine-killing. I am absolutely convinced that the Arya Samaj is a seditious society. The men of influence who direct its policy are anti-British. The degree of this spirit varies and no doubt some are more active than others.

369. SIR R. SCALLON.—In the Punjab have the Muhammadans shown any resentment in regard to the feeling amongst the Sikhs?

370. COLONEL BINGLEY.—The liability of riots between Muhammadans and Hindus and between Arya Samajists and Sikhs has very much increased.

371. PRESIDENT.—But their disagreement is not altogether to be regretted.

372. SIR W. MEYER.—With regard to the Imperial Service Troops, if they constitute a serious danger, why should they be allowed to remain? Have any representations been made to reduce them?

373. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I cannot say. I would suggest a reference on the subject to the Inspector-General, Imperial Service Troops.

374. PRESIDENT.—Upon what information are the figures shewing the recent increase in the Russian regular army based?

375. COLONEL BINGLEY.—The paper dealing with this question is being printed, but we got the figures as a matter of fact from Home. We also got figures from French journals, etc. What has happened is that the Russians have increased the number of their army corps by six. These are so located that they can be moved to any quarter. I do not think that these changes are specially directed against India. I think it is only the growth of the Russian military system; they have got to keep pace with the improvements in the armies of their European neighbours.

376. SIR W. MEYER.—You have commanded a Rajput regiment, Colonel Bingley?

377. COLONEL BINGLEY.—Yes.

378. SIR W. MEYER.—We wanted to know whether the number of Rajputs in the army might be raised. From a reply we received from the Army Department, it would appear that the limit of numbers had been reached in the case of Rajputs from Rajputana. Do you think it would be possible to raise more Rajputs in Oudh—men of character?

379. COLONEL BINGLEY.—I do. When my regiment was at Ahmadabad, a long way from Oudh, I used to get numbers of *umedwars* who wanted to join. I was even able to form a squad of "waiting men" without pay. I fancy from three to six thousand additional men might be recruited. Brahmans too could be increased. These latter would do better in class regiments. You must have whole regiments, as they have a baneful influence on other companies in mixed regiments.

(The witnesses then withdrew.)

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

8th Meeting—Friday, the 7th June 1912.

The Hon. Major-General Sir Malcolm H. S. Grover, K.C.I.E., C.B., Indian Army, Secretary to the Government of India in the Army Department, attended as a witness and was examined.

EVIDENCE OF MAJOR-GENERAL SIR MALCOLM GROVER.

380. PRESIDENT.—General Duff before the Mowatt Committee in 1907 said, that save in the case of the Peshawar Division the Kitchener scheme would make every divisional area self-contained. It appears however from Appendix VIII of the General Staff Memorandum of the 14th July 1911, that practically every one of the nine divisions requires to get a portion of its war or internal defence troops, or both, from outside the divisional area, and the chief defects in this respect are summarized in Part II, paragraph 18 (pages 12-13) of the Memorandum.

- (i) How far is this state of things due to Lord Kitchener's own abandonment or postponement of his original Redistribution Scheme, and how far to subsequent policy?
- (ii) Generally speaking, is it intended to push on, as funds permit, with the self-contained divisional scheme or to give it up as Utopian?
- (iii) The changes in distribution suggested in Appendix VIII of the Memorandum appear to be as follows:—
 - (a) A battalion of Indian infantry, withdrawn from Burma, is to go to Belgaum displacing a pioneer battalion to go to Nowshera, which in turn displaces a battalion of Indian infantry to go to Peshawar where lines would be necessary.
 - (b) A battalion from Burma to go to Takdah (near Darjeeling) where lines would have to be provided.
 - (c) An Indian mountain battery from Burma to go to Quetta, displacing a British mountain battery which would go to Ahmadnagar, where new lines would be wanted.
 - (d) A British mountain battery to go from Murree Hills to Ahmadnagar, requiring new lines.
 - (e) A regiment of Indian cavalry to go from Jacobabad to Lucknow, requiring new lines.
 - (f) A company of sappers and miners to go from Kirkee to Jhansi and a company from Roorkee to Lucknow; lines would again be required.

How far would such changes be calculated to save recurring expenditure?

381. SIR M. GROVER.—I am afraid I cannot answer this question. As regards (i), we are still working on the idea of making each divisional area self-contained.

382. SIR W. MEYER.—Could you suggest somebody who knows the past history and could answer it?

383. SIR M. GROVER.—I would suggest the Chief of the General Staff. With reference to (ii), it is intended to push on with the scheme.

384. SIR W. MEYER.—Gradually?

385. SIR M. GROVER.—Yes, very gradually. We have one or two of the proposals in hand now. The sapper corps are being distributed to divisional

areas; we are also bringing a pioneer battalion into the 1st Division, and so on. Of course, these changes will only be carried out as funds permit.

386. PRESIDENT.—Is it still proposed to move British cavalry from Rawalpindi to Risalpur?

387. SIR M. GROVER.—That still holds good.

388. PRESIDENT.—Would you personally be in favour of that; you commanded the cavalry brigade at Nowshera?

389. SIR M. GROVER.—I am not in favour of it, but that is only my personal view. With reference to (iii), the only recurring expenditure that will be saved, as far as I can judge without papers, is that due to the local allowances in the case of the units from Burma.

390. PRESIDENT.—I understand that new barracks for a second British infantry battalion were constructed at Ahmadnagar where, owing to a modification in the original scheme, this extra accommodation is no longer required. In order, however, to utilize the new barracks, you moved the existing British infantry battalion into them, and in order to make use of the old vacated barracks you are going to move two British mountain batteries into them?

391. SIR R. SCALLON.—Are these moves part of Lord Kitchener's scheme, or are they some proposals made since Lord Kitchener left the country?

392. SIR M. GROVER.—They are practically all new; “(f)” on prepage is the only one that is not.

393. SIR W. MEYER.—I think I am correct in saying that these proposals are to be allowed to stand over until the present Committee has presented its report?

394. SIR M. GROVER.—Generally speaking, they are; the question of moving the sapper and miner companies is, however, going on to the Secretary of State.

395. PRESIDENT.—Lord Morley in paragraph 14 (2) of his Despatch No. 50 (Secret) of the 20th March 1908,* asked whether rigid adherence to Lord Kitchener's scheme of divisional areas was necessary; the Government of India in paragraph 9 of their reply said that it was necessary. Do you adhere to this?

* Not reproduced.

396. SIR M. GROVER.—Beyond accepting the view taken by the Government of India I have not personally thought about the question very much. It seems desirable to work up to the scheme. There is one exception, but it comes into a later question with reference to the Peshawar Division and the Kohat Brigade. Q. 527.

397. PRESIDENT.—General Duff in his evidence before the Mowatt Committee laid stress on the chaos that would arise from the non-fulfilment of the self-contained scheme owing to consequent transfer of mobilization arrangements from the divisional Generals to Army Headquarters. Do you concur in this? Is it always possible in a minor expedition to provide the troops entirely from the nearest division?

398. SIR M. GROVER.—It often happens that Army Headquarters must necessarily intervene even in minor expeditions.

399. PRESIDENT.—You were at the Headquarters of the Punjab Command during the 1897-98 disturbances; was there chaos, or did things work satisfactorily?

400. SIR M. GROVER.—I think matters worked well in spite of the mobilization scheme not being adhered to; of course it was impossible to adhere to it.

401. PRESIDENT.—The arrangements for moving the troops in 1897-98 were made at Army Headquarters. Under present arrangements does the divisional General prepare tables of railway movement or do Army Headquarters?

402. SIR M. GROVER.—Army Headquarters.

403. PRESIDENT.—Therefore all this work must be done by Army Headquarters.

404. SIR P. LAKE.—Do you say that Army Headquarters do movements on mobilization or concentration movements? Concentration movements are prepared by Army Headquarters, but I have a strong idea that movements on mobilization are done by divisions.

405. PRESIDENT.—You say that you have grouped your brigades so symmetrically that they are close to each other so far as is possible within the divisional area. You also say that there are certain battalions which have to come from other divisional areas; are these latter to move under orders from Army Headquarters, or are the two Generals concerned to make the necessary arrangements in communication with each other? If they make them, will not that absolutely dislocate the whole plan of concentration? If it is not done by Army Headquarters, I suggest that the whole plan of movement is liable to be wrecked. Irrespective of the methods adopted, however, we find that, with regard to the question asked, Sir Malcolm Grover does not concur in the view of Sir Beauchamp Duff.

How far do you consider that the circumstances stated in paragraph 4 of your note of the 7th August 1911 as taken into account in 1904, *viz.*, the improved condition of our civil administration, increased facilities for rapid communication and the decreasing power of Native States, require modification at the present date with reference to internal defence?

406. SIR M. GROVER.—I should not modify them at all, they still affect it and they must continue to affect it.

407. SIR W. MEYER.—The point put forward is that the situation is considered to have deteriorated. Would you say that the situation is roughly very much the same as it was stated to be by Lord Kitchener in 1903?

408. SIR M. GROVER.—Yes, very much the same.

409. PRESIDENT.—The General Staff Appreciation of the 11th June 1912 (paragraph 44) lays stress on the change in the internal situation between 1904 and 1912. But—

(a) was the sky quite clear at the earlier date? Had we not had experience of seditious tendencies in 1897-98, for instance, and of attempts by the Poona Brahmans to tamper with the troops?

(b) are not the alleged seditious agencies such as the Chitpavans, Arya Samajists, Tat Khalsaists, etc., largely hostile to each other?

(c) is there more likelihood now than there was in 1904 of Hindus and Muhammadans making common cause? Is the Muhammadan peril not perhaps greater than the Hindu?

(d) was not Pan-Islamic feeling, which has been alleged to be a danger, also experienced in 1897, *e.g.*, by the influence of the Turco-Greek War on the tribesmen? Do the Muhammadans take any account of Morocco?

(e) may it not be that the greater force of seditious tendencies now alleged arises from a more careful watching of these?

410. SIR M. GROVER.—(a) There were attempts of that kind in 1897-98, but they were not very widespread so far as I have been able to find out.

(b) Yes, so far as I am aware, it is so.

(c) I do not think I could possibly give an opinion on this point.

(d) I think the Muhammadans always take great interest in all Muhammadan questions. They are certainly interested in the Turkish war in Tripoli.

411. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you say that the reverberations from the Muhammadan world outside are more serious now than they were in 1897?

412. SIR M. GROVER.—I think that they probably are. With regard to (e) above, we know more about these things nowadays.

413. PRESIDENT.—Do you anticipate danger from any particular class of the native army—Sikhs, Jats or Pathans, for instance?

414. SIR M. GROVER.—No, sir; not under normal conditions. But if you leave the Sikhs alone without work they might intrigue.

415. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think that the fact that the Japanese beat the Russians has led native troops to think that they could give a good account of themselves against us?

416. SIR M. GROVER.—I could not say, but I should imagine it has had some influence amongst the troops because it has had an influence on the country generally.

417. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that there is risk in the policy of reducing the recruitment of the army from inferior fighting races, *e.g.*, Madrasis, and adding to the strength of the martial races?

418. SIR M. GROVER.—I think that there is a danger.

419. PRESIDENT.—Would you include in that, recruiting them from one particular area? You think, if possible, they should be got from other areas if good fighting material is available, but you would not be in favour of taking men who could not fight at all?

420. SIR M. GROVER.—Quite so, sir. Moplahs would be no good as a balancing power. The Rajput might be considered as counterbalancing the Sikh as a fighting man.

421. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that the local troops of the Native States are more formidable now than in 1904? And do you concur in the remarks of the General Staff Appreciation of the 11th June 1912 (paragraphs 61 and 106) as to danger to be apprehended from the forces of the Phulkian and Maratha States?

422. SIR M. GROVER.—I think they are more formidable now than in 1904. They have improved in general efficiency; as regards armament, I cannot say, but I think they have improved in that respect also.

423. PRESIDENT.—Do you concur in the similar remarks on Imperial Service Troops or with the further observations about those in paragraph 138 (g) of the Appreciation? Do you think, speaking generally, that the Imperial Service Troops are a source of safety to us or the reverse?

424. SIR M. GROVER.—They are more formidable than they were.

425. PRESIDENT.—You remember of course the grounds on which the Imperial Service Troops were originally raised? You think that it would be extremely difficult to go back now?

426. SIR M. GROVER.—I think it would be impossible.

427. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think that in certain cases, as, for instance, in the Phulkian States, they might be dangerous?

428. SIR M. GROVER.—Yes, though not in ordinary times.

429. SIR W. MEYER.—Suppose a ferment among the Sikh population?

430. SIR M. GROVER.—They would add very much to the power of trouble but we should of course take them on.

431. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that, all things considered, a British soldier may still be reckoned as equal to two-and-a-half native soldiers? In fixing the ratio, what factors besides the native army itself should be taken in?

432. SIR M. GROVER.—I think the ratio, taking into account the Imperial Service Troops, military police, armed police, and in certain cases, reservists, still holds good.

433. SIR P. LAKE.—Can you give us the history of how the two-and-a-half to one proportion was arrived at?

434. PRESIDENT.—It was arrived at in 1859 by the Peel Commission.

435. SIR W. MEYER.—You speak of civil police armed with rifles, but their rifles are bored out; would you call them formidable riflemen?

436. SIR M. GROVER.—They always are considered when questions of their armament come up and, as a rule, objection is made to giving them more firearms than they have got.

437. SIR W. MEYER.—As regards the first part of the question, you will remember that when the Peel Commission fixed the ratio of British to native soldiers the armament of native troops was distinctly inferior to that of the British troops; they are now level?

438. SIR M. GROVER.—That was considered on the last occasion the question was discussed.

439. SIR R. SCALLON.—There is also the increase in the number of volunteers to be taken into account?

440. SIR M. GROVER.—These we counted as British troops on their paper value.

441. PRESIDENT.—Should any encouragement be given to Native States to arm their local troops with modern weapons of precision?

442. SIR M. GROVER.—No, I would not recommend that.

443. PRESIDENT.—The General Staff Appreciation of the 11th June 1912 depreciates the loyalty of the armed police as compared with that of the native army, and doubts whether in time of trouble any large number would remain loyal even if supported by regular troops. But in paragraph 15 of your note of the 7th August 1911, you quote the Punjab Government as stating that the police would do the security work hitherto allotted to them, so long as the army remained steady, but that their fidelity would be doubtful in the event of wide-spread disaffection among the native troops. Do you know of any evidence for the much stronger position taken up by the General Staff and did any other local Government express similar views? Is it at all likely that the police would be foremost in starting a rebellious movement?

444. SIR M. GROVER.—I do not know why the General Staff took up the stronger position. The only paper we had was the one from the Punjab Government alluded to in my note.

445. SIR W. MEYER.—The Punjab Government wrote that letter on the annual statement you send them shewing the distribution of troops and Volunteers and calling for remarks? They made that a peg on which to hang their remarks?

446. SIR M. GROVER.—I only remember that one letter, but I have not got the Proceedings.

447. PRESIDENT.—You state that prior to Lord Kitchener's arrival in India, the Field Army consisted of only four divisions; was it not really six, and was not this rather the amount that could be at once utilized leaving other troops to follow as circumstances permitted? Could you utilize nine divisions at once now? How long would it take to send them into the field fully equipped and with requisite transport, etc., even allowing for the deficiency of troops (as in the case of the 15th Brigade of the Mhow Division) being supplemented by Imperial Service Troops?

[The President here read from the Proceedings of the Military Department of October 1892 what Sir P. Palmer had said regarding the need for an increase in British troops to complete the proportion then deemed necessary for six divisions, and also the view he expressed that he would prefer an increase that would provide for eight divisions.]

It would appear from what I have read that the scheme was for six divisions?

448. SIR M. GROVER.—Yes, the actual numbers of the troops also indicate that. With regard to the second part of the question, if the full number of transport animals registered is provided, I have ascertained that we could equip our divisions thus :—five divisions in two months, and two more divisions in another month, the remaining division not being required until after the third month.

449. PRESIDENT.—You could not begin to cross the frontier with any considerable force for two months ?

450. SIR M. GROVER.—You could cross with one or two.

451. SIR W. MEYER.—How long would it take to send the last two across ?

452. SIR M. GROVER.—I could not say, but it would not be till after the third month.

453. PRESIDENT.—Can you not move up troops to the front, even if you have not fully self-contained divisions, before the second-line transport required is collected or available ?

454. SIR M. GROVER.—Yes, but it seems undesirable to do so.

455. PRESIDENT.—The point is, what is the good of collecting a large number of troops in proximity to the frontier, for example at Peshawar and Quetta and in their vicinity, if the collection of second-line transport will take so long that you could easily have moved up troops from other places in time as we did in 1897-98. That is to say, is not the collection of second-line transport a vital factor in every scheme of mobilization ?

456. SIR M. GROVER.—I should like to think it out before saying anything definite, but it seems to me that the transport would have to be moved in.

457. PRESIDENT.—Then we should have to find out in what time the second-line transport of the 1st and 4th Divisions would be available ?

458. SIR M. GROVER.—I think that could be worked out.

459. PRESIDENT.—Do you assume that the registration scheme will work satisfactorily ?

460. SIR M. GROVER.—I think so ; if it does not work up to full numbers, it will, at any rate, work up to something better than we have ever had before.

461. PRESIDENT.—Are there not at present, again, some brigades without separate commanders, *e.g.*, the 3rd Brigade of the Peshawar Division, and what arrangements have been thought out for the command of the internal defence troops when a division takes the field ? If commanders are to be supplied from the present Brigadiers, would not the Kitchener idea of having troops led into the field by the Generals who have command of them in peace fall through ? Apart from this, does not the limited tenure of commands and the reliefs of units make it necessary that troops should often be led into the field by Generals who have commanded them for a very short time previously ?

462. SIR M. GROVER.—The 4th and 5th Cavalry Brigades and the 3rd, 15th and 26th Infantry Brigades, have no commanders in peace. A commander for the 3rd Infantry Brigade is nominated annually to take charge of it during manœuvres, the selection being made from the probable commanders. In the case of the 4th, 6th and 8th Divisional Areas, the officers commanding the fort defences would also command the divisional areas. In the case of the other divisional areas the commanders would be appointed at the time either from among those available or from units allotted to internal defence. Brigadiers of Field Army brigades would not be taken away from their brigades. Certain staff officers of the peace Headquarters are selected beforehand to become administrative staff officers of the divisional area in time of war. The limited tenure of commands and the reliefs of units necessitate troops being at times led into the field by Generals who have commanded them for a short period, but it would be difficult to avoid this.

463. PRESIDENT.—Did not the Redistribution Scheme presuppose the Secretary of State's sanction in matters in regard to which his concurrence was open to doubt and was eventually not given; *e.g.*, the proposed cantonments at Torsappar and Baleli (or Mastung)? Did not experience shew that in other matters also the original scheme had been too hurriedly put together with the result that it had to be departed from often, and in some cases, after unnecessary expenditure had been incurred?

464. SIR M. GROVER.—With regard to the first portion of the question my answer is in the affirmative; as regards the second portion, I think the original scheme was put forward as a complete proposal; where it was not accepted it had to be modified. In one or two cases there has been expenditure.

465. SIR W. MEYER.—Can you give any specific case in which a measure had been put forward and begun, and eventually given up?

466. SIR M. GROVER.—The cavalry brigade at Baleli was one, but it was not really begun.

467. PRESIDENT.—Have you ever been to Torsappar?

468. SIR M. GROVER.—No, sir; but I know what the country is like.

469. PRESIDENT.—Would you consider it a bad place?

470. SIR M. GROVER.—I thought it was a most dreadful proposition.

471. PRESIDENT.—Having regard to the above considerations, was it desirable to put an expenditure of millions on redistribution in the forefront of the reform programme? Would it not have been better to confine redistribution, at the outset, to cases in which it was desirable to concentrate small isolated detachments, and to postpone larger moves till after arrangements had been made to render the proposed Field Army and internal defence troops thoroughly efficient by remedying defects in their armament, equipment, transport appliances, etc.?

472. SIR M. GROVER.—It would have been difficult, as units are constantly changing, they are sometimes in the Field Army, sometimes detailed for internal defence.

473. SIR P. LAKE.—Would it be possible to carry out any scheme if you awaited the completion of, say, armament, before going on with other measures?

474. SIR M. GROVER.—I think it was a time when there was money and we tried to push matters through.

475. SIR W. MEYER.—Now you find that you want a number of things and you do not know where to get money; supposing this had not been spent, would it not have been possible to find money in past years for part of these things?

476. SIR M. GROVER.—I doubt it, because armaments, etc., are always changing. Even as it was, all the available money was not spent. There were large lapses.

477. SIR W. MEYER.—You do not think that the expenditure on redistribution is to be regretted?

478. SIR M. GROVER.—I should not think it has made much difference as regards final results.

479. SIR P. LAKE.—Would it be possible to show how much was spent on redistribution and what has been spent on other items?

480. SIR W. MEYER.—Is it not given in the Progress Reports? Would you accept statements drawn up by Mr. Ashmore [Deputy Secretary, Finance Department (Military Finance)] and checked by the Army Department?

481. SIR M. GROVER.—Yes.

482. PRESIDENT.—The Kitchener scheme provided for nine divisions and eight cavalry brigades to take the field primarily on the North-West Frontier

and in Afghanistan. The General Staff Memorandum of 1911 proposes (Appendix I) to increase the internal defence troops by eight-and-a-half cavalry regiments (nearly three brigades) and three infantry brigades with field batteries, *plus* two cavalry regiments for moveable columns, in all nearly a division. Against Afghanistan it is said that the rest of the Field Army will be required (Appendix III, *ibid*), *viz.*, eight-and-a-quarter divisions and four cavalry brigades, with another cavalry brigade as an immediate reserve; an additional three-quarters of a division and three cavalry brigades to be sent up later from the internal defence forces if possible.

- (i) Is so large a force required for Afghanistan? The scheme contemplates sending four divisions and two cavalry brigades to Kabul. How are you going to feed them there? Are you aware that in 1878-80, there were never more than 20,000 men at one time in the front including Kabul and Kandahar, and never more than 10,000 at Kabul; and that the difficulties of supplying them were considerable?
- (ii) The scheme gives the Afghan army credit for 412 guns. On what evidence, and what is their nature?
- (iii) Could any large part of the Afghan army be concentrated against us? Did not General Duff before the Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1907 take a far less serious view of the Afghan army? Do recent incidents in Khost give one a grave idea of the efficiency and concentrating power of the Afghan troops?
- (iv) Does not the total force the General Staff estimates for Afghanistan alone equal that which General Duff thought necessary for Afghanistan *plus* the tribes?
- (v) If we were at war with Afghanistan might not the best course be to occupy Kandahar first and allow the Russians, if friendly, to take Afghan Turkistan?

483. SIR M. GROVER.—(i) The plans of operations are in the General Staff's sphere and I am unable to answer this question in the time which has been allowed me. I understand however that the Quartermaster-General says he can feed them.

(ii) A later estimate has now been received which shows 490 mobile guns, organized in 42 mountain, 36 field and 5 heavy batteries. The evidence has been obtained by watching imports and from reports received from our agents in Afghanistan.

(iii) The information received from the General Staff shews that about 15,000 Kabul district troops could be concentrated against us within a fortnight, and later another 35,000. The recent instances in Khost cannot be regarded as giving us any idea at present of the efficiency and concentrating power of the Afghan troops.

(iv) I agree that it does.

(v) I do not know at all personally; it depends on the attitude of Russia at that moment. I should however say that our best course would be to go straight for Kabul.

484. SIR W. MEYER.—Could you not advance on Kabul from Kandahar?

485. SIR M. GROVER.—It would be a long march.

486. SIR W. MEYER.—But it is an easier country.

487. PRESIDENT.—It is a long march and we should have the difficulty of supplies. The Commander-in-Chief in his note of the 29th August 1911, provides, in the circumstances there postulated, seven divisions for Afghanistan, one additional division (as compared with the Kitchener scheme) for internal defence, and another to meet contingencies external or internal. Have you any remarks on this?

488. SIR M. GROVER.—I think that is entirely a matter for the Commander-in-Chief.

489. SIR P. LAKE.—I think His Excellency proposed that in compliance with a request that he should make the greatest reduction possible. I personally do not think the forces mentioned would be enough.

490. PRESIDENT.—Having regard to the improvement in railway communications on and within our frontiers, are we not now in a far better position for dealing with Afghanistan than we were in 1878-80?

491. SIR M. GROVER.—I think we are, but I think that conditions have improved on the other side also, not only as regards the Afghan army but the frontier tribes as well.

492. PRESIDENT.—I suppose you refer particularly to armaments?

493. SIR M. GROVER.—Yes, sir; chiefly.

494. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider it desirable to proceed with the Loi-Shilman and Parachinar railways? If so, which would you take up first? Do you prefer Lord Kitchener's alternative alignment of the former line to that proposed by the Foreign Department? Was the line, so far as it had been laid, actually torn up?

495. SIR M. GROVER.—Yes, I do. I would take the Loi-Shilman Railway first, but it is desirable to proceed with both. I prefer the alignment advocated by the Foreign Department.

The rails, sleepers and bridge girders of the line have been removed.

496. SIR W. MEYER.—The reason for this last step being, I suppose that it would entail too great an expense to guard them?

497. SIR M. GROVER.—Partly that, and partly that it was having a bad effect on the tribes and exciting them. Some people put down the 1907-08 affairs to the construction of the line.

498. PRESIDENT.—As a matter of fact the Nowshera-Dargai line has had a good effect; it affords the tribesmen facilities for sending in their produce?

499. SIR M. GROVER.—Yes, sir; railways always have a good effect.

500. PRESIDENT.—What is the likelihood of a huge conflagration among the tribes on the North-West Frontier? Could they attack us in effectual combination?

501. SIR M. GROVER.—I should not think they ever would from what I know, but this is a matter of opinion. I do not think they would ever combine. Take the case of 1897.

502. SIR P. LAKE.—Could they not fight us simultaneously, each in their own country?

503. SIR M. GROVER.—They did not do so in 1897.

504. PRESIDENT.—Do you believe in the large figures that have been given as to the armament and fighting strength of the tribesmen? (General Staff Memorandum of 1911, Appendix II)? Whence do they obtain money to pay for rifles? Are not our troops much better armed now than in 1897?

505. SIR M. GROVER.—I think the figures are probably right, sir. The tribes get subsidies from us; they also trade to a certain extent. As regards the third part of the question, the answer is in the affirmative.

506. PRESIDENT.—And is it not the case that a large number of them come into British territory during the winter and take piece work under the Public Works Department for which they get very high wages?

507. SIR M. GROVER.—Yes, sir.

508. SIR W. MEYER.—Still, one finds it difficult to understand how they can pay such large prices.

509. SIR M. GROVER.—I cannot say where they get the money from, but they form syndicates for trading in rifles.

510. PRESIDENT.—In winter the *kafilas* come into Peshawar every day; wood sells for a good price and they collect a great deal of money that way; it costs them nothing except labour?

511. SIR M. GROVER.—Yes, sir.

512. PRESIDENT.—Where are the troops for the special internal security moveable brigades based on (a) Delhi, (b) Allahabad *cum* Dinapore, and (c) Mhow *cum* Jhansi, in the General Staff Memorandum of 1911, Appendix I, to be drawn from on the emergency arising?

513. SIR M. GROVER.—This is a question which the General Staff worked out; the places from which the troops are drawn are held by them to depend on the emergency of the moment.

514. SIR W. MEYER.—So that we may take it that the brigades will not necessarily have been trained together before?

515. SIR P. LAKE.—The reference is to moveable brigades, not columns?

516. SIR W. MEYER.—Yes.

517. SIR M. GROVER.—I am afraid I cannot say, but they would be formed brigades, taken on the emergency arising.

518. SIR W. MEYER.—The Delhi brigade might consist of troops from, say, the 9th Division?

519. SIR M. GROVER.—Yes.

520. PRESIDENT.—The General Staff state in paragraph 11, on page 5 and paragraphs 16 and 20 on pages 12 and 14 of their Memorandum of 1911, that the defence requirements at Delhi, including the strengthening of the ordinary garrison there, cannot be proceeded with at present. Is it intended then to leave Delhi in its present badly defended state? Why was the strategic importance of this centre overlooked in the Kitchener scheme?

521. SIR M. GROVER.—The Delhi garrison is now under consideration.

522. SIR P. LAKE.—The papers before us were written before it was decided to make Delhi the Capital; the garrison is now being considered as a separate question entirely.

The proposal is to provide the following peace garrison for Delhi, but it does not alter the garrison proposed for the area on mobilization:—

1 British cavalry regiment from Muttra, its place being filled at Muttra by an Indian cavalry regiment from Multan.

1 Indian cavalry regiment, which is already there.

1 battery, Royal Field Artillery from Dinapore.

1 company, Royal Garrison Artillery from Roorkee.

1 battalion, British infantry. The battalion at present at Subathu will be the Delhi internal defence infantry battalion and will always have four companies there.

2 battalions, Indian infantry, one of which is already there.

523. SIR W. MEYER.—Thus it may be summed up that the existing requirements of Delhi both as a centre for troops in time of peace and as a garrison place in time of trouble, have to be modified in consequence of the transfer of the Capital; that these moves which have been explained to us will involve considerable expenditure, but you have not considered how and when that expenditure will be met; it will not necessarily be one of the items of the Schedule for next year?

524. SIR M. GROVER.—I think it will have to go into the Schedule.

525. PRESIDENT.—Are you satisfied with the present position at Jhelum where there are no British troops?

526. SIR M. GROVER.—No, sir, I am not ; there ought to be British troops there ; there is an important railway bridge to be defended on one of our main strategic railways at Jhelum.

527. PRESIDENT.—Assuming that the Field Army is to be reduced to seven or eight divisions, would it not be possible to reduce the number of divisional areas correspondingly, and in this way make them more self-contained than at present, besides saving the cost of Generals, Staff, etc. ? In particular—

(a) why should Burma, if reduced in its garrison, remain a divisional command ?

(b) might not the defects of Peshawar as a self-contained area be remedied, in some measure at least, by making it include the Kohat Brigade from which it is now proposed that it should draw troops, and also the brigades at Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan ? The whole of the troops in the Frontier Province would then be in a single divisional command.

528. SIR M. GROVER.—I should like to go into that in more detail, but speaking generally I should say not, because these frontier brigades include large administrative areas.

529. SIR W. MEYER.—Is Peshawar large ?

530. SIR M. GROVER.—No.

531. SIR W. MEYER.—Rawalpindi ?

532. SIR M. GROVER.—It is not particularly small. With regard to (a) I think that for the same reason namely, the extent of the administrative area, you ought to have a divisional General there.

As regards (b) I think not, because it would probably be impossible to move the Kohat Brigade ; I think it likely that there would be just as much disturbance there as at Peshawar at the same moment.

533. SIR W. MEYER.—You would not therefore take troops from Kohat ?

534. SIR M. GROVER.—No. Moreover, I do not agree with the proposals for Kohat ; I think its garrison is reduced dangerously low.

535. PRESIDENT.—From an administrative point of view, would it be convenient to bring in the Bannu and Derajat Brigades ?

536. SIR M. GROVER.—They are better as they are.

537. PRESIDENT.—Would the reduction of the Field Army, if that be thought desirable in the present circumstances, really alter the risks of the situation ?

538. SIR M. GROVER.—I think it would, sir. If it proved necessary to withdraw part of the forces which are now allotted to internal defence, the risk would be greater.

539. PRESIDENT.—If, for purposes of meeting external aggression, it became necessary to withdraw troops from internal defence garrisons, do you consider that they should be replaced—the British portion of them—by troops from Home ?

540. SIR M. GROVER.—Yes, that is what I mean.

541. PRESIDENT.—Would not the possibility that our present friendly relations with Russia may alter in the future, be adequately met by letting the nine divisions and eight cavalry brigades, thought necessary as India's contribution in the event of war with that Power, be made up (from a lower peace footing) by the larger use of reserves ?

542. SIR M. GROVER.—It is a scheme I am rather in favour of, but I know there is a great difference of opinion on the subject.

543. PRESIDENT.—Is the present internal situation better than it was five years ago ?

544. SIR M. GROVER.—The feeling generally ?

545. SIR W. MEYER.—Yes.

546. SIR M. GROVER.—I should not reduce the present internal defence arrangements ; I have always looked upon those of 1903 as weaker than was desirable.

547. SIR W. MEYER.—I think you said that considerable anxiety was felt about certain native regiments in connection with the seditious movements which were prevalent in 1907 but which are now non-existent ?

548. SIR M. GROVER.—I cannot remember having said anything about native regiments in 1907 ; I think I was asked which class would give most anxiety—my answer is, the Sikhs. I do not think there has been much change in the situation.

549. PRESIDENT.—Supposing that we had had war with Russia in 1907-08, would the internal situation have admitted of sending up a Field Army of nine divisions and eight cavalry brigades ?

550. SIR M. GROVER.—I think we should have much more hesitation in sending them up now than we would have had then.

551. PRESIDENT.—Have any steps been taken to obtain a decision as to the location and functions of the tribal militia in the event of serious trouble with their co-tribesmen ?

552. SIR M. GROVER.—No further steps have been taken.

553. PRESIDENT.—I understand that by employing a certain number of them, they are bound to fight against their own people ?

554. SIR M. GROVER.—Very much so ; but I think the situation would be considerably changed if you had the mass of the tribes against you.

555. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that the military authorities should have a larger say in the location and numbers of these forces in normal times ?

556. SIR M. GROVER.—No, sir.

557. PRESIDENT.—Would it not be better, if the establishment of eight Carnatic regiments is below what is considered the minimum standard of efficiency for general service, to raise them to this standard rather than to convert them into six stronger battalions ?

558. SIR M. GROVER.—Two questions are involved in this ; one, the question of expense, and the other, what the future peace strength of infantry battalions is to be. If you are going to lower the general peace strength, this particular question will not arise.

559. SIR W. MEYER.—There is another point. You said that a unit ought not to be disbanded without consideration. The General Staff proposed to convert these eight battalions into six, would it not be better to retain the eight and keep them at an efficient strength ?

560. SIR M. GROVER.—I am an advocate of all units being given a uniform strength. I would prefer to see the eight Carnatic battalions converted into six battalions with a higher establishment.

561. PRESIDENT.—Have the Madrassis been fairly judged in regard to their alleged lack of fighting characteristics (paragraph 121, General Staff Appreciation of 1912) ? Would it be feasible, by discriminatory recruitment, to get more men from among them ?

562. SIR M. GROVER.—It is a question that has been gone into very much by the recruiting staff at various times. There are good and bad Madrassis. There is a great difference of opinion about the value of recruits. The Madras sappers and miners have always done very well on service.

563. PRESIDENT.—Do the officers in these Carnatic regiments become less efficient than other officers ?

564. SIR M. GROVER.—I think so.

565. PRESIDENT.—Under present conditions, do Madras battalions cost materially more than others in such matters as rice compensation?

566. SIR M. GROVER.—Yes, they do, when serving out of their own country. You cannot alter that. In Multan they were very expensive indeed.

567. SIR W. MEYER.—Have not conditions altered of late years?

568. SIR M. GROVER.—No.

569. PRESIDENT.—So far as I know, it all hinges on some agreement made by the Madras Government which you cannot go back on?

570. SIR M. GROVER.—Yes, they are more expensive when stationed outside their own country.

571. PRESIDENT.—Have they the right of taking their wives and families about with them at Government expense?

572. SIR M. GROVER.—Yes, I think so.

573. PRESIDENT.—Has the recruitment of Sikhs been overdone, and are the present conditions in the Punjab not likely to affect it?

574. SIR M. GROVER.—Yes, Sikhs are, I think, over-recruited.

575. PRESIDENT.—The industrial conditions in the Punjab have greatly affected recruiting; the men earn more money by remaining on the land?

576. SIR M. GROVER.—Yes.

577. PRESIDENT.—Could not some of the class Sikh regiments raised of recent years be modified by bringing in class companies of, say, Rajputs from Oudh?

578. SIR M. GROVER.—Yes, sir; I should think they might, but I would suggest that the question be further considered with the Adjutant-General.

579. PRESIDENT.—Has the Agent to the Governor-General, Rajputana, been referred to in regard to the reduction of the Deoli and Erinpura squadrons recommended by the General Staff?

580. SIR M. GROVER.—Yes; he asks for additional cavalry to take their place. The Foreign Department, however, decided that it would be unnecessary to replace them.

581. PRESIDENT.—It is understood that the proposal for the re-organization of existing artillery ammunition columns (referred to in paragraph 22 of the General Staff Memorandum of 1911) has been submitted to the Secretary of State; the saving eventually worked out (statement in connection with the Lake Committee report) being put at nearly 12 lakhs per annum. How does the matter now stand?

* Not reproduced. 582. SIR M. GROVER.—The case was referred to the Secretary of State in our Despatch No. 90 of the 30th May 1912.*

583. PRESIDENT.—With reference to the remarks in Appendix XI of the General Staff Memorandum of 1911, regarding larger reserves and a smaller peace footing:—

(i) What is the military danger of having a larger number of unarmed reservists in the general peace population?

(ii) Is it necessary to put the peace footing of infantry battalions at so high a strength as 832?

(iii) Is not the slow progress in regard to the present sanctioned reserve due to the low pay given (Rs. 2 a month)?

(iv) Is not the reserve now obtained about 35,700 for all arms against a sanctioned strength of 50,000 ?

(v) Could we work down to a peace strength of, say, 712 per infantry battalion which was in force before 1882, which should give an effective strength (without reserves) on mobilization of about 600 ? Then have a first class reserve (the younger men) of 200 per battalion at Rs. 4 per month, and two months' training every other year, and a second class reserve of 300, at Rs. 2 a month and one month's training biennially ?

(vi) Do not the present reserve strengths of infantry battalions vary enormously in practice, from 50 men up to 350 in some cases ?

584. SIR M. GROVER.—As to (i) I have never seen what the danger would be myself.

585. SIR P. LAKE.—About two years ago there was a garrison of about a hundred and fifty Sikhs in the Ferozepore fort. There were also other Sikh forces in the neighbourhood, and if these elements combined with reservists, men on furlough, etc., would there not be some danger ? They might seize the arsenal by a *coup de main* ? Of course, I acknowledge that it is a danger which might be provided for.

586. SIR M. GROVER.—With regard to (ii), I think the establishment might be reduced a little, say to 800.

587. SIR P. LAKE.—Have you worked out the training strength necessary ?

588. SIR M. GROVER.—I have seen what was written by the General Staff on the subject. I would not alter the establishment of cavalry regiments.

589. PRESIDENT.—Are you aware that at Home all the infantry battalions have a comparatively low training strength ? The peace establishment at home is 780 or 800, but this runs down owing to drafts, etc. On this account we have given them the option of training by double-companies. The training strength during the periods of brigade and divisional training is generally about 500.

590. SIR M. GROVER.—My suggestion of an 800 establishment is subject to modification. I would prefer the detailed strengths to be put down by the Adjutant-General's Branch.

As regards (iii), not in connection with the infantry; the infantry has been worked up to the amount sanctioned by Government every year.

As to (iv), the sanctioned strength for 1913 is 34,624 infantry. Two years ago matters were brought to a stand-still because the money for an increase in the reserve was cut out of the Schedule. On the 1st May this year we were about 700 below strength.

With reference to (v), I am in favour of the principle of a scheme on these lines. I should like to defer giving an opinion on the proposal.

And as regards (vi), yes, the difference is due partly to administrative reasons, and partly to some reserves having been started later than others.

591. PRESIDENT.—Under such a scheme as above suggested would it not be feasible in the case of a small expedition to send battalions into the field at 600 without calling up reserves (reinforcements being given from linked battalions if necessary) ; while in the event of a serious call, the 1st class reserve could be at once called up and the 2nd class later if necessary ?

592. SIR M. GROVER.—I should like to call out the first class reserves even for small expeditions. In the case of sudden trouble in the Khyber, such as occurred in 1897, regiments at hand would have to be sent as they stood.

593. SIR W. MEYER.—You might have your frontier battalions at a higher peace establishment than the rest. Would it be inconvenient when the battalions came to be shifted elsewhere in case of reliefs ?

594. PRESIDENT.—It would be easy to discontinue the transfer of men from these units to the reserve for the necessary period, and simultaneously to increase their establishment?

595. SIR W. MEYER.—Suppose you have a normal peace strength of 712 and increase it to 912 on the frontier—when the time comes to move a unit away from the frontier what method would you suggest for reducing the strength to the normal peace establishment?

596. SIR M. GROVER.—You might let the men go either as volunteers or as drafts to other battalions.

597. PRESIDENT.—Would there be difficulties in regard to such a scheme in the case of Gurkha and Pathan battalions?

598. SIR M. GROVER.—Yes, I think there would, sir. We might have to treat Pathans specially.

599. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you anticipate Pathan reservists coming back to fight for us in the case of trouble with their tribes?

600. SIR M. GROVER.—I think there might be a difficulty. The Adjutant-General is the only person who could speak definitely on the point.

601. PRESIDENT.—Would the fact that we are at present said to be debarred from having a larger reserve than 100 per battalion of Gurkhas of 912 peace strength, preclude our having a reserve of 300 for one of 712 peace strength?

602. SIR M. GROVER.—There would probably be difficulty with the Nepal Darbar. I think in a Gurkha battalion we should have to maintain a larger peace strength.

603. PRESIDENT.—With reference to the remark about the five colonial battalions in paragraph 8 of the General Staff Memorandum of the 14th July 1911, Appendix II, could they not be brought up to the strength required for sending them abroad by drawing on linked battalions or by special recruitment commenced in due time? Would not men volunteer readily for these for the sake of the extra pay in colonial service?

604. SIR M. GROVER.—I think they could be, but they can be treated in the same way as frontier regiments; all these cases are perfectly feasible.

605. PRESIDENT.—Will not the fact that battalions are often quartered far from their recruiting areas cause difficulties in regard to the joining of reservists even in present circumstances? If so, what remedy would you suggest?

606. SIR M. GROVER.—The present system is being revised. A copy of the orders will be sent to this Committee shortly.

607. PRESIDENT.—Is it feasible to reduce the peace strength of Indian cavalry regiments, now generally 625, and have a larger reserve?

608. SIR M. GROVER.—I am rather against that, sir. The objections are, a reserve of horses would have to be maintained, and cavalymen who are not constantly exercised become inefficient more quickly than infantrymen.

609. PRESIDENT.—Under the reserve system, what would become of the cavalymen's horses? The question presents many difficulties; the system has been suggested several times, and I have always been against it myself. What would they (the reservists) do with their horses?

610. SIR M. GROVER.—I think they would leave their horses with their regiments.

611. PRESIDENT.—Could the 19 service companies of sappers and miners have their peace strength reduced from 151 sappers to 121, with a 1st class reserve of 30 and a 2nd class reserve of 45?

612. SIR M. GROVER.—I should be against that.

613. PRESIDENT.—Is it possible to reduce the peace strength of native artillery units?

614. SIR M. GROVER.—No, sir.

615. PRESIDENT.—Besides the reserves, is there not sanction, when a battalion takes the field, for raising 256 additional men for the 20 Gurkha and 69 other battalions, and 128 per battalion for the remaining 49 battalions? Do you anticipate that there would be a dearth of recruits in the event of war?

616. SIR M. GROVER.—Yes. With regard to the second part of the question, I think up to the present there has been a falling off in recruiting during war. I think the idea of letting reservists act as recruiting agents is a practical scheme, which might have good results.

617. SIR W. MEYER.—In England, in the first stages of a war people come forward in considerable numbers. Does not that feeling exist in India to any extent?

618. SIR M. GROVER.—The conditions are very different in India. It is not their country to begin with. Recruiting is always up to the limit even under ordinary peace conditions. In a great many cases the question of obtaining 256 recruits on mobilization has appeared to me to present great difficulties for a long time.

619. PRESIDENT.—In the middle of the Afghan War recruiting fell off very much.

620. SIR P. LAKE.—That will always happen when you have a campaign a great distance from home with hard work.

621. SIR R. SCALLON.—In 1897 and 1898 we were rather short of men. The fathers and mothers, uncles and aunts rather discouraged their boys from joining, but at the time of the China affair, there was no difficulty. All India has extraordinary ideas about Afghanistan, whilst everybody knows money is to be made in China. We should have no trouble in getting troops if we were going east. We shall always have trouble in going west, even for a Russian war. Ordinary field service does not stop recruiting. From 1900 to 1905 my regiment was campaigning almost incessantly. It was the first up on the Waziristan business. For five or six years we had rather disagreeable country to live in but the regiment was over strength the whole time, and we had not the slightest difficulty in getting recruits.

622. SIR W. MEYER.—Have not the conditions of field service been somewhat improved since the days of the Afghan War?

623. PRESIDENT.—No, they have been made more severe. Now that the Government has abolished batta, I do not think the conditions are so favourable.

624. SIR R. SCALLON.—The conditions of service are harder—much harder.

625. PRESIDENT.—According to Appendix 10 of the General Staff Memorandum of 1911, Lord Kitchener's scheme ultimately provided for twelve British officers for each native cavalry regiment and infantry battalion taking the field, and ten for each internal defence unit and, allowing for other requirements, this apparently necessitated a peace strength of fourteen officers per unit. Do you agree with the Memorandum that this allowance was too high and calculated to stifle the responsibilities of the Indian officers? If so, do you accept the proposals of the General Staff which allow ten officers per unit in the Field Army, and ten for some and seven for others of the remaining units, with provision for depôts of units on field service, leading up in all (after providing an allowance of 7 per cent. for sick and an addition for first casualties) to a peace complement of twelve officers for most units and a total reduction of 312 officers? Or would you go further in the way of reduction?

626. SIR M. GROVER.—I think that an establishment of fourteen officers is excessive, and that one of twelve is right. I would not go further in reduction. I am rather doubtful if I would go so far with cavalry; for infantry,

twelve officers would be enough. Either the British officers have not enough responsibility, or they have excessive responsibility. Native officers do a great deal of patrol work, etc., but British officers are desirable.

627. SIR W. MEYER.—In the old days you sometimes got along with four officers?

628. PRESIDENT.—You must consider war, and the great difficulty you have in getting a reserve.

629. SIR R. SCALLON.—There are very few native officers capable of putting a company through company training.

630. PRESIDENT.—In this connection do you think that the quartermaster and transport officer allowed in the General Staff war complement of ten are both required? Could not one man discharge the duties with the aid of an Indian officer? Is the lower complement of seven officers proposed for some peace units obtained by omitting from the statement of the General Staff Memorandum of 1911, page 80, the officers for machine gun, signalling and transport?

631. SIR M. GROVER.—In my opinion you want both on service.

632. PRESIDENT.—The above scheme pre-supposes a reserve of 900 officers to be utilized in the event of serious war. Do you consider this amount necessary? The General Staff Memorandum states that it would give nearly 600 more officers for war than we now have?

633. SIR M. GROVER.—I am not prepared to dispute the necessity for this; it is being worked out by the General Staff in detail.

634. PRESIDENT.—As regards raising a reserve of officers:—

(a) What were the proposals of General Barrow's Committee? Have there been subsequent committees on the subject?

(b) Do you concur in the alternative scheme in Appendix X of the General Staff Memorandum of 1911 which proposes to get 200 officers by inducing certain men to retire earlier by the grant of a reserve allowance *plus* proportionate pension, and to obtain the balance from planters and other Europeans in civil employ who would receive a retaining fee of Rs. 100 a month?

(c) If not, what scheme would you propose?

635. SIR M. GROVER.—(a) General Barrow's Committee propose offering:—

(i) Captains of any seniority 'extended furlough' on £250 per annum, conditionally on their entering a Special Reserve of Officers for the Indian army, and serving in it until promoted to major when they would be retired on a special pension of £175 per annum;

(ii) Majors of any seniority 'extended furlough' on £400 per annum, conditionally on their entering the Special Reserve of Officers for the Indian army and serving in it until promoted lieutenant-colonels when they would be retired on a special pension of £400 per annum;

There has been one subsequent committee on the subject.

636. SIR W. MEYER.—Were General Barrow's proposals considered and declared impracticable?

637. SIR M. GROVER.—No, but it was thought they required further detailed consideration, especially in regard to the formation of an Imperial Reserve.

638. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing a war was going on with Germany, is it not likely that the Home Government would seize them all?

639. SIR M. GROVER.—As a set-off against this, the Home Government's reserve would be available for India in the case of hostilities there.

640. PRESIDENT.—The officers at Home who had never been in India would not be fitted for service with native troops?

641. SIR M. GROVER.—That obstacle has always come to the front.

642. PRESIDENT.—It would be necessary to enlist the sympathies of the War Office on your side to a certain extent, otherwise they will not train these officers in peace time.

643. SIR M. GROVER.—(b) I never thought we should get very far with that scheme. There are very few planters; we have never thought very much of the source of supply in India. I think that the recommendations of the Johnson Committee will probably go to the authorities at Home.

644. SIR P. LAKE.—It has been suggested that a large proportion of the Indian army officers might be sent on leave.

645. SIR M. GROVER.—I have always been against that idea.

With regard to (c). I would propose giving officers reserve pay and then letting them retire.

646. PRESIDENT.—Would it be feasible to provide for special war requirements by employing as officers with Indian troops, British non-commissioned officers acquainted with native ways and languages? If so, how would you obtain these and on what special duties would you employ them?

647. SIR M. GROVER.—I should be against it entirely.

648. PRESIDENT.—You consider that the native troops like to be commanded by a *sahib*?

649. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you not gentlemen—or quasi-gentlemen—as non-commissioned officers?

650. SIR M. GROVER.—I should not agree to it as a general scheme.

651. SIR W. MEYER.—It would seem a handy source of supply, would it not? You have men in India acquainted with the language and with a knowledge of troops. Your counter-objection is that the sepoy would not like it?

652. SIR M. GROVER.—In case of necessity we would get them from non-mobilized British regiments.

653. SIR W. MEYER.—Are there not a certain number employed departmentally?

654. SIR M. GROVER.—I do not think they would be any good. Speaking generally, I would be against the scheme.

655. SIR W. MEYER.—Does not your objection apply to the planter?

656. SIR M. GROVER.—No, the planters are very good soldiers up to a certain point.

657. PRESIDENT.—It is conceivable that in a great emergency you might give commissions to deserving non-commissioned officers in British battalions in India thereby setting free subalterns for this work; but rather than take British non-commissioned officers for native troops, I would take subalterns from British regiments for the native army. The Budget Committee of 1911 proposed (Table B (4) of their report) to curtail recruitment of officers in 1912-13; but it appears that the Secretary of State declined to do this pending further consideration. Will you please produce his despatch and say how the matter now stands?

658. SIR M. GROVER.—The Secretary of State was addressed by telegram and replied by telegram on the 9th November 1911:—"The reduction of officers seems impossible as constituting a breach of faith with cadets at Sandhurst and army students at universities."

659. SIR W. MEYER.—The breach of faith would only apply to cadets in Sandhurst now; you can give a three years' notice and avoid it.

660. PRESIDENT.—Do you concur in the proposals for a special reserve of supply and transport officers contained in paragraph 11 of Appendix X of the General Staff Memorandum of 1911, which involve extra cost?

661. SIR W. MEYER.—There was another proposal for reducing the number of supply and transport officers. Is it necessary to push this scheme at all in order to provide a special reserve for the Supply and Transport Corps?

662. SIR M. GROVER.—The Quartermaster-General is considering it.

663. SIR W. MEYER.—If you get a satisfactory reserve system for the army generally, would it be necessary to have any special reserve for the Supply and Transport Corps?

664. SIR M. GROVER.—No, I think not—not a separate list.

665. PRESIDENT.—Might not such services as Supply and Transport, Ordnance and Army Clothing be made largely civil in character?

Apart from this, is it necessary to have a special contract officer for each division; might not his work be partly given to other local supply and transport officers, and partly concentrated at Army Headquarters in regard to such contracts as tea, meat, bedding, etc.?

666. SIR M. GROVER.—The question might be referred to the Quartermaster-General; I could not answer it straight off.

667. SIR W. MEYER.—As a military officer of experience, do you think it necessary that these people who do work which is largely civil in character should necessarily be officers in the army?

668. SIR M. GROVER.—I should think a good deal might be done by civil officers.

669. SIR W. MEYER.—I am not sure that you want a military Director of Army Clothing.

670. SIR M. GROVER.—I think a civil officer might be in charge of it.

671. PRESIDENT.—May I remark that these appointments give a certain relief in employing officers of higher rank in the Indian army?

672. SIR W. MEYER.—I suggest that civilians might be more efficient in that they would remain in the department all their lives, whereas the army officer goes there simply to be re-absorbed into his unit.

673. SIR P. LAKE.—The system was tried at Home but was found to be unsatisfactory in the case of the Ordnance factories.

674. SIR W. MEYER.—It was held for years that only army officers could do the work of the military accounts branch, but civilians are now successfully employed.

675. SIR P. LAKE.—The question is, are they cheaper and more efficient?

676. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider the present system of recruiting officers for the Indian army with reference simply to the estimated requirements of each year, satisfactory? Does it not tend to congestion of promotion such as that referred to in paragraph 24 of your note of 7th August 1911? Would it not be better to regulate recruitment by average requirements calculated on an actuarial basis, as is done in the Indian Civil Service for instance?

677. SIR M. GROVER.—The present system more or less provides for the annual wastage. At present we get about seventy cadets from Sandhurst and twelve from the universities every year.

678. PRESIDENT.—You wanted a great many more in Lord Kitchener's time when the proportion of British officers in Indian units was being increased?

679. SIR M. GROVER.—Yes, sir.

680. PRESIDENT.—When you increased the number of officers in the Indian army did you make an actuarial calculation and find out how many of these officers could succeed to higher appointments?

681. SIR M. GROVER.—No. I agree that there ought to be an actuarial branch in Army Headquarters to consider such things.

682. SIR W. MEYER.—It is done in the Indian Civil Service.

683. SIR M. GROVER.—My answer to the first part of the question is in the negative; to the second and final part in the affirmative.

684. PRESIDENT.—What advantage is there in the present system by which officers ordinarily attain promotion up to the rank of lieutenant-colonel automatically by the efflux of time. The Indian Government, for instance, does not entertain more men as Commissioners and Collectors than it requires for the charge of districts or divisions. Why should it be otherwise in the case of the army?

685. SIR M. GROVER.—I think this is a very big question. We want to fix limits of usefulness for senior officers. We have a proposal in connection with this recommendation for the promotion of officers, by which it will be decided whether an officer will be employed or not, when he reaches a certain grade.

686. PRESIDENT.—Their promotion is automatic, is it not?

687. SIR M. GROVER.—There are two elements—one of luck and one of time. I agree that it is very inequitable. It would not always be desirable to let an officer serve for his full pension. I am in favour of granting pensions in proportion to value received. A second in command can now be told that he will never be promoted to lieutenant-colonel. In that case he is compulsorily retired, and given promotion by virtue of having reached twenty-six years' service. 'Twenty-six years' service is the pension stage irrespective of rank.

688. PRESIDENT.—Is it the case that latterly a number of Commanding Officers have been extended in the tenure of their commands thus aggravating the congestion?

689. SIR M. GROVER.—Yes.

690. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider that the tenure of command in an Indian regiment should be made four instead of five years?

691. SIR M. GROVER.—It is one of the recommendations we are sending up.

692. PRESIDENT.—What is being done in regard to the re-organization of mule transport corps now estimated (item 3, Table A. of the Report of the Budget Committee of 1911) to produce an annual saving of 2.19 lakhs?

693. SIR M. GROVER.—The question is still under the consideration of the Quartermaster-General.

694. PRESIDENT.—Similarly as regards the proposal to reduce the transport registration staff from 22 to 12 British officers, now estimated to save 1.9 lakhs per annum (*ibid* item 4), what practical results have been obtained by the registration of transport animals?

695. SIR M. GROVER.—The numbers of registered animals are as follows:—

Mules and ponies	14,978
Camels	47,682
Bullocks	61,960

696. PRESIDENT.—I think that in 1897 and 1898 owners hid away their good animals?

697. SIR M. GROVER.—We have an Act or a Bill which prevents owners from hiding their animals when they are wanted. With regard to the first part of the question I think recruiting for these particular appointments has been suspended.

698. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider that the following further measures of economy suggested by the 1911 Budget Committee are desirable and feasible:—

- (i) Reduction of three companies of Royal Garrison Artillery now garrisoning inland defences, and the addition of gunners and drivers to

Horse and Field Artillery units (item 5, Table A.)? How is the estimated annual saving of 1·20 lakhs arrived at?

- (ii) Curtailment of the sanctioned reserve of artillery horses from 2,500 to 500, which would save 8·16 lakhs annual expenditure that would otherwise be necessary in the future (item 16, Table A).

Is it expedient to reduce the reserve so much? At what does it now stand?

699. SIR M. GROVER.—(i) The reduction was held over till the result of this Committee should be known. We should have to refer Home about it in any case. I think the reduction is feasible.

As regards (ii), the reserve now stands at 500 horses; I should like to refer the question to the Quartermaster-General and Chief of the General Staff. I am not prepared to answer off-hand.

700. PRESIDENT.—What is being done to give effect to the following recommendations in Table A. of the 1911 Budget Committee Report:—

- (i) Substitution of pensioners for effective soldiers in the Barrack Department at an estimated annual saving of 2 lakhs. (Item 7.)
- (ii) Replacement of British by Indian officers as assistant cantonment magistrates at an annual saving of Rs. 46,000. (Item. 12.)
- (iii) Is anything gained by the present system of placing cantonment magistrates under the Army Department?

701. SIR M. GROVER.—(i) The views of the General Officers Commanding divisions are being received and considered; I do not think anything is likely to come of it.

(ii) Three Indian officers have been appointed to the department and the question of appointing more is under consideration.

As to (iii), yes sir, they assist generally in the administration of the cantonment. The whole control is under the local Governments.

702. SIR W. MEYER.—What would happen in the case of an inefficient cantonment magistrate?

703. SIR M. GROVER.—The question of his retention in the department would be considered.

704. PRESIDENT.—Has not a committee presided over by Surgeon General Sloggett pointed out great extravagancies in the hitherto accepted equipment and organization of field hospitals, etc? How far have its recommendations been accepted? In any case will their effect not be an avoidance of future rather than a curtailment of existing expenditure?

705. SIR M. GROVER.—The report has just been received. The chief thing will be the avoidance of future expenditure rather than the curtailment of present expenditure.

706. PRESIDENT.—Having regard to the report of this Committee and other relevant circumstances, do you consider that the peace and war requirements for the Army Medical Service given in Table C on page 19 of the General Staff Memorandum of 1911 require modification? See also in this connection the note on proposal 19 in Statement E attached to your note of the 7th August 1911. Similarly, as regards supply and transport requirements in Table B on page 19 of the General Staff Memorandum above referred to, with reference to present schemes of reorganization?

707. SIR M. GROVER.—I have not had any time to make a comparison.

708. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider that the rifle factory at Ishapur has justified its existence financially? Can it possibly make India self-supporting in the matter of rifles? Would it not be better to drop rifle manufacture in this country?

709. SIR M. GROVER.—No, sir. We have made a sort of summarized statement of the history of the factory. It amply suffices for supplying replacements—the average wear and tear every year. It is expected to turn out about 25,000 rifles annually to replace loss and damage. The native operatives are only taught sections of the business, thus minimizing the danger which might arise if a native were able to make a whole rifle.

710. PRESIDENT.—Are there any other matters in regard to which you can suggest curtailment of local outlay and production in the Ordnance Department? Has the gun carriage factory at Jubbulpore been a success? Could the saddlery factory at Cawnpore be handed over to civil agency?

711. SIR M. GROVER.—I would not suggest curtailment of outlay.

712. SIR R. SCALLON.—I think it is not possible in Government factories to utilize scraps of material as is done in civil factories.

713. SIR M. GROVER.—Other departments of the State cannot afford to obtain their requirements from the factories at Ishapur and Jubbulpore because of the prices they are debited with for them.

714. SIR W. MEYER.—I suggest that it might be profitable to hand over our contracts for leather goods to Cooper, Allen & Co.

715. SIR M. GROVER.—I think the gun carriage factory at Jubbulpore has been a success—we might get more out of it however. I do not think the British soldier is prejudiced against a rifle made at Ishapur.

I do not think the saddlery factory at Cawnpore could be handed over to a civil agency.

716. PRESIDENT.—Are you satisfied that the present policy of supplying dairy produce and fodder departmentally by dairy and grass farms is economical? Similarly in regard to departmental horse-breeding and rearing?

717. SIR M. GROVER.—Yes, sir.

718. PRESIDENT.—Is it possible to raise a battalion or more of Eurasians? Might not their lesser efficiency as compared with that of British soldiers be made up for by the possibilities of training a reserve? Could Eurasians be employed in inland defence artillery?

719. SIR M. GROVER.—The question is now under the consideration of a special Committee of civil and military officers. The President is General Aylmer.

720. PRESIDENT.—What action has been taken in regard to the changes and economies in the Marine Department suggested by Admiral Slade's Committee?

721. SIR M. GROVER.—The Committee suggested the sale of three large transports, and the transfer of the dockyards to private firms. The Military Finance Branch have disputed the correctness of the manner in which the Committee made their calculations.

722. PRESIDENT.—Do you concur in the suggestion made in regard to reliefs in Appendix XIV of the General Staff Memorandum of 1911? Have you any further suggestions to make in the direction of economy?

723. SIR M. GROVER.—I think the whole question requires more consideration.

724. PRESIDENT.—How, generally speaking, has the large curtailment of the Relief Grant for 1912-13 (1911 Budget Committee Table B, item 7) been effected?

725. SIR M. GROVER.—By postponing many of the reliefs that were due. It has caused dissatisfaction I think.

726. PRESIDENT.—How far would a reduction of the Field Army enable a permanent reduction to be made in the expenditure on Ordnance stores?

727. SIR M. GROVER.—I would suggest that this question might be referred to the Director-General of Ordnance.

728. PRESIDENT.—What is your opinion in regard to Table C, item 2 of the 1911 Budget Committee Report, regarding the employment of officers taken from the ranks as commandants of transport units ?

729. SIR M. GROVER.—I think the suggestion feasible, subject to further consideration.

730. PRESIDENT.—With reference to item 5, Statement D of your note of the 7th August 1911, what changes, if any, have been made in the military expenditure on railway charges with reference to the discussion at the Railway Conference of 1911 ?

731. SIR M. GROVER.—No changes have been made. It is a question as to what rates should be charged for military traffic.

732. PRESIDENT.—Are you satisfied that the present system of fixing compensation for dearness of food and forage in the Indian army is thoroughly satisfactory and economical ? Was it so, say, six years ago ?

733. SIR M. GROVER.—I think it is as good as can be obtained. The question of revising it has been brought up several times, but for reasons generally political, it has been decided not to touch it.

734. SIR W. MEYER.—Was it satisfactory six years ago ?

735. SIR M. GROVER.—I think it was. It is as satisfactory a system as we can get.

736. SIR W. MEYER.—Lord Kitchener in 1906 did not consider it satisfactory ?

737. SIR M. GROVER.—It is not an ideal system at all. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has decided not to re-open the question.

738. PRESIDENT.—With reference to item 5, Statement E, attached to your note of 7th August 1911, why was the proposal to substitute civil for military subordinates in the Military Works Services, dropped ?

739. SIR M. GROVER.—After consideration it was decided that civil subordinates were not desirable for this work.

740. PRESIDENT.—With reference to item 25 *ibid*, can anything be done in the direction of reducing the expenditure on free rations in Baluchistan ? What are the local regiments referred to ?

741. SIR M. GROVER.—The question has been fully considered very recently with the result that it has been decided that it would be inexpedient to do anything in this connection. The Hazara Pioneers is one of the regiments referred to.

742. SIR R. SCALLON.—And the 124th and 126th Baluchistan Infantry.

743. SIR W. MEYER.—Why was it inadvisable to press the matter further ?

744. SIR M. GROVER.—The question has been fully considered very recently.

745. SIR W. MEYER.—Could you not buy up the rights of local regiments in this respect ?

746. SIR M. GROVER.—It would have the effect of breaking up the regiments.

747. PRESIDENT.—How far has the Kitchener scheme of giving considerable financial and administrative powers to Divisional Generals been worked up to in practice ? Do they, as a matter of fact, refer matters to Army Headquarters which they could deal with themselves ?

748. SIR M. GROVER.—The following statement shows the financial powers vested in Lieutenant-Generals of Commands prior to their abolition on the 1st June 1907 as compared with the powers now vested in General Officers Commanding Divisions :—

As regards the second part of the question, I think not.

Statement showing the financial powers vested in Lieutenant-Generals of Commands prior to their abolition on 1st June 1907 as compared with the powers now vested in General Officers Commanding Divisions.

Lieutenant-Generals of Commands.		General Officers Commanding Divisions.	
Rs.		Rs.	
MAXIMUM EXPENDITURE ADMISSIBLE ON ANY ONE OBJECT ...	5,000	MAXIMUM EXPENDITURE ADMISSIBLE ON ANY ONE OBJECT ...	5,000
<i>Main conditions governing expenditure.</i>		<i>Main conditions governing expenditure.</i>	
(1) That it could be met from the appropriate minor head of the Budget grant of their respective Commands.		(1) That it can be met from the Budget head to which it is debitable or by reappropriation under any minor head of a grant, or portion of a grant, under their respective control so long as it is within the same grant.	
(2) That it was not recurring in nature.	...	(2) That it is not recurring in nature.	
(3) That the concurrence of the Controller concerned as to its admissibility was first obtained. (Sums exceeding Rs. 200 only.)	...	(3) That the concurrence of the Controller concerned as to its admissibility is first obtained. (Sums exceeding Rs. 200 only.)	
(4) That it was not devoted to the introduction of a new principle or change of practice likely to lead to expense.	...	(4) That it is not devoted to the introduction of a new principle or change of practice likely to lead to expense.	
(5) That power of expenditure being personal, it was not to be delegated to any subordinate officer.	...	(5) That power of expenditure being personal, it is not to be delegated to any subordinate officer.	
(6) That no standing order of the Finance Department should be contravened.]	...	(6) That no standing order of the Finance Department is contravened.	
(7) Lieutenant-Generals Commanding exercised the power of the Army Department in regard to the grant of injury, family, or exemplary or meritorious service pension or gratuities to followers, subject to the certified admissibility of the audit officer.	...	(7) Divisional Commanders exercise the powers of the Army Department in regard to the grant, continuance, reduction or withdrawal of pensions and gratuities of all ranks of the native army and of followers, with their heirs, subject to the certified admissibility of the audit officer.	
		(8) Divisional Commanders have powers of remitting disallowances by audit officers so far as they affect payments made more than 6 months before the date when they were challenged.	

719. PRESIDENT.—Has the system of making the deputy controller of military accounts attached to each division, a general financial adviser to the General Officer Commanding been carried into effect? If not, what measures of practical reform would you suggest?

750. SIR M. GROVER.—Each divisional Commander has a Deputy Controller. I would suggest Mr. Brunyate, Secretary in the Military Finance Branch, as a suitable source for an answer to this question.

751. PRESIDENT.—Are the Lieutenant-Generals Commanding the Northern and Southern Armies utilized in any way for administrative work?

752. SIR M. GROVER.—No, sir.

753. PRESIDENT.—Are you satisfied of the necessity for the considerable increase in the number of officers employed at Army Headquarters which has taken place of recent years? Do you think that their number could be reduced by measures of administrative decentralization or otherwise?

754. SIR M. GROVER.—I am sure I could not say. I do not know what they are employed on. The details of their work do not come to me at all. I agree that the cry now is to centralize at Army Headquarters.

755. SIR W. MEYER.—Does a divisional General get a budget of his own?

756. SIR M. GROVER.—Yes in regard to certain grants, and he transfers funds from one minor head to another within the same grant.

757. PRESIDENT.—Can you suggest any measures of further administrative decentralization which would reduce clerical establishments?

758. SIR M. GROVER.—No, I do not think so.

759. PRESIDENT.—Under the present system, how is the amount to be provided for special (Schedule) military expenditure in each year arrived at, and, this amount having been fixed, how are the relative merits of schemes to be financed therefrom, determined?

760. SIR M. GROVER.—The approximate limit of next year's military expenditure as a whole is fixed; this gives a rough figure for the Schedule. The allocation of this amount is decided by the Advisory Council.

761. SIR W. MEYER.—Suppose the Finance Department say £19,000,000 and the Commander-in-Chief says he must have £20,000,000, what happens?

762. SIR M. GROVER.—We always have an additional list of Schedule measures to be provided for if possible, should funds lapse elsewhere.

763. SIR W. MEYER.—We might take it that the present system works smoothly?

764. SIR M. GROVER.—It might work better if we could have a more constant grant each year for special measures outside the ordinary budget so as to enable us to work on a programme.

765. SIR W. MEYER.—Would that not be liable to revision? The Finance Department might say "give up part of your fixed grant this year"?

766. SIR M. GROVER.—At present we are rather debarred from carrying out a fixed programme.

767. SIR W. MEYER.—I once proposed to treat the army as the Government of India treats the local Governments.

768. SIR M. GROVER.—I think a special measure of that nature would be very difficult.

769. PRESIDENT.—Do you accept as necessary the full statement of the "Important needs of the Army on which expenditure will have to be incurred in the near future" given in Appendix XVII (paragraph 117) of the General

Staff Memorandum of 1911? What about items 13 and 14 for instance? If not, which measures would you select and in what order? What is the scope of the suggested expenditure on artillery re-armament? Does not this item figure (up to a cost of 22½ lakhs) in the current year's Schedule? Can you give an approximate estimate of the additional cost involved by the measures that you think really urgent in the near future and of how far this will expand the present military budget? It could be met in part, could it not, by replacement of present Schedule items as these are completed?

770. SIR M. GROVER.—They are all items which deserve detailed consideration. Some have already been accepted and others may possibly be unnecessary. Item 13 is important, but the expenditure to be incurred will be largely affected should the proposed reorganization of ammunition columns be sanctioned by the Secretary of State. Item 14 is also necessary, the measure has been practically completed. As regards the order of urgency of the important needs of the army, I put them, generally, in the following order:—

- (i) Armament, equipment and other modern needs.
- (ii) Improvements in distribution and organization.
- (iii) Improvements in communications.
- (iv) Training.

All of which are necessary for the efficient preparation for war. Next would come questions affecting the comfort, contentment, and efficient administration of the troops in peace. A statement has been prepared showing all details in connection with the question of the re-armament of artillery.

771. PRESIDENT.—Are there not usually considerable lapses in military expenditure every year as compared with budget allotments, in spite of large facilities for re-appropriation? Did not such lapses occur even when the special allotments for military expenditure given to Lord Kitchener in 1904 were subsequently curtailed? Is there any difficulty in re-granting in a subsequent year money which has, for good reason, not been spent in a previous one?

772. SIR M. GROVER.—Yes, there have been large lapses every year in spite of facilities for re-appropriation. It has had a bad effect; we have this year, for instance, had a lot of money carried over (which we should have spent) through no fault of our own; this chiefly concerns the Home charges.

773. PRESIDENT.—Can you suggest any method of expediting the procedure in regard to demands from India the outlay on which has to be met in England?

774. SIR M. GROVER.—We might give orders direct to factories. I suggest a reference on the subject to the Director-General of Ordnance. We occasionally receive demi-official information from Home telling us what chances our schemes have of being sanctioned.

775. PRESIDENT.—Are you satisfied with existing methods of procedure in the Army Department and Army Headquarters? Is there not duplication of work?

776. SIR M. GROVER.—I do not think there is any duplication of work at Army Headquarters. Certain suggestions are now being made. Despatches are drafted in the various Branches. They are then subject to revision in the Army Department and Military Finance Branch. Small despatches are drafted straight off in the Army Department. Confidential despatches are often drafted in the Army Department. Army Regulations are revised in Army Headquarters.

777. SIR P. LAKE.—Have you any suggestions to make for accelerating, during any given financial year, the expenditure at Home of money allotted for that year?

778. SIR M. GROVER.—I should like some system by which we could get into more direct touch with the people at Home.

779. PRESIDENT.—Is there any inducement in present circumstances to units to practise economy in regard to stores and equipment issued free? If not, can you suggest any?

780. SIR M. GROVER.—There is no inducement. The question of encouraging economy is about to be worked out by a committee.

781. PRESIDENT.—Have you any remarks to make with reference to military efficiency on the present furlough and leave system in the native army?

782. SIR M. GROVER.—I have no remarks to offer.

783. PRESIDENT.—Does the present system of keeping a large proportion of British troops in the hills in the hot weather affect our readiness to meet internal disorder?

784. SIR M. GROVER.—No, sir.

785. SIR W. MEYER.—Suppose you have an outbreak, what then?

786. SIR M. GROVER.—I am not quite sure that my answer is right in that point. You would get a certain amount of warning however. I can suggest no alternative course; I think there is a risk, but it is counterbalanced by the advantages to the army. I think the move to the hills is not altogether popular with British soldiers, but it benefits their health. Their training can be kept up in the hills when they could not do anything at all on the plains on account of the heat.

787. SIR P. LAKE.—Is anything being done with regard to obtaining earlier financial assistance and advice when schemes are to be drawn up?

788. SIR M. GROVER.—The question of getting earlier financial assistance is being discussed with the Finance Department.

789. SIR W. MEYER.—What are your views on the proposed abolition of bands in Indian regiments?

790. SIR M. GROVER.—It would not be desirable; it would be very unpopular; the band helps to make regimental duty pleasant.

791. SIR W. MEYER.—Can you tell us anything of the Bombay-Sind railway connection?

792. SIR M. GROVER.—I have not seen the scheme at all, myself.

(The witness then withdrew.)

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

9th Meeting—Tuesday, the 11th June 1912.

Sir Charles Cleveland, K.C.I.E., I.C.S., Director of Criminal Intelligence, and Major W. J. Ottley, 34th Sikh Pioneers, attended as witnesses and were examined.

EVIDENCE OF SIR CHARLES CLEVELAND.

793. PRESIDENT.—Sir Charles Cleveland, you are Director of Criminal Intelligence ?

794. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I am. Formerly I was Inspector-General of Police in the Central Provinces for eight years. During 1909 I was employed on special duty in connection with sedition in that part of the world. I came to the Government of India in 1909.

795. PRESIDENT.—Had the Government of India a Director of Criminal Intelligence previous to you ?

796. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, two ; Mr. Stevenson-Moore, and before him Sir Harold Stuart. The post was created in 1904.

797. SIR W. MEYER.—One of the objects of the appointment is to co-ordinate the work of the police in the provinces, is it not ?

798. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, as regards criminal intelligence. The administration of the ordinary police is not included in my duties.

799. SIR W. MEYER.—But you do get reports and it is recognized as one of your functions to bring to the notice of those concerned events in any province as regards criminal movements which may affect others ?

800. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, anything beyond the parochial affairs of a province.

801. PRESIDENT.—What societies and organizations of a religious or quasi-religious character are at work for political objects ?

802. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—There are many such societies. I have with me a thick printed volume which contains the provincial notes and details of all known societies. I am not sure whether your question excludes societies with a political character but which are neither religious nor quasi-religious, *e.g.*, the National Congress.

803. SIR W. MEYER.—I think we should include any society of political significance.

804. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Very well ; the first one I would mention is the Arya Samaj.

805. PRESIDENT.—With what political objects does the Arya Samaj associate itself ?

806. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—It has been a very most and vexed question ; the Arya Samajists themselves every now and then find it convenient to disavow any political connection, but in 1907 the influence of the Arya Samaj on the political unrest prevailing at the time was very clearly traced in the Punjab.

807. PRESIDENT.—Whom do they work among ?

808. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—May I offer you a book on the Arya Samaj ? It is Mr. Sands' account of the Arya Samaj in the United Provinces published

in 1910. There is also a Punjab Note on the Arya Samaj if you wish to have it?

809. PRESIDENT.—Yes, we should like to see it. Do you consider the Arya Samaj a dangerous association?

810. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—It is very hard to generalize, but its dangerous possibilities can, I think, be kept in check by intelligent Government action.

811. PRESIDENT.—Is its influence increasing?

812. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—My personal view is that during the past two or three years much of the political sting has been taken out of it. The political aims of some prominent members of the Samaj were clearly disclosed in 1908-09, and since then they have found it necessary to keep the political side of their teachings rather more in the background.

813. SIR W. MEYER.—It is a very recent religion?

814. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—It was founded by Swami Dayanand Saraswati who was born in 1824 at Morvi in Kathiawar. The first branch of the Arya Samaj was established by him at Bombay in 1875. At the time of his death in 1883 some 300 branches were in existence.

815. SIR W. MEYER.—Should you say that from the time of its foundation it was political and anti-British?

816. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—It was originally antagonistic to the Christian and all other religions.

817. SIR W. MEYER.—If they set themselves to quarrel with everybody their power is considerably diminished, is it not?

818. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—That is their weakness; they are constantly embroiled with other people.

819. SIR P. LAKE.—A statement has been made that some of the influential members of the Arya Samaj had been leading seditious agitators, while others had associated themselves with anarchists in Europe and America. Is there any foundation for such a statement?

820. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes.

821. SIR W. MEYER.—I understand that the Arya Samaj is less militant and anti-British now than it was some years ago. Do you ascribe that to fear of consequences or to the fact that a more moderate element has gained the upper hand?

822. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—On the one hand, extremism has become disreputable owing to various disclosures made in the course of investigations of and trials for political offences; while, on the other, the leaders themselves realized that connection with a policy of violence was doing the society harm in the eyes of the Government and of the public.

823. SIR W. MEYER.—The change of attitude was to a certain extent opportunism and disgust at the commission of crime? Also, are not certain of the people more or less lukewarm?

824. PRESIDENT.—I suppose most people who join the Arya Samaj do not join from any high religious motive, but from hope of personal advantage?

825. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—The motives which lead people to join the Arya Samaj are mixed. Perhaps the following story will interest the Committee and throw light on the situation. I knew an old gentleman very well indeed in my own district who had been of great assistance to me during the famine. I left the district and went back to find that he was an Arya Samajist. In reply to my question on the subject he pointed out that I knew him sufficiently well to believe him when he said that he would not have joined the Arya Samaj if there had been anything wrong in it. Two years later I met him and

said "How are you getting on in the Arya Samaj.?" He replied "I have left it." I asked him why, and he said "Do not ask me."

826. PRESIDENT.—Then you would imply that a great many people join from religious motives?

827. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, and are not initiated into the true inwardness of the association until afterwards.

828. SIR W. MEYER.—Some branches of the Samaj differ in their teachings from others, do they not? Are they under any central control?

829. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—The main governing body has its headquarters at Ajmere. It has many influential people on its rolls but does not control the bodies outside. I can show the Committee a list of the persons constituting that body. It includes such persons as Maharaja Sir Partab Singh.

830. SIR W. MEYER.—Are those people active members of this body? Does the governing body hear appeals or consider religious difficulties?

831. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—The governing body is the nominal head. Its members are the legatees of the Swami.

832. SIR W. MEYER.—It is not a body like the Synod of the Church of Scotland, is it, which exercises control in matters of discipline?

833. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I do not think they take action in such matters.

834. SIR W. MEYER.—Then they are mere figureheads?

835. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, but the body derives a certain amount of influence from the men who are enrolled as its members.

836. SIR W. MEYER.—Then it is the provincial bodies that exercise the real influence?

837. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—They exercise considerable influence.

838. SIR W. MEYER.—Are there Arya Samajists in all provinces?

839. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—We know of 533 branches in all, of which 296 are in the United Provinces, 157 in the Punjab, and smaller numbers in the Central Provinces, etc. You will notice the coincidence that the distribution appears to follow the distribution of the army in a curious way.

840. SIR W. MEYER.—Are there many in Hyderabad (Deccan), the biggest military centre in India?

841. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—The important head centres are those at Lahore and in the United Provinces, near the real recruiting grounds of the bulk of the Indian army.

842. PRESIDENT.—Judging from the list, there would appear to be a large number in the Rohtak District where the Jats come from; thus in Hissar there are twenty-two, and in Gurdaspur twenty.

843. SIR W. MEYER.—A branch may be five or five hundred strong?

844. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—A branch may be large or small according to the number of the local adherents; it would occupy much the same position as a local congregation does in a religious body.

845. SIR W. MEYER.—Is the North-West Frontier Province affiliated to the Punjab in the Arya Samaj organization?

846. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes.

847. SIR W. MEYER.—May I ask if members of the main or "Imperial" branch also belong to the provincial governing bodies?

848. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Some do, but not all.

849. PRESIDENT.—Are their services open; can anybody attend?

850. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—They are open to anybody, but they also have committee meetings which are necessarily not open.

851. SIR W. MEYER.—How do these provincial bodies control local branches?

852. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—They advise them; send out lecturers; take an interest in funds, and act as courts of appeal in questions of doctrine and discipline. They vary from province to province as regards the amount of control.

853. SIR W. MEYER.—What is the size of these governing bodies?

854. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—It depends on the number of branches in a province, all of which elect one or two members. But these, in turn, elect a central committee of from twenty to thirty members, I think.

855. SIR W. MEYER.—Would they be all working members, or like the distinguished Chief you mentioned who gives mere honorary support?

856. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—No, the real power would generally fall into the hands of two or three working members.

857. SIR W. MEYER.—You hold that these provincial bodies do concern themselves with politics?

858. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I think they all do; the political question is bound to come up in all branches.

859. SIR W. MEYER.—You could not for instance have a diocésan conference discussing general politics, as they would understand that it was outside their functions as churchmen. Is the Arya Samaj different, and, when their branches meet, are they bound to discuss political questions?

860. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Not always; but at some time or other they must discuss them.

861. SIR W. MEYER.—It is alleged that the Arya Samaj is a proselytizing religion, but has become anti-British. You say one of its main tenets is "India for the Aryans." We have also arrived at the fact that the government of this "church" rests practically with certain provincial synods, that these have to deal with missionary propaganda, the disposal of funds, and questions of doctrine and discipline, and that they are also at liberty to deal with political matters. Would such a synod discuss what they should do, supposing, for instance, that it was proposed to start a movement to tell sepoys that they are not well treated by the British Government?

862. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—They would talk about it, but not record it.

863. SIR R. SCALLON.—Have you lists of members of the Arya Samaj?

864. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—We have no such lists, but I think that there are lists of Samaj members, especially for the purpose of recording subscriptions. All members of the Arya Samaj are supposed to contribute one per cent of their income to the Samaj?

865. SIR R. SCALLON.—Do you know how many retired members of the army belong to it?

866. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—No, but if you wanted to know about a certain man we could tell you whether he was an Arya Samajist or not. The local people could tell you at once if he was an openly professing Arya Samajist.

867. SIR W. MEYER.—The political danger arises practically from three or four individuals who get the control of the machine into their own hands?

868. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—No, I could not say that. The political danger would depend upon popular feeling, and that might require a great

deal of stirring up, or very little. A leader might arise outside the recognized governing bodies, and by his eloquent preaching upset the people considerably. A good deal would depend upon their lecturers.

869. SIR W. MEYER.—You cannot compare the Samaj to one of the secret societies on the Continent ?

870. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Certainly not.

871. SIR R. SCALLON.—Has not the Arya Samaj started schools where preachers are being trained ? Do they teach them anything connected with politics, or is the teaching entirely religious ?

872. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—It is a vexed question. Their enemies say that the chief Arya Samaj school is a sink of vice. Politics are no doubt inculcated. The teachers have included several well-known seditionists.

873. SIR P. LAKE.—Would you say the *gurukuls* teach sedition ?

874. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I should say that the *gurukul* at Kangri (the big one) has inculcated a good deal of anti-British feeling.

875. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you, if you knew a man of some standing to be an Arya Samajist, think him worth watching ?

876. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—No, I would wait until he had done something, because a man can become an Arya Samajist for many reasons. For instance, caste restrictions may be pressing very heavily upon him.

877. SIR W. MEYER.—So the mere fact of his being an Arya Samajist would not make him suspect ?

878. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—No, but whether I should rely on him in an emergency, is perhaps outside your question.

879. SIR R. SCALLON.—Are the majority of these branches in or near cantonments ?

880. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—There is a branch in the cities near which the cantonments are situated and in several cases there may be a separate branch in the cantonment.

881. SIR R. SCALLON.—You said just now they seemed to follow the troops ?

882. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I merely mentioned it as a coincidence.

883. SIR R. SCALLON.—Have you got a table to show that there are more branches near cantonments than elsewhere ?

884. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—No, I have not got such a table ready. It would not strike me as a matter of importance whether they were near or not : the work would not be much affected by the situation of the branch-office.

885. SIR W. MEYER.—It is an actively increasing body ?

886. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—We imagine that it is increasing tremendously, but we have not yet got the census figures of 1911.

887. PRESIDENT.—The people who entertain respect for caste cannot like people of low caste to be taught that there is no difference between them ?

888. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—That is where they do not carry out their tenets ; some customs stand in the way, others do not. A question of marriage for instance comes under the first category, a food or drink question would fall under the second category, though they would probably stop short at interdining.

889. SIR R. SCALLON.—Do they include the eating of beef among their relaxations of rules ?

890. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—No, of course a good deal of beef-eating goes on in India secretly.

891. PRESIDENT.—What is the next powerful organization? We have heard of the Tat Khalsa. Is that next in importance?

892. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—No, I should say the All India Muslim League is of more Imperial importance.

893. SIR W. MEYER.—I would just ask one more question; did the deportation of Lajpat Rai, etc., in 1907, exercise any influence on the political activities of the Arya Samaj?

894. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—It rather stimulated them in one way, and frightened them in another; but what exercised a very great influence was Lajpat Rai's correspondence with Bhai Parmanand. That drew them out into the open.

895. SIR P. LAKE.—What was the purport of the correspondence?

896. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—It spoke of the desirability of supplying revolutionary books to students and Lajpat Rai wrote "My only fear is that the bursting out may not be premature." This letter was dated 11th April 1907.

897. PRESIDENT.—Had the Arya Samaj any part in causing unrest in the 10th Jats?

898. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes.

899. PRESIDENT.—It was the main cause?

900. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Members of the Arya Samaj stirred up unrest in the 10th Jats.

901. PRESIDENT.—What was the pretext?

902. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—They attempted to spread discontent with their position amongst the sepoys. I do not suppose they had the slightest intention of inciting to mutiny but they wanted them to resign. They have always preached against Government service.

903. SIR P. LAKE.—Have they ever tried to seduce soldiers from their allegiance?

904. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Members of the Arya Samaj have made persistent efforts.

905. SIR W. MEYER.—Can you quote any other instances?

906. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I would refer you to Sir Denzil Ibbetson's note* of 1907 which shows how Arya Samajists then attempted to disaffect the sepoys.

907. SIR R. SCALLON.—Did they try to do with the 6th Jats what they did with the 10th Jats?

908. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I do not remember the details of the case of the 6th Jats.

909. SIR W. MEYER.—There is the further step of going to a particular sepoy and saying "cease to serve this tyrannical Government."

910. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—It would be very difficult to get evidence of such acts done quietly and secretly.

911. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you had evidence during the last few years of the continuance of such efforts?

912. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—The propaganda is continued but not quite so boldly.

913. SIR P. LAKE.—We have heard that they get at people travelling by train; does that still go on?

914. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, we have heard of such cases.

* Not reproduced.

915. PRESIDENT.—In the General Staff Appreciation attention is drawn to the fact that though there is nothing in the old Hindu tenets that prohibits the killing of cattle, they do not hesitate to include cow-killing amongst the deadliest of sins. Do you concur in that statement?

916. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I concur in it generally.

917. PRESIDENT.—Again it is stated in the Appreciation : “It is the only association that has tried to seduce soldiers from their allegiance.” From that one would gather that so far as Dogras, Jats and Rajputs are concerned, they are only influenced by the anti-cow-killing agitation? But that is a form of agitation that is always with us. There is nothing new in it?

918. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—No, nothing.

919. SIR P. LAKE.—The implication was that the Association adopted this movement for the purpose of getting hold of certain classes.

920. PRESIDENT.—Now we come to the All India Muslim League.

921. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I think it might be useful to recall the history of the League. The idea was first given effect to in 1901 at Lucknow. It was resolved to form an association to take united action in the interests of the Muslim community throughout India. Provincial committees were accordingly organized. Little success was however obtained as they were without pecuniary support. What gave a considerable stimulus to the movement was the deputation to Simla in 1906. That was their first success in organized political activity and it led to the institution of the League in its present form. The educated section of the Muhammadans has generally controlled the League, and the year 1911 saw a change and brought into prominence a liberal party. During the present year we have seen extraordinary developments.

922. PRESIDENT.—This League is opposed to Hindus and is in favour of British rule, is it not? And its encouragement is likely to prevent combination?

923. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—The encouragement might be a great illustration of the *divide et impera* principle.

924. PRESIDENT.—The League was in favour of the maintenance of British rule in India up till 1911?

925. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—That is so; since then their affairs have been through a somewhat critical stage.

926. PRESIDENT.—Can they hope to gain anything by assisting Hindus?

927. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—At the end of 1911 the Young Muhammadans became prominent as they got their chance with the Delhi “boons” and other events such as the Turco-Italian war. This young party made a great deal of noise and caused a certain amount of excitement, firstly in Lahore and subsequently in Calcutta. It is now giving a certain amount of anxiety in the United Provinces. Its adherents say that solid acquiescence in the *hukum* of the Government is not the way to get reforms and that Muhammadans must follow the Hindus a little more and perhaps co-operate with them. Some of the younger members have fallen in with this idea.

928. SIR P. LAKE.—They go on the principle that agitation leads to concessions?

929. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes. One of the Young Muhammadan leaders was standing next to me when the cancellation of the partition of Bengal was announced at Delhi and he was angry and upset and said to me “You must look after our young men now, for we won’t. We have paid homage to the King; now we see we should have paid homage to Mr. Gokhale.”

930. SIR R. SCALLON.—Has Mr. Montagu’s speech had any great effect?

931. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes. He said erroneously, as I think, that it was a mistake to suppose that the Muhammadans of Eastern Bengal were

closely connected with other Muhammadans in India. I have got some interesting papers on the point if the Committee would like to look at them.

932. SIR W. MEYER.—You say that the general organization of the Muhammadans dates from 1906, when an influential deputation waited on Lord Minto; but surely before that they worked together? They refused to join the 'National' Congress, did they not?

933. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, but there was no League.

934. SIR W. MEYER.—But there was a certain amount of organization?

935. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Not much.

936. SIR W. MEYER.—They felt that they had common interests; when the late Sir Syed Ahmed Khan said "it is not to our interests to join," they felt they ought to follow his advice?

937. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, but those who did not follow it were not going against any organization.

938. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you attach any great importance to the League as an organization? It is presided over by the Aga Khan who is neither *Shiah* nor *Sunni*. Does not the fact of this heretic being its leader rather affect the influence of the League amongst the orthodox?

939. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I do not think so. The views are still held to be so very sound that it is not worth while quarrelling with the leaders of the organization.

940. SIR W. MEYER.—The League has struck me as somewhat of an assembly of busybodies. There were representations made to the British Government about holding Russia in check in Persia and Italy in Tripoli, were there not?

941. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—That was originated by the London Muslim League which, though affiliated, rather takes the bit between its teeth.

942. SIR W. MEYER.—You speak of the Turco-Italian war, and, I suppose you would add, Morocco?

943. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, but the Moroccan excitement is more recent.

944. SIR W. MEYER.—But has it exercised influence over Muhammadans generally?

945. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—The Turco-Italian war has, but I do not think Morocco has to anything like the same extent.

946. SIR W. MEYER.—Why should they be more annoyed with the Italians for trying to take Tripoli, than with the French for trying to take Morocco?

947. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—So very much less is heard of the Moroccan affair. Tripoli has been much more prominent in the papers, and it is a clearer case of grabbing. Further, Turkey is the heart of Islam and as the custodian of its holy places enjoys immense traditional respect in all Islamic countries.

948. SIR R. SCALLON.—Do not these papers copy from the Egyptian and Turkish papers, where there is a good deal more about Tripoli than about Morocco?

949. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes.

950. SIR W. MEYER.—Is the Muhammadan Press organized in the same way as the Congress Press?

951. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I should say not.

952. SIR W. MEYER.—You speak about this interesting development among the young men; do you attach any great weight to that?

953. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I do not attach very great weight to it, but the Muhammadan population is inflammable and it would not surprise me if it excited them into action, but I do not actually expect it.

954. SIR W. MEYER.—How can they work together with Hindus in politics? One thing the Congress objects to is the large proportion of representation given to Muhammadans under the Morley Reform Scheme.

955. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Then you get the young Muhammadan who does not insist on it.

956. SIR W. MEYER.—Well I put it to you that the Pro-Congress Muhammadan is much like the Protestant Home Ruler in Ireland, a *rara avis in terris nigroque simillima cygno*?

957. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes.

958. SIR W. MEYER.—And you do not think there is a likelihood, for some years, of young Muhammadans joining in with Hindus against the British Raj?

959. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I consider that we are going to get a rather dangerous class of young Muhammadans who, I do not think, have yet settled what their policy is to be. I cannot imagine a combination between Muhammadans and Hindus, but that does not necessarily mean that there may not be a Muhammadan danger.

960. SIR W. MEYER.—There may be one or the other, but is it likely that they might join together?

961. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—No, but it happened in the Mutiny.

962. SIR W. MEYER.—Yes, but then they had a titular head at Delhi; they have not such a thing now.

963. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I cannot say that any combination would last for long; I can only think that an exhibition of weakness on the part of the Government might have the effect of combining them.

964. PRESIDENT.—I suppose this troublesome class has arisen owing to higher education?

965. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, and to dissatisfaction with their prospects.

966. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing a Sikh outbreak, would Muhammadans rally to us?

967. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I should say it would be bad statesmanship if we could not secure that.

968. SIR W. MEYER.—Similarly, in the case of a Muhammadan outbreak, we could secure the sympathy of others?

969. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I hold very strong views that, so long as we are not hopelessly involved in Europe, nothing but a weak Government would tempt these people to combine.

970. PRESIDENT.—Now we come to the Tat Khalsa.

971. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—You will find the memorandum* on this * Not reproduced. subject by Mr. Petrie, Assistant Director, Criminal Intelligence valuable.

972. PRESIDENT.—You would consider the Tat Khalsa advantageous from a political point of view?

973. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—It is like so many of these societies; it depends upon how it is treated. I do not think you can safely leave it alone. I think you can guide it. This movement has for its ostensible object the promotion of Sikh orthodoxy, but, though it may appear curious, there seems to be some likelihood of a combination being brought about between the Tat Khalsa and the Arya Samaj, because a new spirit is permeating the Tat Khalsa.

974. SIR W. MEYER.—But we are told that the Tat Khalsa was started to counteract the proselytizing of the Arya Samaj.

975. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—That is the case, but it has developed a political “kink” since then.

976. SIR W. MEYER.—Does the Arya Samaj still proselytize? Surely the Sikhs resent that?

977. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, very much indeed.

978. SIR R. SCALLON.—Is the headquarters of the Tat Khalsa in Patiala?

979. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—No. At Amritsar.

980. SIR W. MEYER.—What is the numerical strength of the Tat Khalsa?

981. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I have no idea.

982. SIR W. MEYER.—There are about two million Sikhs?

983. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Two-and-a-half to three millions, I think.

984. SIR W. MEYER.—Are any considerable portion of them imbued with the teachings of the Tat Khalsa?

985. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Many of the young generation are so imbued.

986. SIR W. MEYER.—It is not so much a religion as a movement within a religion?

987. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes.

988. SIR W. MEYER.—The census would not, therefore, give us any notion of its numerical strength. Who guides it?

989. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—The people at the head are sometimes very influential, sometimes they are not. It is an exceedingly complicated matter. They maintain teachers who lecture on religious, political, and other subjects, and very often the subjects are more or less intermingled.

990. SIR W. MEYER.—You describe the political tendency of the Arya Samaj as ‘India for the Aryans;’ how would you describe that of the Tat Khalsa?

991. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—The nationalization of the Sikhs.

992. SIR W. MEYER.—The Punjab for the Sikhs?

993. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—That is, putting a somewhat sinister interpretation on it.

994. SIR W. MEYER.—What is their political aspiration?

995. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—There are several of what we should call loyal Sikhs inside the Tat Khalsa movement and they would not say ‘The Punjab for the Sikhs,’ whereas others would say it.

996. SIR R. SCALLON.—With Patiala as King?

997. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—The man who wrote the poem I have mentioned to you would say so.

998. SIR R. SCALLON.—Then there are two classes; the one loyalist, the other composed of people who desire to revive the Sikh kingdom?

999. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—That is as I understand it.

1000. SIR W. MEYER.—Can you say that the Tat Khalsa as a whole is anti-British?

1001. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I should like to answer this by quoting from an introduction I wrote in October last to Mr. Petrie’s Memorandum* on recent developments in Sikh politics, which your Committee already have. I chose my words carefully and cannot, I think, better them now. “It is desirable to

* Not reproduced.

add that Mr. Petrie, as the result of his numerous interviews with prominent Sikhs, is afraid that he may have laid somewhat too much stress on the political nature of the Tat Khalsa movement which in its general nature and spirit may perhaps be less political and anti-British than the writings, speeches and acts, of its most zealous exponents seemed to suggest. But in any case this movement seems to contain the germs of strong development on the political side and to deserve very careful study and observation. The Sikhs are, for many reasons, of special interest to everybody engaged in maintaining British rule in India. Their modern developments are specially difficult to understand and appraise aright. On the one hand we have to avoid overweening confidence, and on the other undue suspicion. The exact point at which the Sikhs require guidance, stimulation or restraint, from the Government in their efforts to improve themselves call not only for statesmanship but for information and knowledge."

1002. SIR W. MEYER.—Assuming that this tendency prevails, would you say that it might bring them into alliance with Arya Samajists and Muhammadans ?

1003. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I do not imagine that they could combine for long.

1004. SIR W. MEYER.—Has not our experience in India been, and it is a great safeguard, that when these societies are started, the members have rivalries, and quarrel with each other ; ought we not to take that into account ?

1005. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, I think that the practical question which arises out of this is whether we have not got too many Sikh eggs in the Government basket.

1006. SIR W. MEYER.—You mean that perhaps we have got too many Sikhs in the army, etc. ?

1007. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, in the army, police, military police, etc., and it is a question whether our schemes do not rely too much on them.

1008. SIR W. MEYER.—Are they not a somewhat factious lot, and do they not find it difficult to pull together ?

1009. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, I should say so.

1010. SIR W. MEYER.—They would not pull together so easily as Muhammadans, would they ?

1011. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—No, because their religion is not so ancient nor so reasonable, and, again, not so easy to understand. They have got a plurality of religious leaders.

1012. SIR P. LAKE.—Do you take it that, in addition to Patiala, the other Phulkian States are tainted with the spirit of unrest ?

1013. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I would take it that the present Ruler of Nabha has a distinctly seditious record, but he has not shown his hand very clearly since his accession.

1014. SIR R. SCALLON.—How about Jind ?

1015. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Jind has not come before me.

1016. SIR R. SCALLON.—You said that the Arya Samajists were preaching near cantonments and discouraging men from accepting Government service, has anything of the same sort been going on in connection with the Tat Khalsa ?

1017. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—It has been very frequently mentioned in Sikh papers, and there have been poems about 'demoralizing service' and so on. That is part of the stock-in-trade of every agitator of course.

1018. PRESIDENT.—What other societies would you mention ?

1019. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Well, there is the Gaurakshina Sabha, which attacks cattle-killing generally. Every now and then it takes on a political taint. You, no doubt, remember the monster petition which was got up just before His Majesty came out. Political feeling was used to push that. The Gaurakshina Sabha has no headquarters.

Then there is the Ram Krishna Mission connected with Vedantism in America.

1020. SIR W. MEYER.—Does it exercise much influence over the people ?

1021. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Over certain classes; it has attracted Americans a good deal. Sensible people are less attracted than formerly by the Indian Vedantists in America but neurotic women and anæmic men still collect round them.

1022. SIR W. MEYER.—Have they anything to do with the anti-British articles published in some of the American papers ?

1023. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, they are very often connected with them.

1024. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you consider the Brahmo Samaj anything serious ?

1025. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—We take very little notice of the Brahmo Samaj as a political body. We have been told that some of the bitterest men are Brahmo Samajists, but they do not join the Samaj from political motives.

Then there is the Ganpati movement among the Chitpavans. The real significance of the Ganpati movement is to be found in the fight by Tilak for the leadership of the Deccan in the nineties. He took it up first of all as an anti-Muhammadan movement and then swung it off against the Government. You will see the anti-Government tendency in the annual Ganpati celebrations. They instal their heroes—such as Tilak—as gods and worship them.

1026. SIR R. SCALLON.—Have Tilak's ideas spread beyond the Deccan ?

1027. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, they extended to Calcutta in 1906, when combination between the Bengalis and Marathas was going on.

1028. SIR R. SCALLON.—Has that died out ?

1029. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—The combination is nothing like what it was.

1030. PRESIDENT.—Do you regard the Maratha Brahmans as a most intelligent and dangerous class ?

1031. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—It is difficult to estimate their danger, but they are generally supposed to be clever and I think they are.

1032. PRESIDENT.—There are many of them in the service of the Government ?

1033. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, a great many.

1034. PRESIDENT.—And no doubt they get information which they communicate to headquarters. I suppose there are some of them in Simla, in the telegraph office, etc.?

1035. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—There are not many in Simla. I rarely see a Maratha Brahman in the Simla streets.

1036. PRESIDENT.—I suppose you keep a careful watch on them ?

1037. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—We keep a watch on all movements which come to our notice, but we would not watch a particular individual unless we had heard something against him.

1038. SIR R. SCALLON.—Have they also tried to affect the army ?

1039. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Tilak and the Chitpavans have made distinct efforts on the army, so has Mr. Gokhale, through his underlings.

1040. SIR W. MEYER.—You would put the Chitpavans down as anti-British ?

1041. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I would say that at least 90 per cent of them are sentimentally disloyal and that they would bow to Tilak in preference to bowing to the King.

1042. SIR W. MEYER.—When you speak of the Ganpati movement you refer to the Chitpavals ?

1043. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—They started it : though a number of people take part, it is an emanation of the Chitpavan brain.

1044. SIR W. MEYER.—It is very old, but has recently been converted into a political instrument ?

1045. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes.

1046. SIR W. MEYER.—Does it still interest itself in politics ?

1047. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—It does if it gets half a chance. Government has had to forbid its songs and also to prevent obvious sedition while the celebrations were taking place. At Nagpur last year we said that we would not allow seditious manifestations in the Ganpati celebrations. They said 'all right, we will not hold a celebration at all.'

1048. SIR W. MEYER.—Then there is the acting of plays ?

1049. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, that is a very favourite method. The play is nominally some incident from the Mahabharata or other book, but between the lines it applies to modern conditions.

1050. SIR W. MEYER.—Are these being acted still ?

1051. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes ; there has been a good deal of weeding out done, but it is difficult to stop them entirely.

1052. SIR W. MEYER.—Are the Chitpavans doing this ?

1053. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, in the Maratha country.

1054. PRESIDENT.—Is the Gaikwar influenced by these Brahmans a good deal ?

1055. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—The Gaikwar was very friendly with Tilak, and it is a tradition that the Chitpavans are the born bureaucrats of the Maratha country.

1056. PRESIDENT.—Is Sindhia ?

1057. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes ; he is influenced by them. He would find it extremely uncomfortable if he quarrelled with the Maratha Brahmans.

1058. SIR W. MEYER.—But if you look back through history you will find Sindhia, Holkar and the Gaikwar at war against the Peshwas.

1059. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I was thinking more of the Chitpavan Brahmans in the Maratha States. Sindhia has many in his State service.

1060. PRESIDENT.—They are so useful ?

1061. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, they are most intelligent and work for small pay.

1062. SIR W. MEYER.—Do they influence the people generally ?

1063. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I have seen it go in waves ; at times in British India they have been 'top dogs' and were looked up to more than the Commissioner of the division ; at others I have seen them reduced to nothing.

1064. PRESIDENT.—You must adopt offensive tactics in dealing with them ?

1065. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—It is fatal if you sit still and let them attack.

1066. PRESIDENT.—Does Sivaji's descendant at Kolhapur (he is on anything but good terms with the Maratha Brahmans) exercise any influence ?

1067. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Not outside his own State.

1068. SIR W. MEYER.—And these, Sindhia and the rest, would they welcome a revival of the state of things which prevailed in the Peshwas' time ?

1069. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—The Gaikwar has always favoured the Maratha Brahman extremists.

1070. SIR W. MEYER.—Do they regard Tilak as their leader ?

1071. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes. Tilak's paper is still published, and his disciples are still trying to maintain his doctrines. They write to him in jail and ask him questions. We also allow him to have interviews with his relatives.

1072. PRESIDENT.—I should have thought that no communication of any sort would be allowed.

1073. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—They allow him interviews. The Maratha Brahman disloyalists are, however, being very strongly dealt with just now in the Bombay Presidency and in the Central Provinces and Berar.

1074. PRESIDENT.—Are the Chitpavans less openly anti-British now ?

1075. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—The Chitpavans are not so dependent upon public subscriptions as they derive their funds more from their newspapers. Whilst the Arya Samajists try to keep up an appearance of being not ill-disposed towards the Government, the Chitpavans are more avowedly anti-British than other disloyal sections. Tilak's papers the *Kesari* and *Mahrarta* have been very outspoken all along and have made no pretence at loyalty.

1076. PRESIDENT.—A reluctance to being martyrs is common to both the Arya Samajists and Chitpavans ?

1077. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes.

1078. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you anything in India corresponding to the Italian " patriots " of the Mazzini type ?

1079. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes. We have had many such in the last few years.

1080. SIR W. MEYER.—Do these not find it most convenient to reside out of India ?

1081. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes. Several such instances have occurred.

1082. SIR W. MEYER.—The rest keep within the law as far as possible ? Has the Press Act had any effect ?

1083. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—A tremendous effect. Men who wish to write open sedition cannot stay in India in safety.

1084. SIR W. MEYER.—Is it being still applied ?

1085. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—It is being very carefully applied, especially in Bombay. There has always been more latitude in Calcutta owing partly to the attitude of the High Court.

1086. SIR W. MEYER.—Is there any evidence of tampering with the troops ?

1087. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, plenty.

1088. SIR W. MEYER.—Does not the activity go back to 1897 or thereabouts ?

1089. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, considerably beyond that ; to the ' eighties and even the ' seventies.

1090. PRESIDENT.—What was the disturbance in Lord Lytton's time when a Press Act was passed ?

1091. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—It was passed in 1878 against the vernacular native Press which had become very seditious and libellous.

1092. SIR W. MEYER.—Yes, the Bengal Press. Are the Chitpavans still tampering with the troops through the Press?

1093. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I do not think we have had any recent articles.

1094. SIR W. MEYER.—Has there been any underground tampering as far as you know?

1095. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—On the whole the attempts to tamper with the native army have been chiefly by newspaper articles, pamphlets, etc. We can give many instances. Secret attempts have not come to our notice on a systematic scale.

1096. SIR W. MEYER.—Are the Chitpavans very largely employed in the telegraph service?

1097. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—A great many posts are occupied by them.

1098. SIR W. MEYER.—Have any steps been taken or are any contemplated with a view to restricting their employment?

1099. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—The matter has been considered and discussed off and on during the past two years, with the result that if we make a reasonable representation that there is a nest of Chitpavans that needs disturbing, the necessary action is taken. Take the case of Bina where there were several reports regarding these men though not enough actual proof for criminal prosecution. I represented the matter to the railway authorities, who went into the subject and scattered the members of the coterie.

1100. SIR W. MEYER.—I was thinking of the possible danger of a large number of Chitpavans being employed in telegraph work and being able to use their position against us in time of trouble.

1101. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—The point has been considered, and it was decided that it was inexpedient to make a general move.

1102. SIR W. MEYER.—Have the railway authorities been approached on the subject?

1103. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I have frequently spoken to the Railway Board with the full knowledge of the Home Member, but they were averse to taking general action.

1104. SIR W. MEYER.—I should like to know the reasons for their inaction.

1105. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—First of all, there is the point as to what would happen to the Chitpavans themselves if they were turned out, and whether it would be legitimate to treat them so. Next you have the question of business; railways are conducted more or less on business lines, and these Chitpavan Brahmans are the best available clerks. Then, interference in small matters which are well within the province of the Railway Board is to be deprecated. Finally, there is the big general question; the foundations of British rule in India are somewhat shaky in many directions. We cannot make them thoroughly sound and strong all round and still claim to treat all classes and races impartially. We cannot eliminate all unreliable natives.

1106. SIR W. MEYER.—You need not necessarily have recourse to such a serious step as dismissal: you could scatter them, could you not?

1107. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—It would be difficult, nor do I think that it would meet the case. Without actually dismissing them you might, as you say, rule that vacancies as they occurred should not be filled by them, except within certain limits, which would mean that you would reduce the proportion of them.

1108. SIR W. MEYER.—The main principle is the maintenance of the Raj. Might I ask your personal opinion; do you think Chitpavans are employed to a dangerous extent?

1109 SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I certainly have thought so. When I was a local officer—Inspector-General of Police—I took a great deal of interest in the subject, and thought the railway authorities unduly apathetic. My outlook has broadened up here at headquarters and I see more clearly the difficulties in the way of moving, but I should have no hesitation in moving if real pressing danger threatened.

1110. SIR W. MEYER.—Taking other Government departments; has there been a dangerous influx of Chitpavans into them?

1111. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—In the Maratha country there are, of course, a great number of Chitpavans in the Government offices. The matter has been noticed by the Bombay Government and I do not think it now constitutes a serious danger.

1112. SIR W. MEYER.—We had the statement—with special reference to Bombay—that the agitators were now taking to using temperance and other apparently innocent movements, as a cloak for anti-British work. Do you agree in that?

1113. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—There is nothing new in that; it has been going on for some years. They have taken a great deal of interest in the temperance business.

1114. SIR W. MEYER.—Are they still working at it?

1115. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, largely as a stick with which to beat the Government.

1116. SIR R. SCALLON.—Have these people ever engineered any political strikes on railways?

1117. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Political strikes? It is rather difficult to say.

1118. SIR R. SCALLON.—Strikes, then.

1119. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—There was the big signallers' strike on the Great Indian Peninsula Railway of 1899 when about 800 Maratha Brahmans went on strike and military signallers had to be put in to replace them. It was an "engineered" affair.

1120. SIR R. SCALLON.—Have there been any similar strikes on the railways?

1121. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I do not remember any such railway strike.

1122. SIR R. SCALLON.—I was thinking of a possible strike arising on these lines in time of trouble.

1123. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Undoubtedly that is one of their plans of campaign.

1124. SIR P. LAKE.—Would you say, from a political point of view, that their power to impede or stop the working of railways, constitutes a danger?

1125. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I should say so. And in time of trouble if I were in authority I should myself make a point of attending to them at an early stage and of showing them I was prepared to deal with them if they misbehaved.

1126. SIR W. MEYER.—How far do you think the influence of the Chitpavans extends beyond Bombay, the Central Provinces and the Maratha States?

1127. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—The influence of individuals is capable of extension and has been extended. Take the instances of Gokhale having his carriage dragged through the streets of Lahore and of Tilak being received as a hero and demi-god in Calcutta. Wherever and whenever the Chitpavan Brahman leaders are spoken of among seditionists, the mention of their names is received with acclamation.

1128. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think they are capable of exciting a movement outside—a serious one that might end in insurrection?

1129. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I think that their power extends to engendering excitement and dissatisfaction.

1130. SIR W. MEYER.—They could not pull very long with the Arya Samaj or the Sikhs, for instance ?

1131. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Not as far as one can see, but I am very diffident of prophesying.

1132. SIR W. MEYER.—With the people in Oudh ?

1133. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Not for very long.

1134. SIR W. MEYER.—Why ?

1135. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Because their interests are not similar.

1136. SIR W. MEYER.—In Bengal—apart from the frothy people who would cheer anybody ?

1137. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I think they might. I think Tilak might be a very great hero in Calcutta.

1138. SIR W. MEYER.—And what would be the attitude of the Muhammadans towards them ?

1139. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Well, we have had Chitpavans shouting in favour of *Allah*. But the only time I saw great efforts made by Chitpavans to win over the Muhammadans it was a failure.

1140. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider that the Maratha States are generally well-disposed towards the British Government, or that the troops in these States are well-disposed towards their own rulers ?

1141. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I should say it was not so much a matter of sentiment as of self-interest. History must repeat itself to a certain extent in these cases. The States will go with the strongest.

1142. PRESIDENT.—Do you think Native States have become more powerful or less powerful of late years as compared with the British power ?

1143. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Lord Minto's policy that the control over Native States should be relaxed has brought them increase of power.

1144. SIR W. MEYER.—In former years our policy used to be to keep them isolated. Have they worked together in recent years ?

1145. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I should say so.

1146. SIR W. MEYER.—Is there anybody whom they follow as leader ?

1147. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—No, I should say they were grouped.

1148. SIR W. MEYER.—Whom would you select as the most important ? Who might give the signal ?

1149. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I should say that the most important group would be Sindhia and Bikaner with Jodhpur, till the death of the late Maharaja.

1150. SIR W. MEYER.—Would Bikaner exercise any influence over other Rajput Chiefs ?

1151. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I should say so, because of his individuality.

1152. SIR W. MEYER.—Udaipur has a good deal of influence, has he not, if he chose to exercise it ?

1153. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—He might have, I suppose, over Rajput States, but he is a man who has kept very much to his own State.

1154. SIR R. SCALLON.—Is there no sign of a possible combination of the Maratha States ?

1155. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—There was the very curious affair of the Sindhia-Baroda engagement ; what it might have led to I do not know.

1156. PRESIDENT.—I suppose Bengal has no particular organization ?

1157. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—That is one of the great mysteries ; we think that there is a very elaborate organization, but it can apparently disintegrate at will, and each person can pursue his allotted task without further orders from headquarters, we think it has been put together by a powerful brain.

1158. PRESIDENT.—I suppose now they are well pleased with the present arrangements as announced at the Darbar ?

1159. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I fancy they thought they had won a victory at least on paper. As a Bengali said after the Darbar “They have wiped away our tears, but taken out our eyes in doing so.”

1160. PRESIDENT.—There is nothing much in the shape of sedition in Bengal to speak of now ?

1161. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I cannot say that; there is less obvious sedition but the press is nasty now in parts of the province.

1162. SIR W. MEYER.—Is it worse than at other times ?

1163. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—No, not worse, but it is very unpleasantly anti-British. The attacking articles are more persistent now than they were a year ago when there was a better tone in view of the approaching Royal visit.

1164. SIR W. MEYER.—What are the objects of their attack now ?

1165. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Individual officers very freely ; and all sorts of articles are published against pretty well every one except the Viceroy, Lord Carmichael and the High Court.

1166. SIR W. MEYER.—These dacoities which took place ; would you attribute them to a headquarters organization or to sporadic attempts of societies acting on their own lines ?

1167. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I should say that the original society has split up and these are the attempts of people acting on their own. But rumours and reports of a central organization are still rife.

1168. SIR W. MEYER.—Have they still got these *samitis* for drilling the people ?

1169. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, but they are not very thorough ; the fervour has worn itself out very considerably.

1170. SIR W. MEYER.—Did you ever regard it as very serious ?

1171. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I thought that an outlying police-post or even a Government treasury might have been attacked and perhaps captured by the young men of the *samitis*.

1172. SIR W. MEYER.—What about Bihar ?

1173. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—At present the Biharis are very busy quarrelling amongst themselves.

1174. SIR W. MEYER.—And Oudh ?

1175. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I think Oudh has come out of the seditious business extremely well. We can look to the Talukdars with every confidence, provided they are well handled.

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1176. SIR P. LAKE.—We were told that though classes were divided, they were ready to unite whenever it was a case of European *versus* Indian, (for instance the Gaikwar's conduct at Delhi was defended in the Muhammadan papers).

1177. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I do not remember such articles in the Muhammadan papers, but I was so busy at that time that I might have overlooked them. I did not study the papers as carefully as usual at that time.

1178. SIR P. LAKE.—Should you say that the situation was now more dangerous or more full of possible danger than in 1904 ?

1179. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—The year 1904 saw the beginning of a movement, we are now at the end of it. That particular movement has arisen and subsided again. We are having a lull and I think the new schemes have not been formulated.

1180. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you say the movement reached its zenith in 1907?

1181. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I should say that the temperature was high in 1907 and the pulse very high; in 1909 the temperature was higher but the pulse was lower—the pulse representing readiness to act.

1182. SIR W. MEYER.—You think that there was a practical combination at that time (1907) between Lajpat Rai, representing the Arya Samaj, Tilak, representing the Chitpavans, and Arabindo Ghose, the Bengalis, to try if possible to start a conflagration in the Punjab and see how far it would spread?

1183. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I think they had settled that it would be a good thing before very long. I would not confine Lajpat Rai to the Arya Samaj sphere. I should say they were exchanging views. In 1909 the readiness to act was lower.

1184. SIR W. MEYER.—Was that the result of the Seditious Meetings Act?

1185. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I should say it was due to the deportations by the Government of Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh that readiness to act openly declined after 1907.

1186. SIR W. MEYER.—What effect had the deportations of 1908?

1187. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—The deportations again showed that the Government meant business, but they were a little spoilt by the knowledge that they did not command the sympathy of the Home people.

1188. SIR W. MEYER.—Did the Morley Reform Scheme of 1908, exercise much influence?

1189. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I do not think that it influenced the extremists, but it influenced the moderate politicians a good deal. Many of the latter were able to say "we have got something now;" it had a tranquillizing effect.

1190. PRESIDENT.—Do these educated men never ask themselves what would happen if they could get rid of the British Raj?

1191. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I have spoken to many of them. They do not seem to understand the value of sea power; they profess to be without serious apprehension as to any invasion on the part of the Amir. Their views generally seem unpractical.

1192. SIR W. MEYER.—Let us suppose that they could get rid of us; surely the next state of things would be that the fighting races of India would come to the front and wipe them out?

1193. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I suppose so.

1194. SIR W. MEYER.—I could understand the Chitpavan Brahmans arguing that, having the Maratha States, they would come to the top. But take the Bengali, does he suppose that he would rule, or does it occur to him that the Nepalese might come down?

1195. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—The Bengali does not look so far ahead.

1196. SIR R. SCALLON.—Did these agitators in 1907 think that they had secured the army?

1197. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I think they expected the army to get excited and to take sides with them.

1198. SIR R. SCALLON.—Or at any rate to refuse to act against them?

1199. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, I think so.

1200. SIR W. MEYER.—In any case where you have got an alien or unpopular Government there are two sections, one consisting of people who would not move unless they thought they had some chance of success, the other of those who would move from sheer hatred of the Government. Would the second section be strong in India ?

1201. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I do not think so. The real fanatics who are influenced by political ideas have not stood the test of the past few years. There are very few in India of that kind.

1202. SIR W. MEYER.—But if we were at war on the Indian frontier and met with some disaster we should have a lot of other folk to deal with ?

1203. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes.

1204. SIR R. SCALLON.—Do all educated Indians belong to some Society ?

1205. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—A great many of them do. Generally speaking, educated people belong to something or other ; and there are a great many societies which dabble in objects which are not their ostensible objects.

1206. PRESIDENT.—Will you tell us about the "Servants of India Society" ?

1207. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—The "Servants of India Society" was founded by Mr. Gokhale. They have changed their original prospectus and now possess a very moderate one representing the change in Gokhale's ideas and plans. There is, however, on record against them a very violent article about the native army which was published in a Bombay newspaper on the 18th June 1907. (The President read aloud the article in question.)

1208. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you consider the article that has been read disloyal ?

1209. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, I should think so.

1210. SIR W. MEYER.—An Englishman might write such an article without much desire to harm the Government, might he not ?

1211. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I do not think that you can read innocent intention into that article unless you shut your eyes.

1212. SIR W. MEYER.—I understand that the "Servants of India Society" was founded on the 12th June 1905, and its constitution made less political in character in 1908, is that so ?

1213. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I have not got the exact details of the changes here to-day. The rules have been changed from time to time.

1214. SIR W. MEYER.—I have heard the society compared to the Jesuit Order, is that correct ?

1215. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, I think so.

1216. SIR W. MEYER.—It was put to us by Major Jackson the other day that the Society was split up into branches which did just what they pleased. Do you subscribe to that ?

1217. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—No. It is still under strong central control. It has not penetrated far yet, and its chief home is in Poona. Its real interest to us is that it reflects the attitude of Gokhale, who is a most important person in politics in India through the influence he has obtained with the Secretary of State, home politicians and the Council out here. But among Indians Tilak is the more influential man of the two. I regard it as an organization which will materially assist Mr. Gokhale in his plans whatever they may be. It is not as strong in organization and probable permanence as the "Society of Jesus."

1218. SIR W. MEYER.—What can you tell us about the National Congress ?

1219. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I have studied the Congress very closely, I have formed my idea of the Congress a good deal from seeing how it acted on

my province. A large number of people have joined the Congress with totally different motives and ideas. When they had their split in 1907, the parties became bitterly opposed to each other. It is therefore difficult to generalize—you cannot say that because a man is a “Congress-wala” he holds particular views.

1220. SIR W. MEYER.—Is the Congress, as a congress, a source of danger?

1221. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—In Bombay it was made the cloak of a very violent programme, and the same in the Central Provinces after 1906. The United Provinces were not affected in the same manner. In Bengal the Congress is quite different to what it is in other provinces. There, there is no real separation between the moderates and extremists. The work is done at the Committee meetings. They fight in their Committee meetings sometimes. The Congress sting has been taken out of it now. It was treated as a safety valve before the extremists showed their hand. Since the split the extremists have never come back to the fold. The Congress had a great many constitutional agitators, but there was a very dangerous proportion working for revolution.

1222. SIR W. MEYER.—How far can you get real information of the machinations of these organizations? Can you get your own men into them as spies?

1223. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—It is impossible to put any reliance on a Chitpavan spy because he so often betrays both sides. In some organizations you can get in your own spy perfectly well. In the Arya Samaj you can introduce spies to a certain extent.

1224. PRESIDENT.—Do you get any information from the military authorities about the state of the various regiments?

1225. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—We see their papers and they see ours. We have weekly conferences with selected officers of the Military Intelligence Department up here. I see the Chief of the Staff on important matters. We are in absolutely satisfactory touch with the military authorities.

1226. SIR W. MEYER.—Are not police reports somewhat inclined to be pessimistic?

1227. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I do not think the ordinary police officer is given to stigmatizing all and sundry as seditionists. If he were, he would never be able to get through the work which such a policy would involve. Moreover, he would soon be pulled up by his District Magistrate, or by his Commissioner or by his Lieutenant-Governor, all of whom see the political reports. The local Government influences the political reports. The optimism or pessimism of a local Government is sometimes reflected in the police reports which may be a bit too pessimistic or optimistic in consequence.

1228. SIR R. SCALLON.—Are these reports over-estimated or under-estimated?

1229. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Some officers take a sombre view, others a bright view.

1230. PRESIDENT.—Have you any reason to suppose that the police force is less well disposed than the Indian army?

1231. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—The police have had the fighting of sedition, and they have done it *con amore*. The anti-British party have all along adopted an extremely bitter tone against the police. We have had extremely few cases of disloyalty among the police, and very few instances in which they have been loath to “go for” the seditionists. Real out-and-out loyalty is not necessarily inherent in the police; their prospects and material happiness affect the question.

1232. SIR W. MEYER.—The Government of the Punjab, apparently in 1909, said that the police had done excellently, and could be relied on in matters of internal security until there was serious disaffection in the army. Do you accept that as a fair statement of the case?

1233. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—As a fair general statement, yes. I cannot imagine the police starting a movement against the British Raj.

1234. SIR W. MEYER.—I believe that you had an experience of a Commanding Officer being unwilling to take native troops against seditionists although the local police were acting freely against them. Please tell us about it.

1235. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—At the time of the Tilak riots in Nagpur after a great deal of trouble with the extremists who boasted that the troops were with them (there had been a few instances of trying to get at the Maratha regiment at Kamptee), I went over to Kamptee and saw the officer commanding the Maratha regiment. He did not think his men had been affected by the efforts of the extremists. I shared this belief, and requested him to march his regiment through Nagpur city to show that they were not won over by these people; it would have had an excellent effect. A day later he said he was prepared to march his men through the city, provided he had an equal number of European soldiers with him. This was, of course, not what I wanted. I think he was absolutely mistaken and he could have risked it perfectly well.

I think it is a mistake in our policy not to make a little more of the best side of the police. I am in favour of arming the better portion of the police for internal defence. There are 3,610 rifles in the possession of the police of the various provinces. All the police are taught to use smooth-bores, but only a small proportion are taught to use rifles.

The United Provinces keep up the distinction between armed and unarmed police.

1236. SIR W. MEYER.—In Madras the idea was to make a more marked distinction between them?

1237. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I am in favour of having the armed reserve of a district, strangers to the district. I do not look on it as a likely possibility that the whole of the Field Army will be out of India at once. I do not think we shall ever get as far as that, therefore the police will never be exposed to quite the strain Lord Kitchener contemplated. I would go back on Lord Kitchener's policy in that I would not deplete India of troops to the extent he proposed. I do not think that the police are less reliable in 1912 than they were in 1904. An "armed policeman" is "a policeman with a weapon in his hands—a smooth-bore or a rifle."

1238. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you any remarks to make on paragraph 45 of the General Staff "Appreciation?"

1239. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I think the figures given therein are not quite reliable. The concentration theory is a paper scheme. Men would be concentrated according to necessity. I helped the Police Commission in the production of the scheme and have tried it in my own province. I think 60,000 men would represent the whole available force, but I cannot say without looking into the matter further.

1240. SIR W. MEYER.—The point is, how much value can be attached to the police contingent, in the event of disturbances, as regards numbers?

1241. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Circumstances vary so much that I do not think that any numerical test is a sound one.

1242. SIR R. SCALLON.—In connection with the scheme did you go so far as to make arrangements for enlisting pensioners, etc?

1243. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—No.

1244. SIR W. MEYER.—I take it that during the last few years the numbers and organization of the police have been considerably improved and increased?

1245. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, considerably.

1246. SIR W. MEYER.—As a weapon against disturbance are the police more efficient now than they were in 1904 ?

1247. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I would not say against *disturbance*. The native police are becoming a little softer ; they are getting more educated men and the prestige is not quite what it was. Formerly the policeman was more peremptory than he is at present. This was not altogether a misfortune from the point of view of the people.

1248. SIR R. SCALLON.—Many policemen have been run in before the courts.

1249. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes. I should require more police now than I did twenty years ago to deal with a riotous mob as policemen are less ready than formerly to take the legal risks of strong action. I repeat that I do not consider that it would be safe to deplete India of troops to the extent Lord Kitchener contemplated.

1250. SIR R. SCALLON.—The riots between Sikhs and Muhammadans might be to our advantage—do you accept that ?

1251. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—One of our cardinal maxims is, no matter what advantage we get from a riot, it is our bounden duty to strive for the maintenance of order. It might give us tremendous trouble if we had to punish the Muhammadans very severely ; it might entail a very serious harvest.

1252. SIR R. SCALLON.—Ought we to be prepared to put down riots at once, where really and truly in the end they are to our advantage ?

1253. PRESIDENT.—We must maintain the *Pax Britannica*.

1254. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I think we have more to gain than to lose by stopping rioting.

1255. SIR W. MEYER.—In a religious or racial riot, could police be relied on for action against their own people ?

1256. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—When feelings have been simmering long reports regarding tendencies and acts might be partial ; when it comes to the repression of disorder I would sooner tackle Muhammadans with Muhammadans than Hindus with Hindus.

1257. PRESIDENT.—If that is the case with the police, I do not know why we should assume that it would not be the case with the army ?

1258. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I am speaking after practical experience of rioting only in my own small province.

1259. PRESIDENT.—I suppose really, it has been a bad thing for the Sikhs—their becoming more prosperous, and their going abroad where they are treated with great consideration ?

1260. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, everybody I have spoken to on the subject has agreed that the Sikhs are suffering from “swollen head.”

1261. SIR W. MEYER.—You said that the leaders of these dangerous organizations made efforts every now and then to tamper with the troops, but always took a hostile attitude to the police ?

1262. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—That has been one of the outstanding features of the whole thing. The argument they use is that the Government is practically carried on by the police ; the police are bad, therefore the Government is bad also. They have identified the Government with the police.

1263. PRESIDENT.—But the police, far from being bad, are very good, are they not ?

1264. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—That depends. They vary from province to province.

1265. SIR W. MEYER.—You think the seditionists could not, even if they wanted to, get round the police as they try to get round the sepoy ?

1266. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—In my opinion, and speaking for the whole of India, the seditionists have gone too far to win over the police to their side now. Unrest has not affected recruiting for the police, but high prices and conditions of labour have done so. The odium in which the police are held is beginning to tell a little. The head-constable class are feeling discontented with their prospects. Most can only rise to Rs. 20 per mensem. They used to have a career open to them, but now that the educated classes are wanted in the upper ranks of the police, it is very rarely a head-constable can rise. The Chitpavan is very rarely a good policeman. I do not regard these elements of discontent as serious; they constitute an administrative rather than a political difficulty.

1267. SIR R. SCALLON.—The police have been criticized very often, have they not?

1268. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes, and they feel it very much.

1269. PRESIDENT.—They have sometimes been unjustly attacked by the Judicial Bench?

1270. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Very unjustly attacked.

1271. PRESIDENT.—They are not enlisted from one class, in the police force?

1272. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—They are mixed in every province.

1273. PRESIDENT.—In speaking of all these seditious agencies and organizations, do you think there is good reason to suppose that the great bulk of the population has been seriously affected?

1274. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Not seriously. I think waves of feeling swell up and again subside. I have seen an agricultural population become disloyal, and in a moment swing back again. The Royal visit produced a very great effect, but it will wear off.

1275. SIR R. SCALLON.—Is it possible that a rising will take place in India, within the next ten years, similar to that which took place in 1857-58?

1276. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I think not, if the Government keeps its head.

1277. SIR W. MEYER.—Are you satisfied that the Government is able to keep a real touch on the pulse of the people?

1278. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—There are many things about the people we do not know. I think we are closer in touch now than we ever have been. I think we ought to see things coming.

1279. PRESIDENT.—You have a more complete organization than there has ever been before?

1280. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—It is described as a "mammoth organization" and so on. The tendency is to cut it down.

1281. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you take special measures to guard against individual assassination?

1282. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—No, not now.

1283. SIR W. MEYER.—Have the police been able to frustrate assassination schemes of which the public have never heard?

1284. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Numerous schemes. We are not paying the attention now we paid two years ago to assassination. It is not so much in the air. They are no longer writing and talking about it as they were. It would be more an individual case if it happened. I do not hold with the theory that the Government is specially bound to protect its officers' lives. I would not be surprised to hear of an assassination in Calcutta.

1285. PRESIDENT.—We thought the police had behaved so well in the periods of stress that it was curious that doubt should be thrown on their loyalty.

1286. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I think there has been a little misunderstanding somewhere.

1287. SIR W. MEYER.—Do the military police or the frontier tribes come within your cognizance?

1288. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—No. It has been arranged that I should not specially concern myself with the tribes on the frontier, but I see reports about them.

1289. SIR R. SCALLON.—Would an increase to the number of native army reservists be in any way a danger?

1290. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I have not considered the question. They would only, I suppose, be armed when brought up for training. I prefer not to give a precise opinion.

1291. SIR R. SCALLON.—Do you concur in the opinion, expressed by Lord Kitchener and concurred in by Sir John Hewett, that evil effects are likely to result from stationing a native regiment within its recruiting area?

1292. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—Yes.

1293. SIR R. SCALLON.—Do you consider that the distribution of troops for internal defence, as proposed by the General Staff, when the Field Army is employed outside India, is satisfactory, and that the numbers allotted are adequate?

1294. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I have seen a proposal for the distribution of troops in the Punjab and I do not consider that the number of troops allotted is adequate. I do not know, however, whether I have seen the latest revised proposals or not.

1295. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think that the industrial development of India will be dangerous in the way of internal security?

1296. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I think order will be more difficult to maintain with the industrial development coming on. In Bombay the Tilak riots of 1908 were run by political agitators, but in Calcutta there were no political agitators at the back of the mill hand riots—they were economic and due to resentment of personal grievances, such as alleged unjust dismissals and punishments for assaults.

1297. SIR R. SCALLON.—What are the chief danger centres in India where one ought to be prepared with troops?

1298. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I should find that difficult to say straight off—it depends upon the objective and causes of the disturbances.

1299. SIR R. SCALLON.—Have you any remarks to offer on the scheme of scattered garrisons and flying columns?

1300. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I cannot say I have; I should like to think about it.

1301. SIR R. SCALLON.—Do you agree that all our arrangements for internal defence should be with a view to doing the very best possible thing when the time comes?

1302. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I have hitherto held the opinion that the schemes seem to inculcate too great a tendency to act on the defensive and not enough on the offensive.

1303. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think these internal defence schemes should be revised in view of altering circumstances?

1304. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—I would not attach too much importance to the opinions of local Governments who do not go into these questions fully. I would keep the military hand on these matters.

1305. PRESIDENT.—You mean to say local Governments are apt to consider these schemes rather a nuisance when they are asked to advise on them.

1306. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—That is my impression.

(The witness then withdrew.)

SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS.

1307. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider that anti-British sentiments are propagated by *fakirs*, *yogis*, etc., at *melas* and like gatherings, or otherwise? If so, do these men act on their own account or as the agents of an organization? Are they in touch with, or used by, any of the other organizations you have already described to the Committee? Assuming that these *fakirs* and *yogis* exercise a pernicious influence, do you consider that their activities have increased of late years?

1308. SIR C. CLEVELAND.—We have no reason for thinking that the genuine *fakirs*, *yogis*, etc., have, during the past few years, taken wholesale to political or anti-British preaching as part of their religious or professional stock-in-trade. There have been, on the other hand, a good many instances of political preachers being sent out in the guise of *sadhus*. Extremely few important cases have come to light in which popular feelings have been seriously embittered by the preaching of genuine or false *sadhus* or *fakirs* at *melas* and other gatherings. Usually the facts are that the police hear that there is some particular *sadhu* talking politics, and enquiry is made; if he is really dangerous he is dealt with. If on the other hand he is merely a crank or an excitable person inclined to let his tongue run wild he is not severely dealt with.

Orthodox Hinduism is not on the whole in favour of the diversion of popular charity from religion to politics. In Benares religious institutions and individual mendicants easily absorb every single anna which is available, and the orthodox leaders at such a place would not welcome subscriptions to political funds which nearly all political parties in India put in the forefront of their propaganda. I myself had this position very clearly before me when I was dealing with Chitpavan seditionists in the Maratha Brahman country in 1909. At that time the Chitpavan extremists were basing their organization very largely on national schools, and they proceeded to levy *chouth* on the public for those schools. The orthodox religious leaders did not approve, and when I had to deal with a political *sadhu* of the very worst description who was imported to assist the extremist cause I was able to obtain considerable assistance from the local religious head in exposing the *sadhu*. I found the orthodox people very ready to accept the argument that the governmental toleration of religion would have to be restricted very considerably if religious leaders allowed sedition to be preached under the cover of religion.

The most advanced nationalists, or extremists as they are sometimes called, are now working to combine religion with nationalism, but there is no sign as yet of their cause being so far advanced that the *sadhus* and *fakirs* are disposed to make politics part of their stock-in-trade. Taking a very broad view of the general situation and remembering the enormous number of *sadhus*, *fakirs*, etc., scattered about over the length and breadth of India, I would say that hitherto no funds have been available to make such people the paid servants of the revolutionists, while without such payment they have shown no inclination to become voluntary workers in the revolutionary cause.

(End of Sir Charles Cleveland's evidence.)

EVIDENCE OF MAJOR OTTLEY.

1309. PRESIDENT.—You served with a regiment of Moplahs, did you not, Major Ottley?

1310. MAJOR OTTLEY:—Yes sir. I was the first adjutant of the 77th Moplah Rifles. I left them before they came to the Punjab. My regiment was raised in 1899 when Sir George Wolseley was Lieutenant-General Commanding the Madras Command. The regiment was disbanded somewhere about 1907. I was adjutant till they were raised up to about 400 men. I commanded them for about six months of that time because every officer found it necessary, or convenient, to go away on leave, etc. The selection of the men was very bad and the handling was worse. In the first place, when they were raised (when I was asked to come back from leave and became adjutant), there were only seventeen Moplahs present. I was through the Omdurman campaign, and I happened to say to my colonel that they looked like Soudanese troops. He agreed and said "I think they would look very nice if they were dressed like Soudanese troops." They were dressed in fezzes at his suggestion. The fez was not suitable to their constitutions; we found that in Bangalore many of the men tumbled down with heat apoplexy and the doctors attributed it to the wearing of insufficient head cover. Many times it was recommended that they should be put into puggaries—it was not done. It was on that account mainly, I believe, that the constitutions of the Moplahs from the outset were weakened and that through bad health on many occasions they were led to commit crimes and other indiscretions that healthy men would not have done. The British officers did not wear fezzes. The Moplahs are *Sunni* Muhammadans. The Moplahs have interbred among themselves and become a race of their own. They have good fighting qualities and are amenable to discipline. I found that they always obeyed me during the eighteen months or so that I was with them. I attribute my success with them to the fact that I spoke their language—Malayalam.

There was an officer in the regiment who originally belonged to the Church of England. At Trivandrum he was converted to the Roman Catholic Church. He was a great enthusiast on religion and spent most of his time in converting Madras sepoys to the Roman Catholic Church and enlisting Madras Roman Catholics in the regiment; this was before it was formed into a Moplah battalion. When the Government orders came along to reconstitute the regiment into a Moplah one, that officer was very upset about it, as he said all his old friends would gradually be pushed out and Moplahs introduced. From the start he was dead against the Moplahs from a religious point of view. Other officers were against them from the very start because they gave too much trouble to work with and, unfortunately, just at that time there seemed to be a most unhappily selected number of officers dumped into the regiment. In fact I can tell you this, there were three subalterns appointed to it, two of whom were rank bad characters. One was so bad that I wired to Madras Army Headquarters to request that he should not be sent as it would not be conducive to the welfare of the corps in any way if he joined it. He was removed that day to another corps. The other officer stayed in the regiment until he got fifteen years' penal servitude. Then, the other religious aspect was that most of the Madras Muhammadan sepoys were *Shiahs* and the custom in the old Madras army was that the fathers and grandfathers or the sons and grandsons of the men serving, also lived in the lines. In fact it was a regular institution amongst a large community of Madras people, especially at Bangalore, to live on the regiment and in the regiment, in the hope of putting their sons into it. Later on, these people made a dead set at the *Sunnis*; they saw that their bread and butter was gone from them with the advent of the Moplahs. Thus was the religious aspect introduced into the question. There is a deadly feud between Moplahs and *Shiahs*.

1311. PRESIDENT.—Thus, under these unfortunate circumstances, the Moplahs did not get a fair trial?

1312. MAJOR OTTLEY.—No, sir, I do not think they did. Their physique was good.

1313. PRESIDENT.—Were there, in your opinion, sufficient Moplahs to form two battalions?

1314. MAJOR OTTLEY.—No, sir. The Moplahs do contract work and fishing. They are also agriculturists. They live on the Malabar coast. The Moplah population is by no means so small as has been stated; I think it will be found that it works out practically to a million.

I think the men we got were too young, and there were not enough men for two battalions. If one battalion had been well run, military service would have been more popular. Their emoluments in civil life are considerable; this would not necessarily militate against the stamp of men who would enlist. There were about 400 Moplahs in the regiment when I left. I left because I saw that we were going to be a failure. Besides the fez, they had, when I was with them, ordinary khaki clothing, but they were very seldom allowed to wear it. They wore cotton stuff. In cold weather they were shivering and hardly able to hold their rifles. The minimum temperature of Bangalore is about 65 degrees and I should say it is never much above 90 degrees.

1315. SIR W. MEYER.—There were two Moplah battalions; one was finally disbanded on account of indiscipline, and the other because it could not stand the northern climate?

1316. MAJOR OTTLEY.—I cannot speak of the indiscipline from personal knowledge, but one battalion was unfortunate enough to have a bad-tempered adjutant who hit the men across the legs with his stick, until they 'downed' him. I think it would be well worth the experiment to enlist Moplahs again. A regiment of them, with carefully selected officers, would be as good as any other regiment in India. It would not be advisable to mix them up with any Carnatics. I would advocate starting with a clean sheet, or, if that were impossible, mixing them with the best fighting races of the north.

1317. PRESIDENT.—The difficulty with class companies of Moplahs would be, I understand, that their language is a distinct language from any other?

1318. MAJOR OTTLEY.—Malayalam, but they can talk Hindustani as well as most other people in India. In their native country they wear a small puggari and have no objection to wearing it. The 77th Moplahs formerly described, could not tie their puggaries, which the colonel noticed and took as an opportunity to disparage them. I would be quite ready to take them into Tibet in order to shew that they were capable of going anywhere. They were not given even a blanket when they took part in the northern manoeuvres. If properly clothed they could serve anywhere, and render better service to the country than many races at present enlisted in the army—especially owing to their undoubted gallantry.

Owing to the set that was made against them by the Bangalore Muhammadans whenever they went into Bangalore bazar, there were frequent conflicts. On the first occasion there were only twenty-seven Moplahs in the regiment, and the news came to the lines that some Moplahs were being beaten by the people in the bazar. Their comrades immediately went to their help. I went down and found the twenty-seven men holding their own amidst 1,000 Bangalore Muhammadans. I said "you had better come home with me," and they did. There was a great outcry regarding the incident in all the Madras papers—even the *Madras Mail*. Sir George Wolseley took it up and he was inclined to have the men concerned turned out of the regiment. He was told, however, that if these twenty-seven men were turned out we should get no more recruits. Sir George thereupon abandoned the idea of dismissing them and eventually wired down that Commanding Officer's punishments were to be given these men according to their length of service. Seven days' imprisonment was the severest punishment awarded. When Sir George Wolseley's decision was read to the men they said 'we were all in this row and yet we have not got the same amount of punishment. We are quite willing to go through the highest punishment so long as we get the same punishment.' Except under these conditions they refused to undergo

any punishment. I turned out the guard. I wanted them to go into a temporary prison. They would not. I threatened to use force. They did not believe it. When they saw the guard with Martini-Henris loaded they went in and that was the end of the riot. Another riot occurred later when we had 200 Moplahs in the regiment.

1319. SIR W. MEYER.—How do you think the Moplah would get on with the Punjabi Muhammadan?

1320. MAJOR OTTLEY.—I do not think you would find the Moplahs would get on any worse with other races in India than Sikhs or Muhammadans. The Madras sepoy looked upon the Moplah as an interloper, hence the riots. There would be no danger from Moplahs mixing with well-disciplined regiments.

1321. SIR R. SCALLON.—The Punjabi sepoy got on extremely well with the Moplahs.

1322. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you seen anything of other Madras sepoy?

1323. MAJOR OTTLEY.—I was in the Madras army from 1894 to 1900. I would not say that Madras people were deficient in fighting characteristics. Two companies of Marawars who came under my notice were very fine men indeed, and we were very disappointed when we lost them on being ordered to convert the regiment into a Moplah unit. The Marawars are a Tamil race who are hard to get, owing to the Kolar gold fields which absorb them. They are far superior to anything obtainable in Madras except the Moplahs. I think the Madras sepoy does not represent the best classes of Madrasis. The pay is too low; the people prefer to work in the mines and factories.

(The witness then withdrew.)

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

10th Meeting—Friday, the 4th June 1912.

Major J. E. M. Molyneux, Officiating Inspector-General of Imperial Service Troops, attended as a witness and was examined.

EVIDENCE OF MAJOR E. J. M. MOLYNEUX.

1324. PRESIDENT.—You are officiating Inspector-General of Imperial Service Troops, at present, are you not ?

1325. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Yes, sir.

1326. PRESIDENT.—You have been doing duty with Imperial Service Troops for some time I suppose ?

1327. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—For about four-and-a-half years.

1328. PRESIDENT.—In which of the Native States ?

1329. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—The Native States to which I am officially attached are Patiala, Rampur and Kashmir, but I have also been down to see troops in other States—in Rajputana and Central India.

1330. PRESIDENT.—Can you give us any information about the composition, training and efficiency of the Imperial Service Troops ?

1331. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Yes, sir. The Imperial Service Troops number altogether between twenty-one and twenty-two thousand men, of whom roughly about seventeen thousand are reported as fit for active service. The composition is cavalry, infantry, artillery, sappers and transport corps; the artillery, however, are confined to Kashmir where they have two batteries of mountain artillery armed with modern guns.

1332. PRESIDENT.—None anywhere else ?

1333. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—None. Many requests have been made by States for permission to have their artillery placed on an Imperial Service footing, but the Government has always seen fit to withhold sanction.

1334. PRESIDENT.—How many cavalry and infantry are there ?

1335. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—The cavalry are about seven thousand strong; the infantry about ten thousand the rest being sappers and transport.

1336. PRESIDENT.—Are the Imperial Service Troops generally equal to the Indian army in training and efficiency ?

1337. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—No, sir.

1338. PRESIDENT.—Some of them are ?

1339. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—The best of them are; those of Jodhpur, Patiala, and possibly Alwar, in point of training of men can be put down as absolutely equal to our own Indian troops. But they suffer from the disadvantage of not having British officers. That makes a great difference. At Sir Robert Scallon's request I have recorded my opinion on that subject in the form of a memorandum to be handed in to the Committee.

1340. PRESIDENT.—You speak of 20,000 men and you say 17,000 of them are efficient; are the remainder inefficient ?

1341. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—For one reason and another they are not fit for active service; they are, in the case of the cavalry, not fully horsed and at present would not be considered fit for service.

1342. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider Patiala's troops efficient ?

1343. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Exceedingly efficient. Patiala's cavalry has been inspected by the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief and by the late Commander-in-Chief, all had only one opinion to offer; in fact, Sir O'Moore Creagh told the Maharaja that there was not a single regiment in our service as well horsed or who could drill as well.

1344. PRESIDENT.—What is your opinion of the Jodhpur cavalry?

1345. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—At present they are not as good as Patiala's for this reason,—when they were originally formed they naturally started with a number of young men; those have grown older, and as the State does not recognize any system of pensions, they are now past their prime. The commandants, knowing that most of their men are poor, have certain qualms of conscience about turning them out; the result is that they have lost a great deal of their efficiency.

1346. SIR W. MEYER.—Are the pay and pensions in States where they are given, equal to the pay and pensions given by the Government of India to the Indian army?

1347. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—No, sir, not quite. In Patiala I was asked whether the pay and pensions of the Imperial Service Troops could not be brought up to the British standard; but I threw cold water on the proposal. I said that the State troops are kept in one place, that they have not to pay comparatively large sums to go to their homes on leave and furlough, and in a general way, that they are not so hard worked, so that there did not seem to be any good reason for raising the standard. Another reason for my discouraging the idea was that it might cause the tapping of the best sources of supply for our own army. At present this is only partially the case; in some instances the States draw recruits from the same source as we do but, generally speaking, the men are obtained almost entirely from the States in which they serve. In Patiala, however, you will find that a quarter of the men came from Government territory.

1348. SIR R. SCALLON.—Do they, to any extent, take men who have been with the colours in the Indian army?

1349. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Hardly at all, a few officers and instructors only.

1350. PRESIDENT.—I suppose in a State like Patiala, the Maharaja would give the order and could have the pick of the men in the State for his Imperial Service Troops?

1351. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—If he found any difficulty in getting men, he might find it necessary to take such measures, but as they have not the slightest difficulty in getting them, there does not seem to be any reason for the adoption of such a course.

1352. SIR W. MEYER.—Are the States obliged to get the sanction of the Government for enlisting men from outside their own territories?

1353. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—No, sir, they are quite free in this respect. For instance, we get a great many men from the Ferozepore district for the Patiala Lancers. There may have been a general sanction given in the first instance, but there is no individual sanction. I have been told that the present system of enlisting men from Government territory is in future to be restricted as far as possible. The Patiala troops, for instance, would be recruited entirely from that territory and as the terms of service of the men enlisted from Government territory expired they would be gradually eliminated from the force.

1354. PRESIDENT.—Where does Gwalior get men from?

1355. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—A great many from the Deccan; he also enlists Sikhs and men from neighbouring States.

1356. PRESIDENT.—Has the standard of training and efficiency risen recently?

1357. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Yes, on the whole, but there are always certain exceptions. Training and efficiency must depend so much in Imperial service Troops upon the attitude of the Ruler at the moment. If he is enthusiastic about his troops (as they mostly are) and proud of them, then he will give them every facility and also give the Inspecting Officer every facility for improving their efficiency. But, in other cases, it may be he is indifferent and does not care, or again it may be that there has been a good deal of intrigue in the State, which has undermined the efficiency of the troops—as it does very rapidly. Another form of obstacle in the way of progress is to be found where the Ruler, without having any professional training or knowledge, attempts to manage the whole military machine of the State—as in the case of Gwalior—and results are not always beneficial to the efficiency of the troops.

1358. SIR W. MEYER.—What is the highest rank to which an officer in the Imperial Service Troops rises? You have officers commanding regiments; I presume these are lieutenant-colonels? Do they rise to the rank of colonel?

1359. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Yes, sir.

1360. PRESIDENT.—Then again, you have Major-Generals? Has Patiala more than one Major-General?

1361. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—As a matter of fact, he has three, but one was made Major-General because he was the best polo player in India.

1362. PRESIDENT.—Do you perceive any tendency to train officers of superior rank for high command?

1363. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Only in one or two cases; Gwalior is a case in point, he has appointed his own Inspector-General.

1364. PRESIDENT.—Does he shew qualifications which would enable him to command a large body of men?

1365. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—No, sir. There is only one man in the Imperial Service Troops who could be put down as a really good man—General Bakshish Singh of Patiala; he is nominally Military Secretary, but is really Commander-in-Chief. He is the only man I know of who can take men out on manœuvres and move them about as well as our own Generals.

1366. PRESIDENT.—Then we must take it that as a general rule these organizations have not hitherto produced senior officers who would be capable of commanding brigades or divisions in the field in the same way as British officers can do?

1367. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—No, sir, and there is none, with that possible exception, who seems to shew any promise.

1368. PRESIDENT.—What, if any, facilities are given them for training with regular troops? Do they avail themselves of them?

1369. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—I think that if it is desired further to improve the efficiency of the Imperial Service Troops, greater facilities ought to be given them for training with our own troops. In only a few cases has this been done hitherto. The Patiala Imperial Service Cavalry attended a camp of exercise at Rupar and acquitted themselves to the complete satisfaction of the British Generals who were commanding, in fact they were told publicly they were as good as any regiment there. Take, for instance, their signalling; there is only one regiment of the Indian army better. In every detail the rank and file can hold their own with regiments of the Indian army. Other States would also be glad to have greater facilities for training their troops with our own.

1370. PRESIDENT.—Provided our troops are trained in reasonable proximity to the Imperial Service Troops concerned? You could not move them very long distances, I suppose?

1371. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—If it did not come too often they would be prepared to come, either by rail or march, as circumstances prescribed.

1372. PRESIDENT.—But if brigaded with regular troops, would the State pay the whole of the expenses?

1373. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Yes, sir; but they do not mind that so long as they are not asked to do it too often. It would have the greatest effect on their efficiency, it would raise their general tone by leading them to think the Government was anxious to increase their military value.

1374. SIR W. MEYER.—Did they attend at the Delhi Darbar?

1375. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Yes, sir; there were about 8,000 there altogether.

1376. PRESIDENT.—A certain number of them served in Tirah and were glad to do so?

1377. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Oh yes, they are only too delighted; nothing would improve the efficiency of the Imperial Service Troops more than the thought or knowledge that the Government would take them on service.

1378. PRESIDENT.—Are there any grounds for the suggestion that Inspecting Officers exercise the functions of command as well as those of inspection?

1379. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—No, sir.

1380. SIR P. LAKE.—What was said was that some of the Chiefs are apt to complain that British officers are practically in command.

1381. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—I do not think that there is any serious ground for that suspicion. The Inspecting Officer has a duty which in many ways is more difficult than would appear at first sight. He has to try and maintain these regiments in a state of the highest efficiency. There is no need whatever to interfere with matters which do not concern him and, as regards actual command, it is a thing we have incessantly impressed upon us that we are not to assume command. And when it comes to promotions, you will find that it is the Ruler of the State—or, if he is a young man, those round him—who wishes to manage that part of the business himself, and he generally proceeds to do so on lines incompatible with military efficiency. We all know that in this country from time immemorial the family has been the unit rather than the community, and we know that a native Commanding Officer, who is trying his best to do his duty, will often find that the general opinion of his own family will condemn him if he promotes the most suitable man rather than some absolutely inefficient member of his own family. If, on the other hand, he tries to do his best he finds it useful to have the Inspecting Officer there to say whether he will support the best man. If he did not do so, we should be striking at the root of all military efficiency; and it would be the same in any other department of life. If you are going to deprive a man of the fruits of his labour he will not labour. We have, also, to support the commandant and often find ourselves in conflict to a certain extent either with the Ruler himself or with those around him. The result is that they complain that Inspecting officers are interfering in matters in which their own authority should be supreme.

1382. SIR W. MEYER.—Will you explain how you submit your recommendation? Do commandants' recommendations go through you to the State authorities?

1383. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—The way it is usually done is that the State military authorities, the commandant of the regiment and the Inspecting Officer, form a sort of committee, and draw up their proposals. Their recommendations then go to the Maharaja or Darbar for sanction, and then the friction begins, if there is going to be friction.

1384. SIR W. MEYER.—May we take it that you do not merely wait to give advice until it is asked for, but where the circumstances justify it, you give advice spontaneously.

1385. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Yes, sir.

1386. PRESIDENT.—Promotion among officers is, I suppose, by seniority generally?

1387. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.--Yes, sir, as in our own service.

1388. SIR W. MEYER.—We will assume that there are two men, A and B. A is the better man, B is good enough; they propose to put B in, would you intervene?

1389. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—I should put the matter fair and square to the State authority and tell him that in my opinion A was the better man though B was good enough; I should then leave it to him to decide. But if B were absolutely inefficient I should say so.

1390. PRESIDENT.—The conclusion is that unless the Inspecting Officer exercised advisory functions in these matters, the Imperial Service Troops would cease to be efficient and promotion would be given anyhow?

1391. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Yes, sir.

1392. SIR W. MEYER.—When a still more important vacancy occurs, say that of commandant of a unit, or Commander-in-Chief, do you advise as a matter of course?

1393. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—No, sir, not when a Commander-in-Chief is appointed because he commands all troops, both regular and irregular. In the case of a commander of Imperial Service Troops alone the Inspector-General would advise.

1394. PRESIDENT.—I presume, as regards commandants of units your attitude is that it is in the power of the State authorities to appoint anybody, but if they appoint a man who is incompetent it would become your duty to report the unit as unfit for service?

1395. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Yes, sir.

1396. PRESIDENT.—Is there any reason to believe that Imperial Service Troops are not in all cases thoroughly loyal to their Chiefs?

1397. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—With the exception of one or two States, I believe them to be thoroughly loyal to their States and to the supreme Government.

1398. PRESIDENT.—In these exceptional cases, to whom are they loyal if not to the Ruler of the State?

1399. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Well, there are certain cases in which the Ruler of the State is generally disliked. As a rule, however, the troops are thoroughly loyal. At the same time the loyalty of these troops to their Chiefs is a different thing to what it was in the old days. There is no longer—except in a general way—the same conception of the Divine Right of Kings that we had before the execution of Charles the First, and for that reason I am inclined to think that if the Ruler is known to be acting in open opposition to the Government of India, he would not have the support of his troops.

1400. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you discriminate in the matter of local loyalty between the troops recruited in the State itself and those from outside?

1401. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Yes, I think it may be accepted that the latter would be affected by the fact of their having been our subjects before they enlisted.

1402. SIR W. MEYER.—On the other hand, they would be less likely to resist tyranny on the part of a Ruler to his own subjects?

1403. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Yes, sir, I think they would.

1404. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you know anything of the Maratha States, Indore and Sindhia and the like? Take Gwalior; there you have a Ruler who is a foreigner; does that fact affect the loyalty of the troops?

1405. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Yes, sir.

1406. PRESIDENT.—Does Sindhia enlist Marathas?

1407. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—He would like to, but cannot get them in sufficient numbers.

1408. PRESIDENT.—Does Kashmir enlist Dogras chiefly, or does he take Muhammadans?

1409. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—He prefers Dogras, though he has also Muhammadans.

1410. SIR W. MEYER.—Patiala's troops are mostly Sikhs, are they not?

1411. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Yes, sir, three-quarters of them are Sikhs, the remainder are Muhammadans. Kashmir and Rampur have Gurkhas also.

1412. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider the Imperial Service Troops a possible source of danger to the Government of India. If so, do you think the movement should be discouraged?

1413. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—All troops that are alien in race to their Rulers are, in certain circumstances, a potential source of danger, but I do not consider Imperial Service Troops a greater potential danger than the Indian army itself. They might become dissatisfied; but of this I am convinced, that Imperial Service Troops are far less inclined to be a danger to us than any local troops of the States, and I can give you many reasons why I think the native Chiefs themselves are aware of this fact. The thing which would most likely be a danger to us in this country, if ever trouble were to come, would be the circulation of a lie, as was the case in 1857 when the lie—it was of course partly a truth—about the greased cartridge was circulated. I would also mention the plague riots which owed their origin to the circulation of lies about the pollution of wells, which were accepted by the ignorant.

In the Imperial Service Troops the men do meet white officers and are brought into close contact with them, so that if people circulate lies which are monstrous, they find it much harder to get the lies believed amongst members of Imperial service corps than would be the case amongst men who had no knowledge of what the white man is and what our administration is. And as regards the view taken by the Chiefs themselves their opinion in a general way is unquestionably that the most reliable troops they have got are their Imperial Service Troops. Within the last two years there have been several instances of this. One instance occurred in Rampur where the people suffered very much from dacoits and violent highwaymen. The gangs were hunted down by the Imperial Service Troops although any number of police were available. In one case the dacoity took place within less than half a mile of the Nawab's own palace, and when the police could not face them, he sent off a guard of Imperial Service Troops (about twenty-five men) who happened to be at hand and they forthwith compelled the dacoits to surrender.

The second case occurred at Junagad, where the Imperial Service Troops consisted of only one squadron, a hundred strong. On the 22nd January 1911, the Nawab died and, finding that these were the only disciplined and reliable forces in the State, the Administration put them on to guarding all State treasuries, etc. That year the rains failed everywhere in Kathiawar except in Junagad, so the rest of the squadron were taken out to guard the State grass racks, and we have got testimonials from the political authorities speaking in the very highest terms of the behaviour and utility of these troops.

The third case was at Dholpur. A certain collection of rogues, led by a blackguard Thakur, got into a disused castle, sat down and began collecting tribute from all the villagers within a day's ride. A report was made to the political authorities and the Agent went out with fifty Imperial Service infantry from the nearest State, Bharatpur (Dholpur has "local" troops but they have no discipline). He also took with him a couple of hundred Dholpur police and local troops, and with these he surrounded the fort at night. In the morning the Dholpur men were hopeless and broke and ran. The Political Agent then decided to retire as he only had the fifty Bharatpur infantry men left to him; these covered his retirement and he could not speak too highly of their conduct. He then sent for four more companies of Bharatpur infantry. (The people in the castle were under the impression that they had defeated us). The four companies turned up and attacked and the outlaws

eventually surrendered, but not before the infantry Inspecting Officer had been hit through the foot.

These instances of Rulers employing Imperial Service Troops in the maintenance of order show that they rely on them implicitly and count on them in time of trouble. I could multiply instances if necessary.

1414. PRESIDENT.—I suppose it is only to give employment and pay that they keep up local forces in addition to Imperial Service Troops?

1415. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Partly that, and partly because they know that their Imperial Service Troops might be taken away and they must have somebody left to keep order. Otherwise, you would have instances like that in Dholpur.

1416. PRESIDENT.—And also they think that it adds to their dignity to keep up a large force? What about Hyderabad, I suppose the Nizam maintains Imperial Service Troops?

1417. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—I can only give second-hand evidence about Hyderabad. The Nizam has two regiments of Imperial Service Lancers. In addition he keeps up a larger force than any other Prince in India, with the exception of Nepal where the standing army amounts to about 35,000 men. His local force is variously estimated at from about eighteen to twenty thousand. The great bulk of his force may be put down as inefficient from a military point of view.

1418. SIR W. MEYER.—Has he any guns?

1419. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—A great many, but all smooth-bores and none of a serviceable kind, judged by modern standards.

1420. PRESIDENT.—Are the Imperial Service Troops in close touch with the local State forces, and is there any interchange of personnel between them?

1421. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—With the exception of one State, I should say that the Imperial Service Troops are not in the least degree in touch with the local forces; in fact Imperial Service Troops look upon themselves, and are looked upon, as being a cut above the local troops, and there is not much in common between them.

1422. SIR W. MEYER.—Which is the exception?

1423. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Gwalior; and, so far as Gwalior is concerned the personnel is exchanged between the Imperial Service and the local forces. The Maharaja Sindhia would like to keep up a very much larger force of the Imperial Service Troops than the Government thinks fit to allow. His idea has been to get round the regulation by first of all equalizing the status, pay and pensions of the two forces. In addition, he constantly transfers officers and instructors—but not men—to the local troops, with the idea of having all of the same standard of efficiency. The results of this policy have, as a matter of fact, been most unfortunate, for he has managed to impair the efficiency of the Imperial Service Troops without adding to that of the local forces.

1424. PRESIDENT.—Has the Inspecting Officer any voice in the matter when a man is transferred?

1425. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—He cannot stop it.

1426. SIR P. LAKE.—I understood you to say that in Gwalior there is not a large amount of personal loyalty?

1427. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—No, sir, there is not a large amount.

1428. PRESIDENT.—What generally are the terms of service in the Imperial Service Troops?

1429. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—They are assimilated to ours except that the troops get somewhat less pay. In the Jodhpur service no pensions are granted.

1430. PRESIDENT.—In local forces they serve on and get no pensions?

1431. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Yes, sir, with the exception of one or two States such as Gwalior, where they are introducing pensions on a small scale.

1432. SIR W. MEYER.—But do they get land?

1433. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Yes, that is the case in certain States.

1434. SIR W. MEYER.—Have any of the States started a system of reserves such as we have?

1435. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Not to any appreciable extent; it may practically be said that there are no reserves.

1436. PRESIDENT.—Are you able to say how the Chiefs who maintain Imperial Service Troops view the prospect of the entire removal of their units on mobilization?

1437. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—That would depend on what they are taken for. If you asked them to send their troops on to the frontier or out of British India they would be delighted, and the troops look forward to it as the culminating point of their ambition. On the other hand, if you asked them to go and garrison stations in British India, they would do it, but they would not like it.

1438. PRESIDENT.—The question is, in view of the possibility of trouble in the States and of the unreliability of the local forces, would the Chiefs feel that they were left in a somewhat helpless position if the whole of their troops were removed?

1439. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—I think they would be inclined in almost every case of active service to say "let them go."

1440. PRESIDENT.—Are the orders of the Government controlling the supply of arms and ammunition to Imperial Service Troops strictly adhered to? Have you any suggestions to make for rendering them more efficacious?

1441. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—The orders are adhered to absolutely. I think the conditions are so thorough that there are no suggestions to offer for their improvement. The States cannot obtain a round of ammunition without our knowing exactly what they have got. They have to send back all empty cases and we check the numbers. Provided that our arsenals are absolutely secure, Imperial Service Troops could get no ammunition, beyond the fifty rounds a man which they have, without our permission.

1442. SIR W. MEYER.—What is their armament—the same as that of our native troops?

1443. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Yes, sir, the '303 rifle.

1444. PRESIDENT.—Is the number of Imperial Service Troops in any one State regulated by the Government of India? If any Ruler were to say "I want to raise more men," he could not organize them, I suppose, without the sanction of the Government of India?

1445. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—No, sir, and sanction has been withheld in many cases. The state of affairs is somewhat difficult; you may have a Ruler who is enthusiastic about raising Imperial Service Troops; of course they are expensive and once he has raised them the Chief does not like to ask permission to disband them again. That is why the Government is so very chary about allowing the Chiefs to enlarge their forces.

1446. PRESIDENT.—Also on account of the objection to increasing the proportion of native to British troops?

1447. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Yes, and another reason is that the present Ruler might be quite pleased to pay, say, a fifth of his revenue towards maintaining Imperial Service Troops while his successor might say it would be quite enough to pay one-tenth. For that reason it would be a good thing for the Government to lay down some standard proportion which could not be exceeded.

1448. SIR R. SCALLON.—With reference to a previous question, we are told that except for Imperial Service Troops in Native States there are no

troops who would be of any use in maintaining order. If these troops were taken away, might we not have to keep more troops in close proximity to the State, for it would then be our duty to maintain order?

1449. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Yes, our own Government is ultimately responsible for maintaining order, but I take it that in the vast majority of cases, at any rate for a limited period, the States themselves would be capable of maintaining order. In any case, I take it, we should have to leave behind a certain number of troops.

1450. SIR W. MEYER.—There is another way of looking at it; in the event of a big war on the frontier, you might have internal disturbances in the country; in that case, would it not be better to move up Imperial Service Troops?

1451. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—I think that from every point of view it would be better that those who are sufficiently efficient to place in the fighting line should be moved up. The moral effect of their troops fighting for us would be that the Chiefs would feel that they were committed to our side.

1452. SIR W. MEYER.—Therefore the more troops we send up to the front the better?

1453. SIR P. LAKE.—Might not Rulers say "If you send the whole of our troops to the front we cannot maintain order in our own States"—they might feel somewhat apprehensive in regard to their own personal safety?

1454. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—I think that they would chance it in the majority of cases. Besides, there are always the depôts of the Imperial Service Troops.

1455. PRESIDENT.—It has been suggested that the presence of a large number of British officers in units of the Indian army not only deprives the native officer of opportunities of assuming responsibility and taking the initiative, but renders him incapable of being entrusted with administrative functions and the duty of training his men. What opinion has your experience with the Imperial Service Troops, who have no British officers, led you to form on the subject?

1456. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—That is an important question, and I have put my views down in the form of a written memorandum.*

1457. PRESIDENT.—We may take the sense of your memorandum to be this: You must have European supervision and guidance of a sort; there is occasional supervision such as is given in the Imperial Service Troops, and there is constant supervision such as is given to the Indian army; you would prefer the latter?

1458. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Certainly, sir.

1459. SIR W. MEYER.—Then, taking our own Indian regiments, would you say that the number of British officers can be decreased?

1460. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—The question is a difficult one, because it depends on what the alternative would be. If you were to decrease the number of British officers with our regiments, in the event of war unless you had a reserve you would have no one to send on odd jobs, such as road commandants, etc.

1461. SIR W. MEYER.—Would it be more desirable to have British double-company commanders or to leave this work entirely to native officers?

1462. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—I think that if you want to develop their efficiency to the utmost, it must be done under a close system of British supervision. I take it that the least number of British officers that would be sufficient to maintain efficiency would be one with each squadron or double-company, always present.

1463. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing your Imperial Service corps go into the field, the only British officers with them will be the Imperial Service Inspecting Officers?

1464. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—I believe the idea is that no corps should take the field with less than two British officers.

1465. SIR W. MEYER.—Would the Inspecting Officer take command?

1466. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—I believe his position would be practically that of command; that is to say, he would not interfere more than he now does in matters of internal management, but as regards movements in the field he would command.

1467. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing you were with an Imperial Service regiment in the field, and the Brigadier ordered the regiment to move, to whom would his order be addressed?

1468. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—It would come to me.

1469. SIR W. MEYER.—Let us suppose a campaign in which Imperial Service Troops are serving alongside our native regiments; would the fact of the difference in the strengths of their officers excite any discontent among our troops; would they say 'if so and so can get on with native officers why should not we?'

1470. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—I do not think so.

1471. SIR W. MEYER.—In the event of war, would Imperial Service Troops be brigaded together or would they be distributed among British units?

1472. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—I believe that the present idea is that the latter would be the case.

1473. SIR W. MEYER.—Do the terms on which the various States have offered, and the Government has accepted Imperial Service Troops, permit the Government to use them in any way it likes or must the Native State agree?

1474. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—No; once a Native State has offered a unit for service, it is understood that until it returns to the State, it is absolutely under the orders of the Government.

1475. SIR W. MEYER.—That is not quite my point. Gwalior has offered to keep up certain Imperial Service Troops; does that offer permit the Government of India to call on Gwalior for them at any time, or must Gwalior say that he would like to send his troops?

1476. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—It is part of the contract that for general Imperial Service the Government can call on the States for their troops; the Government have not got to wait for an offer. But as a matter of fact, States have in the past petitioned for their troops to be sent.

1477. SIR W. MEYER.—Has there been any material increase in numbers of late years?

1478. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—The most recent case is that of the Bhopal infantry; a regiment of 600 strong has just been sanctioned. The Begam already keeps up a regiment of lancers. The Government thought she was doing enough, but as she was *persona grata* they gave way. Rampur is another case; he has been permitted to turn his local infantry into Imperial Service Troops, so that the ultimate strength of the State is not affected. There have also been the Tehri Sappers and the Idar Despatch Riders.

1479. SIR W. MEYER.—Have there been any converse cases where troops have been reduced?

1480. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—I do not think so.

1481. SIR W. MEYER.—About officers; are they largely what we would call "gentlemen," or do they rise from the ranks?

1482. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—They vary very much; in the Rajput States it may be taken that they are the aristocracy. But in the Sikh States and also in parts of Central India, they are farmers pure and simple.

1483. SIR W. MEYER.—Are there corps in which both categories are included?

1484. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—What they are trying to do in the Punjab is to get in young men of higher education and standing as officers. These will not enter through the ranks. They are appointed direct, but on probation; and until the Inspecting Officer is satisfied that they have come there to work, and they have passed to his satisfaction, their commissions are not confirmed.

1485. SIR W. MEYER.—Would direct commissions mean increased efficiency?

1486. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—I do not think so, because I do not think that a man who has been given a direct commission will necessarily fit himself for it.

1487. SIR W. MEYER.—You do not find that an Imperial Service corps, which necessarily has to remain the whole time in one place, deteriorates?

1488. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—It is a drawback, and for that reason I personally think that they ought to be taken away for manœuvres.

1489. SIR W. MEYER.—It has been suggested that the moves of our regular units might be curtailed; do you think it would affect their efficiency?

1490. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—I do.

1491. SIR W. MEYER.—You say you are not allowed to advise about local troops, but are you privately asked about them?

1492. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Oh, yes, but I say as little as I can. Of course, sometimes one cannot get out of it without giving offence. Sometimes it is policy even to break the spirit of the regulation, and I have sometimes found it advisable to have a field day in which local troops were included.

1493. SIR W. MEYER.—When you are absent, it is open to them to have manœuvres including both Imperial Service and Local Troops?

1494. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Yes, but the Ruler would regard it—and I certainly would—as an act of great discourtesy if he did so without letting me know. I should always try to be present at such manœuvres.

1495. SIR W. MEYER.—But if he suggested it, you would not object?

1496. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—No, not at all.

1497. SIR W. MEYER.—Patiala has some serviceable guns?

1498. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Only smooth-bores.

1499. SIR W. MEYER.—Speaking generally, you do think that the local armies would be any danger to us?

1500. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—No.

1501. SIR W. MEYER.—As regards fidelity to the British Raj you do not see much difference between our own and Imperial Service Corps? Is there not the important difference that British officers are constantly with the men of the Indian army?

1502. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—It does make a difference, but it is counter-balanced by the fact that the Imperial Service Troops depend on their Ruler for their pay, and if he were loyal—as I believe the vast number of them are—the troops would be loyal also, through him.

1503. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing a case where the Ruler was disloyal and ready to rebel; that would work the other way?

1504. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Yes, that would constitute a very serious danger.

1505. SIR R. SCALLON.—Do company and troop officers rise to higher command, such as Adjutant, and Assistant Commanding Officer and Commanding Officer?

1506. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—In most regiments they do. There are very many systems in operation.

1507. SIR R. SCALLON.—Do you think that the troop and company officers are better than those of the regular native army either by birth or education ?

1508. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—As a rule I should say they are not better.

1509. SIR P. LAKE.—Do I gather that the general efficiency of Sindhia's troops is distinctly not high ?

1510. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—That is the universal opinion of all our officers.

1511. SIR P. LAKE.—But you would say that his local troops are possibly better than those of other States ?

1512. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Yes, though not very appreciably higher.

1513. SIR W. MEYER.—As Inspector-General, you are under the Foreign Department, and Inspecting officers report to the Inspector-General ?

1514. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Yes.

1515. SIR W. MEYER.—Are your annual reports on the training, etc., of the troops communicated to the military authorities ?

1516. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Only as confidential documents.

1517. SIR W. MEYER.—Would it be of advantage if such knowledge as you possess as Inspecting Officer of Imperial Service Troops and indirectly, your knowledge of local armies, were communicated to the military authorities ?

1518. MAJOR MOLYNEUX.—Yes, I think, on the whole, it would be an advantage. Of course there is always the danger that a report cannot tell a man everything, and false ideas might get about if the thing were too widely circulated. I think it would be a distinct advantage to General Officers Commanding.

(The witness then withdrew.)

ANNEXURE.

(See answer 1456.)

Memorandum on the value of the Indian Native Officer, and his capabilities for training troops in peace and leading them in the field, as exemplified in the Imperial Service Troops.

(Read by Major Molyneux at the 10th Meeting on Friday, the 14th June 1912.)

Some considerable experience of the military forces maintained by Native States, amongst the most martial races, has convinced me that, in their present stage of evolution, they cannot be brought to a useful standard of either discipline or efficiency otherwise than under effective European supervision. Amongst the commandants of Imperial Service Troops, with whom I am intimately acquainted, are one or two whom I regard as the very best Indian officers I have ever known, and for whom I have the utmost respect and admiration. For example, I consider that Colonel Nand Singh of Patiala—whom General Drummond, late Inspector-General of Imperial Service Troops, who had known him intimately for over twenty years, considered the best Indian cavalry officer in the country—is better fitted by ability and experience to train a regiment in peace, or to command it in war, than any Indian officer whom I have come across in Government Service. He has risen from the very bottom of the social scale, being of goala origin, and utterly without influence or backing, and has reached his present position solely through his possession of the sterling qualities (which did not escape the observation of the Inspecting Officers who have watched his career and helped him with the State authorities) of absolute integrity, single-mindedness and the highest sense of honour, coupled with quite uncommon shrewdness and tact, and the infinite capacity for taking pains which is sometimes given as a definition of genius. Take another example—Maharaj Sher Singh, Commandant of the 2nd Jodhpur Sardar Rissala. He is a Rajput gentlemen of the bluest blood, of great wealth, and the highest position, with the fullest support behind him of the State. He is a keen soldier, handsome and with the most charming manners, of high character, a splendid horseman, sympathetic to his men, liked and admired by them.

I have purposely chosen the two very best and highest types of Indian officers whom I have met, and whom I have reason to think are by universal consent the best in the country. It is only an accident that they happen to be drawn from the opposite poles of society. This is not an essay on Indian psychology, and it is not my intention, and perhaps not in my power to explain lucidly why such men should require help or support from Europeans or anyone else; but of this I am absolutely convinced, that either of these exceptional officers would view with consternation and misgiving any proposal to withdraw the European Inspecting Officers. I am even more certain, if possible, that they would be right in feeling so, and that the efficiency, in peace and in war, of the units under their command, would suffer rapid deterioration if left without European guidance.

I do not think that this state of things can be altered really materially, at present, or in the immediate future, by any process of training which we can impart to the Indian officer. The question is one far less of training than of character; or perhaps "racial characteristics and inherited instincts" would describe my meaning more exactly, for Indians often are found with plenty of what we call "character."

In this connection, it may be useful to refer to our long experience in the past, and to consider whether the inherent characteristics of Indians have undergone sufficient change to warrant any radical departure from our successful procedure in the earlier days of our history in the East. Since the days when Europeans have first been available as military leaders, their value has been apparent: and no local substitute could ever be found for them, even when every consideration of policy pointed to finding such a substitute, if possible. What Clive and Wellington did with scanty forces drawn from races of inferior military value against powerful and well-equipped armies may perhaps be partly discounted by the unity and singleness of purpose of the policy which

they represented, and by the prestige of the nation behind them. But the earlier military adventurers who served the native Princes had no such support or backing. Nor were Perron, DeBoigne, Avitabile, George Thomas, Skinner—to mention a few of the more prominent chosen by these Princes because of their education or attainments, or from political or social considerations. Many of them had no standing even in their own country—Avitabile the deserter, and George Thomas the runaway sailor, had little in the way of literary attainments. They were employed only because they were Europeans of strong character, and experience had taught the native Princes that under European leadership their troops were far more certain of victory than if led by the bravest and ablest of Indians. Social, political, and often religious instinct were all in favour of choosing a leader from other sources. But in an age of internecine warfare, when the sword alone was the arbiter, sentiment had to yield to facts, and self-preservation impelled them to employ those whom they knew to be immeasurably superior to anything India could give.

We know, too, that the East India Company, guided by the purely commercial instinct of obtaining the cheapest article that would serve the purpose, experimented considerably with troops entirely under native leadership, in its earlier days. There was little love lost in Calcutta at the time between the military and mercantile communities; but the pressure of inexorable facts forced them to bring out a sufficient number of European officers.

In the Sikh wars our experience underwent no change. The great bulk of the armies that overthrew the Sikh power were composed of races admittedly inferior to the Sikhs in all martial qualities, and in several momentous actions were much inferior in numbers. But they were led by British officers.

The last example which I shall quote furnishes the most dramatic example in history of the surpassing importance of European leadership to Asiatics. It was no question of superior training, for the more highly trained troops were against us. It was not a question of tactics or gunnery: for the tactics and gunnery of those days were not too abstruse for the oriental mind to grasp. We know that the mutineers of 1857, almost always overwhelmingly superior in numbers in the earlier phases of the campaign, well-armed, well-trained, well-horsed, far better provided with artillery and munitions of war, accustomed to habits of discipline, with the traditions of an almost unbroken record of victory behind them, everywhere succumbed to raw, hastily raised levies, drawn from the very races they had recently beaten, upon almost every occasion when they met them. There is only one explanation, and no other can be found. The European leaders were now on the other side.

I have only mentioned our historical experiences, because we have to consider the present problem in the light of experience. As far as my own observation goes, the same thing is true today, and is daily exemplified in the Native States. Practically every State which keeps up Imperial Service Troops also keeps a local army! In some case, it is true, the local troops are quite content to vegetate: in certain other States, and notably in one, under my own supervision, there are the keenest efforts made to bring them up to the Imperial Service standard of efficiency. Everything that happens in the Imperial Service Troops, next door to them, is known: every detail of drill, every manœuvre is watched and copied. In one State, the Ruler is notoriously far more interested in his local (or 'regular') infantry than in his Imperial Service infantry. He has appointed his own Inspector-General for them: discipline is maintained ruthlessly, and the best of the trained Indian officers and instructors are drafted from his Imperial Service Troops to them. Yet in no case do I know of any 'local' troops which would be of much use except for police purposes.

Another reason, which is quite apart from the question of efficiency, why the presence of European officers with Indian troops is essential, is that he forms an indispensable link between them and our own Government. If he is of the right sort, his influence should be, and usually is very real; for Indians, as a rule, are orderly and docile, (if they were not, we could hardly be in the country) and have an inherent respect for properly constituted authority, especially if associated in their minds with justice and fairness, and an intelligence and education higher than their own. If we have to employ

Indian troops, whether Government or Imperial Service, outside of British India, we have no reason to doubt their loyalty and willingness; for, so far as we can foresee, it would then be subjected to no strain which it has not yet already borne. Our Muhammadan troops, when fighting against their co-religionists, have never allowed community of religion to interfere with the discharge of their duty. Were trouble to come in India itself, on the other hand, the strain might quite conceivably be a far more severe one. It is even possible to imagine that cases might occur where the Ruler of the State might find his policy in direct opposition to that of the Supreme Government. Under such circumstances, the attitude of his Imperial Service Troops would, in all probability, decide the question of whether his line of conduct would be defiant or not. Were there full sympathy and confidence between the inspecting officer and the troops, it is probable that the latter would either decline to take part in anything of the kind, or go into it so half-heartedly as to offer no prospect of success.

This view has been confirmed by my own experience in one State where, upon evidence which I have good reason to consider beyond question, this very argument has been used by a very small but comparatively influential seditious section as a reason for trying to get rid of certain excellent officers on the score that they were so much under the influence of the inspecting officers that it was certain that they would do nothing against the Supreme Government, and that the men would stand by their officers. This incident was reported by me at the time to the Inspector-General.

In the first part of this memorandum I cited the cases of two officers of unusually high type, and expressed my belief that even under such men troops must deteriorate in value if European supervision and assistance were withdrawn. These views apply with greater force to the bulk of those troops who serve under Indian commandants, because in the majority of cases the troops are under disadvantages which do not apply with these two commandants. In the vast majority of cases, the commandant, without the unflinching support, which he knows he can count on from the Inspecting Officer, would be morally powerless to resist outside influence in the making of any promotion or appointment. The immediate and inevitable result, to be seen in its full luxuriance in almost any non-Imperial Service unit in the Native States, is this :—that every man who wishes to get on forms his own little party of intrigue, tries to buy or curry favour in influential quarters, and by every kind of devilment to remove from the competition any rivals or those who may stand in his way. Of course, to work at his profession under these circumstances is the last thing that will pay any officer; in some corps the fact is frankly admitted, and there is no attempt to do or learn anything. In others, if the Ruler is keen on military matters, just enough ‘eye wash’ is indulged in to satisfy a man who has no professional knowledge. I am now referring only to those corps in which the commandant is trying to do his best, but cannot stand alone. I am not alluding to the large number of units in which promotion is a matter of bargain and sale, or where the commandant himself without knowledge or qualifications, has been appointed for any possible reason other than professional fitness, and neither desires it in his corps nor is competent to decide in what or in whom it exists. Practically every Imperial Service unit, if deprived of its Inspecting Officer, would deteriorate within a couple of years almost to the level of the ‘local’ troops, in spite of the fact that some of them are, in all but officers, now the equals in efficiency of Government regiments.

The whole question of the supply of European officers to Indian troops is a matter of delicate balance and adjustment. Without European officers, zeal, up-to-date efficiency, and progress, would be rare. On the other hand, if over-weighted with too many British officers, the native officer will necessarily deteriorate; and if he does, the regiment will deteriorate too. I do not think it would be possible to find a good Indian regiment without good Indian officers. If the British officers are too numerous, the position and responsibilities of the native officer suffer, with the result that his initiative and power of accepting responsibility (always a weak point with the Indian officer) become atrophied for want of use, and he will be found wanting in the hour of trial

The art of command is a difficult one and, with most men, the habit is only acquired by degrees. Nor can we think that the native officer, if a really good man, will willingly acquiesce in being a mere cypher. Upon the proportion of British officers more than on any other factor the future efficiency and contentment of the Indian officer will depend.

To the above I would add the following :—

The best of the Indian commandants of Imperial Service Troops are usually exceedingly reliable in the following respects :—

- (i) Drill and parade movements are most carefully taught and admirably executed.
- (ii) The training of horses and horsemastership (where the latter is not interfered with by the remission of punishments, etc., by an outside authority) are unexpectedly good.
- (iii) Stores and mobilization equipment are carefully and well kept.
- (iv) Special services, such as signalling, etc., receive due attention.
- (v) The suggestions and criticisms of the British officer, if tactful and helpful, are received in the best spirit.

The weak points, so far as purely professional training is concerned, are want of power to apply the knowledge which they already fully possess, and a certain hesitation and want of confidence in their own opinions and powers, unless a British officer be at their elbow.

EDWARD MOLYNEUX, *Major,*
Offg. Inspector-General of Imperial Service Troops.

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

12th Meeting—Friday, 21st June 1912.

Mr. H. H. Hayden, C.I.E., B.A., B.A.I., (T.C.D.), F.G.S., Director, Geological Survey of India, attended as a witness and was examined.

EVIDENCE OF MR. HAYDEN.

1519. **PRESIDENT.**—Mr. Hayden, you were some time in Afghanistan ?

1520. **MR. HAYDEN.**—I was there for ten months during 1907-08.

1521. **PRESIDENT.**—You first went from Peshawar to Kabul ?

1522. **MR. HAYDEN.**—Yes. I crossed the Hindu Kush, but did not go far to the westward. I eventually returned to Peshawar down the Kabul river valley.

1523. **PRESIDENT.**—In what condition is the road from Landi Kotal to Jalalabad, and on to Kabul ?

1524. **MR. HAYDEN.**—At my time it was stoney and rather bad. Some heavy machinery was stuck in the mud, and I heard that it had been there some months.

1525. **PRESIDENT.**—I understand that the road over the Lataband Kotal is not now used ?

1526. **MR. HAYDEN.**—I believe not ; the road over the Haft Kotal is the one now followed.

1527. **PRESIDENT.**—Is that road fit for motor traffic ?

1528. **MR. HAYDEN.**—I understand that it is so now. I did not get so far as the Haft Kotal, but as far as I did go, it was an excellent road. It was not metalled, but it was practically a natural metalled road.

1529. **PRESIDENT.**—Then north of Kabul, what sort of roads did you find ?

1530. **MR. HAYDEN.**—The road leading north from Kabul was a perfectly good road but it was only just made out of the mud from the fields. The Amir talked of metalling it for motoring purposes. The road up the Ghorband Valley was excellent for caravan traffic throughout its length.

1531. **PRESIDENT.**—North of Kabul there were no metalled roads ?

1532. **MR. HAYDEN.**—No attempt at metalling has been made anywhere to the north.

1533. **PRESIDENT.**—When the snow is on the ground they are practically impassable ?

1534. **MR. HAYDEN.**—Yes, they get churned up.

1535. **PRESIDENT.**—Was there any difficulty about water-supply along the various roads ?

1536. **MR. HAYDEN.**—No, I never had any trouble anywhere ; but the water was frequently muddy.

1537. **PRESIDENT.**—Did you go over the Hindu Kush itself ?

1538. **MR. HAYDEN.**—Yes ; the Amir has made an excellent road—a caravan road—over the Ak Robot Pass which I crossed in July. The altitude of the pass is about 10,000 feet. It is snowed up throughout the winter. I also went to the top of the Shahdarrah Pass which is over 13,000 feet high.

1539. PRESIDENT.—In the winter, I presume, these passes are blocked ?

1540. MR. HAYDEN.—I went to the top of the Shahdarrah Pass in June and there was still some snow there.

1541. PRESIDENT.—I gather that these ranges are devoid of vegetation ?

1542. MR. HAYDEN.—Almost entirely.

1543. PRESIDENT.—A force moving along the roads leading over the Hindu Kush would find no fuel ?

1544. MR. HAYDEN.—They would find a few coal seams on the northern side of the Hindu Kush. The coal is good from a chemical point of view, but so crushed as to be like gunpowder. It would be extremely difficult to mine, as there is no wood with which to timber the mines.

1545. PRESIDENT.—When you got the coal you could only use it by mixing it up with clay to form briquettes, I suppose ?

1546. MR. HAYDEN.—Yes.

1547. PRESIDENT.—Are any supplies of foodstuffs obtainable on the Hindu Kush ?

1548. MR. HAYDEN.—I had fifteen sowars with me, but I had the greatest difficulty in obtaining supplies, especially if I stayed three or four days at one place. There are a few sheep but not many. Bhoosa is used as forage for horses. They grow wheat in all the villages. The population was very sparse over most of the tracts I passed through, that is, the Hazara country. Ruined villages were met with in every direction.

1549. PRESIDENT.—Then there is a very small supply of fodder ; you could only get it with difficulty—just sufficient for the people themselves ? Is there any grazing ?

1550. MR. HAYDEN.—On the slopes of the Hindu Kush there is grazing. Further north there is quite good grazing, that is, in the southern part of Afghan Turkistan. The people camp on the tops of these hills during the summer months with their flocks of sheep and a few ponies.

1551. PRESIDENT.—North of the Hindu Kush ?

1552. MR. HAYDEN.—Yes.

1553. PRESIDENT.—Are there many of these nomadic people who travel about in the summer ?

1554. MR. HAYDEN.—I met very few of them, and not many flocks of sheep ; in fact, I think, I only saw two flocks of about 600 sheep.

1555. PRESIDENT.—What do the caravans consist of ?

1556. MR. HAYDEN.—Almost entirely of two-humped camels. The ordinary plains' camels do not seem to go very far inland.

1557. PRESIDENT.—Did you notice a very large number of these camels ?

1558. MR. HAYDEN.—One used to meet strings of a dozen or twenty.

1559. PRESIDENT.—What do these camels get to eat ?

1560. MR. HAYDEN.—They graze on the little scrub there is on the hill-sides.

1561. PRESIDENT.—Did you see anything of the Afghan troops ?

1562. MR. HAYDEN.—I had fifteen sowars with me—I did not think very much of them. They were very poorly mounted. They got Rs. 15 per mensem out of which they had to provide themselves with everything. Their uniform had been picked up in the bazars I should think. They were armed with Martinis and each sowar carried from ten to twenty rounds of ammunition. The Afghan troops have their regular cantonments, where they have magazines apparently, and I think their ammunition is stored in these and is not served

out to the men. Generally speaking, the Afghans are delightful people to get on with, but I had a very objectionable native officer with me who was extremely obstructive.

1563. PRESIDENT.—When you were at Kabul, did you see any of the troops there?

1564. MR. HAYDEN.—I saw a review near the big Musjid. The troops marched past and formed up again.

1565. PRESIDENT.—Did you consider that they marched well?

1566. MR. HAYDEN.—Yes, quite well. I saw about three regiments. A good many of the men had been trained by the Amir's Turkish colonel. They looked quite smart, most of them being in uniform. I met the Turkish colonel twice; he seemed intelligent, and appeared to have travelled a great deal. I think he talked Persian to the Afghan troops; they all talk Persian in Kabul now.

1567. PRESIDENT.—Did you notice anything in the shape of camping grounds where a force of any size could camp?

1568. MR. HAYDEN.—I think troops would have to camp in the valleys at the foot of the passes. The country in the neighbourhood of the Hindu Kush is very peculiar. The bottoms of the valleys are always flat and generally full of alluvium. The fields and gardens would provide excellent camping grounds.

1569. SIR W. MEYER.—I understand that the passes of the Hindu Kush are only open for four months in the year?

1570. MR. HAYDEN.—From the beginning of June to October.

1571. SIR P. LAKE.—Does that apply to all?

1572. MR. HAYDEN.—I would not like to include the Ak Robat Pass. That pass, I remember, they told me is closed for a considerable portion of the year.

1573. SIR W. MEYER.—Might the pass you crossed be taken as fairly typical of the rest?

1574. MR. HAYDEN.—I think so.

1575. SIR W. MEYER.—Could you get guns across it?

1576. MR. HAYDEN.—Yes, over the Ak Robat Pass, but not over the Shahdarrah Pass. Most of the roads are mere camel tracks. The Russians could not move troops with any degree of rapidity towards Kabul, and I doubt whether they could bring their guns across. They would have to carry their own food by pack transport.

1577. SIR W. MEYER.—What is the character of the country round Kabul as regards supplies?

1578. MR. HAYDEN.—A large force could be fed there. The valleys in the vicinity are comparatively broad and rich.

1579. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing we had to put a force of 50,000 men in and about Kabul, to what extent could they be fed locally?

1580. MR. HAYDEN.—I do not think you could feed them for long.

1581. SIR W. MEYER.—I suppose the people would hide their supplies as far as possible?

1582. MR. HAYDEN.—I should think so unless the period was about August, when the crops ripen.

1583. SIR W. MEYER.—Did you see the Afghan troops on any other occasions than the one you mentioned?

1584. MR. HAYDEN.—I once saw them carrying out target practice near Kabul. Their shooting was very inferior. I think that my remarks about the sowars of my escort might apply to the whole of the Afghan army except the

Amir's special troops. He gave the Turkish colonel 300 men to train, with the promise of more if he were successful. I never saw any men being drilled except the Turkish colonel's small detachment.

I went through the rifle factories where they were turning out Martinis, but the sighting of the rifles appeared to be very erratic. I suppose when a man gets to know his own particular rifle he is able to shoot with it. They are also turning out small guns I believe.

1585. SIR W. MEYER.—Is the Amir able to supply his whole army with Martinis from his factory?

1586. MR. HAYDEN.—I do not remember the figures. They were turning out a very fair number. They had a few Hindustani *mistris* from Quetta employed in the factory, I think. The Afghans used the lathes very well, but were inferior to the Hindustani *mistris*. An Afghan was in charge of the whole factory. He succeeded Fleischer who was murdered.

1587. SIR W. MEYER.—Was Fleischer an expert in rifles?

1588. MR. HAYDEN.—He was in charge of the factory.

1589. SIR W. MEYER.—Then, you speak of a gun factory?

1590. MR. HAYDEN.—I believe they were turning out guns of 2 inch calibre made in the same works. I am not quite certain as to the calibre of the guns.

1591. SIR W. MEYER.—Had the Amir any European instructors for his troops?

1592. MR. HAYDEN.—No. The Turkish colonel was entirely alone.

1593. SIR W. MEYER.—You say, as far as you were concerned, there was no anti-foreign feeling?

1594. MR. HAYDEN.—Not among the people, only among the officials. In the event of our moving troops into Afghanistan, so long as the people did not think we were going to take the country for ourselves, I should say they would be extremely friendly. In Kabul the people were quite pleasant and friendly.

1595. SIR P. LAKE.—Do you know the Kandahar side at all?

1596. MR. HAYDEN.—No, not at all.

1597. PRESIDENT.—The rich valleys near Kabul which you have mentioned are not very extensive?

1598. MR. HAYDEN.—No.

1599. SIR P. LAKE.—A similar remark would apply to the valleys near the Hindu Kush?

1600. MR. HAYDEN.—Yes.

1601. PRESIDENT.—Is there an abundant and cheap supply of firewood at Kabul?

1602. MR. HAYDEN.—All the wood supply has to come from the mountains between Kabul and Kurram. All my firewood was very expensive—about Rs. 30, Kabuli, a camel load. The coal could be easily briquetted, but you would have to import all your timber and you could not mine anywhere in that country without timbering. Economically, Afghanistan would not be worth taking.

1603. SIR W. MEYER.—Has the Amir anything in the way of cordite manufacture?

1604. MR. HAYDEN.—In Fleischer's time they made smokeless powder, but they do not know how to make it now.

1605. SIR W. MEYER.—We had it put to us that Afghan tribesmen using their guerrilla tactics would be more formidable than the trained Afghan army?

1606. MR. HAYDEN.—Much more so. The Afghan troops have deteriorated a good deal since Abdur Rahman's time. I do not refer to the southern Afghans and the tribes.

1607. PRESIDENT.—Did you notice anything about the importation of arms from the Persian Gulf?

1608. MR. HAYDEN.—We heard nothing, and saw nothing of it.

1609. SIR R. SCALLON.—Are the Ak Robat and Shahdarrah Passes long?

1610. MR. HAYDEN.—I could not say about the Shahdarrah Pass because I got to the top in a snow storm. The Ak Robat is easy. It was rather cold on the top of the pass but not unpleasantly so. I met a few caravans coming down from the Oxus. They carried the ordinary bales one sees in India.

1611. SIR W. MEYER.—Was there a large supply of camels in the country itself?

1612. MR. HAYDEN.—No.

1613. SIR R. SCALLON.—Were there any forts on these routes?

1614. MR. HAYDEN.—There is a fort on the Bamian Pass and the fort the Amir is building for himself at Jabal-us-Siraj but they are only fortified *serais*. They are built of mud and the only two forts I saw were completely commanded from all the surrounding hills.

(The witness then withdrew.)

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

13th Meeting—Tuesday, the 25th June 1912.

The Hon. Mr. M. W. Fenton, C.S.I., 2nd Financial Commissioner,
Punjab, attended as a witness and was examined.

EVIDENCE OF MR. FENTON.

1615. PRESIDENT.—Mr. Fenton, you are Financial Commissioner to the Punjab Government?

1616. MR. FENTON.—Yes.

1617. PRESIDENT.—You have had great experience in the administration of the Punjab?

1618. MR. FENTON.—Well, I happened to be Chief Secretary to the Punjab Government during 1909, 1910 and 1911, and was Commissioner of Rawalpindi at the time of the riots there. I have been Commissioner in four out of the five divisions in the Punjab.

1619. PRESIDENT.—What are the principles observed by the Punjab Government in deciding how the land irrigated by any particular canal is to be distributed between military and other settlers?

1620. MR. FENTON.—I do not think that at any time the respective claims of military as compared with other settlers have ever been weighed against each other or brought into competition. Historically, when colonization commenced, the settlers were divided into what were called “peasant,” “yeomen” and “capitalist” grantees. At that time it was not realized that there would be any demand on the part of the military for land, and the only provision suggested by the Punjab Government was that half of the capitalist area—which at that time was put at 100,000 acres—should be reserved for military reward grants, that is to say, for distribution to retired military officers and soldiers who would obtain the land on reward terms.

1621. SIR W. MEYER.—The capitalist had to pay for his grant?

1622. MR. FENTON.—Yes, a *nazarana*, a sort of entrance fee; if, however, he wished to obtain proprietary rights, he had to pay more.

1623. SIR W. MEYER.—And the military settler?

1624. MR. FENTON.—The land originally reserved for the military settler was to be allotted on reward terms, that is to say, the price per acre which he was required to pay represented a more or less substantial concession as compared with the market value of the land. All grantees, whether reward holders or others, had to pay the normal annual assessment on account of land revenue and water rates.

1625. SIR W. MEYER.—Were these ‘reward’ grantees to be exclusively military?

1626. MR. FENTON.—Yes, as far as the first branch canal was concerned, but experience showed us that, in addition to applications from others, a great many applications for land on ordinary as distinguished from reward terms came from native military officers and retired soldiers. As there were no means of discriminating between the claims of such applicants, it was decided that in colonizing the second branch of the canal a certain proportion of the land should be set aside for the military, and that the Commander-in-Chief should be requested to distribute this amongst the various regiments. In all subsequent colonization schemes therefore, steps were taken to set apart land for native officers and soldiers. I can give figures of the allotments. Roughly, ten per cent. of the total area has been allotted to military

settlers. As the military element in the population is nothing like ten per cent. of the total, it may be said that the soldiers have been very liberally dealt with.

1627. PRESIDENT.—The Colonies Committee in 1907-08 recommended that in future distributions of such land, a larger proportion than heretofore should be reserved for military settlers. Has that recommendation been accepted by the Punjab Government?

1628. MR. FENTON.—The Committee thought that in future colonization schemes a very substantial area should be placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief. The Punjab Government, in sending on the recommendation, fully concurred that there was no better way of disposing of land than by allotting it to old soldiers. The Government of India have not given orders as to the future, because they say they will deal with each colonization scheme on its merits, and the only one which has been sent up since then was that for the Upper Chenab Canal, which was opened by the Viceroy the other day. Unfortunately there is very little Government land on the Upper Chenab Canal. There are only about 80,000 acres, and most of the available area is already ear-marked for allotment to disappointed Jhelum grantees, that is, people who were unable to get the land which was promised to them in the Lower Jhelum Canal.

1629. SIR. W. MEYER.—Does the old policy of giving reward grants on more favourable conditions still apply?

1630. MR. FENTON.—We have got separate orders for reward grants sanctioned by the Commander-in-Chief. I may say that 76,000 acres have been allotted in reward grants since we started in 1889. I may also mention that the Secretary of State has decided that no more civil reward grants are to be given.

1631. PRESIDENT.—You read out some remarks of the Government of India in which they said they did not wish land to be given to military officers as rewards as a general policy; this was because a proposal for giving increased pensions was under consideration at the time. You do not know whether the pensions have actually been increased?

1632. MR. FENTON.—No.

1633. PRESIDENT.—Beyond the report of the Colonies Committee, has any representation reached the Punjab Government from the Commander-in-Chief or Army Headquarters to the effect that they were dissatisfied or that they would like larger grants?

1634. MR. FENTON.—I have never heard of such a representation being made. Last year Sir O'Moore Creagh was at Sargodha, and a great many military grantees visited him and made representations to him which led to his addressing the Punjab Government demi-officially; their complaint was not that insufficient land had been allotted to them, but that they had not received the amount of water they ought to have got. The reply shewed that they received a great deal more water than they had been promised.

1635. SIR W. MEYER.—The impression, therefore, that we may gather is that there is no case for the proposition that the Punjab Government had refused to deal liberally with the claims of the military to land?

1636. MR. FENTON.—I think that impression is essentially correct. Everyone welcomes ex-soldiers. They constitute an element of loyalty in the colony, though their sons may not. There has never been any reluctance to receive them as colonists. We have of course had adverse reports regarding them as agriculturists, but they are most pleasant people to have anything to do with.

1637. PRESIDENT.—It has been suggested that one of the conditions of tenure of all holdings on canals should be that one member of the family should join the army. What is your opinion on the point?

1638. MR. FENTON.—Of course it seems very retrograde that we should accept service in kind, but I am entirely in favour of it. There is this precedent; when we took over the Cis-Sutlej territory of the Punjab, all the principal land-holders were required to provide horsemen or infantry when called upon; eventually this obligation was commuted at certain rates for horsemen and infantrymen. In 1852 it was altered to a drawback of two annas in the rupee of the assigned land revenue. The Land Revenue Act also provides for land revenue taking the form of service; that is to say, a man might be exempted from land revenue if he agreed to render military service; so the principle is not without recognition.

1639. SIR W. MEYER.—In villages is it a recognized principle that people useful to the Government shall receive preferential treatment in regard to land?

1640. MR. FENTON.—The headman gets five per cent for his duties, but my own opinion is that it is perfectly legitimate to make a bargain with anyone; if we allot land to a military settler who would not otherwise have any chance of getting land, I think it would be quite reasonable to stipulate that he should furnish, say, one recruit to the army in consideration of his having been selected. Of course you cannot enforce specific performance of such a rule because it may so happen that a family may not have an individual suitable for military service.

1641. SIR W. MEYER.—You speak of the military settler only; what about the others?

1642. MR. FENTON.—Well, the others are, as a rule, not of the right class. You could not call upon Azaiens, for instance, to supply recruits as the army would not accept them.

1643. SIR W. MEYER.—But in the case of a man of a suitable fighting race?

1644. MR. FENTON.—Of course we could make a condition in all cases, but we propose imposing other obligations on the non-military classes, such for instance, as the cultivation of a certain kind of cotton, the breeding of horses and mules and so on. In some cases, settlers have to provide transport animals should the Government require them.

1645. PRESIDENT.—As regards the obligation to provide men for the army, there may be objections; the family might send its most dilapidated member to serve, or the man who was sent might go very unwillingly and make a perfectly perfunctory soldier?

1646. MR. FENTON.—That is so, but the prospect of an enhanced payment of land revenue as penalty for making default in the condition would probably prevent any shuffling out of the obligation that might otherwise occur.

1647. PRESIDENT.—Under what conditions do military settlers now hold land in the colonies?

1648. MR. FENTON.—On exactly the same terms as anybody else.

1649. PRESIDENT.—It has been suggested that an impression prevails in the army that, *vis à vis* the civilian, soldiers are very badly treated as regards the distribution of land in the canal colonies in the Punjab. Is this so?

1650. MR. FENTON.—I have never become aware of the existence of such an impression and I consider that it is entirely unfounded.

1651. PRESIDENT.—Have ex-soldier settlers an influence for good amongst the canal populations, from the point of view of loyalty to the Government?

1652. MR. FENTON.—I think on the whole that they have. It disappears, however, in the next generation.

1653. PRESIDENT.—In the canal colonies, are any ex-native officers or other soldiers employed in subordinate administrative appointments? If so, are they found suitable?

1654. MR. FENTON.—The only subordinate administrative appointments in which they could be employed are those of *lambardars* and *zaildars*; ex-soldiers are *cæteris paribus* preferred for these. The *zaildar* gets as *lambardar* his Government allowance of five per cent on land revenue and also an allowance which comes to about Rs. 200 a year.

1655. SIR W. MEYER.—Was there not a proposal some two years ago that certain military officers should be given appointments as Extra Assistant Commissioners?

1656. MR. FENTON.—Yes, the Punjab Government made the suggestion but the Government of India have not issued any orders. I think that other local Governments would have nothing to do with the proposal. In the Punjab we reserve two appointments out of every twelve for younger sons of good family. We have taken some men from the army—three or four I think—and some have turned out very well.

1657. SIR W. MEYER.—How do you think the ordinary native officer risen from the ranks would do?

1658. MR. FENTON.—I do not think he would be suitable.

1659. PRESIDENT.—As a general rule, how does the ex-soldier compare as a colonist with the ordinary peasant colonist?

1660. MR. FENTON.—I cannot do better than repeat what was said by the Colonies Committee on the subject. “No one who has had practical experience of colonization work is prepared to allege that man for man, the retired soldier is equal as a colonist to the best class of peasant proprietor accustomed to work on his own land, on which we are able to indent in the Punjab. But all are agreed that military pensioners have on the whole done very well in the Chenab and Jhelum colonies and that as a class they deserve every encouragement. If not able to follow the plough themselves, their sons or relatives are prepared to do so. And since it is an axiom that peasant grants should only be given to soldiers who are of agricultural tribes, a foundation is laid for a district of the right type by the introduction of military pensioners as colonists”.

1661. PRESIDENT.—In your opinion, is the population of the canal colonies contented, and does the grant of land tend to enhance its loyalty to the Government?

1662. MR. FENTON.—At present I think that the population of the canal colonies is contented; it was discontented in 1907, but solely on account of having been deceived by agitators. As regards loyalty, the original grantees are no doubt grateful, but in subsequent generations that gratitude disappears.

1663. PRESIDENT.—What about the grievances alleged in connection with the Canal Colonies Bill of 1907?

1664. MR. FENTON.—The allegations were not in connection with past grievances so much as with apprehensions in regard to the future. The Viceroy refused assent to the Bill.

1665. PRESIDENT.—Are there any indications that such societies as the Arya Samaj, Tat Khalsa, etc., are particularly active in the canal colonies?

1666. MR. FENTON.—Not now; they were in 1907, but these are not the districts in which they are most active.

1667. PRESIDENT.—Do you think there is any chance of a recrudescence of the agitation of 1907 in connection with the canal colonies?

1668. MR. FENTON.—There are no present indications whatsoever.

1669. SIR W. MEYER.—But what has happened before, might happen again?

1670. MR. FENTON.—I believe that the measures taken by the Government, such as the Press Act, the Seditious Meetings Acts and various

prosecutions, have entirely suppressed any possibility of serious agitation. I think the people have come to realize that the Government means business and that agitation is unprofitable. It has also become unfashionable. There will, of course, always be secret intrigue.

1671. PRESIDENT.—Can you give the strength of the armed police in the Punjab?

1672. MR. FENTON.—The total number of police in the province is 20,169.

1673. PRESIDENT.—Are the unarmed police also trained to the use of fire-arms?

1674. MR. FENTON.—The whole of the police are trained; the upper subordinates with the revolver, the lower with the rifle.

1675. SIR W. MEYER.—Can you give us generally the strength of the unarmed police?

1676. MR. FENTON.—I do not think that it could be said that any portion of the police is unarmed. I cannot say what the reserves of arms are; a large quantity is kept in stock to be used as occasion may require.

1677. PRESIDENT.—What proportion of the armed police is concentrated in formed bodies at district headquarters or elsewhere?

1678. MR. FENTON.—There are usually twenty-five men at the police lines at headquarters who have no particular duties to perform and constitute a reserve. In addition to these, there are the city and cantonment police, who vary in numbers according to the size of the city or cantonment.

1679. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that the Punjab Police are, generally speaking, loyal? Is there any evidence that sedition-mongers have tried to seduce them from their loyalty?

1680. MR. FENTON.—I should say that they are just as loyal as the native army, in fact, possibly a shade more so, because there is less chance of the seditionists influencing them. The latter regard the police as dangerous to touch. The advanced party of the seditionists has made such a set against them that there is distinct hostility between the two. In addition to that, if any particular individual of the force shows seditious tendencies he can be transferred; nor are there the same chances of collusion between men of the same caste in the police as in the army. Another factor is the large number of Muhammadans in the force, and up to the present Muhammadans are supposed to be in no way affected by sedition. The total number of Muhammadans out of the 20,169 policemen in the Punjab, is 12,954, in addition to 846 officers.

1681. SIR W. MEYER.—Sir Charles Cleveland told us the other day that A. 1266. there was some discontent in the police owing to the new scheme under which head-constables could rise beyond that grade.

1682. MR. FENTON.—There is; it will take some time before the feeling wears away.

1683. SIR W. MEYER.—Does the Punjab Government propose to take any action if it proves in practice not to work well?

1684. MR. FENTON.—I have spoken to the Inspector-General, but he did not mention any such proposal.

1685. PRESIDENT.—Are the attacks on the police justifiable?

1686. MR. FENTON.—There have been cases of police torture.

1687. PRESIDENT.—In 1909 it was stated that in the event of deep-seated disaffection in the native army, the police, generally, could not be safely relied on for use in quelling disturbance. Do you agree in that opinion?

1688. MR. FENTON.—Well, I think it would be a very bad state of affairs if there were deep-seated disloyalty in the native army. If it were confined to one

section, say the Sikhs, probably only the Sikh members of the police force would be affected, but if it affected other classes no doubt the police force would feel the influence of it.

1689. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that in times of disaffection, provided the army remained loyal, the police could generally be trusted to do so also? Is it likely that the police would be less trustworthy than the native army?

1690. MR. FENTON.—The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative, to the second in the negative.

1691. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing conditions changed and the trouble was with a Muhammadan regiment, what then?

1692. MR. FENTON.—Well, then we should expect the Muhammadan police to sympathize with their co-religionists in the army.

A. 1256. 1693. SIR W. MEYER.—Sir Charles Cleveland said that, supposing it was necessary to use the police against their co-religionists, he would rather trust Muhammadan police against Muhammadans, than he would trust their Hindu brethren against Hindu rioters.

1694. MR. FENTON.—It depends upon the nature of the disturbance; I would not be prepared *a priori* to make any pronouncement.

1695. PRESIDENT.—Is any difficulty experienced now in recruiting for the police? If so, did the same difficulties exist in, say, 1904?

1696. MR. FENTON.—I am told that there is more difficulty than heretofore on account of promotion to the higher ranks having been curtailed. These difficulties did not exist to the same extent in 1904.

1697. SIR W. MEYER.—The pay of constables, etc., has been increased?

1698. MR. FENTON.—Yes, but prices have risen more than *pro rata*, and the pay, I think, is too low for the rank and file.

1699. PRESIDENT.—Do you think the recruitment of Sikhs for the army has been overdone, and are the present conditions in the Punjab likely to affect the question of recruitment?

1700. MR. FENTON.—By “overdone” do you mean, have we exhausted the supply?

1701. PRESIDENT.—I mean have we taken more Sikhs than is prudent?

1702. MR. FENTON.—The other day the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar, who was asked to what extent his district could supply recruits for a new colony, replied that if many were taken from his district the difficulties of recruiting for the army would be enhanced. There can be no doubt that the prosperity of the country is not without its influence on recruiting; the greater the prosperity the greater the difficulties of recruitment of Sikhs and others. The canal colonies have tended to reduce the supply. Then there is the high mortality from plague and the high rates paid for labour.

1703. PRESIDENT.—And also the great scope the Sikhs have for serving oversea?

1704. MR. FENTON.—There has been a large diminution of that lately.

1705. SIR W. MEYER.—Has their exclusion from Canada and Australia aroused any hostility?

1706. MR. FENTON.—I do not think so; they are an illiterate lot and I do not think they ever asked the educated party to make that a plank of the political platform.

1707. SIR W. MEYER.—The exclusion of natives of India from South Africa has been held up as a great grievance?

1708. MR. FENTON.—I have not found much evidence that in the Punjab it is considered a grievance.

1709. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think there are too many Sikhs in the army ?

1710. MR. FENTON.—As to that I cannot do better than refer you to Mr. Petrie's note; this was sent to the Punjab Government for criticism and their reply was, that in the main they agreed with the conclusions at which he had arrived. There is certainly material in that for suspecting the Sikhs. My own view is that the educated portion of the three communities, Muhammadans, Sikhs and Hindus, has become discontented and would like a change under which a larger share in the administration would become its own. These educated members of the community are quite willing to work up the proletariat to assist them.

1711. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you say, then, that the Sikhs are better or worse disposed towards the British Government than other classes in the Punjab ?

1712. MR. FENTON.—I should say that the uneducated and rural population is well-disposed; I think the rural classes throughout the Punjab are well-disposed, except where they have been got at by agitators.

1713. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing we had a Muhammadan rebellion, would the Sikhs take up the cudgels on our behalf ?

1714. MR. FENTON.—I think they would, because they do not like the Muhammadans, and also for the love of a fight.

As regards the proportion of any particular class to be maintained in the Indian army, I think twenty per cent. ought to be a safe figure for any element; it depends a good deal on their location.

1715. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you station a Sikh regiment at Amritsar ?

1716. MR. FENTON.—I should say, keep them away from Amritsar because this is the centre of all intrigue among the educated Sikhs. They would also be better away from Lahore and Ferozepore; they are too near the Sikh agitators in these districts.

1717. SIR W. MEYER.—Were you cognizant of the 1907 affair ?

1718. MR. FENTON.—The impression left in my mind was that at that time the Sikh regiments were well-disposed towards us within themselves, but neither the Criminal Intelligence Department here, nor the branches in the province, nor the Intelligence Branch of Army Headquarters, communicated facts about the army to the Punjab Government, and the Lieutenant-Governor had to write and ask to be kept informed of the trend of events. He also had to ask for information as to certain orders to troops in all cantonments to hold themselves in readiness. We received a reply that information would be supplied, but it never was supplied. The police did not watch the regiments because it was feared that they might possibly come into conflict with the soldiers through misunderstandings.

1719. SIR W. MEYER.—You think there ought to be a freer interchange of information ?

1720. MR. FENTON.—I do think so; it should lie with the Criminal Intelligence Department to communicate it.

1721. PRESIDENT.—But would the general officer commanding, say at Rawalpindi, be in communication with the Commissioner on such subjects ?

1722. MR. FENTON.—When I was at Rawalpindi, the present Commander-in-Chief was commanding there, and on the day of the riots we saw him and there was verbal discussion.

1723. SIR W. MEYER.—That was an extraordinary event. At ordinary times would you have interchanged opinions ?

1724. MR. FENTON.—I do not think an interchange generally takes place. The Commissioner reports to the Lieutenant-Governor and the general officer commanding, I suppose, reports to Army Headquarters.

1725. PRESIDENT.—Was there a disturbance at Rawalpindi in 1907 ?

1726. MR. FENTON.—There was a serious riot at Rawalpindi on the 2nd May 1907, and owing to the available police reserve having been concentrated at Lahore to meet possible disturbances there, the military had to be called out. The rioters dispersed when news that the British cavalry were coming reached them. Among the rioters were Government employes, mule drivers, men of the arsenal, and men from workshops. It is easier for agitators to get at employes of factories, etc., than at scattered people.

1727. SIR W. MEYER.—The deportations of Lajput Rai and Ajit Singh had a most salutary effect ?

1728. MR. FENTON.—Yes, a very salutary effect.

1729. PRESIDENT.—What do you consider to be the political bearing of the Tat Khalsa and other recent movements amongst the Sikhs ? Have the Sikhs so far succumbed to the teachings of political agitators as to render them unworthy of implicit trust ?

1730. MR. FENTON.—I do not think I could give any better answer than to refer to Mr. Petrie's note which was mainly accepted by the Punjab Government. The individual leaders of the Tat Khalsa need to be watched by the Government.

1731. SIR W. MEYER.—Does the Government still contribute to the Khalsa College ?

1732. MR. FENTON.—Yes, Rs. 10,000.

1733. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think it is wise for the Government to contribute ?

1734. MR. FENTON.—The Commissioner of Lahore, who is President of the Committee of Management, is enquiring into the matter, and what probably will be done will be to turn out those members who have shewn themselves unworthy of trust—not openly on grounds of not suppressing sedition, but on the ground that they have allowed the finances to get into a low state.

1735. SIR W. MEYER.—You have always had the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner as *ex-officio* members ; why was it that in past years the College got so out of hand ? The Government, through the Commissioner and through the Sikh Chiefs, could have taken action before ?

1736. MR. FENTON.—Action could have been taken (see Annexure paragraph 2).

1737. PRESIDENT.—Is it a fact that the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab expressed the opinion some years ago that it would be advisable to reduce the number of Sikhs in the army by 15,000 ? If so, on what grounds was the opinion given ?

1738. MR. FENTON.—I asked His Honour about that and he gave me a written answer, which is as follows :—

To the best of my recollection what occurred was this :—After the Anglo-Russian Agreement had been made, it appeared to me that it was possible to take advantage of the freedom from external attack which this agreement afforded, temporary though I thought that it would be, with a view to secure a reduction in expenditure, which was very necessary in 1906-07-08. I suggested that the strength of the Indian army might be reduced by 15,000 men by short recruitment without reducing cadres. I added that this would be in a way an advantage in the Punjab, where owing to plague and the new colonies the labour market was under-stocked, and continuous recruiting tended to put up wages and eventually might necessitate a permanent increase in the soldier's pay. A reduction in the number of Sikhs recruited would also be an advantage, as rather too much attention was being devoted to this particular class at that time by the military authorities. The reduction in the

strength of the Indian army in this way would also strengthen our position against possible disorder in India without attracting undue attention to what was being done. For six years we have enjoyed freedom from the Russian menace and we could well have done without these 15,000 men. How long we shall continue to enjoy such freedom I have now no means of judging.

1739. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing that the Government had evidence that some native regiments were inclined to be disaffected, that native officers had expressed anti-British opinions, and that some had even expressed willingness to put themselves at the head of a movement, do you think the best policy would be to hush the matter up or to allow these people to know that we were aware of their leanings?

1740. MR. FENTON.—I think the stronger the policy the better; we do not gain anything by letting disloyal people believe that we think them loyal. I might quote the case of the 10th Jats and the effect of the expulsion of the men from the regiment. When the local people saw these men come back in disgrace they thought that the Arya Samaj did not pay and shewed that they thought so; in fact, if a man was a member of the Arya Samaj, the fact was frequently brought up against him by his rivals as something not to his credit.

1741. SIR W. MEYER.—What has been the tendency of these various movements during the last few years?

1742. MR. FENTON.—The tendency has been to accentuate the differences between the various communities, each wishing to magnify its own position, and the Sikhs, in consequence of this, desire to proselytize as many people as they can, to exhibit as much strength as they can in the census returns.

1743. SIR W. MEYER.—If we gave up our insistence on Sikh baptism in the army, would Sikhism endure?

1744. MR. FENTON.—It would now I think. There is great respect paid in the army to the Grunth Sahib, while the tendencies of the Tat Khalsaists and the Neo-Sikhs are political and not religious. They are almost wholly neglectful of religious observances, and in that way, if the army accentuated the religious aspect and favoured religious observances, I think it would be salutary on the whole.

1745. SIR W. MEYER.—Is the Sikh priesthood powerful?

1746. MR. FENTON.—It is, but only locally. I do not think that the Tat Khalsaists will get hold of the Golden Temple.

1747. SIR W. MEYER.—Is any influence exercised by the prophecy that a white race would arise and free them?

1748. MR. FENTON.—The Neo-Sikhs do not like it, but I do not think that it really exercises much influence.

1749. PRESIDENT.—Does the Sikh population of the Punjab (both in British and Native States' territory) look to His Highness the Maharaja of Patiala as its head and leader?

1750. MR. FENTON.—I think it would take very little to make them look to Patiala as leader. As a matter of fact, he has not exercised leadership up to the present. An attempt was made to get him to preside at the Sikh educational conference last year, but political pressure was brought to bear and he did not preside; there was great disappointment in consequence. It is very undesirable that he should become the leader of the Sikhs, and our efforts should be directed against such an idea.

1751. SIR W. MEYER.—I suppose it is because he is the head of the principal Sikh State?

1752. MR. FENTON.—Yes, and also because he has military resources.

1753. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing he were to start a claim to the leadership of the Punjab, would he be widely accepted?

1754. MR. FENTON.—Yes, I think sentiment would be largely in his favour.

1755. PRESIDENT.—Is the general feeling in the five principal Sikh States well-disposed towards the British Government?

1756. MR. FENTON.—It very much depends upon the Ruler for the time being.

The Maharaja of Patiala is only a boy and is easily open to influences that are, or may be, from time to time brought to bear upon him. At present there is no indication that he is other than well-disposed to the British Government.

The present Maharaja of Nabha has a personal feud with the head of the Khalsa Diwan which prevents him from joining in any of the intrigues of that body.

The Maharaja of Jind takes no interest in politics and is personally, I believe, well-disposed to the Government.

The same may be said of the Maharaja of Kapurthala.

The Faridkot State is under a Council of Regency, the president of which professes to be ultra-loyal.

1757. PRESIDENT.—Has unrest in the Punjab diminished since the late Sir Denzil Ibbetson* wrote his minute on the subject in 1907? If so, is it due to preventive measures, or to the fact that the causes which led to the movement have, to a certain extent, been removed?

* Not reproduced.

1758. MR. FENTON.—It has certainly diminished. The causes were purely artificial and imaginary grievances invented by agitators, and the subsidence is entirely due to preventive and punitive measures (see annexure, paragraph 1).

1759. SIR W. MEYER.—In 1897 was there much cause for anxiety in the Punjab?

1760. MR. FENTON.—No, the ferment was amongst the people on the frontier.

1761. PRESIDENT.—Is there a party in the Punjab which desires to 'emancipate' the province from British Rule? If so, is it an influential one?

1762. MR. FENTON.—There is not one party, but several. That is to say, the educated section of each of the three communities—Muhammadans, Sikhs and Hindus—contains a number of persons who are anxious that the British Administration should be supplanted by a native Administration.

1763. PRESIDENT.—And each wishes itself in that position?

1764. MR. FENTON.—The Hindus I think have views which reach further than those of the Sikh community. The Sikhs would like to be supreme in the Punjab, whereas the Hindus would like to wield a general influence over the whole of India, joining hands with the Marathas and the Bengalis.

1765. SIR W. MEYER.—And the Muhammadans?

1766. MR. FENTON.—The development of the educated Muhammadan section is quite recent. I think it is largely due to what the Muhammadans consider the success of the Hindu agitation, especially in annulling the partition of Bengal. There is a small section now which has started a newspaper called the *Zemindar*, and whose one object seems to be to assert itself and say nasty things in order that the Government may give it more attention. The present object of the Muhammadans is only to secure larger recognition without actually supplanting the British supremacy. I think that a portion of the educated Muhammadan community is prepared to join hands with the Congress in order to secure its object.

1767. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think these people are likely to get much out of the Congress?

1768. MR. FENTON.—They would get promises, but probably their immediate object is to get the Government to pay more attention to them.

1769. PRESIDENT.—What are the main centres where trouble might be anticipated in the event of political unrest becoming acute?

1770. MR. FENTON.—Large towns, especially where there are large numbers of the lower classes whose feelings can be acted upon, as happened at Rawalpindi.

1771. PRESIDENT.—It is a matter of common knowledge that acts of the Government are misrepresented by certain individuals to suit their own ends. In what light has the transfer of the Capital to Delhi been represented to them by the people?

1772. MR. FENTON.—I do not think any Punjab newspaper has had a word to say against it. The people of the province feel that it is an honour and I do not think anyone would dare to misrepresent it.

1773. PRESIDENT.—Have the Punjabi Muhammadans been affected by the Pan-Islamic movement? Do you know what is the general feeling amongst them in regard to the Turco-Italian war, and recent events in Persia and Morocco?

1774. MR. FENTON.—Only the educated portion and those whom the educated portion are able to influence have been affected. With regard to the second portion of the question I do not think they are sincere, I have never seen events in Morocco mentioned much. They only speak in a general way of the disappearance of Muhammadan kingdoms. Muhammadans dwell a lot on the Turco-Italian war, because they regard Turkey as the headquarters of the Khalifat.

1775. SIR W. MEYER.—Can you compare the influence of the educated classes as between Muhammadan, Hindu and Sikh?

1776. MR. FENTON.—I understand that the question relates to the influence of the educated section of each community over the rest of such community. Of course there is a far larger portion of the Hindu community educated and their influence is greater. As regards Muhammadans and Sikhs, the educated Sikhs are the more influential within their own community. I believe that any demonstration of the educated Muhammadans is insincere. They see that it increases the circulation of their papers.

1777. PRESIDENT.—It has been suggested that the Muhammadans of India have no real community of interest and are not a homogeneous body; what are your views on the subject as regards the Punjab Muhammadans?

1778. MR. FENTON.—Racially they are certainly not a homogeneous body. Many of them are converts from Hinduism, but when the flag of religion is waved they are all quite ready to join if they can all be reached. As a matter of fact, it is impossible to reach the Muhammadan community as a whole, so many are located in rural districts where they hear little or nothing.

1779. PRESIDENT.—How would the Punjab Muhammadans be affected in the event of a war with Afghanistan, the north-west frontier tribes, or any outside Muhammadan Power?

1780. MR. FENTON.—Well, we have only past experience to go by; as regards Afghanistan, we had Muhammadan regiments there fighting on our side. The population of the Punjab was nowise affected, and I do not think there is any likelihood of the Muhammadans of the Punjab looking upon the Amir favourably. They do not regard him as a religious head although he does call himself the King of Islam. They would be more concerned in the event of our going to war with Turkey.

1781. PRESIDENT.—What do you consider are the political character and aims of the Arya Samaj? What are its relations with the Tat Khalsa and with outside agitators, such as those of Poona and Bengal.

1782. MR. FENTON.—Many of them are only concerned with its religious side. They want a religion free from idolatry. But, inasmuch as the community consists almost entirely of educated persons, we find that it contains a

large number of political agitators who desire to create what they call an 'Indian Nationality,' and I believe that their ultimate aim is to get a native Civil Administration. I do not think at present that they want to cut themselves off from the British Empire, but it may be at the back of their minds that they can get rid of British domination. At any rate, their views are very far-reaching, and in that respect the same as those of the Maratha and Bengali agitators.

1783. SIR W. MEYER.—If you heard that a man was an Arya Samajist, would you consider him likely to be more anti-British than an orthodox Hindu?

1784. MR. FENTON.—As Sir Denzil Ibbetson said to a deputation of the Arya Samaj, "all I can say is that every Deputy Commissioner in the province has reported that where there is a disloyalist there is an Arya Samajist."

1785. SIR W. MEYER.—Have they any recognized leaders that you know of?

1786. MR. FENTON.—There is no head of the organization. There is none who can give a command to the Arya Samaj that they must pursue a certain course of action. Each locality has its own branch, but the branches do not admit subordination to any headquarters organization. The consequence is that when any local branch breaks out in disloyalty, all others can repudiate it and its views.

1787. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think that is merely a convenient line to take or that each really goes its own way?

1788. MR. FENTON.—There is undoubtedly community of interest, but they allow perfect freedom to members to mix in political matters as much as they please. I think that the main reason they are so disloyal is that they are the educated section of the community.

As regards the Tat Khalsa, the leaders of the Arya Samaj and Tat Khalsa may be in perfect sympathy in their views, but there could be no combination between them on account of certain dividing factors. Sikhs are bound to Gurmukhi, for instance, while the Arya Samaj wishes to make Hindi the national language. There are other reasons.

1789. SIR P. LAKE.—You could not say that the Chitpavan and Arya Samaj leaders in any way agree upon a mutual line of action?

1790. MR. FENTON.—I do not think that there are any Arya Samaj or Sikh leaders who could combine the whole community by any communication with these Maratha people. The Bengali has no sympathy with the main objects of the Sikhs. Sikh aspirations for instance are, for the present, confined to the Punjab. The Bengalis, on the contrary, say that all efforts should be national.

Q. 1182.

1791. SIR W. MEYER.—Sir Charles Cleveland told us that there were indications of community of action between Lajpat Rai, Tilak and Arabindo Ghose.

1792. MR. FENTON.—I can believe it might have been so, but Lajpat Rai was of course only representative of a portion of the Arya Samaj. When search was made in Lahore and certain correspondence of Lajpat Rai was found recommending the dissemination of revolutionary books, the Arya Samaj at once disowned him.

1793. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you say that that was genuine indignation?

1794. MR. FENTON.—No, but the governing body of the Samaj Dayanand College was afraid that if Lajpat Rai was punished by the Government the *fiat* would go forth that no boy from that institution should receive consideration in the recruitment of the Government services.

1795. PRESIDENT.—Is the Punjab Government aware of attempts to tamper with the loyalty of the troops? Have there been any such of recent years?

1796. MR. FENTON.—As I said before, the Punjab Government gets very little information on that subject and has none of its own as the secret police have orders not to interfere with agitators in connection with regiments.

1797. PRESIDENT.—Would the Muhammadans of the Punjab be likely to move against us in common with the Hindus and Sikhs? Is there any difference, in this respect, in the attitude of the Young Muhammadan leaders?

1798. MR. FENTON.—There would have to be some very binding cause to unite all communities together in order that they might move against us. At present I know of none.

1799. SIR W. MEYER.—A previous witness has said that the situation is materially different now from what it was in 1857 as there is no titular Emperor of Delhi round whom they could all rally; would you associate yourself with that?

1800. MR. FENTON.—I could not say that that was the sole reason why Muhammadans joined in the Mutiny; the butchers for instance, I doubt if they were much influenced by that fact. The causes of the Mutiny were quite local so far as the Muhammadans were concerned. At Delhi itself no doubt it had its influence. There was an outbreak in Montgomery amongst the jungle tribes, and that I am perfectly sure had nothing to do with the Emperor of Delhi.

1801. PRESIDENT.—What is your opinion regarding the adequacy of the arrangements for internal defence in the Punjab as set forth in Army Department letter No. 1802-2, dated the 11th March 1912?

1802. MR. FENTON.—My Government has accepted that as an improvement on previous arrangements.

1803. SIR W. MEYER.—Also as satisfactory *per se*?

1804. MR. FENTON.—Yes.

1805. PRESIDENT.—Is it, in your opinion, safe to leave Jhelum without British troops?

1806. MR. FENTON.—Not if danger is to be apprehended from the native troops there, but it is not a point of danger as regards the population. The Muhammadans there are supposed to be quite loyal.

1807. SIR W. MEYER.—Our greatest danger is possible disaffection in the native army?

1808. MR. FENTON.—I suppose so, and for that reason it might be unsafe to have no British troops at Jhelum.

1809. SIR W. MEYER.—It has been put to us by a previous witness as regards internal security, that all that is required is that the Government should take strong action against disaffection, weak action causing disaffection to spread. A 969.

1810. MR. FENTON.—Undoubtedly; I do not think this can be too strongly emphasized.

1811. SIR R. SCALLON.—There are detailed military arrangements where-with to meet emergencies; is there anything analagous in the civil administration?

1812. MR. FENTON.—Yes. Take Lyallpur for instance, there is a rallying post there and arrangements have been made for the supply of water to it, and of notice to be given to the civil population to concentrate there in the event of an emergency arising. Guards to take away treasure have also been provided for. A scheme like that has been worked out in every case.

(The witness then withdrew.)

ANNEXURE.

Letter No. 1424-S. (Home) dated 23rd July 1912, from the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Army in India Committee.

I am directed to return the enclosure* of your letter No. 122-218, dated

* Copy of the evidence given by the Honourable 15th July 1912, and to say that the Hon. Mr. M. W. Fenton.

Mr. Fenton's remarks generally represent Sir Louis Dane's own views. His Honour would not, however, say that the subsidence of all agitation in the Punjab is entirely due to preventive and punitive measures.† In 1907 the people were dying in thousands of plague, crops were short and prices were high, while wages had not risen in proportion. The conditions were therefore ripe for an agitation against Government. The deportations did good, and then plague dropped and wages increased. The Punjab Government steadily abstained from encouraging any one sect at the expense of the others, and by treating (though some proclaimed the loyalty of the Sikhs and others swore by the Muhammadans and so forth,) all as loyal until they showed themselves to be disloyal, confidence was restored though it took some time to secure this result. At the same time the attention of the educated classes was directed to educational and civil reform and industrial enterprise with good results. Now the press complain that political life is dead in the province, and so it will be as long as the present conditions of prosperity last, and the policy of equal, fair and friendly treatment of all without fear or favour, and of stern punishment of political offenders is pursued.

† See answer
1758.

† See answer
2736.

2. †The reason why the Punjab Government could not interfere earlier about the Khalsa College was that a reconstitution was made in 1908 with the approval of Government which had the effect of still leaving the weight of influence with the Tat Khalsaists, who were in strong favour with the army and with the Maharajas of Patiala and Nabha. These States were sounded and were not prepared to alter the management. To have done this on the ground of disloyalty would have been a serious aspersion on the army party of Sikhs, and might have led to serious trouble in the army, even if the charge could have been proved which was doubtful. Now conditions have altered. The Maharaja of Nabha is against the management and the Maharaja of Patiala is, it is understood, prepared to act. The finances have failed. A drastic reorganization has therefore been proposed which will, if approved by the Government of India, give the Punjab Government full control over the institution for the future.

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

14th Meeting—Friday, the 28th June 1912.

Major-General J. E. Dickie, C.B., Director-General of Military Works, attended as a witness and was examined.

EVIDENCE OF MAJOR-GENERAL DICKIE.

1813. PRESIDENT.—You are Director-General of Military Works and have served a considerable number of years in the Military Works Services?

1814. GENERAL DICKIE.—Yes, sir.

1815. PRESIDENT.—To what extent would it be possible to substitute native civilian for British military subordinates in the Military Works Services, and to employ pensioners in the Barrack Department? Certain proposals were made in these directions; what were the reasons which led to their being dropped?

1816. GENERAL DICKIE.—With regard to the first part of the question I am very much opposed to the substitution of native civilian for British military subordinates. I do not think that the work would be so good and I believe that it would not be carried out so economically. It is difficult to say to what extent native civilians could be employed at all. There are a few employed in places where it is undesirable to put military subordinates, places on the frontier, where there are no associates for white men. There, we have got a certain number of Indian subordinates who have been in the army and these have been fairly successful.

1817. PRESIDENT.—The scheme for separating the Military Works from the Public Works put forward by Sir George Chesney provided that the superior personnel should be military in character and not partly civil and partly military?

1818. GENERAL DICKIE.—Yes, I think it did.

1819. PRESIDENT.—The object really was to provide a reserve for war?

1820. GENERAL DICKIE.—Yes, sir.

1821. SIR W. MEYER.—You do not think that the civilian would be as satisfactory as the soldier; what about the men in the Public Works Department?

1822. GENERAL DICKIE.—They do all right there, but they would not do so well with soldiers.

1823. SIR W. MEYER.—Where do your subordinates come from?

1824. GENERAL DICKIE.—They come mostly from Roorkee and have been soldiers themselves.

1825. PRESIDENT.—These subordinates then are soldiers and go to Roorkee to be trained?

1826. GENERAL DICKIE.—Yes, sir. A certain number of men are taken on directly after passing an examination and amongst them are a proportion of Royal Engineer non-commissioned officers.

1827. SIR W. MEYER.—The proposal seems to have been discussed: had it been adopted would it have resulted in economy?

1828. GENERAL DICKIE.—It might shew an economy so far as pay goes, but I do not think it would have ultimately resulted in economy. The proposal was referred to the Commander-in-Chief last year and his orders were that it was to be dropped.

1829. SIR W. MEYER.—What would these men be doing if they were not military subordinates in your service?

1830. GENERAL DICKIE.—Well, some would probably go to the Public Works Department, and the rest would remain in their regiments.

1831. SIR W. MEYER.—Do they stay long with you?

1832. GENERAL DICKIE.—They are appointed to the Unattached List and remain until they go on pension. Many retire with warrant or honorary rank.

1833. SIR W. MEYER.—Can you give us the estimated figures of cost as between the present establishment and that suggested in the proposals you have mentioned?

1834. GENERAL DICKIE.—If I have not got them, I could have them worked out. There are always a good number of our men who endeavour to get away to the provincial service of the Public Works Department, although they are not so well paid there.

1835. PRESIDENT.—Does it add considerably to the popularity of the British army in this country that soldiers who go in for educating themselves are eligible for what I may call departmental employment and for the Unattached List?

1836. GENERAL DICKIE.—I should say that it has a distinctly attractive effect.

1837. PRESIDENT.—With regard to the second portion of the question, what are your views with reference to the employment of pensioners in the Barrack Department?

1838. GENERAL DICKIE.—There seems to have been an idea that anybody would do for the Barrack Department, but there has been a good deal of misunderstanding on the subject. The employes in the department require considerable technical knowledge; their work is not confined to the making of soldiers' kit boxes. They must supervise the manufacture of field hospital equipment, for instance, as well as of articles for institutes and better class furniture. Besides this, they have a great deal of office work in the matter of returns and other duties which call not only for a considerable amount of technical knowledge, but also for a good deal of energy. I do not think that the pensioner, who would presumably be a man past his prime, would be suitable. I have made enquiries as to what pensioners are available in India and there are not so very many, and of these I should hesitate to employ more than a limited number; in fact, I am entirely opposed to the idea. The proposal is being worked out in its preliminary details, but nothing has been settled.

1839. PRESIDENT.—Would any economy result?

1840. GENERAL DICKIE.—I feel that, on the contrary, there would be a good deal waste and extravagance.

1841. PRESIDENT.—Speaking of the substitution of civil for military subordinates, the latter, I gather from your first answer, are employed when they can be got and when qualified, in the Public Works Department. Why then, if civil agency is better and more economical than military agency, does the Public Works Department employ military subordinates?

1842. GENERAL DICKIE.—They get them for the same pay as they do the civilians, and I believe the military men get advancement more quickly than do the civil subordinates as they are sharper and better educated.

1843. SIR W. MEYER.—Your view is that it is better for purposes of harmony with the troops to have white men, and if you have a white man, better a soldier than a civilian. Who are the present barrackmasters?

1844. GENERAL DICKIE.—Of the barrackmasters who are at present serving a few come from the cavalry, artillery and engineers, but the bulk

from the infantry. They are soldiers on the Unattached List and are available for service. They have nothing to do with the construction of barracks. They look after quarters as well as barracks. They bring to notice any defects which they consider ought to be remedied in the matter of equipment.

1845. SIR W. MEYER.—Has the experiment of putting in pensioners been tried in one or two places? Would it be worth trying?

1846. GENERAL DICKIE.—The experiment has not yet been tried, but it might be worth trying.

1847. PRESIDENT.—What has been the general policy of the Government of India during the past twenty years with regard to the hutting of native troops? What has been the comparative cost of providing native troops with lines during that period?

1848. GENERAL DICKIE.—Previous to the period in question the Government incurred no expense in hutting the Indian soldier, except in cases where troops had to be sent to distant stations where there was no accommodation at all. Formerly they lived in huts they built themselves.

About twenty years ago Colonel Young's Committee assembled, and certain accommodation was specified as being necessary for the Indian soldier. Government then accepted the responsibility of providing hutting, or rather of providing funds for it. The policy laid down was that the Indian soldier should supply the labour or the bulk of the labour himself, and was to be assisted with a contribution from the Government for the purchase of materials. I do not know whether before 1892 Indian units received anything for the upkeep of their lines. Until three or four years ago lines were kept in repair as far as the "hutting grant" given to units would allow, but the amount of this grant was found to be so inadequate, and lines which had originally been built on Colonel Young's principle were found to be so defective in many ways, that when the present Commander-in-Chief came to India, it was accepted by the Government that the Indian soldier should henceforth be housed in a proper manner. A scheme was accordingly drawn up for the gradual replacement of old tumble-down huts by lines of superior description which would cost a minimum to maintain. The specification which was eventually agreed to was not however so good as I should have liked to have seen it. The result is rather instructive; one Commanding Officer has told me that men of his regiment on return from furlough came back full of complaints about the accommodation in their villages, and suggested that the civil authorities should take steps to help them to house themselves in the way the military authorities housed them in cantonments!

1849. SIR R. SCALLON.—What will the cost of maintenance of lines be now?

1850. GENERAL DICKIE.—Probably about Rs. 1-4 per soldier per annum, and about 14 annas per follower.

1851. SIR R. SCALLON.—Is that less or more than it used to be?

1852. GENERAL DICKIE.—Very much about the same, only I think the buildings will be kept in better repair.

1853. SIR W. MEYER.—Under the old scheme, when regiments received a lump sum for the construction of lines was that debited to Military Works?

1854. GENERAL DICKIE.—No, it came from the Quartermaster-General's hutting grant.

1855. SIR W. MEYER.—And now, I understand, the Military Works takes complete charge both as regards construction and maintenance; does that apply to existing lines?

1856. GENERAL DICKIE.—Only in the case of lines which may be sufficiently good to bring on to our books. There are very few, hardly any, that we could agree to take on.

1857. SIR W. MEYER.—You have a set of lines built under the old system and you consider them bad—what action do you take?

1858. GENERAL DICKIE.—We undertake to rebuild them and take them on to our books.

1859. SIR W. MEYER.—Do units still continue to maintain the old lines?

1860. GENERAL DICKIE.—Yes, but they do not receive the same grants as they did formerly; the money is now pooled and the Quartermaster-General doles it out according to requirements. When we have taken over the whole of the lines in India we shall require an increased grant, but the Quartermaster-General's grant will be reduced.

1861. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think you could maintain the lines according to your standard as cheaply as under the old system?

1862. GENERAL DICKIE.—I am not quite confident about it; it is conceivable as the new buildings are of a more durable nature.

1863. SIR W. MEYER.—As a general policy, would you say that it is undesirable to give the soldier more comfort at the cost of the State than he gets his own home?

1864. GENERAL DICKIE.—I do not think that the accommodation is so much better as to cause bad feeling on that account. If, on the other hand, the Indian soldier were not given better lines than he has had up to this, he would be apt to compare his accommodation with that provided for the British soldier. I think the improved housing arrangements should promote contentment and good feeling. There is not a doubt that at one time the Indian soldier was beginning to cavil at the very much superior accommodation given to his British comrade.

1865. SIR W. MEYER.—I remember reading some years ago that a good deal of discontent had been caused by the men having to build their own lines?

1866. GENERAL DICKIE.—That is so, but there was no real grievance, because if they did not care to build the lines themselves they could get some one else to do it for them.

1867. SIR W. MEYER.—Under the old system, the British officer was supposed to find his own quarters?

1868. GENERAL DICKIE.—Yes.

1869. SIR W. MEYER.—Is there a tendency nowadays for the State to build quarters and charge rent for them?

1870. GENERAL DICKIE.—Yes, in places where accommodation does not exist. The redistribution of the army has, to a large extent, been responsible for this.

1871. SIR W. MEYER.—Is the new system popular with British officers?

1872. GENERAL DICKIE.—It is very popular; they prefer it to the old private enterprise system.

1873. SIR W. MEYER.—Does the rent you get cover the commercial cost?

1874. GENERAL DICKIE.—Not always, but in a good number of cases it does. It is rather difficult to build in some places sufficiently good quarters, the rent of which on a commercial basis would not exceed what the officer might reasonably be called upon to pay.

1875. SIR W. MEYER.—If an officer is on leave does he have to pay rent?

1876. GENERAL DICKIE.—If he continues to occupy his house or leave his things in it, he does.

1877. SIR W. MEYER.—I suppose you have got statistics of cost somewhere?

1878. GENERAL DICKIE.—Yes, in our revenue accounts.

1879. SIR W. MEYER.—Then you regard the system of supplying houses to British officers as a good one, and not very expensive?

1880. GENERAL DICKIE.—Yes.

1881. PRESIDENT.—How far have the schemes for supplying troops with electric light and fans been carried? How do the schemes for providing troops with pure water stand?

1882. GENERAL DICKIE.—The following electric installations are at work:—I have classified them as “medium” and “small.”

The medium-sized installations are at Fort William, Meerut and Jhansi. These have lights, fans and punkhas. The small installations are at Bareilly, Attock, Delhi and Quetta. Bareilly is used almost entirely for punkhas and fans; Attock has a very small installation, and the one at Quetta is only for the Staff College. The Attock garrison is reduced so low now that I have proposed the transfer of the plant thence to Campbellpore. There is a mechanical punkha-pulling plant at Ambala.

1883. PRESIDENT.—Why were these places selected?

1884. GENERAL DICKIE.—Jhansi is very hot; but I am not sure what governed the selection of these places.

1885. PRESIDENT.—Is the introduction of these arrangements advantageous?

1886. GENERAL DICKIE.—The Medical Branch are going to see if there are any statistics to shew whether health has been improved. The old system of lighting was very bad and the old punkhas worked very unsatisfactorily. There can be no doubt that the introduction of electric light and fans has added greatly to the comfort of the British soldier, which is a consideration.

1887. PRESIDENT.—Is it proposed to expand these schemes?

1888. GENERAL DICKIE.—Owing to its having been decided to undertake the provision of improved hutting for Indian troops, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has decided to hold up the electric schemes until funds can be made available for providing additional installations.

1889. PRESIDENT.—What has been done in the matter of providing pure drinking water for the troops?

1890. GENERAL DICKIE.—Most stations have a good water-supply, but there are still a number at which entirely or partially new systems are required whilst at others improvements or extensions of existing systems are needed. I have made a note of the more important stations which require entire reconstruction, and I have at the head of the list Secunderabad where conditions are very bad—in fact something like a water famine is prevalent there just now. The arrangements at Mhow are defective; a proper system is required for Poona and Kirkee where the supply is doubtful; and Sialkot is another place where a new supply seems to be required. The Jutogh water-supply is going to be taken up very soon, at present water for the station is brought in *pakhals* from springs down the *khud*. Besides the above, there are the following places to be considered, Jhansi, Kamptee, Neemuch, Landour, Benares, Cawnpore and Bannu.

The places which require improvement and extension are:—Peshawar, Nowshera, Rawalpindi, Amritsar, Dharmasala, Karachi, Aurangabad, Almora, Manipur and Fort Lockhart.

1891. SIR W. MEYER.—I suppose in a number of cases where cantonments adjoin large civil stations, you do not require to construct a separate system?

1892. GENERAL DICKIE.—No, we take off from the municipal mains.

1893. SIR W. MEYER.—At Jutogh, for instance ?

1894. GENERAL DICKIE.—We shall take off from the Simla supply, and in the same way at Karachi we shall take from the Karachi main.

1895. SIR W. MEYER.—I suppose that lighting and punkha-pulling by means of electricity cost considerably more than they formerly did under the old methods ?

1896. GENERAL DICKIE.—It is extremely difficult to arrive at an effective comparison. One might say that the electric power system is more costly but more efficient.

1897. SIR W. MEYER.—Are all your power installations worked departmentally ?

1898. GENERAL DICKIE.—Yes.

1899. SIR W. MEYER.—Could you make use of any of the commercial schemes now working in the country ?

1900. GENERAL DICKIE.—It is possible that some of these could be utilized, but up to the present this has not been done. It is hoped that we shall obtain an annual allotment so as to get on with the electric installations ; it would be a great pity to drop them altogether.

1901. PRESIDENT.—Could you not obtain various stores required by the Military Works Services as promptly and cheaply from Ordnance factories as in the outside market ?

1902. GENERAL DICKIE.—The stores which one could get from the Ordnance factory at Cossipore would be principally certain sections of iron and steel, but nothing much beyond that. For fairly large orders Cossipore is cheaper by about ten per cent.—at any rate for stuff required up as far as Lahore.

1903. PRESIDENT.—Are orders executed promptly ?

1904. GENERAL DICKIE.—Quite as promptly as indents on Home. Bombay would probably be quicker, but many of the sections from Bombay would be of Belgian manufacture, and if we want to encourage Home industries we must obtain our supplies from Cossipore or England.

1905. PRESIDENT.—Do you obtain any stores from Ordnance factories ?

1906. GENERAL DICKIE.—To a certain extent, and not long ago we set enquiries on foot as to how we could get still more.

1907. SIR W. MEYER.—On occasions when you have not placed your orders with the Ordnance factories, what has been the reason for not doing so ?

1908. GENERAL DICKIE.—When the stores have been wanted quickly orders have been given in India ; but where requirements can be foreseen the usual procedure is to order them from Home.

1909. SIR W. MEYER.—Why not go to Ordnance factories ?

1910. GENERAL DICKIE.—Well, in the case of small sections, there should be no difficulty.

A. 713.

1911. SIR W. MEYER.—It was said by a previous witness that the Ordnance Department complained that their manufactures were not taken by other Government departments on account of their book values. Is that so ?

1912. GENERAL DICKIE.—I do not think so. My experience does not go to shew that at all. We get steel and iron from Cossipore cheaper, as far as Lahore. Higher than that, it would be cheaper to get them out from Home.

1913. SIR W. MEYER.—In any case, it is only a paper transaction, and it is right that Government Departments should assist each other ?

1914. GENERAL DICKIE.—I entirely subscribe to that.

1915. PRESIDENT.—Is any contribution made by the civil department towards roads constructed and maintained by the Military Works Services ?

1916. GENERAL DICKIE.—No, sir. In the Frontier Province, it is true civil works are carried out by the Military Works agency, but I do not think that is what is meant by the question.

1917. PRESIDENT.—Take the instance of the road to Dalhousie ; that was made out of Military Works funds, also the road to Chakrata ? They are used for civil purposes also ; are they maintained by Military Works funds ?

1918. GENERAL DICKIE.—Part of each road is maintained. Forty miles of the Chakrata road were made over to the Public Works Department because that portion of the road is no longer used by troops.

1919. SIR W. MEYER.—Are there not converse cases in which civil departments maintain and pay for roads which are of material use for military purposes ?

1920. GENERAL DICKIE.—Yes.

1921. PRESIDENT.—Would any inconvenience result from a more frequent interchange between officers of the Military Works Services and of the Corps of Sappers and Miners ?

1922. GENERAL DICKIE.—This is a question which I have carefully considered and have discussed with commandants of sapper and miner corps. The opinion I have formed is that occasional interchange is advantageous, but that frequent interchange militates against efficiency. There at present is, and always has been, occasional interchange. Occasional interchange operates advantageously in that the officer transferred brings with him other experience and fresh ideas. The drawback to frequent interchange may be said to be that the Indian soldier, unlike the British soldier, cannot be relied on to follow with confidence and obey without hesitation an officer whom he knows but slightly. In a technical corps this difference is accentuated. It takes an officer some time to learn the individual characters of Indian soldiers, and in units in which there are several different castes and classes the difficulty of getting to know the men is intensified. Mutual confidence is only established with lengthened acquaintance and after considerable work carried out in concert. I have proposed that young officers should do a year with sapper companies, as for field service they might be recalled from Military Works or Public Works to make up the establishments of these units. I may add that only recently I sent out a circular to say that for manœuvres the proportion of officers should, as far as possible, be the same as for field service.

1923. PRESIDENT.—Have you any personal knowledge of the alternative routes proposed for the railway between Peshawar and Dakka ?

1924. GENERAL DICKIE.—Yes, I have acquired some personal knowledge of the alternative routes by making journeys from Peshawar to Landi Kotal by the Mullagori road. From what I have seen, and from what I heard through consultation with officers who know the country, I have come to the conclusion that of the two alternative routes the river route is the better. It is estimated to be about fifty lakhs cheaper and it would be just as easy to defend. No doubt it would be more open to sniping but, to my mind, if a railway is to be made into Afghanistan, the river route is the one to adopt. If we came to terms with Afghanistan, the Amir could be trusted to keep the Mohmands in order ; otherwise their country would have to be entered and partially occupied.

1925. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing we were to push on to Smatzai, do you think that it would excite the Mohmands very much ?

1926. GENERAL DICKIE.—I think it would, but at the same time means might be taken to calm their excitement.

1927. SIR W. MEYER.—Might they not find that it was a good thing ?

1928. GENERAL DICKIE.—I think they would eventually, but at first they would be incited by fanatical people and those inimical to us.

1929. SIR W. MEYER.—Would it be easy to push on the line to Dakka and Kabul ?

1930. GENERAL DICKIE.—There would be some heavy work between Smatzai and Dakka.

1931. SIR W. MEYER.—Could the line be pushed on at the rate of a mile a day ?

1932. GENERAL DICKIE.—No, it would be absolutely impossible.

1933. SIR P. LAKE.—Do you think there is any possibility of our using river transport on the Kabul river ?

1934. GENERAL DICKIE.—I think something might be done in that way. I have been down the Kabul river and at certain times it would be difficult; there are some very bad rapids.

1935. SIR W. MEYER.—In the report of the committee presided over by Lord Nicholson in 1901, mention was made of the possibility of using traction engines for road traffic.

1936. GENERAL DICKIE.—There were some experiments made both at Quetta, and in the Frontier Province, but they were abandoned owing to the way the engines cut up the roads.

1937. PRESIDENT.—Has anything been done towards opening railway communication up the Khyber ?

1938. GENERAL DICKIE.—The possibility of making a railway up the Khyber has been considered, but nothing has been done up to the present. The roads have been improved, but a great deal still remains to be done in this respect.

1939. PRESIDENT.—Can a motor go up to Landi Kotal ?

1940. GENERAL DICKIE.—Quite easily. The construction of a light railway could probably be carried out without any great difficulty; the proposal, however, was dropped, one reason being the unwisdom of confining the northern line of advance to one defile only. Another objection is that a line of railway through the Khyber would interfere seriously with the use of the road. The sound policy to adopt, pending resumption of the construction of the Kabul River Railway, appears to be to double the road through the Khyber; this has in fact been to a certain extent carried out. The Darjeeling Railway is an example of the drawback attending the utilization of a road for a line of railway.

1941. SIR W. MEYER.—Do the tribes object to the doubling of the Khyber road ?

1942. GENERAL DICKIE.—Not at all, it brings in money to their coffers.

1943. SIR W. MEYER.—What about the water-supply at Landi Kotal ?

1944. GENERAL DICKIE.—That was improved while I was up there; the water comes from springs not very far from Landi Kotal.

1945. SIR W. MEYER.—It might be cut off ?

1946. GENERAL DICKIE.—It was cut off in 1897. A certain quantity of water is, however, stored in tanks in the fort.

1947. PRESIDENT.—As regards the roads up the Khyber, the ascent is not so steep that you could not use motor lorries ?

1948. GENERAL DICKIE.—I think motor lorries could travel along them.

1949. PRESIDENT.—What is the cost of the maintenance of the special defences constructed at Rawalpindi, Attock and Quetta ?

1950. GENERAL DICKIE.—I put down these figures :—

			1909-10.	1910-11.	1911-12.
			Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Rawalpindi	11,485	7,141	6,149
Attok	1,406	2,190	1,396
Quetta...	6,572	6,225	4,385

The reason for the drop at Quetta in 1911-12, was that certain roads were not repaired, there being no necessity for it. The average expenditure might be taken at 15,000 rupees per annum.

1951. PRESIDENT.—What responsibility with regard to the construction of railways in war rests with the Corps of Sappers and Miners and the Military Works Services, respectively ?

1952. GENERAL DICKIE.—I do not think any responsibility rests with the Military Works Services in this respect. The Railway Department have at present two railway companies which they can call on. The sappers will usually be required for other field work during war. If the whole Field Army were mobilized there would remain no sapper field companies for railway work. If, however, sapper companies should by any means become available for this work, they would be placed under the orders of the Director of Railways. The Military Works Services cannot be said to have any responsibility as regards railway construction.

1953. SIR P. LAKE.—The Railway Department would not have the right to call on us for Pioneers ?

1954. GENERAL DICKIE.—No, they would not have the right ; it would be a matter of arrangement.

1955. SIR W. MEYER.—The railway companies are at present employed with the North Western Railway. I suppose that while that is so the railway pays for them ?

1956. GENERAL DICKIE.—Yes.

1957. SIR W. MEYER.—What are your Military Works officers going to do in time of war ?

1958. GENERAL DICKIE.—A large number would be employed on roads and communications and with the troops. A good number would be required to bring the sapper companies attached to each division up to strength. The whole question was dealt with by the Lyall Committee.

1959. SIR W. MEYER.—What is your opinion as to the strength of Royal Engineer officers required with divisions taking the field ?

1960. GENERAL DICKIE.—I cannot give the strength exactly, but there were as many as 170 in Afghanistan in 1878-80.

1961. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you concur in the view of the General Staff that we should require altogether 543 Royal Engineer officers ? If so, how are you going to make up the deficiency ?

1962. GENERAL DICKIE.—Yes, I concur in the estimate of the General Staff. As regards the second part of the question, I might get officers from England.

1963. SIR W. MEYER.—But supposing England engaged in a war and unable to supply officers, would you be able to get satisfactory substitutes from the Public Works Department ?

1964. GENERAL DICKIE.—I think we should be able to obtain a certain number of Public Works officers who would be very useful indeed. I understand that a certain number of Public Works officers who now come out have been members of the Special Reserve in England, they might be similarly enrolled in a reserve of officers in India.

1965. PRESIDENT.—To what extent are you responsible for supplying Royal Engineer officers on mobilization ?

1966. GENERAL DICKIE.—I have to bring field units up to strength as regards British officers.

1967. PRESIDENT.—And settle with the Adjutant-General what officers you will supply and what the Public Works Services will supply ?

1968. GENERAL DICKIE.—Yes, sir.

1969. PRESIDENT.—In constructing new barracks, is the cheapest form of building, compatible with durability, employed ?

1970. GENERAL DICKIE.—I think so. As regards barracks for British troops, we are not now constructing them of such durable material as we used to. For instance, at Risalpur the barracks for British cavalry for a good part have walls of sun-dried brick and mud. Formerly, one never used that material. As regards Indian troops lines, all exposed walls have only a skin of brick. Economy is studied to the utmost.

1971. PRESIDENT.—Have you used reinforced concrete ?

1972. GENERAL DICKIE.—In places we have used a good deal of it.

1973. PRESIDENT.—It is not so cheap as it is in England ?

1974. GENERAL DICKIE.—No, for the reason that cement is expensive here.

1975. SIR W. MEYER.—It has been said in time past that “the Public Works Department build for time, and the Military Works for eternity.”

1976. GENERAL DICKIE.—It is a very difficult thing to build for a specified time ; it would be impossible to erect a structure that would only last for, say, twenty years, and I think it is better to err on the side of permanence than to make buildings too *kutchra*.

1977. SIR W. MEYER.—In short, you do not admit that the Military Works Services are at all unnecessarily expensive ?

1978. GENERAL DICKIE.—Far from it.

1979. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you find that the increased cost of labour affects your figures ?

1980. GENERAL DICKIE.—Yes, more so than materials do.

1981. SIR W. MEYER.—Are you directly under the Commander-in-Chief ?

1982. GENERAL DICKIE.—Yes.

(The witness then withdrew.)

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

15th Meeting—Tuesday, the 2nd July 1912.

Mr. O. V. Bosanquet, C.I.E., I.C.S., of the Foreign Department, and the Hon. Mr. H. Wheeler, C.I.E., I.C.S., Secretary to the Government of India in the Home Department, attended as witnesses and were examined.

EVIDENCE OF MR. O. V. BOSANQUET.

1983. PRESIDENT.—Mr. Bosanquet, you are in the Foreign Department and you have had considerable experience of Baroda ?

1984. MR. BOSANQUET.—I was at Indore for four and at Baroda for one-and-a-half years as Resident.

1985. PRESIDENT.—What is your opinion of the character and efficiency of the Gaikwar's military forces ? What is their approximate strength ? Does he employ European or Eurasian officers in his army ?

1986. MR. BOSANQUET.—The military forces of the Baroda State are required only for ceremonial purposes and the maintenance of internal order. They are sufficient for these duties but not excessive. Their sanctioned strength is :—

Artillery	93
Cavalry (consisting of the Gaikwar's bodyguard and three regiments)	1,500
Infantry	3,182
Armed police	2,549
						7,324

The actual strength of the army as shown in the last official report is :—

Artillery	84
Cavalry	1,261
Infantry	2,647
Staff, etc.	89
						4,081

The artillery are armed with seven 6 pr. guns, which in 1884 were described by Major Melliss as obsolete and useless. The muskets with which the rest of the troops are armed were condemned in 1903 as useless. The Darbar accordingly indented for 2,680 muskets wherewith to re-arm their infantry. The whole number not being available, 815 were supplied and permission was given to the Darbar to purchase the balance in the open market. This they did not do. In 1905 the Government of India offered to supply 2,680 bored-out Martinis on payment and on condition that an equivalent number of old arms were returned to the Government in their stead. This offer was accepted by the Darbar, and in 1910 bored-out arms for one infantry regiment of 815 men and one cavalry regiment of 450 men were supplied. The balance will be issued by yearly instalments as requested by the Darbar.

As regards the personnel of the regiments, when Major Melliss began his reorganization of the State forces he described the army as an "armed horde" under no control, many of the men doing no work at all and their

officers being afraid of them. Amongst other things, he introduced a class composition of the units, adopting a scale of half Marathas and Gujaratis, quarter Hindustanis and Rajputs and quarter Muhammadans. He said Gujaratis made indifferent soldiers. Recruits are enlisted at Baroda.

1987. SIR W. MEYER.—Do they come spontaneously ?

1988. MR. BOSANQUET.—Yes.

1989. SIR W. MEYER.—Has the Gaikwar ever applied for a better class of arms than he already possesses ?

1990. MR. BOSANQUET.—No, he only applied for muzzle-loaders and the Government offered him bored-out Martinis.

1991. PRESIDENT.—Are the troops paid pretty well ?

1992. MR. BOSANQUET.—I think so, sir. There is a Debt and Loan Fund from which the men can discharge their debts. The army is contented but of no military value. The Gaikwar's body-guard is fairly well-mounted.

1993. SIR W. MEYER.—Does the Gaikwar take any personal interest in his army ?

1994. MR. BOSANQUET.—None whatever. He never goes near the lines.

1995. PRESIDENT.—Has he got any Imperial Service Troops ?

1996. MR. BOSANQUET.—No.

1997. PRESIDENT.—He has never proposed to raise any Imperial Service Troops ?

1998. MR. BOSANQUET.—The question has been mooted on several occasions.

1999. PRESIDENT.—Does he employ European or Eurasian officers in his army ?

2000. MR. BOSANQUET.—The following European and Eurasian officers are employed :—

Colonel Birdwood, General Commanding. He retired after commanding the 110th Mahratta Light Infantry.

Captain Rigg, a retired officer of the Warwickshire Regiment, commanding an infantry regiment.

Colonel Nissen, a Swede or Dane who has been in Baroda for over thirty-five years.

There are four Eurasian officers, one being the son of Colonel Nissen, one the son of General Hardy (who retired from the command of the Baroda troops in 1904), and one a son of General Devine, who commanded the Baroda troops in 1885.

2001. SIR W. MEYER.—I take it that the military value of these latter gentlemen is not very great ?

2002. MR. BOSANQUET.—I think not.

2003. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing there was a time at which the Gaikwar was against us, would his troops follow him ?

2004. MR. BOSANQUET.—I should very much doubt it. On going through the lines the men strike one as well-conducted and there is a friendly tone. A number of the Gaikwar's officers used to come to social functions at the Residency. In the Mutiny there was no trouble whatever at Baroda.

2005. SIR W. MEYER.—Is their employment hereditary ?

2006. MR. BOSANQUET.—It practically is among the officers, and I fancy it is with the men in the cavalry as it is organized on the silladar system.

2007. SIR R. SCALLON.—Are most of their native officers retired officers from the regular army?

2008. MR. BOSANQUET.—No, only some are. This dates from Major Melliss's time.

2009. SIR P. LAKE.—In speaking of the efficiency of the force, does it drill at all decently? Have the officers any control over it?

2010. MR. BOSANQUET.—They drill sufficiently well for ceremonial purposes. They mounted a very fair guard of honour for the Viceroy when he visited Baroda. There was also a review in His Excellency's honour.

2011. SIR P. LAKE.—There is, as you said just now, a reasonable amount of discipline?

2012. MR. BOSANQUET.—Undoubtedly.

2013. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you knowledge of any case in which the State troops have been required to put down riots, etc.?

2014. MR. BOSANQUET.—There was a case that happened about the year 1898 in a village called Pilwai. This village refused to pay its revenue, and was besieged for three or four days, during which time the villagers held their own.

2015. PRESIDENT.—Does the Gaikwar contribute by money payments or otherwise, towards Imperial defence?

2016. MR. BOSANQUET.—The contention of the Maharaja is that the Baroda State does contribute towards Imperial defence. He took up this ground in his reply to Lord Curzon's *kharita* of April 1904 to the Chiefs on the subject of Imperial Service Troops. That *kharita*, in discussing the question of a minimum contribution from the States of ten per cent. of their gross revenues, observed:—"There are States which, though they do not directly provide Imperial Service Troops, make contributions towards Imperial, as apart from local, defence in other forms."

In his reply the Gaikwar claimed that his State was included in that number. He contended that by the Treaty of 1805, Baroda ceded districts then yielding an annual revenue of Rs. 11,70,000 for the payment of the Subsidiary Force of 3,000 native infantry, and one company of European artillery which the H. E. I. C. agreed to maintain for the protection of Baroda; that by the Treaty of 1817 the Subsidiary Force was raised by 1,000 native infantry and two regiments of native cavalry, for which Baroda ceded further districts yielding Rs. 12,61,969, and that the whole of this Subsidiary Force, (payment for which at the rate of revenue at the time of the above cessions amounted to Rs. 24,31,969 a year), had been merged in the Indian army.

Again that by the Treaty of 1817, Baroda had to maintain a contingent of 3,000 Horse, which was disbanded in 1885 by mutual assent, whereupon the Darbar agreed to contribute Rs. 3,75,000 in place of it.

2017. SIR W. MEYER.—Is the State analogous to Hyderabad in that respect?

2018. MR. BOSANQUET.—Yes.

2019. SIR W. MEYER.—Does the Gaikwar still not want to maintain Imperial Service Troops, or does the Government of India not now want him to have any?

2020. MR. BOSANQUET.—I should say it was both. The Despatch to the Secretary of State on the answers of the Chiefs to the Viceroy's *kharita*, dealt with Baroda's as follows:—

"The attitude of the Gaikwar cannot be described as otherwise than unreservedly hostile. The history of the past fifteen years in which His Highness has assured every Viceroy in turn of his intention to take part in the Imperial Service movement and has then evaded the fulfilment of his pledge, has led us to expect no other result. It is the reflex of the Gaikwar's

views about the position which Indian Princes in general, and himself in particular, ought to fill in the Indian Constitution. He thinks that they ought to be treated as independent sovereigns, to which it is a natural corollary that they should possess independent armies. We do not propose to take His Highness into consideration in the further examination of the subject."

I think that over-stated the case against the Gaikwar.

2021. SIR W. MEYER.—Has the Gaikwar offered to contribute Imperial Service Troops on previous occasions?

2022. MR. BOSANQUET.—Tentative proposals have been put forward from time to time by the Gaikwar to contribute Imperial Service Troops. These were summarized by the Resident in 1904 as follows:—

- (i) An offer in general terms in 1893 which was rejected by Lord Lansdowne as half-hearted.
- (ii) An offer in 1897 (when His Highness was told that transport was all that could be accepted of him) of 300 camels, which he was told was quite beneath the dignity of his State. He then began to get together a transport train, but nothing further came of it.

There are points which can be urged on His Highness' behalf:—

- (i) The Gaikwar's subjects are not a military people. The Gujaratis, or Baroda men proper, do not enlist in any numbers, and when they do, they turn out slovenly and indifferent soldiers as Major Melliss reported.
- (ii) There is no scope for the use of troops in Baroda except for ceremonial purposes. Even a transport train would be of no use in time of peace. There are no roads in the State owing to want of stone, and for this reason the Darbar use light railways for the development of the country, as a permanent way is not much more expensive than a metalled road.
- (iii) The interest, such as it is, which the Gaikwar takes in his troops, is merely to get some value for the money which he spends on them. There is not a single man of note among the officers.
- (iv) The Gaikwar's personal resentment against Lord Curzon was, I believe, a considerable factor in his reply.
- (v) General Beatson, the Inspector-General of Imperial Service Troops, who interviewed His Highness shortly afterwards on the subject, reported "he impressed me as being both sincere and loyal."
- (vi) I myself, when Resident at Baroda, had hopes of getting His Highness to offer a railway corps or a medical corps, or perhaps signallers, should the Government be disposed to accept such an offer. I was told unofficially that there was no intention of increasing the number of Imperial Service Troops.
- (vii) During the South African war, His Highness placed the resources of his State at the disposal of the Government. His offer was utilized to the extent of accepting a few horses from him.

2023. SIR W. MEYER.—Did he make any offer in the case of the China campaign?

2024. MR. BOSANQUET.—I do not remember, but he did offer help at the time of the Tirah Expedition.

2025. PRESIDENT.—Are we specifically bound by treaty to maintain a native regiment at Baroda; would such obligation apply in case of war or serious internal trouble? Has the regiment ever been withdrawn of recent years, and, if so, in what circumstances?

2026. MR. BOSANQUET.—Article 2 of the Treaty of 1817 repeated the provisions of Article 12 of the Treaty of 1805, making the whole of the Subsidiary Force available for service wherever required in the event of war, with

the exception of a battalion of native infantry which should remain near the person of the Maharaja or such provision as might appear necessary for the security of Gujarat.

The Government of India have stated that the engagements respecting the Subsidiary Force have lapsed with desuetude, and that it is rather in regard to political expediency than in the matter of subsidiary engagements, that the question of the Baroda garrison demands attention.

Colonel Meade, who was Resident when the question of the distribution of the army in India was under consideration, expressed the opinion that the regiment should never be withdrawn from Baroda on the grounds of military expediency. Personally, I do not see why it should not be withdrawn. The presence of a single regiment there would not make much difference either way. In case of serious internal trouble we could move the regiment to wherever it might be wanted. To my knowledge, the regiment attended divisional manœuvres on two occasions when only a sufficient number of men required to furnish necessary guards were left behind. I do not know whether the Gaikwar would object to its withdrawal.

2027. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think that an isolated regiment might be influenced for evil ?

2028. MR. BOSANQUET.—No.

2029. PRESIDENT.—Is it not a support to the Resident there ?

2030. MR. BOSANQUET.—I think not, sir. Personally, for local reasons I consider that it would be desirable to withdraw the regiment.

2031. PRESIDENT.—What class of regiment is usually quartered at Baroda ?

2032. MR. BOSANQUET.—The regiments vary much, the last regiment was one of the Hyderabad Contingent.

2033. SIR W. MEYER.—Are Maratha regiments sent there ?

2034. MR. BOSANQUET.—On one occasion there was a suggestion to send a Maratha regiment, but I think the move was countermanded.

2035. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you know if the Gaikwar or the more important members of his entourage keep up personal relations with the native officers of the regiment—private relations ?

2036. MR. BOSANQUET.—None; the Gaikwar mixes socially with the British officers.

2037. PRESIDENT.—What, so far as you know, are the Gaikwar's relations with Tilak and other extremists ? Do you consider him disaffected and his State a possible source of danger to the Government ?

2038. MR. BOSANQUET.—The only extremist with whom I know the Gaikwar to have had relations, is Arabindo Ghose, who was His Highness' private secretary in 1902-03. I was assured, when I was in Baroda, that while he was in the State Arabindo Ghose did not engage in politics. He was Vice-Principal of the Baroda College during the absence of the Principal (Mr. Clarke), on leave in 1905. On his return, Mr. Clarke refused to have him on his staff as he heard that he had been lecturing on political subjects in the College Debating Society. Arabindo Ghose left Baroda shortly afterwards.

I do not consider the Gaikwar disaffected, nor his State a source of danger. The population of the State is 1,952,000 according to the last census, viz :—

Hindus	1,546,992
Muhammadans	165,014
Forest tribes	176,250
Jains	48,290
Parsis	8,409
Christians	7,691
Others	46

Of the Hindus, while there are 99,935 pure Gujarati Brahmans, there are only 13,795 Deccani Brahmans. There are only 17,356 Marathas all told in the State. The Gujaratis dislike the Marathas.

2039. SIR W. MEYER.—Has the Gaikwar had any correspondence or relations with Tilak?

2040. MR. BOSANQUET.—I heard the statement made that he presented Tilak with a house in Poona, but I believe it was merely a matter of business, and that the Darbar sold the house among other property which they were disposing of.

2041. SIR W. MEYER.—I have a note here on the subject of sedition in the Central Provinces. Do you know anything about the Gaikwar's relations with Dr. Munji?

2042. MR. BOSANQUET.—I know nothing of it.

A. 1055.

2043. SIR W. MEYER.—Then we were told by a previous witness that there were a great many Chitpavan Brahmans holding appointments in the Baroda State.

2044. MR. BOSANQUET.—I think not. There are undoubtedly considerable numbers of Deccani Brahman officials in all Maratha States, but I should not say there are an excessive number in Baroda, by any means.

2045. SIR W. MEYER.—It is alleged that Baroda has been the centre for the preparation of seditious pamphlets, the storing of arms, etc.

2046. MR. BOSANQUET.—I know nothing of arms, but of course there is no Arms Act in the State.

There was a troublesome paper in my time called the *Pudari*. It was warned once or twice, but the Maharaja at the time was away in England, consequently it was very difficult to legislate in his absence. However, the *Pudari* was closed down. We also had a serious complaint that two very seditious plays had been publicly dedicated to the Maharaja, the author having received financial assistance from him. I found that the plays had been published ten years before, and that the editor had written for a grant for two "historical" plays, from a State fund which there is for the encouragement of literature. These pieces were acted in due course in Poona and Bombay. Afterwards they were reproduced and attracted a good deal of attention. When this complaint was made orders were passed to ensure the scrutiny of any literary works to receive grants from the fund.

2047. SIR W. MEYER.—Are you aware that the seditionists allege that the Gaikwar is with them?

2048. MR. BOSANQUET.—Undoubtedly, but I do not see how the Gaikwar is to prevent their making these allegations. I think the seditionists are trying to compromise him.

2049. SIR W. MEYER.—You read just now an extract from a Despatch in which the Gaikwar was represented as seeking after independence?

2050. MR. BOSANQUET.—The Maharaja's remarks were with special reference to an allusion in that *kharita* to the federation of the German states and he contended that there was no analogy between them and the Native States in India. He asked whether some of the difficulties noticed in the *kharita*, could not be got over by still further trusting the Native States.

2051. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you gauge his general attitude as a hanker-ing after independence?

2052. MR. BOSANQUET.—I do not think he does hanker.

2053. SIR W. MEYER.—You speak of his personal resentment against Lord Curzon; to what was this due?

2054. MR. BOSANQUET.—It was really caused by the circular issued by Lord Curzon on the subject of Chiefs going Home, which the Gaikwar considered to be levelled against him. He goes to England and the Continent for

relaxation and on medical advice but he conducts State business whilst away and examines social and industrial questions abroad with a view to introducing improvements into his State. His attitude towards Lord Curzon was a personal one; he was fond of Lord Minto.

2055. SIR W. MEYER.—His Highness, it is alleged, got in touch with seditionists in Paris whilst on the Continent ?

2056. MR. BOSANQUET.—Though I had severed my official connection with the Baroda state at the time; I questioned Captain Rigg (who was then his aide-de-camp), on this point when I heard of it, and he absolutely denied that any of these people had been near His Highness.

2057. SIR W. MEYER.—Did you see that much-discussed incident at the Delhi Darbar ?

2058. MR. BOSANQUET.—I did not see it. I think it is certain that he did not mean any intentional discourtesy. I know though I had no official duties with His Highness at the time that he had not attended any of the rehearsals for that function. He is an extraordinarily shy man. The incident happened on the day after a divorce case had been launched against him in London; he said to me afterwards in the course of conversation that he realized that he was facing the whole audience with this stigma on him.

2059. SIR W. MEYER.—The views which you have expressed about the Gaikwar are peculiar to yourself, are they not ?

2060. MR. BOSANQUET.—They are not in accordance with popular opinion, but they are based on the enquiries which it was my duty as Resident to make. My predecessor who was Resident at Baroda for seven years had a very warm regard for the Gaikwar. All I contend is that the case against the Gaikwar rests on suspicion, and that the evidence on which it is based including the sources from which it is drawn must be carefully examined.

2061. SIR W. MEYER.—Would it be a fair summary of your views to say that he is not actively loyal and not actively disloyal ?

2062. MR. BOSANQUET.—That would be one way of expressing it. But I believe His Highness to be loyal. He is not a danger, but he might be, if disloyal, because he carries very great weight in the west of India.

2063. SIR W. MEYER.—There was a marriage arranged between the Sindhia and Baroda families; has the breaking off of it led to bad terms between the two Rulers ?

2064. MR. BOSANQUET.—Not at all, because the Gaikwar was opposed to the marriage from the first. When the mother and daughter decided on the marriage, the Gaikwar washed his hands of it. He disapproves of polygamy.

2065. SIR W. MEYER.—Sindhia and the Gaikwar are rather close friends, are they not ?

2066. MR. BOSANQUET.—I think not. They would not act together and I believe I am correct in saying that Sindhia disclaims any friendship with the Gaikwar.

2067. PRESIDENT.—What is the character of the local troops of the Indore State ?

2068. MR. BOSANQUET.—The Indore army was reorganized in 1904. The reorganization fixed the strength at :—

Artillery (2 batteries)	210
(Including the fort battery, only 53 strong, to furnish guards for the fort where there are a few guns).					
Cavalry (2 regiments)	800
Infantry (2 regiments)	748

Their firearms consist of old and useless Enfields. They have had no guns since 1857, and the existing guns are useless except for firing salutes. In

1907 the strength of the infantry was raised to 865 by the inclusion of treasury guards. The last return shows the strength to be 840.

2069. SIR W. MEYER.—What is the position in regard to Native States and their troops? Are they bound by specific obligations not to increase them without reference to the Government of India?

2070. MR. BOSANQUET.—The circumstances vary. In Baroda, when the present Gaikwar was invested with full powers, the condition was imposed that no material change should be made in the numbers and constitution of the army without the sanction of the Government. In all cases the Government of India has the power to prevent Native States from increasing their troops without sanction.

2071. SIR W. MEYER.—Can the Government of India say “you must get our sanction before you move”?

2072. MR. BOSANQUET.—Except in cases like Baroda where there is an absolute prohibition against any increase the action to be taken would depend on the circumstances.

2073. SIR W. MEYER.—The States would apprise the Resident of what they proposed to do?

2074. MR. BOSANQUET.—It would depend upon the size and nature of the change. But it is the duty of political officers to keep such matters in view.

2075. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing the Nizam of Hyderabad proposed to increase his army?

2076. MR. BOSANQUET.—As no State is allowed to buy arms in the open market, he would have to work through the Government. So far as I recollect, the reorganization of the Golconda Brigade which was carried out some twenty years ago was accomplished without reference to the Resident.

2077. SIR W. MEYER.—It is a matter which varies with the different States?

2078. MR. BOSANQUET.—Yes.

2079. PRESIDENT.—As they cannot obtain arms and ammunition without the consent of the Government, it is practically of little importance even if they do not ask?

2080. MR. BOSANQUET.—All matters relating to Native States troops are regarded as important. The Government of India might require a case to be made out accounting for an increase. Any fluctuation in the annual return of native troops is noted, and if necessary, an explanation is called for.

2081. SIR P. LAKE.—Any application for arms is referred to the General Staff by the orders of the Government.

2082. PRESIDENT.—You say that the local troops of Indore are few in number; are they like the troops in Baroda—useless?

2083. MR. BOSANQUET.—Yes, useless for military purposes, but under better discipline. They have regulations based on Indian Army Regulations. In Indore, some of the principal *sirdars* are connected with the troops. I might mention that the strength of the police in Indore has been greatly reduced. In 1904 there were 2,722 foot, and 437 mounted police, whereas in 1912 there were only 1,886 foot and 41 mounted men.

2084. SIR W. MEYER.—Have they firearms of sorts?

2085. MR. BOSANQUET.—Yes. A certain number of rifles were lent to them by the Government for a limited term of years to help them to put down dacoity, cattle lifting, etc. I do not know whether the rifles have been returned or not; they numbered about 100; besides these, they have only muzzle-loading Enfields. In Baroda there are 2,549 police who are armed with muskets (Enfields).

2086. SIR R. SCALLON.—Are the Indore troops enlisted locally ?

2087. MR. BOSANQUET.—Yes, the Pardesis come from Hindustan.

2088. SIR P. LAKE —Is the young Maharaja likely to exert much influence among his fellow Chiefs ?

2089. MR. BOSANQUET.—I do not think so.

2090. SIR W. MEYER.—What terms is he on with Sindhia ?

2091. MR. BOSANQUET.—On terms of friendly acquaintance, there is hereditary enmity between the States. Holkar was educated at the Mayo College and has had English tutors.

2092. PRESIDENT.—Is he actively loyal ?

2093. MR. BOSANQUET.—Yes, very.

2094. SIR W. MEYER.—Are his ministers loyal ?

2095. MR. BOSANQUET.—I should say very. Many of them are men who came on from the old régime. I was president of the Council.

2096. SIR W. MEYER.—From your observation, were they good men from our point of view ?

2097. MR. BOSANQUET.—Distinctly good.

2098. SIR W. MEYER.—Are any of them likely to be anti-British ?

2099. MR. BOSANQUET.—Not at all—very strongly for the British. The army has a pro-British tone.

2100. SIR W. MEYER.—We were told that Sindhia transfers a certain number of men from the Imperial Service Troops to his State troops. Has that been done in Indore ?

2101. MR. BOSANQUET.—Three hundred men were transferred from the Imperial Service Troops on the reorganization of the latter.

2102. PRESIDENT —It has been alleged that in the event of serious trouble we might meet with hostility from the States of Indore and Gwalior, either by reason of the attitude of their Rulers or of that of the troops. Do you concur in this view ?

2103. MR. BOSANQUET.—I can only speak personally of Indore—I should say certainly not. The small portion of Gwalior that I know, I should call an absolutely peaceful country.

2104. SIR R. SCALLON.—I would suggest that if Mr. Bosanquet has anything of special interest to us in his notes that we have not asked any questions about, he might oblige us by reading them.

2105. MR. BOSANQUET.—Regarding sedition in Baroda; one of the points I should like to lay stress on is that the Maharaja has Europeans in charge of practically every department in the State. This fact does not seem to be consistent with the attitude attributed to him.

2106. SIR W. MEYER.—Did he put in Englishmen instead of natives ?

2107. MR. BOSANQUET.—Yes, certainly.

(The witness then withdrew.)

EVIDENCE OF MR. H. WHEELER.

2108. PRESIDENT.—Mr. Wheeler, you are Secretary to the Government of India in the Home Department, and have considerable experience not only of India generally but of Bengal in particular?

2109. MR. WHEELER.—Yes, sir.

2110. PRESIDENT.—You were present when Sir Charles Cleveland was examined; do you concur, generally, in his evidence?

2111. MR. WHEELER.—Yes.

2112. PRESIDENT.—Would the preaching of a *jihad* on the frontier affect the Muhammadans of the United Provinces, Eastern Bengal and Hyderabad?

2113. MR. WHEELER.—That is not a matter on which we can safely prophesy. There have been *jihads* preached on the frontier in the past which have not had that result. On the other hand, we have had recent evidence that Muhammadans resent any imputation that the interests of any members of their religion are not the interests of all. Doubtless any trouble on the frontier would be the subject of much speculation and discussion in India, but assuming the success of British arms on the frontier, it seems unnecessary to think that there would be anything in the nature of an internal Muhammadan rising in sympathy.

2114. SIR W. MEYER.—Taking the converse, would you say that the revocation of the Curzon partition of Bengal created feeling among Muhammadans outside Bengal?

2115. MR. WHEELER.—Muhammadans outside Bengal are not directly interested in the re-arrangement of the province, but there have been various expressions of opinion in other parts of India in sympathy with the local protest against the alleged sacrifice of Muhammadan interests, and Mr. Montagu's speech upon the point was widely commented upon and resented.

2116. PRESIDENT.—The repudiation of the statement that the Muhammadans are not a homogeneous body has probably had a soothing effect?

2117. MR. WHEELER.—Yes, they have welcomed that as a victory.

2118. SIR W. MEYER.—Is there a feeling that the British Government has broken its pledge by the revocation of the Curzon partition?

2119. MR. WHEELER.—There was undoubtedly a feeling among Muhammadans to this effect, and they are at present watching the developments of the policy very jealously; in particular they are anxious to secure an adequate and separate representation of Muhammadan interests in the Legislative Councils, etc.

2120. SIR W. MEYER.—Do the Muhammadans of Eastern Bengal consider they have a grievance?

2121. MR. WHEELER.—I should say they undoubtedly do.

2122. PRESIDENT.—Do any grounds exist for suspecting the loyalty of the police in India?

2123. MR. WHEELER.—No representations have been received from local Governments casting doubt upon the loyalty of the police: on the contrary, so far as the annual reports of Bengal, Eastern Bengal and Assam go, and these are the provinces in which the severest strain might have been expected, the local Governments are satisfied that the police have stood the trial very well.

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2124. SIR W. MEYER.—We were told by Sir Charles Cleveland that there was discontent in the police owing to the fact that the new regulations make it difficult for head-constables to rise to higher positions.

2125. MR. WHEELER.—That is a matter that may give rise to discontent, but it has not taken any very active form as yet.

2126. SIR W. MEYER.—Is it likely to quench their zeal and diminish their activity ?

2127. MR. WHEELER.—It might do so, but there have been no representations on the subject so far.

2128. SIR W. MEYER.—It is an order of the Government of India, I think, which local Governments could not alter at their own discretion. Therefore, if the general principle is to be changed, the Government of India would have to act spontaneously, or local Governments would have to submit a reference on the subject ?

2129. MR. WHEELER.—The orders passed regarding the recruitment of sub-inspectors and inspectors, with the view of ensuring more extensively the selection of competent outsiders in preference to promotion from the subordinate ranks, were the outcome of the report of the Police Commission, and in so far as it might be desired to modify any of the principles then laid down by the Government of India, the further orders of that Government would require to be taken.

2130. SIR W. MEYER.—The Government of India do not think the present system is so provocative of discontent as to need remedying ?

2131. MR. WHEELER.—They have not at present any reason for thinking so.

2132. SIR W. MEYER.—What about the pay of the police ?

2133. MR. WHEELER.—Their pay was raised as the result of the enquiries of the Police Commission, and effect has actually been given to these improvements to a considerable extent. In some provinces financial reasons delayed the giving of the enhanced rates, but these will presumably be introduced as funds permit.

2134. SIR W. MEYER.—But is it an improvement relatively to the rise in prices which has taken place ?

2135. MR. WHEELER.—It was an improvement which, all things considered, was held to be adequate and which represented all that could be done at that particular time.

2136. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think the position of the police calls for special remedial measures to prevent discontent ?

2137. MR. WHEELER.—I do not think so ; nearly all local Governments are still giving effect to the recommendations of the Police Commission, and the full effect of these has still to be seen.

2138. PRESIDENT.—What is your opinion as to the relative likelihood of either :—

(a) a spontaneous movement against the Government on the part of the police or the army ; or,

(b) an organized movement undertaken by the police or the army at the instigation of, and led by, political agitators ?

2139. MR. WHEELER.—I should say that a spontaneous or organized movement against the Government on the part of the police in the first instance was most unlikely ; if anything of that nature were to take place, it would almost certainly originate in the army. The actual outbreak might bear the appearance of being spontaneous, but it is almost certain that we should have some warning of it. How far it would affect the police would depend entirely on the measure of success achieved. If this was small the police might be expected to remain unaffected ; if it was great the whole administration would come down irrespective of the attitude of the police.

2140. PRESIDENT.—You think the movement would have to be organized ?

2141. MR. WHEELER.—Yes, and as regards the police it would be an echo of some other movement. Ordinarily political agitators leave the police alone ; in fact the latter are regarded as their enemies and are being constantly held up to contempt and condemnation.

2142. PRESIDENT.—To what extent have the civil armed police been increased since 1903, and how far has the increase been due to Lord Kitchener's proposals for the internal defence of India ?

2143. MR. WHEELER.—It is difficult to answer the question in the form in which it is put. The Police Commission of 1903 considered the questions of armed reserves (paragraphs 72-76 of their report) and recommended the adoption of the Bengal system by which a reserve of twenty-five constables and two head-constables should be kept as an emergency force at headquarters in addition to the reserve for leave vacancies, guards, escorts, etc. The reserve was to be in charge of European serjeants. They condemned the separation of the police into armed and unarmed branches and recommended that all members of the force should be taught drill and the use of arms, while they commended a practice prevailing in Madras of maintaining mobilization schemes, under which, if need be, men could be withdrawn from outlying stations and added to

* Lord Lansdowne's Government had decided in 1889 that Snider rifles should only be given to special reserves employed as military police or against dacoits ; that the ordinary reserves did not require rifles, but ought to have such arms as would enable them to deal effectively with large bodies of rioters at close quarters, and that a suitable weapon for the purpose would be a breach-loading smooth-bore carbine to fire ball or buckshot.

the headquarters' emergency force. The Commission* did not touch upon the matter of armament. In their Despatch No. 28, dated the 19th November 1903, the Government of India accepted the principle that all police should be trained to the use of arms and seemed to assume that

these, for the most part, would be inferior weapons firing buckshot. They reserved opinion in the matter of the headquarters reserve, merely condemning the recommendation that it should be in charge of European serjeants. The question was referred to local Governments on the 14th April 1904, repeating these preliminary conclusions.

The Government of India addressed the Secretary of State with their final recommendations on the 22nd December 1904, but in the meantime Lord Kitchener's scheme for the redistribution of the army in India had been under discussion and had been referred to local Governments on the 29th March 1904. In their Despatch of the 22nd December the Government of India reviewed briefly the position of the armed police as contemplated in that scheme, and examined how far the proposals based upon the previous recommendations of the Police Commission met the needs of the scheme. It is impossible, therefore, to say that such and such proportion of subsequent additions to the police is the result of Lord Kitchener's scheme, and such and such the outcome of the report of the Police Commission. Whatever increase has been made was primarily in consequence of the latter, though the question was examined in the light of Lord Kitchener's report. The conclusions of the Government of India were summarized as follows :—

“ We propose, in brief, (i) to approve the system of reserves proposed by the Police Commission for Madras, Bengal, the Punjab, Burma, the Central Provinces and Assam, (ii) to allow the Governments of Bombay and the United Provinces to retain their existing system of dividing the force into armed and unarmed branches, at the same time expressing our preference for the system advocated by the Commission and urging its adoption as opportunity offers, (iii) to maintain the military police in Assam, Burma and Bengal, and in the two former provinces to look to this branch only of the police force for the maintenance of order in times of emergency, and (iv) to arm the force ordinarily with bored-out Martinis, but to retain the rifles now in its hands, and temporarily to increase their numbers in cases of necessity. We believe that the arrangement which, in accordance with these conclusions, we propose to make in each province for a police force acting in combination with moveable columns of troops, will be sufficient to hold the country in a time of emergency without in any way interfering with the due performance by the district police of the normal duties entrusted to them.”

In examining the circumstances of each province, in connection with Lord Kitchener's scheme the Government of India relied largely on the following figures :—

Sanctioned strength of constables.

Province.	In 1904.	As raised after scrutiny of the proposals of the Police Commission.	Increase.
Madras	18,283	21,676	3,393
Bombay	15,984	18,350*	2,366
Bengal	18,799	23,962	5,163
United Provinces	19,378	23,579†	4,201
Punjab	14,930	16,683	1,753
Central Provinces and Berar	10,128	10,898	770
Total	97,502	115,148	17,646

* 40 per cent. to be armed.

† Of these 1,030 officers and 5,923 men were to be armed.

The orders on the report of the Police Commission, dated the 21st March 1905, embodied these conclusions.

There have been subsequent reorganizations of the armed police, noticeably in Eastern Bengal and Assam, Bengal and the Central Provinces in 1911.

It is difficult to compare the numbers of armed police now available with those returned in 1904. Lord Kitchener's scheme referred to the total number of civil police as 141,659, of whom 47,925 had firearms. The figures compiled from the annual police reports for 1910 show a total of 186,973 civil police, in whose possession were 59,606 rifles and muskets.

Taking the figures from the annual armament returns dated the 1st January 1912, and 1st January 1904, respectively, the results are—

	1904.	1912.	Increase.
Rifles and Martini-Henri cavalry carbines	3,546	4,398	842
Other firearms (excluding pistols) ...	40,087	52,606	12,519
Total ...	43,633	56,994	13,361

The discrepancies between these two statements are at present the subject of enquiry.

But the most important issue for the purpose of the present enquiry is probably the strength of the armed force which could be mobilized on an emergency. That was given in Lord Kitchener's scheme as follows :—

Punjab	4,000
United Provinces	5,130
Central Provinces	2,400
Bengal	4,400
Bombay	2,500
Madras	3,500
Burma	2,982
Total				24,912

These figures seem to have been obtained informally through the Police Commission, and the basis of the calculation is not known.

From the latest information available in the Home Department, the following figures show the standing armed force available :—

Punjab	812
United Provinces	7,125*
Central Provinces	432
Bengal	1,900
Eastern Bengal and Assam	2,922
Bombay	8,222*
Madras	3,993
Burma	3,358
Total				28,764

* Total armed forces.

But in addition to these, under the emergency mobilization scheme it is claimed that the following additions could be made :—

Punjab	2,415
Bengal	2,602
Madras	Apparently about 50 men per district.

The inclusion of the total armed force in the United Provinces and Bombay is to some extent misleading, as the whole may not be available on emergency. The figures for the Central Provinces appear to be incomplete. In Burma the total military police force is 448 officers and 15,632 men. There are also military police in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa and Assam. The future organization of the military police in these provinces is under consideration.

2144. PRESIDENT.—How far is it advisable to reckon upon the assistance of the civil police as proposed by Lord Kitchener in 1904 ?

2145. MR. WHEELER.—In so far as that scheme concerns the reserves at headquarters, these should be available, but it is to be remembered that the reserves are the first to feel any depletion by resignations and short recruitment, and any extra demands upon the force. The value of the mobilization schemes is more open to doubt, because until an actual emergency arises it would be difficult to say how far the men could be withdrawn from the centres detailed on paper.

2146. SIR P. LAKE.—When you talk of “reserves” you mean the 25 constables, etc., at headquarters ?

2147. MR. WHEELER.—Yes, these and the reserves retained at headquarters for guards and to fill leave vacancies, etc.

2148. PRESIDENT.—The purport of your answer is that it is a little difficult to say to what extent this assistance can be relied on, because the *thanas* from which we wished to draw the men might lie in the most troublesome areas?

2149. MR. WHEELER.—Yes; a good deal would depend upon the circumstances of the moment. It might happen that the police station which was supposed to send supports to headquarters was itself the centre of disturbance and required to be strengthened.

2150. SIR W. MEYER.—When you speak of the number of men available, you exclude the military police?

2151. MR. WHEELER.—Yes, except in Burma, where the figures given include a certain number of the military police.

2152. SIR W. MEYER.—The general feature of the army defence scheme in the event of serious disturbance is to concentrate in a few places and deal with the country by means of moveable columns. Do you think that the ordinary civil police would be able to add to the strength of these moveable columns?

2153. MR. WHEELER.—I do not understand that it is intended that the police should actually become part of the moveable columns. Their responsibility would be the prompt suppression of minor local disturbances before they could spread to an extent necessitating the intervention of the moveable columns.

2154. SIR W. MEYER.—Let us suppose some serious riots in a number of places; the functions of the police would rather be to deal with minor riots and leave it to the military to deal with bigger affairs?

2155. MR. WHEELER.—Yes.

2156. SIR W. MEYER.—So the assistance they render is indirect rather than direct?

2157. MR. WHEELER.—Yes.

2158. SIR W. MEYER.—As the police have been increased, do you think we ought to get more assistance from them than Lord Kitchener contemplated?

2159. MR. WHEELER.—The police are undoubtedly numerically stronger than they were prior to Lord Kitchener's proposals. To that extent it ought now to be easier to concentrate the number of men which that scheme contemplated. There has been no material change in the quality of the help which might be expected from the police.

2160. SIR W. MEYER.—Lord Kitchener relied a good deal on the police; do you think that that reliance, and the consequent reduction of the military forces for internal defence, were justified? Having regard to subsequent facts, do you think he laid too much stress on the aid he could get from the police in times of serious trouble?

2161. MR. WHEELER.—I think that the position of the police, armed as they are at present, would be difficult if the military force were reduced to a minimum. That also raises the question of armament.

2162. SIR W. MEYER.—Having regard to the inferior arms of the police, Lord Kitchener perhaps laid too much stress on the police as a factor in quelling internal disturbances?

2163. MR. WHEELER.—The matter could only be tested by actual experience. It is undoubted that under the scheme large areas of country would be denuded of troops, and the sufficiency or otherwise of the police would depend entirely upon the extent of the disturbances with which they would have to cope.

2164. SIR P. LAKE.—Do you know how far Lord Kitchener intended to use the police ?

2165. MR. WHEELER.—So far as I have understood his scheme, it did not lay down anything definite as to the duties of police : it was merely supposed that the police would be in sufficient strength to deal with minor outbreaks.

2166. SIR P. LAKE.—Yes, but he looked upon them as an assistance to the military forces. Did he mean that he would concentrate them in armed bodies and attach them to moveable columns, or did he mean that they would simply be useful in maintaining order outside the action of the ordinary military forces ?

2167. MR. WHEELER.—There were no details laid down. The existence of the headquarters reserve would seem to indicate that he wished bodies to be concentrated in some degree, but so far as I know there was no detail worked out. I understand the police were not to form part of the moveable columns.

2168. PRESIDENT.—Is it reasonable to assume that the military authorities had no very clear perception of how the police were to be employed, and left the civil authorities to determine how the police were to co-operate with the army ; and that the civil authorities, depending on the scheme as it stood, did not feel called upon to formulate a definite plan of action ?

2169. MR. WHEELER.—To some extent I should say that was the case.

2170. SIR W. MEYER.—Am I correct in saying that these figures (of the police) were furnished to Lord Kitchener through the agency of the Police Commission ?

2171. MR. WHEELER.—Yes.

2172. SIR W. MEYER.—Then do you consider that Lord Kitchener's estimates of the number of troops required for internal defence were ample enough ?

2173. MR. WHEELER.—I am not prepared to give a general answer.

2174. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think it would be possible to increase the number of men that could be concentrated in police columns ?

2175. MR. WHEELER.—If the suggestion is that there are superfluous men now employed at the outlying police stations, who could be brought into headquarters to strengthen the reserves, I do not think that is the case. The force at the different police stations is no more than sufficient to discharge the ordinary duties of each. The mobilization schemes contemplate that in times of emergency it may be possible to raise the number of the police by the recall of men on leave and the employment of *chowkidars* at the less important centres, etc. As I have already said, it will very much depend upon the circumstances of moment how far that expectation can be realized.

2176. SIR W. MEYER.—You would be in favour of giving them better weapons ?

2177. MR. WHEELER.—I think there is a great deal to be said in favour of giving better arms to a certain proportion of them.

2178. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think that it would often happen that the police would run away in the face of trouble ?

2179. MR. WHEELER.—I think the police could ordinarily be relied on to face the kind of people they are supposed to keep in order and to deal with sporadic riots, dacoities, etc.

2180. SIR W. MEYER.—Do they fire promptly when they are ordered to ?

2181. MR. WHEELER.—I do not recollect any cases of refusals to fire.

2182. PRESIDENT.—Where you come to close quarters the present arm is as effective and deadly as the rifle. If you arm them with the same arm

as native troops, the question of the proportion of British to native troops would arise ?

2183. MR. WHEELER.—Any proposal to increase the number of rifles in the hands of the police usually meets with opposition from the Army Department on account of the difficulties relating to this proportion. The Home Department is at present examining the distribution of rifles in different provinces among the police, which *prima facie* does not at present appear to be fixed upon any very intelligible estimate of the requirements of different provinces.

2184. PRESIDENT.—Would it be possible to substitute civil for military police in certain portions of Burma, or to alter the constitution of military police battalions ?

2185. MR. WHEELER.—I have no local knowledge of the subject and can only explain the facts as they appear from the records of the Home Department.

In 1888 the local Government took up the question of the reorganization of the police in Lower Burma and the system then existing of having Indians and Burmans scattered at the various stations, the former being responsible for guard and sentry duties and the latter for ordinary police work. Experience had shown this to be unsatisfactory. The Burmans disliked it and decent men could not be recruited ; the type of Indians was poor and discipline deteriorated. There were also no reserves. A committee was appointed to consider the whole question and the final orders of the local Government on their report are reproduced :—

“The organization of the Indian police is the next matter that engaged the Committee’s attention. Upon this subject they have made no detailed proposals. But they have agreed generally in the views submitted to them in the Resolution by which they were convened, namely, that the total number of the men of this class should be reduced, Burman police being substituted ; that the inefficient should be weeded out ; that the remainder should be kept in comparatively large bodies at a few stations instead of being scattered in fives and sixes over many ; that the Indian police should be kept under military discipline and under command of their own officers, and that the Indian and Burman police should, as far as possible, be kept apart in separate barracks. The necessary steps will be taken to give effect to these views and in future the bulk of the Indian police will be enrolled under the Military Police Act. The adoption of these measures cannot fail to have a marked effect in increasing the efficiency of the Indian portion of the force, and the Chief Commissioner believes that in a less direct manner it will also tend to increased efficiency on the part of the Burmans.”

The recommendations of the local Government were submitted in 1890 to the Government of India, and after discussion were sanctioned in 1891, to the extent of a military police force of 3,520 men, divided into two battalions of twenty and twelve companies, with headquarters at Rangoon and Tongoo, respectively. This was to absorb the existing ten companies of military police, the Karen levy of the Upper Burma police and the civil Indian police.

The report of the Police Commission raised the question of the desirability of maintaining the military police in Lower Burma, and the point was put to the local Government. The retention of this force was strongly urged in reply, the numbers being given as 3,767 men, *plus* a separate body of 200 for local service in Northern Arakan. The Government of India accepted this view.

The matter next came up in 1906 when the local Government asked for an increase of 351 men and this was agreed to.

In 1908 in connection with discussions as to the strength of the native army the local Government was again called upon to justify the retention of the military police in Lower Burma, and again they objected strongly. The Government of India accepted this view in general, but suggested a diminution in the number of rifles (substituting bored-out Martinis) and the introduction of the Lower Burma organization in some districts of Upper Burma which would have enabled a reduction in numbers to be effected. The Lieutenant-

Governor protested against the first suggestion and it was dropped ; the second is still under consideration.

The sanctioned strength of the civil and military police in Burma in 1910 was as follows :—

						Number.
Inspectors-General of Police and Deputy Inspectors-General of Police						6
Superintendents	54
Assistant Superintendents	46
Deputy Superintendents	37
Inspectors	221
Sub-Inspectors	1,100
Serjeants	14
Head-constables	1,724
Constables	12,233
Total						15,435

The sanctioned strength of the military police in Burma at the end of 1910 was :—

Battalion.	Number of Commandants.	Number of Assistant Commandants.	Number of Native ranks. (Subadars, Jemadars, Havildars, Naiks, Sepoys and Buglers.)	Total.
1. Reserve ...	1	1	921	923
2. Myitkyina ...	1	8	1,695	1,704
3. Bhamo ...	1	5	1,243	1,249
4. Ruby Mines ...	1	1	791	793
5. Chin Hills ...	1	5	904	910
6. Chindwin ...	1	3	1,130	1,134
7. Shwebo ...	1	2	1,017	1,020
8. Magwe ...	1	3	1,130	1,134
9. Mandalay ...	1	2	1,356	1,359
10. Southern Shan States ...	1	5	1,130	1,136
11. Northern Shan States ...	1	2	678	681
12. Toungoo ...	1	2	2,094	2,097
13. Rangoon ...	1	2	1,893	1,896
14. Arakan Hill Tracts	200	200
15. Salween	131	131
GRAND TOTAL ...	13*	41	16,313	16,367

* In addition to these one Commandant is Personal Assistant to the Deputy Inspector-General of Military Police.

2186. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think that the reason for dropping the proposal was merely that the Government of India did not wish to create friction with the local Government, or that they thought the Burma Government was right?

2187. MR. WHEELER.—The Government of India appeared to have realized the different conditions which prevailed in Burma, and were therefore prepared to accept the opinions of the local Government.

2188. SIR W. MEYER.—It has been suggested that the military police might be placed in a measure under the Commander-in-Chief?

2189. MR. WHEELER.—I should consider that to be undesirable.

2190. SIR W. MEYER.—Can you give reasons?

2191. MR. WHEELER.—In the case of Burma, for instance, although the police there are called "military police," they discharge to a considerable extent, the duties of civil police.

2192. SIR W. MEYER.—It has been suggested that the Commander-in-Chief should nominate the officers of military police battalions; what do you think of that?

2193. MR. WHEELER.—The Commander-in-Chief is always consulted before appointments are made there; there is always on the file a note by the Commander-in-Chief that he considers the officer suitable or unsuitable; I do not think any change is desirable so long as the police remain under the civil authorities.

2194. PRESIDENT.—What evidence is there to prove that the present situation in India is more serious than it was in 1904; was it not worse in 1907-08 than it is now? If so, why was it that up to the beginning of the present year no communication was addressed to local Governments asking them whether they required additional military support?

2195. MR. WHEELER.—I had some difficulty in understanding this question because at no time recently has the necessity of giving additional military support to local Governments been raised by the Home Department.

2196. PRESIDENT.—The point is that in 1907-08 there was a good deal of sedition in India. Nothing was then said of the inadequacy of the arrangements for internal defence fixed in 1904; but, in 1911 it was said that the situation was much more serious. Do you consider the present internal situation better than it was in 1907-08?

2197. MR. WHEELER.—Things are quieter in so far as outward manifestations go.

2198. SIR W. MEYER.—Since 1907-08 there have been deportations, Seditious Acts and the Press Act; do you consider these measures have materially helped to reduce unrest?

2199. MR. WHEELER.—The Press Act has undoubtedly had a marked effect on the tone of the press.

2200. SIR W. MEYER.—It is a permanent Act?

2201. MR. WHEELER.—Yes, and so is the Seditious Meetings Act.

2202. PRESIDENT.—Is not the danger of combination against British rule largely counteracted by the rivalries and religious differences of the various classes?

2203. MR. WHEELER.—It is an undoubted fact that strong racial and religious feelings do exist, and looking to the past, it is difficult to see how these differences could ever be smoothed over sufficiently to allow of a permanent combination in opposition to the Government. It is difficult to say what may happen in the future. Efforts are often being made towards rapprochements on the part of different communities, but so far they have not been very successful.

2204. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think there is any chance of Muhammadans and Sikhs combining?

2205. MR. WHEELER.—Not at present; we know that, at the moment in the United Provinces and Punjab the feeling between Hindus and Muhammadans is very bitter.

2206. PRESIDENT.—Has anything been done recently to tighten up the administration of the Arms Act?

2207. MR. WHEELER.—There has been no general enquiry in recent years with this end in view, although there has been considerable correspondence with regard to isolated cases dealing with the operation of the Arms Act. The subject has received a considerable amount of attention in connection with recent political assassinations and dacoities. This has resulted in a general feeling in the provinces that the Arms Act should be strictly administered. The most important pending correspondence is in connection with a proposal from Eastern Bengal and Assam that the possession of pistols and revolvers without license should be prohibited in all cases.

2208. SIR W. MEYER.—At present all Europeans and Eurasians are exempt from the restrictions imposed by the Act and there is nothing to prevent these people from selling arms to Indians, is there?

2209. MR. WHEELER.—Of course if they sold to unlicensed persons they would commit a breach of the law. There has been correspondence on the subject of the extent to which arms are passed on by exempted people to seditious persons, but we have not traced any very wide circulation in this way.

2210. SIR W. MEYER.—Speaking generally, would you say that the Arms Act at present works satisfactorily and that there is no necessity to tighten it up in any way?

2211. MR. WHEELER.—I do not think there is any particular respect in which the rules require tightening up, although this question of the withdrawal of exemptions in the case of pistols and revolvers is under consideration.

2212. SIR W. MEYER.—Am I correct in saying that it would be tightened up by rules without having recourse to the Legislative Council?

2213. MR. WHEELER.—The rules could certainly be rendered more stringent in some respects, noticeably as regards exemptions, without modification of the Act.

2214. SIR W. MEYER.—You do think arms come into the country in an under-hand way to people who ought not to possess them?

2215. MR. WHEELER.—We know that arms have been smuggled in, but we have no evidence that military weapons come in in any quantities.

2216. PRESIDENT.—Is there any evidence to shew that the Turco-Italian War has had any effect upon Indian Muhammadans?

2217. MR. WHEELER.—We have no evidence beyond the fact that there are frequent references to it in the Muhammadan press, and that we have had various resolutions from Muhammadan bodies on the subject. A report has, however, only recently been received from Sir John Hewett that it and the disturbances in Persia have had a disturbing effect on Muhammadans in the United Provinces. That report is still under consideration.

2218. PRESIDENT.—I suppose it is only a matter of sentiment and that they are not inclined to do anything but talk?

2219. MR. WHEELER.—It is largely so, but the report from the United Provinces presents the matter in a more serious light.

2220. PRESIDENT.—Is it not a fact that owing to the revolution in Turkey, the orthodox Muhammadans outside Turkey who do not belong to the New Turkish party do not regard the present Sultan as the true Khalifa?

2221. MR. WHEELER.—It is questionable whether the Conservative element among Indian Muhammadans would be in sympathy with the revolution.

2222. PRESIDENT.—I suppose the Young Muhammadan party is based on the New Turkish party?

2223. MR. WHEELER.—It is doubtless partly the result of education, and an impetus has been given to it by the success which they think has been achieved by the Hindus as the result of agitation. The consequence is that the younger men are inclined to advocate similar action in Muhammadan interests.

2224. SIR. W. MEYER.—Do you ever get extracts from demi-official or other letters written to His Excellency the Viceroy by Heads of local Governments on matters of this sort? Are portions of such letters communicated to the Home Department in regard to subjects concerning that Department?

2225. MR. WHEELER.—Not as a matter of routine, but if any question was raised concerning the Home Department, and requiring action, we should presumably hear of it.

2226. PRESIDENT.—Is there any evidence to shew whether the Sikhs have so far succumbed to the teachings of political agitators as to render them unworthy of implicit trust?

2227. MR. WHEELER.—On that point the Home Department have got very little to add to the evidence of Sir Charles Cleveland; our facts are his facts.

2228. PRESIDENT.—Is there any evidence that the Arya Samaj, the Tat Khalsa, the Chitpavan Brahmans or other agencies have made attempts to tamper with the loyalty of the troops? How far are the leaders of these organizations connected with seditious propaganda?

2229. MR. WHEELER.—There again I would answer in somewhat the same way as Sir Charles Cleveland.

2230. PRESIDENT.—What is your opinion regarding the Pan-Islamic feeling amongst Muhammadans in India?

2231. MR. WHEELER.—That is not a subject on which we have much evidence; the movement is watched by the Director of Criminal Intelligence and he would bring to our notice any particular manifestations of it.

2232. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you say it was on the increase?

2233. MR. WHEELER.—Possibly, sentimentally, to a certain extent; probably the Young Muhammadan party would encourage it; then there is the diffusion of newspapers which assists the spread of Pan-Islamic ideas.

2234. SIR R. SCALLON.—Does any newspaper come from Kabul which is read by Muhammadans?

2235. MR. WHEELER.—I do not know of any. There are papers in Calcutta connected with Persia. One is a paper against which there have been complaints. Violent articles not infrequently appear in it which have been brought to notice.

2236. SIR R. SCALLON.—Has it got a large circulation?

2237. MR. WHEELER.—No, not very large.

2238. PRESIDENT.—To what extent are special castes, *e.g.*, Chitpavan Brahmans, implicated in seditious propaganda?

2239. MR. WHEELER.—There again I have not got much to add to what Sir Charles Cleveland has said.

2240. PRESIDENT.—Has the question been considered of the effect which the widespread employment of such classes in Government service and on railways may have?

2241. MR. WHEELER.—There was a discussion of that matter in 1910. The Bombay Government issued orders laying stress on the desirability of not allowing any undue predominance to any section or caste. These orders were

brought to the notice of the Government of India, who suggested to other local Governments that they might take similar action. The question again came up in 1911. Attention was drawn on both occasions to the proportion in which different sections of the community were employed in Government service.

2242. SIR W. MEYER.—But had there not been similar orders of long standing in the various provinces?

2243. MR. WHEELER.—Yes, but the tendency is to lose sight of them.

2244. PRESIDENT.—Has any definite action been taken?

2245. MR. WHEELER.—I do not think the general policy enunciated has been acted upon to the extent that there has been any exclusion of Chitpavan Brahmans.

2246. SIR W. MEYER.—What about the employment of Chitpavans in railways and telegraphs?

2247. MR. WHEELER.—The correspondence in 1911 had reference to telegraphs, post offices and railways, and special instructions were issued to the Director-General, Posts and Telegraphs, to the Railway Board and to the agents of the railways concerned.

2248. SIR P. LAKE.—Would you say that there was a sufficient number of this caste in Government service to constitute a serious danger to the working of those Departments?

2249. MR. WHEELER.—There is no doubt they constitute a very large element in Government service.

2250. PRESIDENT.—What arrangements exist for obtaining information regarding the spread of sedition, first in India generally, and secondly in the army; and how far do the civil and military authorities co-operate in giving effect to these arrangements?

2251. MR. WHEELER.—Sir Charles Cleveland explained the general organization. Orders were issued in 1907 emphasizing the need of co-operation between the civil and military authorities. In all provinces orders have been passed on this subject. I do not think there have been any recent complaints of deficiencies in this respect.

2252. SIR W. MEYER.—Is it desirable for the Government to take up legislation to deal with the control of temples or marriage customs, etc.? Might not such action be misrepresented as tampering with the customs of the people?

2253. MR. WHEELER.—We had Mr. Basu's recent Marriage Bill which met with much opposition from different elements and was eventually dropped. This was an unofficial measure and was opposed by the Government. There is a case now before the Government concerning the registration of charitable endowments in Bombay, with regard to which the argument against interference is being used. The policy of the Government of India for many years has been to have nothing to do with the administration of religious endowments.

2254. SIR W. MEYER.—Would Mr. Basu's Bill, if it had passed, have been ascribed to the Government?

2255. MR. WHEELER.—There is the danger that the Government would have been held responsible by those who disliked it.

2256. SIR W. MEYER.—You think such measures might become sources of political danger?

2257. MR. WHEELER.—Yes.

2258. PRESIDENT.—Have we any reason to suppose that in the Indian army the feelings of loyalty and confidence in the strength, justice, and stability of the British Government have weakened?

2259. MR. WHEELER.—On that question the Home Department has no information beyond the evidence of attempts which have been made to tamper with the army.

2260. SIR W. MEYER.—I would like to ask you, as a Bengal civilian, what is your opinion of the National Congress as a body. Is it harmless or harmful?

2261. MR. WHEELER.—The influence of the Congress at the present time has probably considerably waned owing to the split between the moderates and the extreme element which has not yet righted itself. There has also been the influence of the enlarged Councils, which has created an impression that they render Congress superfluous.

2262. SIR W. MEYER.—The collective Congress in 1906 passed resolutions that the British Colonial system of Government should be extended to India. The Secretary of State has recently condemned this suggestion. Do you think that if the Congress entertains such an ideal it is likely to be harmful?

2263. MR. WHEELER.—I think the ideal is one which is unrealizable; it has been allowed to be expressed for some years past and the recent pronouncement of the Secretary of State is one of the first definite utterances against it. Of course the Congress would say that it is its ultimate ideal, but that it sees no chance of its realization for some years to come. The advanced papers, generally, have resented Lord Crewe's pronouncement.

2264. SIR W. MEYER.—The Congress used to be regarded as a safety valve; do you think that is the position now?

2265. MR. WHEELER.—The need of a safety valve has now been largely supplied by the Legislative Councils.

2266. SIR W. MEYER.—Then would you say that Congress as an organization ought to be watched carefully?

2267. MR. WHEELER.—Certainly; it represents the opinions of an influential section.

2268. SIR W. MEYER.—Has there been a definite breach between the extremists and the moderates in Bengal as in other provinces?

2269. MR. WHEELER.—It is very difficult to say; it is probable that the breach has not been so definite in Bengal as elsewhere because some leaders have managed, in a way, to keep a foot in each camp.

2270. SIR W. MEYER.—The extremists made a great effort about 1907 to capture the Congress; do you think they are likely to repeat the attempt?

2271. MR. WHEELER.—Not immediately, because open extremism is rather at a discount at present.

2272. SIR W. MEYER.—Is there a party which wants complete independence?

2273. MR. WHEELER.—Yes, but it is for the moment in the background.

2274. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think that party has been actively connected with such assassinations as have taken place?

2275. MR. WHEELER.—The assassinations have been the outcome of the teachings of that party.

2276. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you say that sporadic assassinations were the acts of individuals or of an organized body?

2277. MR. WHEELER.—The question as to how far any main organizations control local centres is one which has never been satisfactorily answered.

2278. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you say that the Eastern Bengal dacoities were part of an organized movement?

2279. MR. WHEELER.—I think it is the general opinion that they were the work of local centres. Dacoity having been preached as one method of regenerating the country, it has taken root in certain local centres which organized these outrages.

2280. SIR W. MEYER.—Are school boys and students still being influenced by the seditionists ?

2281. MR. WHEELER.—Attempts are certainly made to do so, and not without success. The scheme of organizing national schools independent of the Education Department still continues, though the movement is probably not increasing at the moment.

2282. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you regard this as a possible danger ?

2283. MR. WHEELER.—Yes, if it succeeds, and in so far as the tone of these schools is definitely anti-Government. I saw a recent report from Eastern Bengal and Assam, and the number of national schools there was not increasing.

2284. SIR W. MEYER.—Has the Calcutta University taken any steps to exercise greater control over colleges and schools affiliated to it ?

2285. MR. WHEELER.—I do not remember any recent cases of disaffiliation, certainly not on account of political opinion.

2286. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think there is much danger of seditionists in Bengal cloaking their movements under the guise of religion ?

2287. MR. WHEELER.—The religious element is always mixed up in that kind of teaching.

2288. SIR W. MEYER.—We have been told for instance that, as regards the Punjab, the Neo-Sikhs are personally irreligious men, a fact which might lead to a split between them and the orthodox.

2289. MR. WHEELER.—I do not think that the religious element has been introduced in Bengal to the same extent as in the Punjab.

2290. SIR W. MEYER.—A great many seditionists are pleaders. Is it possible to take any action against them as pleaders ?

2291. MR. WHEELER.—Action has been taken in various provinces to prevent the enrolment of men against whom adverse reports are on record. At the present moment we have a case of this kind pending in Bengal.

2292. SIR W. MEYER.—Is the boycott movement active at present ?

2293. MR. WHEELER.—Not to the same extent as in 1907-08 ; we do not hear so much about it. It is still mentioned and the vow is periodically renewed, but the movement is not so much to the fore.

2294. SIR W. MEYER.—Has the Sivaji cult obtained any footing in Bengal ?

2295. MR. WHEELER.—In 1906 or 1907 we heard a good deal of it, but it is not so much in evidence now.

2296. SIR W. MEYER.—Was it a mere temporary ebullition, or the sealing of a compact between the extremists of Bengal and the Maratha Brahmans ?

2297. MR. WHEELER.—In 1907 it was probably an extremist political move, but I do not think it met with any general success.

2298. SIR W. MEYER.—As regards the recent reconstitution of the province and the transfer of the Capital, is the general feeling in Bengal for or against the Government ?

2299. MR. WHEELER.—The modification of the Partition has been welcomed by the Bengali Press and has been represented by it as a victory for agitation. The papers are not, however, altogether of one opinion on the point. For instance, a quarrel has been in progress on the subject between the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* and the *Bengali*. Of course the Muhammadans are not pleased, and they are also inclined to say that they have been ignored because they kept quiet.

2300. SIR W. MEYER.—His Majesty the King was very enthusiastically received in Calcutta; would that shew that the people were more loyal than one would imagine from the newspapers?

2301. MR. WHEELER.—The Bengalis are sentimentalists. They indulged in a flood of sentiment on the occasion of His Majesty's visit but I should say that amongst the educated classes at any rate it will prove transient.

2302. SIR W. MEYER.—We have heard a good deal of the Chitpavans and Government service; what about the Bengalis in the civil secretariats?

2303. MR. WHEELER.—Many Bengalis are undoubtedly employed, and among those who are disloyal there must be a certain risk of leakage.

2304. SIR W. MEYER.—Their numbers will be reduced, I suppose, by the transfer of the Capital?

2305. MR. WHEELER.—Probably, because Bengalis dislike both Simla and Delhi.

2306. SIR W. MEYER.—You served in Bihar; do you think Patna would need special protection in the event of serious disturbance?

2307. MR. WHEELER.—There always has been a somewhat turbulent element in Patna, and it has always been considered that the city required watching.

2308. SIR W. MEYER.—It has been proposed lately to remove a battery of field artillery from Dinapore; would you approve of that?

2309. MR. WHEELER.—I am not prepared to give an opinion.

2310. SIR W. MEYER.—In the recent correspondence with local Governments about internal defence, I did not observe any provision for the defence of Bihar; do you think that is a point which ought to be rectified?

2311. MR. WHEELER.—I understand that the local Government has always objected to the removal of troops altogether from Dinapore.

2312. SIR W. MEYER.—I am referring more to war distribution in the absence of the troops at the front. Would you say there ought to be a moveable column for Bihar?

2313. MR. WHEELER.—The local Volunteers in Bihar are distinctly more efficient than is ordinarily the case.

2314. SIR W. MEYER.—What is your opinion, generally speaking, of the Volunteers as an efficient force?

2315. MR. WHEELER.—Speaking for the Bihar Light Horse, I think they would be very useful in putting down trouble of the kind they might be called upon to meet.

2316. SIR W. MEYER.—Has the practical exclusion of Indians from South Africa, the Dominion of Canada and Australia, caused much ill-feeling in this country?

2317. MR. WHEELER.—It is a matter that is frequently referred to in the Press; it has also been the subject of Council debates.

2318. SIR W. MEYER.—You think it is a matter which is worked up by native newspapers, but you could not give an opinion as to the effect it has really had on the people?

2319. MR. WHEELER.—No, it is one of the stock grievances.

2320. SIR P. LAKE.—Could you suggest any closer co-operation between the civil and military elements with regard to internal security?

2321. MR. WHEELER.—I think, so far as headquarters are concerned, ample provision exists to ensure full co-operation. In districts it probably depends a good deal on the personal element.

(The witness then withdrew.)

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

16th Meeting—Friday, the 5th July 1912.

Major-General F. J. Aylmer, V.C., C.B., Adjutant-General in India,
attended as a witness and was examined.

EVIDENCE OF MAJOR-GENERAL AYLMER.

2322. PRESIDENT.—General Aylmer; you are Adjutant-General in India?

2323. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes, sir.

2324. PRESIDENT.—And you have long Indian experience both on the Staff and in command?

2325. GENERAL AYLMER.—I have been in India since 1883, and I have been on the Staff practically since 1895. I have been in command of brigades on the frontier for six years and commanded the Quetta Division for nine months.

2326. SIR W. MEYER.—I understand that you have also had a good deal of experience of Madras troops?

2327. GENERAL AYLMER.—I served with Madras troops in Burma for nearly two years and afterwards in Madras for five months. Later, I was at Ootacamund for nearly three years as Assistant-Quartermaster-General of the Madras Command.

2328. PRESIDENT.—Under Lord Kitchener's scheme it was proposed to make every divisional area self-contained, both as regards its contribution to the Field Army and the internal defence troops. As a matter of fact it appears that practically every one of the present nine divisional areas in India proper would require to obtain a portion of its war or internal defence troops, or both, from outside; and that the full working out of the Kitchener scheme in this respect would involve large expenditure. Do you consider that this expenditure need be incurred or that the full working out of the scheme might be abandoned?

2329. GENERAL AYLMER.—I do not think that it should be abandoned, but there are a great many requirements for the army in India which should take precedence to its further development, except where this can be carried out at slight cost.

A few of such requirements are:—

(1) Contentment of the native army, under such headings as:—

Increase of pensions.

Improvement of position of native officers, etc., etc.

(2) Re-armament, rifles and guns.

(3) Mobilization efficiency of artillery.

(4) Reserves of officers.

(5) Aviation corps.

(6) Staff for command of internal defence areas.

(7) Assistance to sillardar cavalry regiments to make them mobilizable, such as increase of pay of grass cutters.

(8) Possible increase of pay to captains and subalterns of the British service.

(9) More signalling units.

(10) Supply of motor traction, etc., etc.

I think it quite possible that the present enquiry may lead to modifications the scheme of distribution, but a sound scheme on similar lines should be eventually carried out.

2330. PRESIDENT.—What great advantage do you get from having the troops required both for the mobilization of a division for field service, and for internal defence purposes, concentrated in the peace area ?

2331. GENERAL AYLMER.—You gain the advantage, first of decentralization, second of better training, and third of more rapid concentration.

2332. PRESIDENT.—You say you get better training by quartering in the same divisional area all the troops required for field service from, and for internal defence in, that area. Supposing you have a brigade of four battalions quartered in the Lahore area and four in the Peshawar area ; why should the training in the one area be superior to the training in the other ?

2333. GENERAL AYLMER.—It is better to have your units for war trained together.

2334. PRESIDENT.—Are they ever trained together divisionally ?

2335. GENERAL AYLMER.—In a great many cases they are.

2336. PRESIDENT.—We have been told in the General Staff Memorandum, dated the 14th July 1911, that training under the divisional system is practically confined to brigade training.

2337. GENERAL AYLMER.—That is certainly not the case in all divisions. Of course some divisions are very much dispersed indeed, and it would cost a good deal to bring them together ; but in a great many, divisional training, or a close approximation to it, has been carried out very efficiently.

2338. PRESIDENT.—You have in India great facilities for training on a large scale in the winter months ?

2339. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes.

2340. PRESIDENT.—The best place for training is not necessarily in any particular area. You fix on a place and carry out inter-divisional or army manoeuvres on a considerable scale ; as you can have this great facility without expense or with but little expense, what advantage is there in quartering troops for the purpose in a divisional area ?

2341. GENERAL AYLMER.—Well, I consider it a great advantage that they should be under the General and Staff they are to serve under in war.

2342. PRESIDENT.—You consider it of great importance that the troops should be under the divisional General who is going to command them in war ? Are these troops periodically changing in course of relief ?

2343. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes, but at the same time you get the maximum of training under one man.

2344. PRESIDENT.—Is the tenure of the General in command—with his Brigade Commanders—permanent, or does it last only for a prescribed number of years ?

2345. GENERAL AYLMER.—Four years. I think that under the alternative system matters would be worse than they are now. I recognize that there must always be limitations, but at the same time if you did not have the present system the other would be less perfect.

2346. PRESIDENT.—Is there any uniformity in training of commands by General and Staff officers.

2347. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think so.

2348. PRESIDENT.—Is there great uniformity ?

2349. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think there is a certain amount of variation; at the same time, the General Staff lay down certain lines of work, and, further, the General Officers Commanding the Northern and Southern Armies are there to secure this uniformity.

2350. PRESIDENT.—Then what benefit do you get by quartering troops in these divisional areas?

2351. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think a certain amount of allowance must be made for the personal factor. A General of a division probably possesses certain ideas of his own, and although you may not be able to secure absolute uniformity, you can ensure that troops are trained on uniform lines.

2352. PRESIDENT.—But your ideal would be an absolutely uniform system of training?

2353. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think it would be distinctly advantageous, but the idiosyncrasies of Generals must also be reckoned with; these constitute a disadvantage which it is impossible to avoid.

2354. SIR W. MEYER.—From the various preferable objects you have mentioned, you consider that further expenditure on redistribution to any considerable extent ought to be postponed for several years?

2355. GENERAL AYLMER.—If you cannot get money to do both, you should concentrate your efforts on the things I have mentioned.

2356. SIR P. LAKE.—Do you think it desirable that where barracks are falling down they should—if necessary—be rebuilt at places indicated under the Redistribution Scheme.

2357. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes.

2358. PRESIDENT.—Lord Kitchener was able to provide nine divisions for the Field Army, as opposed to four (subsequently raised to six) contemplated in previous arrangements, (a) by reducing the proportion of British to native troops formerly held necessary for the Field Army, and; (b) by reducing the strength of what were formerly considered to be necessary for obligatory garrisons, etc.

(i) As regards (b) do you consider that Lord Kitchener's scheme adequately provided for the necessities of internal security and defence?

(ii) Might a larger Field Army have been provided without the complete recasting of previous arrangements?

2359. GENERAL AYLMER.—(i) As the scheme and other circumstances have since developed, it does not sufficiently provide for internal security and defence. With the growth of our knowledge of disaffection in India the number of units detailed for internal defence may be considered insufficient, as shewn in Sir Douglas Haig's Memorandum of the 14th July 1911. The enormous calls on the internal defence units to supply the deficiencies in the Field Army in many cases render them altogether inefficient. The artillery furnishes an excellent example of this. In my opinion these drafts from internal defence units to make good deficiencies in the Field Army are now totally unjustifiable.

(ii) I consider that the previous arrangements were chaotic from a mobilization and concentration point of view. To have obtained a larger army under former conditions was doubtless possible, but its efficiency and the rapidity of its concentration would have been very low. I am of opinion that a very extensive recasting of old conditions was most necessary.

2360. PRESIDENT.—You say the previous arrangements were chaotic?

2361. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes, sir.

2362. PRESIDENT.—Have you examined the arrangements made when the original Mobilization Committee was formed; when Lord Roberts was

President, and Sir George Chesney, Sir Henry Brackenbury and other officers of great ability, were members?

2363. GENERAL AYLMER.—I have seen them, but I have not examined them very carefully. The arrangements were no doubt the best that could be made at the time with reference to conditions then existing with regard to expenditure, etc., but with the advance of ideas as regards mobilization and concentration I consider they were chaotic.

2364. PRESIDENT.—You are aware that all units were detailed for their specific duties and that mobilization stores were established; you are aware that at that time the high officials I have mentioned had great experience and were men of remarkable ability?

2365. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes, sir.

2366. PRESIDENT.—And you still maintain that the arrangements made were chaotic?

2367. GENERAL AYLMER.—I do, sir.

2368. PRESIDENT.—You are aware that they were approved by the Secretary of State?

2369. GENERAL AYLMER.—I am.

2370. PRESIDENT.—You have now got an improved and decentralized system so that work that was formerly centralized at Army Headquarters has now been decentralized?

2371. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes, sir.

2372. PRESIDENT.—Have you ever considered what the strength of the Headquarters Staff was at that time—when Lord Roberts was Commander-in-Chief in India?

2373. GENERAL AYLMER.—I do not know exactly, but I understand it was less than it is now.

2374. PRESIDENT.—Are you aware that it has been nearly trebled since?

2375. GENERAL AYLMER.—I could not say.

2376. PRESIDENT.—Is that the result of this system of decentralization?

2377. GENERAL AYLMER.—That I could not say.

2378. PRESIDENT.—Are you aware that at that time the work of the General Staff was divided between the Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General, and that the former was the principal staff officer?

2379. GENERAL AYLMER.—I am, sir.

2380. PRESIDENT.—Are you aware what the staff of the Adjutant-General was in those days?

2381. GENERAL AYLMER.—About the same as it is now.

2382. PRESIDENT.—Therefore, taking into account the Chief of the General Staff with his twenty-seven subordinates besides attachés, in spite of the decentralization work appears to have enormously increased at Simla?

2383. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think there is more wanted and demanded now in the way of training. Also the large staffs of the Bombay and Madras armies have been abolished since then.

2384. PRESIDENT.—Where were you in 1897-98?

2385. GENERAL AYLMER.—I was on the staff in Simla.

2386. PRESIDENT.—Were the arrangements for the mobilization of the troops and for suppressing the frontier disturbance during that period chaotic?

2387. GENERAL AYLMER.—They were very complicated.

2388. PRESIDENT.—Are you aware that the delay that occurred in sending troops into the field was due to delay in collecting transport, particularly second-line transport ?

2389. GENERAL AYLMER.—I know there was great difficulty in getting together transport for the Bara Brigade.

2390. PRESIDENT.—Are you aware that to collect something like 30,000 transport animals for the Tirah Expedition took some weeks ?

2391. GENERAL AYLMER.—I am, sir.

2392. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider that the collection of camels would proceed with greater rapidity at the present day ?

2393. GENERAL AYLMER.—I am inclined to think it would.

2394. PRESIDENT.—Why ?

2395. GENERAL AYLMER.—Because we have now got certain standing camel corps and cadres. At the same time, I think there is a general tendency for camel breeding to diminish.

2396. PRESIDENT.—Then why should you get them with greater facility ?

2397. GENERAL AYLMER.—Well, I think the camel corps are on a pretty sound basis now.

2398. PRESIDENT.—The chaotic nature of the arrangements you speak of therefore resolve themselves into this, that there was some delay in collecting transport ?

2399. GENERAL AYLMER.—No; I think it was more that troops were thrown together from all parts of India, and Generals were put in command of troops whom in many cases they had never seen before, and staffs were improvised.

2400. PRESIDENT.—And you would say that now the troops will always have the same Generals, etc., as they are accustomed to in peace time ? You had the other day the Abor Expedition ; had those troops been trained together and had they been accustomed to the officer in command ?

2401. GENERAL AYLMER.—I believe there were some special staff officers.

2402. PRESIDENT.—Was that chaotic ?

2403. GENERAL AYLMER.—Well, it is possible that it might be looked upon in that way.

2404. SIR W. MEYER.—I take it that you hold that one advantage of the present system is that under the old scheme commanders and staffs were improvised, and everybody used to rush to Simla, if he could, to get sent on the expedition ? Under the present system there will not be all this jostling for appointments. But has that system since it came into force been strictly observed ? Do you remember the Mohmand affair of 1908 ?

2405. GENERAL AYLMER.—Well, the Chief Staff Officer was sent from Simla, but, so far as one can see, there is no reason why it should not be so; there may have been special reasons for selecting that officer from Simla.

2406. SIR W. MEYER.—Since you consider that the arrangements of 1897 were chaotic in regard to the Field Army, might it not be equally said that arrangements under the new scheme for internal defence are chaotic ?

2407. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think there is still much that requires to be remedied.

2408. SIR W. MEYER.—To a certain extent the Field Army has been formed at the expense of internal defence ?

2409. GENERAL AYLMER.—That is so now. I consider that the matter of command in internal defence is of the utmost importance, and is not provided for.

2410. SIR W. MEYER.—You speak of camel transport; are you aware that the scheme for the Field Army relies to a considerable extent on getting Ghilzai camel corps?

2411. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes, there are eighteen Ghilzai corps, I believe, in the scheme.

2412. SIR W. MEYER.—Is that a safe calculation?

2413. GENERAL AYLMER.—Well, there are various opinions held on that question. Sir Henry McMahon when Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan was very confident that they would turn up. Others are not so confident.

2414. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing a *jihad* were proclaimed, would you be able to count upon the Ghilzais?

2415. GENERAL AYLMER.—It is hard to say; but I think there are various possibilities that they would not come up. The Afghan people might cut them off. It is, as I say later on, one of the doubtful points in our transport arrangements.

2416. SIR W. MEYER.—If I remember rightly, Lord Kitchener's scheme gave about 85,000 men for internal defence; speaking roughly, how many men would you consider necessary?

2417. GENERAL AYLMER.—I should say that the estimate laid down in General Haig's Memorandum is sufficient, if your internal defence units are really efficient.

2418. SIR P. LAKE.—The present system, if carried to completion, would be better than the old one?

2419. GENERAL AYLMER.—I should say that such deficiencies and weaknesses as exist are not so much due to the system as to the fact that the scheme has not been completed.

2420. SIR W. MEYER.—You think that if Lord Kitchener's scheme had been worked out in full you would have had efficient internal defence units?

2421. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think that as matters have turned out the efficiency of internal defence units is not sufficiently secured, because there are too many drafts on them to make up deficiencies in the Field Army. I cannot say what was in Lord Kitchener's mind; he doubtless hoped to get all those needs made good subsequently.

2422. SIR W. MEYER.—This is largely the case in regard to transport for internal defence also?

2423. GENERAL AYLMER.—I believe all the transport would be taken for the Field Army.

2424. SIR W. MEYER.—Is that a great defect?

2425. GENERAL AYLMER.—Undoubtedly; at the same time, there is more chance of getting together in sufficient time local transport for internal defence, and it would be more easily improvised than transport for work across the frontier for the Field Army. I think it is more important to equip the Field Army than internal defence units with transport.

2426. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you have internal defence transport cadres?

2427. GENERAL AYLMER.—No; I think it could be done more in the way of registration.

2428. PRESIDENT.—Are you acquainted with the question of the proportion of British to native troops for the Field Army in India?

2429. GENERAL AYLMER.—I am. I think that in 1900 or thereabouts they were brigaded in equal proportions.

2430. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider the present proportion of one in three adequate?

2431. GENERAL AYLMER.—I would prefer it to be higher.

2432. SIR W. MEYER.—Given the existing number of British troops, which do you consider the more important, to leave a larger proportion behind or to put them with the Field Army?

2433. GENERAL AYLMER.—I should say you must actively employ your native troops; if you leave them behind, they are exposed to temptation. I think the practice originally followed of detailing British and native troops in equal proportions for the Field Army resulted in too many native troops being left behind.

2434. SIR W. MEYER.—Then I take it that you agree that, the number of British troops being taken as constant, it is better to stiffen internal defence rather than the Field Army with British troops?

2435. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes, generally.

2436. PRESIDENT.—Even if troops were fully concentrated, as under Lord Kitchener's scheme, would they be able to move without their second-line transport, and would that be promptly available?

2437. GENERAL AYLMER.—My own view is that the troops would not be able to move at once, but without examining a very great mass of figures, I am not in a position to give an authoritative answer. The Quartermaster-General can doubtless give exact numbers. In this connection, however, I can say that a considerable amount of transport is doubtful; for example, the eighteen Ghilzai camel corps which may or may not turn up when required. I am also strongly of opinion that, in order to feed large masses of troops at the front, motor transport must be introduced. Camels will occupy too much road space, and when in great numbers on a particular line of communication, will be impossible to feed.

2438. PRESIDENT.—You know Quetta—could you feed a large number of camels in that country?

2439. GENERAL AYLMER.—The whole question depends upon the length of the lines of communication and the period for which you use them. Grazing near the line of march will, after a time, become exhausted, and it will be very difficult to feed the camels.

2440. PRESIDENT.—In what time do you think you could move the 1st and 4th Divisions?

2441. GENERAL AYLMER.—In a fortnight, I should think, generally speaking.

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2442. SIR W. MEYER.—General Dickie, speaking of motor-transport, said it had been tried and given up. Do you think it might be tried again?

2443. GENERAL AYLMER.—I certainly think it should be tried again, but with a different type of vehicle—self-propelled motor lorries for instance.

2444. SIR W. MEYER.—As far as your knowledge goes, has any experiment been made with the type of motor you mention?

2445. GENERAL AYLMER.—No, not so far as I know.

2446. SIR W. MEYER.—Working on those lines may to some extent solve the transport problem?

2447. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes, I think it might. I had a chance of seeing motor-transport tested on the French manoeuvres about twenty months ago. Twenty-six motors sufficed for an army corps, a brigade and a cavalry division, and, except for meat, all supplies were carried by these. These motors used to go right up to the troops' distributing points and do about 100 kilometres a day. It was a most admirable arrangement. The convoys had a repair motor lorry which accompanied them in case of breakdown.

2448. **PRESIDENT.**—Lord Morley, in a despatch of March 1908,* asked whether rigid adherence to Lord Kitchener's scheme of divisional areas was necessary. The Government of India in their reply said that it was. Do you concur in this ?

* No. 50 of 1908
not reproduced.

2449. **GENERAL AYLMER.**—I should say that it was highly expedient ; but I think that the present distribution, though by no means ideal, would give sufficiently good mobilization results, and that therefore further steps towards the completion of the scheme might be delayed for the present pending the adoption of still more urgent measures. I recognize the fact that it will be financially impossible to do everything required at once.

2450. **PRESIDENT.**—In your opinion there is no need to do everything that is required at once ?

2451. **GENERAL AYLMER.**—No, sir ; measures for completing the requirements of the army, including redistribution, can be undertaken at reasonable intervals.

2452. **PRESIDENT.**—In the case of France and Germany it is necessary that their armies should be capable of very rapid mobilization and movement. In the case of the North-West Frontier, for instance, there is no probability of the enemy's rapid concentration and invasion of the plains of India ?

2453. **GENERAL AYLMER.**—I do not think there is. The tribes might make raids, but organized invasion is practically an impossibility. But of course we might have to mobilize quickly to meet some other move.

2454. **PRESIDENT.**—Sir Beauchamp Duff, giving evidence before the Mowatt Committee at the India Office in 1907, drew a vivid picture of the chaos that would arise from the non-fulfilment of the self-contained divisional area scheme, and the consequent transfer of mobilization arrangements from the divisional Generals to Army Headquarters. Do you concur in this, and had you any experience of such a condition of things in a frontier expedition ?

2455. **GENERAL AYLMER.**—I have no hesitation in saying that there must be decentralization to divisions to ensure the smooth working of a large mobilization and the management of internal defence afterwards. Many of the officers at Army Headquarters will go to the Field Army, and the staff here will be at once shorthanded. Such decentralization is an acknowledged necessity in every civilized army. I officiated as Assistant-Quartermaster General and Deputy-Quartermaster-General at Army Headquarters in 1897, and I consider that there was much confusion and overwork at Simla in endeavouring to run everything from there. This would have been greatly reduced, had there existed a sound system of decentralization.

2456. **PRESIDENT.**—When you were in the Quetta Division were you responsible for the various movements connected with reinforcements for that Division and for bringing up transport and warlike stores ?

2457. **GENERAL AYLMER.**—No, sir, not so long as the troops came from outside my divisional area.

2458. **PRESIDENT.**—Who was supposed to do this work ?

2459. **GENERAL AYLMER.**—The units would be despatched from their station by their own divisional Generals. The work of allotting troops, etc., fell to Army Headquarters, but this was laid down in the prepared scheme.

2460. **SIR P. LAKE.**—You would say that where a unit has to come from one division into another, the plan is in the hands of the two Generals and their responsible staffs who carry out the moves on receipt of orders ; where it is a case of a large concentration on the frontier, that is done from Army Headquarters ?

2461. **GENERAL AYLMER.**—For a large concentration the scheme is worked out beforehand by Army Headquarters. The transfer of one unit from one division to another is in the hands of the two Generals concerned.

2462. PRESIDENT.—I am trying to discover what difference there is between the old and the new systems ?

2463. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think there is a great deal of difference now.

2464. SIR W. MEYER.—You have got a 4th Cavalry Brigade ; it is nominally attached to the 4th Division, but the units are scattered through three divisional areas. To get that brigade you would necessarily have to receive a variety of orders from Army Headquarters ?

2465. GENERAL AYLMER.—Certainly it might involve Army Headquarters, but most of the work would be taken up by the divisional Generals concerned.

2466. SIR W. MEYER.—Anyhow, you have said that though the full carrying out of the scheme is *per se* good, it ought to stand over pending the completion of more important matters ?

2467. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think the scheme itself is an urgent matter, but others are now more urgent.

2468. PRESIDENT.—Is it always possible or expedient in a minor expedition to provide the troops required entirely from the nearest division ?

2469. GENERAL AYLMER.—As a rule I consider it is. There may, of course, be exceptions. For example :—

(i) Sickness among troops.

(ii) Tribal reasons. For instance, it might be inadvisable to send a regiment with two or three companies of Mahsuds into the Mahsud country.

(iii) Religious reasons, which would demand a preponderance of units composed of men of a different faith.

(iv) It may be very advisable to give an unit belonging to another division a baptism of fire.

2470. PRESIDENT.—There are probably always varying degrees of efficiency amongst units ?

2471. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think there is a good deal of variety.

2472. PRESIDENT.—There are some regiments whose fighting efficiency is not equal to that of others ?

2473. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes, sir.

2474. PRESIDENT.—Take the case of a difficult expedition in which the number of troops was strictly limited by various conditions and where it was essential that the troops employed should be of the finest quality ; supposing you had none in the division of the requisite standard, would you nevertheless send up units of that division ?

2475. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think it might possibly be advisable to send others, but such a case would be exceptional.

2476. PRESIDENT.—Is not the object of war to defeat the enemy in the most decisive manner ?

2477. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes, sir.

2478. PRESIDENT.—Then you must use the troops best fitted. Were you in Burma ?

2479. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes, sir, I have served there.

2480. PRESIDENT.—You are aware that when Upper Burma was occupied it was considered very desirable, as the country lay within the sphere of the Madras army, to send a good number of Madras troops there ?

2481. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes, sir.

2482. PRESIDENT.—What was the result?

2483. GENERAL AYLMER.—Some did not do very well.

2484. PRESIDENT.—And what had to be done?

2485. GENERAL AYLMER.—The military police were raised from the northern races of India.

2486. PRESIDENT.—Therefore in that instance it would seem that the system you advocate failed. Can the proposition that troops ought to be trained and commanded in peace by those who will lead them into the field in time of war be fully carried out in practice, having regard to the limited tenure of commands, the possible unfitness of particular officers for field service, and the periodical reliefs of units?

2487. GENERAL AYLMER.—It is most desirable that this should be the rule. It is a distinct asset in any campaign. Officers should not be appointed to commands unless fit to lead their troops in any kind of operations which are likely to take place. I consider for this reason that commanders of frontier brigades and divisions should be men with frontier experience. Officers of the British service should also have had considerable Indian experience before being given commands in this country. Reliefs should be arranged so that too many units from one command do not change the same year. This is not very difficult.

2488. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you consider that all the Generals at present holding divisional and brigade commands are competent to take the field with them? I do not of course want mention of any specific names.

2489. GENERAL AYLMER.—I would prefer not to answer that question.

2490. PRESIDENT.—Are you satisfied with the arrangements contemplated for the command of internal defence troops when the whole or a large part of the Field Army is mobilized for service on the frontier?

2491. GENERAL AYLMER.—I am not at all satisfied. If all nine divisions were to be mobilized, there would probably be only two or three Brigadier Generals left behind and practically no staff outside Simla. A state of absolute chaos would supervene. I consider that in every division there should be a senior staff officer for Administration—preferably a Brigadier-General, who in peace would relieve the divisional General of all details of administrative work and, when the Field Army is mobilized, would take command of the divisional area with all the remaining troops therein. He would thus become responsible for the internal security of an area, the conditions of which he had studied previously. There would then be somebody with whom Army Headquarters could deal direct.

Even for peace work this would be a very convenient arrangement as General Officers Commanding are apt to relegate their administrative duties to quite a secondary place, and much additional work is thus thrown on Army Headquarters. At the present moment the Adjutant-General has to deal with fourteen units, and things are not worked out as they ought to be in divisions and independent brigades.

On general mobilization, the senior unit commander left behind for internal defence might possibly take command of the internal defence area, but he should have some idea beforehand that this will be his duty.

In addition to divisional area commanders and internal defence area commanders there ought to be some organization for their staffs. The amount of work to be done will be enormous. If these staffs were to be taken from area defence units, it would render them more inefficient than they would be even under the present arrangements. The whole question requires the most urgent attention.

2492. PRESIDENT.—I gather then you are in favour of giving divisional Generals a Brigadier-General to take charge of Administration?

2493. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes, sir.

2494. PRESIDENT.—In that case the divisional General would be cut off from Administration? Do you consider that is a good training?

2495. GENERAL AYLMER.—The Brigadier-General would be under the General Officer Commanding, who could therefore interest himself in important administrative cases.

2496. PRESIDENT.—The cost would be heavy?

2497. GENERAL AYLMER.—It would be something considerable, but at the present moment we have great difficulty in finding employment for senior officers of the Indian army.

2498. PRESIDENT.—What work would remain for the divisional Generals to do?

2499. GENERAL AYLMER.—Training and the larger questions of discipline. Also the larger administrative questions.

2500. PRESIDENT.—I suppose you hold that a divisional commander should not be always interfering with his subordinates about training, but should only do his own work of general supervision and higher training?

2501. GENERAL AYLMER.—Certainly, sir; but he has got to know his troops in addition.

2502. PRESIDENT.—The training of the army in India lasts for a short period?

2503. GENERAL AYLMER.—We will say two months are devoted to higher training.

2504. PRESIDENT.—Then you are going to keep a divisional commander practically for the work of six weeks or two months a year?

2505. GENERAL AYLMER.—He has a good many other things to do.

2506. PRESIDENT.—When a divisional General takes the field, is it not essential that he should be acquainted with Administration?

2507. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think he should be acquainted with Administration in a general way.

2508. PRESIDENT.—Have you had much experience of the work devolving under the present system on General Officers Commanding? Were you ever overburdened?

2509. GENERAL AYLMER.—Sometimes I was. There were big cantonment questions and matters of that sort to be dealt with.

2510. SIR W. MEYER.—Your proposal involves a good deal of additional expenditure; have you any other method to suggest? Might it not be better to improvise a few Brigadier-Generals for the Field Army and leave a few of the existing Brigadiers behind in India?

2511. GENERAL AYLMER.—Of course that would be contrary to the principle of the peace General commanding his troops in war.

2512. PRESIDENT.—You said these administrative Generals would be available to command internal defence forces? But are you aware that the nature of their duties would give them no practice in commanding troops?

2513. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think it would be more a matter of management of troops within the area than of command. I acknowledge the difficulty, but at the same time it seems to me a better system than that of having nobody at all.

2514. PRESIDENT.—But would it not be better to take some officers who had some experience of command? Whom would you select for the work?

2515. GENERAL AYLMER.—You could take senior colonels of regiments.

2516. SIR W. MEYER.—In the Quetta Division you have got a brigade of infantry with a Brigadier-General?

2517. GENERAL AYLMER.—Now we have got two.

2518. SIR W. MEYER.—Would it not be possible to make one an administrative General in peace and the commander of your internal area in time of war?

2519. GENERAL AYLMER.—It would be possible, but then his brigade would be handed over to someone else.

2520. SIR W. MEYER.—What about the divisional General, could he not command it?

2521. GENERAL AYLMER.—I do not agree with that principle.

2522. PRESIDENT.—Was it desirable to put a large expenditure on redistribution in the forefront of the scheme of 1904? Might it have been better to confine redistribution, at the outset, to cases in which it was desirable to concentrate small isolated detachments and to postpone larger moves until after arrangements had been made to render the proposed Field Army and internal defence troops thoroughly efficient by remedying defects in their armament, equipment, transport appliances, etc.?

2523. GENERAL AYLMER.—It is quite possible to hold such a view. It is a most difficult task to give their correct relative importance to a set of problems put forth with the object of efficiency. It is generally necessary to attack one big thing at a time. Lord Kitchener evidently considered that, under the conditions existing at the time, a sound scheme of redistribution was the most difficult and important of these factors and therefore worthy to be pushed on. In this view the Government of India and the Secretary of State supported him. I think it must also be remembered that Lord Kitchener by no means confined his attention to this, but introduced very large measures especially tending to the content of the Indian army. Had he had time and money, he would doubtless also have initiated the other measures mentioned. As I am asked my opinion, I would say with the greatest respect that he was perfectly correct.

Meanwhile, however, the partial completion of his Redistribution Scheme and the long postponement of the other measures mentioned have given those measures such relatively greater importance that I submit they should now take precedence of the completion of the Redistribution Scheme.

2524. PRESIDENT.—Lord Kitchener's original proposals included the establishment of large cantonments at Torsappar and Baleli (or Mastung). Apart from political objections, do you think this would have been desirable?

2525. GENERAL AYLMER.—From a purely strategical point of view, a brigade at Torsappar is advisable, as it completely commands the passage through the Khyber and any other road or any railway which might be made in that neighbourhood. I understand that the local difficulties and cost of establishing a cantonment there were under-estimated. For these and political reasons the scheme was abandoned or indefinitely postponed. Speaking generally, I am inclined to agree with the abandonment of the idea. I have never visited the exact locality.

I would certainly like to see field artillery and cavalry placed in the neighbourhood of Quetta. Personally I regard the southern line of advance as more important and practicable than the northern or central line. I do not approve of cantonments which are too large, as the training facilities become very cramped and expenses increase. Hence I was never very fond of the Baleli scheme. Mastung has many local disadvantages, though situated at a convenient distance from Quetta. The water is not good and the sand is advancing rapidly. Other cantonment sites could be found in Pishin, which would be quite suitable, where the troops would be near enough to participate in combined manœuvres with the Quetta garrison. I would like to see a whole cavalry brigade and infantry division in, and around, Quetta. It would be very sound strategically, but I fully recognize the great cost, and that other measures, such as I have already indicated, must come first. However, I am strongly of opinion

that, though it may be postponed, the idea should not be dropped. I know the whole country very well.

2526. PRESIDENT.—You are aware that Torsappar is a treeless mound; have you considered what the unfortunate troops would have done there?

2527. GENERAL AYLMER.—I have said that there were local objections.

2528. PRESIDENT.—You have spoken of the contentment of the Indian army as a matter of the highest importance; the troops of the Indian army are contented at Quetta because they get free rations, etc.?

2529. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes, I think that adds to their contentment.

2530. PRESIDENT.—In the event of war with Russia, do you think that the Russians would content themselves at the outset, with occupying Afghan-Turkistan and consolidating their position there, or that they would make so rapidly for Kabul that we should have to throw troops into that place very quickly? Bearing on this, have you any special knowledge of the difficulties of transport and supply in Afghanistan?

2531. GENERAL AYLMER.—I am inclined to think that the Russians in their first campaign would be content to advance as far as the Hindu Khush on the north. The roads from the Oxus are, I believe, mostly very difficult and the transport troubles with which the Russians would be beset would be enormous. Any raid on Kabul with insufficient forces would be very risky, especially as they might expect to be met by ourselves as well as the Afghans. I do not think that we could prevent the Russians taking Afghan-Turkistan and occupying the passes. If the conditions of our partnership with the Afghans proved satisfactory and they really helped us, and the border tribesmen kept quiet, we might combine with the Afghans to attack the Russians on the Hindu Khush. In case of success, a further advance would be possible, though by this time we would probably be experiencing in full measure the disadvantages of having such allies.

On the west I do not think the Russians would have much difficulty in seizing Herat and the Farah Valley in a single campaign. We could not prevent them. It would be risking nearly certain defeat for them at once to push across the desert west of Girishk on the Helmand. They would only dribble across and we would be ready to fall on them. They would nearly certainly consolidate their position before making a further advance.

2532. PRESIDENT.—Have you ever been in Afghanistan?

2533. GENERAL AYLMER.—No, sir; I have never been in Afghanistan, but I have studied the difficulties of transport and supply on the route Herat-Farah-Girishk-Kandahar-Chaman. I consider that these difficulties are greater than is generally believed for large forces. The greatest difficulty that would be encountered, however, would arise from the alliance of a civilized country with a barbarous one like Afghanistan. I have never seen this aspect of the case sufficiently dealt with. The Afghans would commit atrocities which would damage us in the eyes of the civilized world.

2534. PRESIDENT.—Do you regard our agreement with Afghanistan as satisfactory?

2535. GENERAL AYLMER.—I cannot really regard any agreement between a civilized and a barbarous Power as satisfactory.

2536. SIR W. MEYER.—Might it be better to arrange for the partition of Afghanistan?

2537. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think a barbarous buffer State introduces untold difficulties.

2538. PRESIDENT.—If we had a conterminous frontier with Russia, we may assume that Russia would complete communications in her own territory. Are you aware that the Russian army is a conscript one, and that she has a very much larger army than we have?

2593. GENERAL AYLMER.—I am, sir.

2540. PRESIDENT.—Then why do you not view with apprehension her military force as compared with ours?

2541. GENERAL AYLMER.—I regard our co-operation in the field with Afghan troops with greater apprehension. It would be most awkward; we should have the whole of civilization against us; but I recognize the disadvantages in both cases.

2542. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you studied the question of the Trans-Persian railway?

2543. GENERAL AYLMER.—I have read a little about it.

2544. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you be prepared to negative it on military grounds?

2545. GENERAL AYLMER.—It may involve a redistribution of the army; but I think its construction is inevitable. I would personally like to see it negated on military grounds.

2546. PRESIDENT.—In the event of a war with Russia, with Afghanistan more or less friendly, do you think that we should endeavour to occupy the Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar line and Hindu Khush passes at once, or confine ourselves to an advance on Kandahar and Jalalabad, until reinforcements arrived from England?

2547. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think that the answer depends on what is meant by "more or less friendly." In any case, I do not think we can reach the Hindu Khush passes before the Russians. They are not likely to give us any warning as to when they intend to start. It will probably be in the summer when our mobilization will take a considerable time, owing to the native troops being on leave and furlough and British officers mostly absent. If the Afghans cordially accept our assistance, and the frontier tribes are for us and behave well, we might be able to prevent the Russians advancing beyond the Hindu Khush, and might, the cordiality continuing, combine with the Afghans in driving the Russians from the Hindu Khush passes. We might then occupy the line Girishk-Ghazni-Kabul and the Hindu Khush passes.

If, however, their friendliness consisted of a surly acceptance of our assistance by the Afghan regular army and attacks on our lines of communications by every *budmash* in the country, as well as by our frontier tribesmen, our arrival at Kabul in time and in a condition to give much assistance is somewhat problematical. I do not think in any such case we would be in a condition to fight beyond Kabul. I do not think there would be much to prevent our reaching Girishk in an efficient condition to fight the Russians, provided we had three or four divisions on the southern line. It is extremely probable in such a case that we might have to confine our first advance to the line Girishk-Ghazni-Jalalabad till reinforcements arrived. Personally, I have a feeling that an alliance with Afghanistan will prove disastrous to us. How will we stand in the eyes of the civilized world when fighting as the allies of a set of barbarians who murder and mutilate their wounded enemies—allies who may turn against us at any moment, and who have little or no control over the majority of the population of their own country?

A barbarous buffer State seems to me to be altogether unnatural. I think, however, that whoever took northern Afghanistan proper (I do not mean Afghan-Turkistan) would never cease to repent it.

2548. PRESIDENT.—In the event of a war with Afghanistan, Russia being friendly or neutral, the General Staff in 1911 estimated that we should require a Field Army of eight-and-a-quarter divisions and four cavalry brigades, with some other units and a cavalry brigade as an immediate reserve. An additional three-quarters of a division and three cavalry brigades to be sent up later from internal defence forces, if possible. This was assuming that the

frontier tribes gave little trouble, and the scheme contemplated sending four divisions and two cavalry brigades to Kabul:—

- (i) Do you consider that so large a force would be required to cope with Afghanistan, and that it would be possible to feed the four divisions, etc., proposed for Kabul?
- (ii) Has the development of railway communication put us in a much better position for dealing with Afghanistan than in 1878-80?
- (iii) Do you concur in the view recently expressed by the General Staff that the military power of Afghanistan is steadily increasing, especially for purposes of defence?
- (iv) Do you think the Afghan army is really formidable *per se* and that any large part of it could be concentrated against us?
- (v) What do you know of the strength and character of the Afghan artillery?

2549. GENERAL AYLMER.—Personally, I do not think that now-a-days it is at all possible to postulate that the frontier tribes will give little trouble. In a war with Afghanistan, they are bound to go against us in a very dangerous manner. It is the one great opportunity they will ever get and they are well armed and thirsting for a row. Pan-Islamism has made considerable progress—

- (i) However, assuming their strict neutrality, I think that six divisions would be sufficient. It would be very difficult to feed more. They would, if more numerous, “stick in their own fat.” I think it would be most difficult with present transport to feed the four divisions proposed for Kabul. Conditions on the Kandahar line are far more favourable. The principal point seems to me to start the war with some definite object, that is, to make up our minds as to whether it is to be a war *à l'outrance* or one with a much more limited object, such as the permanent occupation of Kandahar.
- (ii) Certainly it has, except that it has interfered with camel breeding.
- (iii) I agree. The Pan-Islamic feeling and the spirit of revolt in Asia against the white man have increased the Afghans' power of resistance, and, in a measure, decreased our powers of attack owing to its effect on our native troops.
- (iv) In itself I do not consider the Afghan regular army to be really formidable, but it is rendered so by the strength of the Kabul line for defence, its animosity, and the assistance it will obtain from the irregular contingents of tribesmen within Afghan territory and on our own border. Probably about one half of it could be concentrated against one line of advance.
- (v) I have no further knowledge of the Afghan artillery than that given by the General Staff. The more modern the guns, the less danger probably. I do not regard their artillery as really formidable. Its heterogeneous composition is very weakening.

In the event of a war against the frontier tribes and Afghanistan combined, which is a most probable contingency, we shall want every man we have in India in an efficient state of organization to carry through a successful campaign. This is a very strong reason against leaving the frontier tribes to become strong as we are at present doing.

2550. SIR W. MEYER.—Do recent events in Khost convey a strong idea of the efficiency of the Afghan regular army?

2551. GENERAL AYLMER.—I do not think that army has shewn up at all well. I do not think it formidable *per se*.

2552. SIR W. MEYER.—They have got Turkish instructors?

2553. GENERAL AYLMER.—I believe so, but I know very little about them.

2554. SIR W. MEYER.—Does not history shew us that it is to our advantage to allow the troops of an uncivilized nation to be trained in a modern way ?

2555. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes, I think it does. I think a partisan war would be difficult to put down, but I think in Afghanistan we should have both regulars and irregulars to deal with.

2556. SIR W. MEYER.—General Duff gave seven days as the period in which we could push the Afghan army aside.

2557. GENERAL AYLMER.—A great deal would depend upon how the tribes acted.

2558. SIR W. MEYER.—General Duff's rough estimate for fighting Afghanistan and the tribes was 120,000 men. What do you think of that estimate ?

2559. GENERAL AYLMER.—I do not think the estimate is far wrong, if we want to beat both.

2560. SIR W. MEYER.—As regards their armament, their old guns are not much use *per se*, and they could not work their new ones ?

2561. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes. It will be the combination of the Afghans and the tribes against us that will tell. I think the fact that we have got Hazaras in our service is an asset in our favour. We have got twelve companies, and they are excellent men.

2562. PRESIDENT.—For a general war with the tribes on the North-West Frontier the General Staff, in 1911, estimated a force of six-and-a-third divisions as necessary, *plus* several separate units of infantry, cavalry, and Pioneers. Do you agree with this estimate ? Do you consider that if the Government took prompt measures at the outset, there could be any simultaneous and concerted action of the tribes against us ?

2563. GENERAL AYLMER.—I do not think that the estimate of the General Staff is excessive. I consider that, with the present feeling in Islam, there is every possibility of sufficiently simultaneous and concerted action of the tribes being very dangerous. We must always take into account unofficial Afghan assistance to them. If the Government of India were left a free hand and were prepared to act with real vigour without interminable political preliminaries, risks would be minimized. But is it possible to avoid interference from politicians in England ? Everyone who has lived on the frontier and has read its history knows the extraordinary forbearance of the Government, a forbearance which ninety-nine times out of a hundred is misunderstood by the tribes, and is ascribed to weakness.

2564. SIR W. MEYER.—A previous witness told us that he thought the tribesmen would not care much for the Amir, though they would be much influenced by the Sultan of Turkey. A. 1780.

2565. GENERAL AYLMER.—I do not think the Sultan's influence is greater than that of the Amir.

2566. SIR W. MEYER.—Is there no leader they would be likely to follow ?

2567. GENERAL AYLMER.—Not that I know of, though one might arise ; but they could give trouble in their own areas.

2568. PRESIDENT.—A memorandum* prepared by the General Staff in this connection estimated the total strength of the tribes at about 300,000 fighting men, with about 62,000 breech-loading rifles or carbines and about 40,000 muzzle-loaders. Do you think these large figures are to be relied on ? How do you account for the alleged large purchases of expensive rifles by poor tribesmen ?

* Appendix II G.
S. Memorandum of
1911.

2569. GENERAL AYLMER.—I have no reason to doubt the substantial accuracy of the General Staff figures but from samples of the arms imported which I have seen, I somewhat doubt the efficiency of a good many of the

breech-loaders, and I think the stock of ammunition for some of them is probably low.

The Pathan has a passion for a rifle and would starve or sacrifice anything he has to get one. I also believe that rifles are considerably cheaper than they used to be.

2570. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think that our action in the Persian Gulf will tend to send up the prices of rifles?

2571. GENERAL AYLMER.—I could not say how matters stand now, but two years ago the price was down. The action in the Gulf might affect it.

2572. SIR W. MEYER.—Is their stock of ammunition formidable?

2573. GENERAL AYLMER.—For some of their weapons they have got a good stock of ammunition; they manufacture it in certain places. But for some of the more modern weapons I think they would have very little ammunition.

2574. PRESIDENT.—In the event of war with the tribes, are you in favour of continuing the previous policy of withdrawal after a punitive expedition, or would you endeavour to settle permanent garrisons in tribal territory?

2575. GENERAL AYLMER.—The policy of withdrawal has always proved a failure, and in the great majority of cases will do so in future. Civilization cannot live next to barbarism in a state of rest. Civilization must advance. We have allowed the tribes on our frontier between the administrative border and the Durand line to become a source of far greater danger to us than they were sixty years ago. The present condition of affairs hopelessly looks up a large number of our troops in case of any operation beyond the frontier. In the case of a war with or in Afghanistan we might easily have to keep three divisions watching the tribes. Permanent garrisons and strict disarmament, once we occupied frontier tribal country, would be far more economical and much kinder to them in the end. If there is another rising on the frontier, such as that in 1897, we should certainly take the opportunity of really annexing the country in the interests of our own eventual preservation.

2576. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing we had a war, say, with the Mohmands, and, as a result, were able to annex the Mohmand country, might that not bring other tribes on our heads?

2577. GENERAL AYLMER.—The annexation of a single tribal area might bring us trouble; but I think it would be better to have it out; I would risk it.

2578. SIR W. MEYER.—What tribes do you think we have most to fear attack from?

2579. GENERAL AYLMER.—One of the most formidable is the Afridis; we may have trouble with any of the tribes.

2580. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think the Afridis are spoiling for a fight, or that they will wait until a favourable opportunity offers?

2581. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think they would take advantage of any favourable opportunity.

2582. SIR W. MEYER.—From your experience on the frontier could you say what tribes we are likely to have trouble with in the near future?

2583. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think the Mahsuds are the most likely people, but it is rather a toss-up. I do not think the other tribes have much sympathy with the Mahsuds.

2584. PRESIDENT.—Assuming that friendly relations with Russia continue, what strength do you consider necessary for the Field Army of India?

2585. GENERAL AYLMER.—I cannot discriminate in India between a Field Army and troops for internal defence. All should be thoroughly efficient for active duties, whether they go into the field or remain behind for internal defence. I do not think that the whole force in India at the present time is a man too many, even if made thoroughly efficient in every way.

Considering our local and imperial responsibilities, our army in India is very weak, even leaving Russia out of account. In no circumstances should our armed Indian forces be increased. They are our principal danger unless they are kept in a state of contentment which will make it worth their while to remain faithful. If money is not forthcoming to do this, our position would be strengthened by their reduction. Troubles in one direction lead to troubles in others. We must provide for the worst case, and in our calculations add our Imperial to our local responsibilities. The so-called Field Army should provide for both. I think we should run serious risk if we had less than nine divisions available for other than internal war. But all our native troops must be contented, both those going on service and those remaining behind. If our money will not run to this as well as to the maintenance of their numbers and efficiency, I would much sooner have eight, or even seven, thoroughly efficient and contented divisions available. They would be much more valuable than nine discontented and inefficient divisions.

I do not think that estimates of the strength of troops required to meet our wants are of much value. The estimate is really a bogus sort of business, based on what we have already got, and what more we may hope to screw out of the taxpayer. The strength of our army should be what we can afford to keep, taking it as the most important, and indeed paramount, necessity. Every department of the State depends on its efficiency and should be prepared to give way.

2586. PRESIDENT.—In other words, you consider the whole army one and indivisible for your purposes?

2587. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes; it might be quite possible if you had nine divisions detailed for mobilization, to detain one or two of them for internal defence; it would depend on the circumstances at the time.

2588. SIR W. MEYER.—Why then should you not have, say sixteen divisions?

2589. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think it would be much sounder to have sixteen divisions, but we cannot afford them.

2590. SIR W. MEYER.—Roughly, our whole army would run to sixteen divisions or so; you calculate the strength of a division at, roughly, 12,000 men, do you not?

2591. GENERAL AYLMER.—Thirteen thousand.

2592. SIR W. MEYER.—I understand your meaning to be that we have troops for, say sixteen divisions, and that we should use them as circumstances dictate?

2593. GENERAL AYLMER.—That is, generally, my meaning. I say, have as many organized divisions as you can, say, nine mobilizable and the others dotted over India. If you can only take eight of the nine to the front and must leave one behind for internal defence, that is your misfortune.

2594. SIR R. SCALLON.—Are we to understand from your reply to a previous question that the native army is not contented?

2595. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think they are under the impression that they do not get enough pay. Their pension rules also are bad.

2596. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider it desirable to proceed with the Loi-Shilman and Parachinar railways? If so, which would you take up first? The Foreign Department desired to run the former line along the Kabul river; Lord Kitchener suggested an alternative line; which do you prefer?

2597. GENERAL AYLMER.—I consider it will be necessary to proceed with both lines eventually, but I think that the urgency of both is inferior to that of the measures I mentioned in answer to a previous question. When, A. 2329. however, the projects can be put in hand, I would take up the Parachinar line first as it gives us a point nearer Kabul than the other does.

For the railway from Peshawar towards Jalalabad, I much prefer the river route. I do not believe in railways with steep gradients running over mountain ranges. Their capacity is generally very small. I think this is a greater disadvantage than the danger of being attacked, to which the river line may possibly be exposed.

2598. PRESIDENT.—Do you think there is much to be gained, having regard to the expense involved—estimated at Rs. 3,18,19,407 in 1907—by establishing direct railway communication between Bombay and Karachi?

2599. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think there is very much to be gained. I regard this line as being of the greatest strategical importance. Eventually it will become essential commercially when connection by rail between India and Europe is established. Personally, I regard the southern line of advance into Afghanistan as of greater importance than the two others. The proposed railway would render the despatch of troops, destined for this line of advance, independent of the Punjab railway system. It avoids an enormous detour. By its means the Southern Army could be based on southern India. Personally, I think the Bombay-Sind connection is of more importance than the Loi-Shilman and Parachinar lines.

2600. SIR W. MEYER.—How would you compare it in the matter of importance with the urgent necessities detailed in your answer to a previous A. 2329. question?

2601. GENERAL AYLMER.—I should put it after them.

2602. PRESIDENT.—So far as you have studied the internal situation in India, do you think it materially worse or better now than it was (a) in 1904, and (b) in 1907?

2603. GENERAL AYLMER (a).—I think that it is worse.

(b) I do not think that there is any real improvement. I consider that the general unrest among the educated classes is likely to go on increasing till something forcible happens which will give it a check. Our principal object should be to keep it from spreading to the native army by continuing to make it the interest of the army to remain faithful.

2604. PRESIDENT.—Speaking generally, do you concur in the arrangements for increasing the internal defence forces as suggested by the Government of India to local Governments and Administrations in January and March 1912? In particular, what is your opinion with regard to the following points:—

(a) The withdrawal of two battalions of native infantry from the Kohat Brigade?

(b) The provision of no European troops, exclusive of Volunteers, British infantry depôt, one battalion of native infantry and two squadrons, native cavalry, for the Nasirabad (Rajputana) area.

(c) Do you think that the scheme of numerous and relatively weak moveable columns is desirable? Take for instance the column at Belgaum, which consists of two companies of native infantry only; and those for Delhi and Meerut (contiguous places). Might it be better here, and in some other instances, to have fewer but stronger columns?

2605. GENERAL AYLMER.—I concur generally in the proposals referred to, but the essential point is that the internal defence units should be really efficient for war in every way, not mere skeletons left after withdrawing a large number of their best officers, men and horses, to supply the deficiencies of the Field Army. Local Governments have a right to expect efficient units:—

(a) As soon as concentration takes place the Kohat Brigade ceases to exist. Two battalions go to the Peshawar area for internal defence. The mountain battery comes under the orders of the

General Officer Commanding the northern line of advance for the defence of the lines of communication. The remaining troops, namely, four squadrons, one battalion, and the Frontier Garrison Artillery come under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the central line for guarding his lines of communication. As soon as the broad gauge railhead reached Kohat, that place became the base of the central line. It seems essential therefore that the Kohat Brigade should cease to exist as an independent unit when the central column advances. The General Officer Commanding the central line can dispose of his line of communication troops as he thinks best. He will probably leave the units of the Kohat area in the country they know, that is between Kohat and Thal (including the Samana). If they prove to be insufficient, he will increase their strength by the addition of other units.

- (b) I think it is very dangerous and difficult to examine the conditions within one area without reference to the defence dispositions of India as a whole. Taken by itself the Nasirabad area seems somewhat neglected, but its low relative importance and the high probability of loyalty on the part of the Native Chiefs in it must be taken into consideration. Personally, I do not advocate very small detachments of British troops which are apt to be surprised and overwhelmed. On the whole, I agree with the proposals of the General Staff.
- (c) If we were to separate strategy from political considerations, which is really unjustifiable, the multiplication of small defence detachments all over India could not be supported. Unfortunately, from a so-called military point of view, we are forced to compromise with policy, and a number of detachments become necessary to guard civil interests. In the previous scheme for internal defence this was probably carried too far. In the new scheme striking forces of considerable size have been allotted to certain centres. This is an improvement. The smaller detachments, or those practically confined to particular areas, are, however, divided up into fixed garrisons and small moveable columns on somewhat rigid lines. Personally, I think that this is a mistake. Defence, to be of any real protective value, must be essentially mobile. The officer commanding an area should not be tied down to any particular strength of moveable column. Sometimes the strength laid down cannot be worked up to; at others he may be able to make far greater numbers available for mobile work. Once it has been impressed on all concerned that a very mobile and active offensive is required, with every man who can be spared, the rest might be left to the officer commanding the area. The laying down of strengths for moveable columns cramps the initiative of the local commander. It is quite possible that even two companies could not be moved out from Belgaum, but it is possible, on the other hand, that the 6th Division area might be able to get together far more men for mobile work in that neighbourhood.

I think the above also answers the questions of Delhi and Meerut. A freer hand for the local commander to use his own initiative as to what columns should be used, whether separate or combined, appears to me to meet the case fully. As a guiding principle, "fewer and stronger" is generally the best method.

2606. SIR W. MEYER.—You would say to each local commander, "We can spare you so many men, you have got to defend this area as best you can"?

2607. GENERAL AYLMER.—You might make it quite clear to him what interests there were from a civil point of view, and leave the rest to his judgment. I would leave him a freer hand than the scheme under discussion contemplates.

2608. SIR W. MEYER.—Are you satisfied with the present distribution of defence areas—Jubbulpore, Nasirabad, etc.?

2609. GENERAL AYLMER.—Taken all round, without absolutely examining every one of these areas, I should say as a general principle that the scheme is quite a good one.

2610. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think the territorial distribution is sound?

2611. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think the present scheme is quite a good one, but perhaps, as I have already said, rather too rigid.

2612. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider it sound that there should be no special arrangements in advance for an organized moveable column for the defence of the Madras area?

2613. GENERAL AYLMER.—As stated in my answer to the preceding question, I do not think it sound to lay down strengths of moveable columns beforehand. All that is advisable is to imbue officers with the necessity of mobility and offensive action. We want young and active officers for such work. We have numbers of them in the army, but they must not all be allowed to go off to the front, leaving nothing but the inefficient, old, and fat.

2614. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider it desirable that in time of peace the whole of the southern portion of the Madras Presidency should depend, as far as troops are concerned, on the weak Indian battalion at Trichinopoly?

2615. GENERAL AYLMER.—I consider it very undesirable that the inhabitants of large areas should never see a soldier. They soon believe that we do not really possess an army. It is a point for consideration, but the dispositions throughout India must be most carefully examined, or a worse evil might be created elsewhere.

2616. PRESIDENT.—This is the result of the redistribution and massing of troops on the frontier. One quite agrees with the view that the total withdrawal of troops from large areas is undesirable, but how are concentration and dispersal of units compatible?

2617. GENERAL AYLMER.—I do not think recently we have had any troops south of Trichinopoly. There used to be a battalion at Quilon.

2618. SIR W. MEYER.—When I first came out to India in 1881 there was, I think, a regiment at Palamcottah.

2619. SIR P. LAKE.—Has it been found that in times of peace the garrison is insufficient?

2620. GENERAL AYLMER.—I do not think it has. There is also a native battalion at Cannanore, a British battalion divided up between Wellington, Calicut, Cannanore and Malipuram, and a Volunteer corps at Calicut, besides railway Volunteers.

2621. PRESIDENT.—The existing scheme places stress on organized brigades being earmarked for the Field Army, while internal defence troops would have to be drawn largely from various and possibly distant sources. Thus we are informed that the mobile brigade with base at Delhi proposed under the new defence scheme might perhaps be drawn from the 9th Division. Again, while Secunderabad is a large military centre, most of the troops stationed there would be earmarked for the Field Army, while the troops for the defence of the Hyderabad area—which are more than the equivalent of a brigade—would be drawn from a variety of places. Do you consider these arrangements sound? Might it be preferable to allot internal defence to troops already stationed in or near the places to be principally guarded, and to make the moves from other places in connection with the mobilization of the Field Army?

2622. GENERAL AYLMER.—My opinion is that the divisional areas should eventually be self-contained as far as possible. Much has been done in this

direction. More remains to be done, but the completion must come after more urgent requirements have been met.

There are two categories of troops detailed for internal defence.

(1) The regular defence-of-area troops: generally broken up and not organized in higher tactical units.

(2) Special columns of a mixed brigade or so.

I do not think we can ever ensure those of the second category being in the areas where they will be eventually wanted, though we may name certain places as likely. Sedition may occur anywhere, but probably not everywhere; hence these larger columns may be required where least expected. Sedition will probably not at once follow mobilization, and there will be time to collect such larger columns, and at any rate partially train them to act together, before they will come into play. No such time is available in the case of units detailed for the Field Army. We want them already trained to act together and under their own commanders. It therefore appears to me to be the lesser evil to act as at present arranged, namely, to have ready units of a strength of a brigade or division for the Field Army and to be prepared to scramble for the larger internal defence columns, than to adopt the reverse policy.

2623. PRESIDENT.—You think the two policies are so antagonistic that they cannot be harmonized? You imply in this answer that the troops allotted for the time being for internal defence are not as well trained as the troops allotted for the Field Army. Are they not equally well trained?

2624. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think a regiment always benefits by being trained and associated with a higher organization.

2625. PRESIDENT.—We do not question that at all, but in reply to a previous question you advocated uniformity of training.

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2626. GENERAL AYLMER.—When I said that the training of the whole army should be uniform, I meant that it should be so as far as possible; troops might be quartered in a place where they might, for various reasons, fall off a bit.

2627. SIR W. MEYER.—Suppose we had reliable information that great danger was to be expected, say, from Sindhia. You have a brigade at Jhansi; would you march the Jhansi Brigade off to the frontier with the 5th Division, and march a scratch brigade against Sindhia?

2628. GENERAL AYLMER.—I can quite conceive of a case where it would be advisable to detach a brigade from a Field Army division.

2629. PRESIDENT.—Would you sacrifice the requirements of internal defence to the requirements of the Field Army?

2630. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes, I would in this matter.

2631. PRESIDENT.—Supposing that the Field Army were reduced to seven or eight divisions, would you make a similar reduction in the divisional areas and thus render it more easy to have each divisional area self-contained? In particular:—

(a) Why should Burma, if reduced in its garrison, remain a divisional command.

(b) Might the defects of the Peshawar Division be remedied, in some measure at least, by making it include the new independent brigades of Kohat, Bannu and Derajat?

2632. GENERAL AYLMER.—Generally speaking, I think that the number of divisional areas should correspond to the number of divisions which are required for the Field Army. I do not see, however, why there should not be at least one more area besides Burma of a miscellaneous composition from which internal defence troops, especially the larger columns, could be allotted. Such

an area would be under the command of a General with the status of a divisional General, and should be centrally situated. For overseas expeditions it might be well to alter the composition of our normal divisions, especially as regards artillery, so that this miscellaneous area could then be drawn on without upsetting the normal organization of the regular divisional areas.

(a) Even if the number of troops is considerably reduced, it must be remembered that the military police would come under the orders of the General Officer Commanding in the event of active operations. The very isolation and importance of Burma, and its exposure to a set of warlike operations apart from those which might be engaging the attention of the rest of the army, render it necessary, in my opinion, that there should be in the province a commander with the status of divisional general as well as a suitable staff. It is what I have called above a miscellaneous area, and as many troops as could be spared from it would be taken for outside purposes.

(b) There are many objections, as things stand, to such an idea. The Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan Brigades are confined to their own areas in times of a war and their attachment to the Peshawar divisional area would in no way tend to the completion of the organization of the 1st Division. The Kohat Brigade lies across the line of advance of the central line army, with which the 1st Division has no connection. Its inclusion in the Peshawar area would thus lead to complications. As a matter of fact, the Kohat Brigade supplies the Peshawar defence area with two Indian battalions on mobilization.

2633. SIR W. MEYER.—So far as regards Kohat then, its maintenance as an independent brigade is not in accord with the general principles, because you say it will cease to exist as a unit directly war breaks out? The essence of the present scheme is that divisions and brigades should be war formations, is it not?

2634. GENERAL AYLMER.—I would keep Kohat up as an exception for smaller expeditions.

2635. PRESIDENT.—From what you have seen of Imperial Service Troops, do you consider them really efficient corps and comparable with regular Indian battalions, etc., of like character?

2636. GENERAL AYLMER.—I have only once served with Imperial Service Troops, namely, at Gilgit in 1891-92, and they were a very new formation then. They were somewhat crude, but consisted of good material, especially the Maharaja of Kashmir's Body Guard. I do not consider Imperial Service Troops comparable with regular British or Indian battalions. The absence of British officers, other things apart, must always keep them inferior. The miscellaneous nature of their organization and want of uniformity in strength, etc., will always render them somewhat hard to deal with.

2637. PRESIDENT.—What is your opinion in regard to the local armies of the Native States? Do you think any of them are formidable in point of numbers, armament, and general efficiency?

2638. GENERAL AYLMER.—I have not had the opportunity of seeing much of these forces, and have not studied the question particularly of late years. Generally speaking, I consider them a source of possible and considerable danger. They probably form the second greatest danger to us in case of sedition coming to a head. I consider that they are of no use to us and cannot be made so. There is a high degree of doubt as to what they will do in case of trouble, and our means for discovering their intentions are very limited. They thus have a tendency to tie up a number of our own troops and are a distinct nuisance. The Nizam's army is an example, necessitating as it does the concentration of a very strong force at Secunderabad. I think State troops should be regarded as a positive nuisance, and should be discouraged in every

way. Any system of passing men rapidly through the ranks to form a large reserve should be stopped. I do not refer here to the Nepal army.

2639. SIR W. MEYER.—But surely the concentration of a large force at Secunderabad is of great military value ?

2640. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think the reason why we have concentrated so many troops at Secunderabad is because of the Nizam's army. I had to draw up most of the defensive schemes at Madras and went into the question pretty thoroughly.

2641. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think these local armies are formidable ?

2642. GENERAL AYLMER.—I should not say they were formidable, but I think they form the nucleus for the formation of a bigger force which would give us a great deal of trouble in the event of sedition in India coming to anything.

2643. PRESIDENT.—What is your opinion of the efficiency of the tribal militia corps on the North-West Frontier ; do you consider that they could be trusted to fight against their co-tribesmen in case of serious trouble on the border, or would you in such an event try and move them elsewhere ?

2644. GENERAL AYLMER.—Of the large corps, the Khyber Rifles, the Kurram Militia, and the Zhob Levies are mostly composed of local men. The North and South Waziristan Militias are recruited nearly entirely from Trans-Indus Pathans, but not from men in the areas protected by these corps. Their outward efficiency is high. I have inspected several of them. They had a very good military training and acquitted themselves most creditably. I consider that their reliability varies greatly.

The Khyber Rifles went wrong in 1897 as a body, but to say the least, there were many extenuating circumstances. They are, I believe, almost entirely composed of Afridis, and I would not place great reliance on them in the case of a serious *jihad*, or in the event of a war against the Afridis.

The Kurram Militia are extensively composed of *Shias* who are hated by the surrounding tribes. They have everything to gain by sticking to us, and I consider that we can rely on them under nearly all contingencies.

The North and South Waziristan Militias are a very miscellaneous body, recruiting all along the border on both sides of the administrative line. I think they are reliable except in very extensive trouble, or in case of a big *jihad*. Of course we might have to have some companies removed, or to disband them, in case of trouble with a particular tribe.

The Zhob Levies are, I consider, reliable, except possibly in the case of a very big *jihad*. They are the natural enemies of the Mahsuds, and I do not think they would combine under almost any circumstances.

In case of very serious trouble all along the border, I do not see where we could move them to. We certainly do not want them in our Indian cantonments, especially if the people in the latter should be already shaky. I think the only thing to do would be to act as appeared best at the time, disarming if possible, those classes who were wavering.

Many of the senior men are, I am sure, imbued with the highest sense of fidelity, and in most cases we should get sufficient warning.

2645. SIR W. MEYER.—Do they serve long ? Are they pensionable ?

2646. GENERAL AYLMER.—They have just been made pensionable.

2647. PRESIDENT.—What is your opinion of the Border Military Police in the North-West Frontier Province ? A Committee on this force, presided over by the Honourable Sir Harcourt Butler, proposed in 1911 :—

(4) The reduction of the native cavalry at Kohat by two squadrons.

- (ii) The stationing on the Samana of a battalion of native infantry (now there), half a squadron of native cavalry, and a detachment of native garrison artillery.
- (iii) The posting at Thal of a battalion of native infantry and two squadrons of native cavalry.
- (iv) The posting at Tank of one battalion of native infantry and a regiment of native cavalry.
- (v) A withdrawal from Wana and the Upper Tochi.
- (vi) The reorganization on a lower establishment of the Border Military Police, to be styled 'Frontier Constabulary' which would have a larger establishment of European police officers.

What do you think of these proposals?

2648. GENERAL AYLMER.—The Border Military Police, as at present constituted, is extremely inefficient and worthless, though many individual members of the force have shown great bravery on occasions.

(i), (ii), (iii). Under the present system, the civil authorities are somewhat curiously responsible for the defence of the frontier, and for this purpose the Militia and Border Military Police are absolutely at their disposal. The regular soldier is only supposed to come to their assistance when things get too much for them. There are, as it were, three lines of defence, namely the Militia under Political Officers beyond the regular administrative border in the Agencies; the Border Military Police under the Deputy Commissioner along and within the administrative border; and the military reserves quartered in large cantonments. However, to help the others, the regular troops occasionally occupy advanced posts. The system is really a dreadful mixture in many cases.

I am not in favour of (i) and (iii). It will only make the confusion even worse than it is, and be very expensive. Considering that there is a narrow gauge line from Kohat to Thal it does not appear necessary.

(ii) There is so much confusion already on the Samana ridge, the responsibility being shared between the military and the police that I see no great objections to this. Personally, I should put the whole battalion on the top of the Samana, garrisoning the forts as lightly as possible and keeping the balance of the battalion absolutely mobile by quartering it outside the forts.

(iv) Personally, I agree to this. Dera Ismail Khan is too far from the border; in any case, owing to the encroachment of the Indus, a scheme is already in hand to move the Dera Ismail Khan Brigade to Tank.

(v) I am most strongly opposed to such a measure. Such a retrograde movement would inevitably lead to trouble. It will only be interpreted by the tribes in one way and that is "fear." We would also abandon many to their inveterate enemies. Such withdrawals have always been disastrous.

(vi) If the present curious system of frontier defence is to continue, I see no great objection to this proposal, except that this force will probably become too regularized.

2649. PRESIDENT.—It has been suggested that the Militia in the North-West Frontier Province, the Zhob Levy in Baluchistan, and the Military Police in Bengal, Assam and Burma, should be placed under the Commander-in-Chief. What is your opinion?

2650. GENERAL AYLMER.—Personally, I consider that it is an admirable and most sensible suggestion. Under the present system, Political Officers, who are often very young, have full authority to use a very considerable force, say, 1,500 well armed men who are to all intents and purposes soldiers, not police, in whatever way they like. They can create situations out of which the soldier may be suddenly called to extricate them. The military commander knows nothing about the frontier except such odds and ends of information as he can pick up. Everything beyond the administrative border is a closed book. This

is the country and these are the tribes which he may have to deal with any day. Directly war is declared, the militia must come under the orders of the General Officer Commanding, but the latter is at the mercy of the Political Officer for all information.

The General Officers on the frontier should conduct political as well as military matters. They should be on the same footing as the General Officer Commanding at Aden, being given an assistant from the Political Department. The commander of a militia corps, which need not be more regularized than at present, should be under the General, and a young Political Officer can assist him if necessary. The Agent to the Governor-General can co-ordinate all political measures on the same frontier.

Of course, all the extra cost would fall on the Military Budget, but surely it is a fair charge? The Government in India and at Home are not so destitute of reason as some would urge, that they could not appreciate the necessity of correspondingly increasing the Military Budget. The defence of the frontier is the absolute duty and right of the army. I consider the present system complicated, inefficient, and totally opposed to the first principles of defence.

2651. SIR W. MEYER.—Lord Curzon instituted the present system, which he claimed was peaceful. You have not had so many expeditions as you had before, have you?

2652. GENERAL AYLMER.—There have been causes enough, but the Government have been disinclined to undertake them. The tribes have always been troublesome.

2653. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that the Government of India has shut its eyes?

2654. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think they have been more loath to have an expedition than before.

2655. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think that putting these frontier militia, levies and military police under the army would tend to provoke wars?

2656. GENERAL AYLMER.—I do not think so. They are very much regularized. The Kurram Militia, for instance, were extremely efficient for militia when I inspected them. These troops are a little less expensive than regulars, and are cheaper in the matter of officers.

2657. SIR W. MEYER.—If they are as efficient as the regular corps, might we not save some money on our regular army by putting some of them on the same footing as these tribal battalions?

2658. GENERAL AYLMER.—That goes further than I mean. They are efficient for militia but not quite as efficient as our native troops. They were much better housed than the native troops on the frontier when I was on the frontier. The Military Works Services build their barracks at the expense of the civil authorities.

2659. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that the policy contemplated in this question would produce any delay when prompt action was required, or lead to friction between the civil and military authorities?

2660. GENERAL AYLMER.—I do not see any reason why it should.

2661. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that the system which now obtains for the selection and appointment of officers to the frontier militia, including the Zhob Levy Corps, and the military police in Bengal, Assam and Burma, is satisfactory? If you consider that the system should be changed, what do you recommend, and why?

2662. GENERAL AYLMER.—I would like to see officers appointed of a rank suitable to the importance of the command. In the case of the militias on the North-West Frontier, each some 1,500 strong, they should be lieutenant-colonels. We particularly desire employment for our senior officers. There is now too little available.

In a great many cases the present system of selection (especially in Burma) leads to the choice falling on officers who are heavily in debt. Cavalry officers are sent to command infantry and so on. Such appointments should be the reward of virtue, not of slackness in money affairs. There are of course also many excellent officers in these corps who enter from sheer keenness, and in whose cases money has nothing to do with it. The corps should be military, and the selection purely military.

When a captain has had an independent command of some 1,500 men, it unsettles him to a very great extent in his military career afterwards.

2663. SIR W. MEYER.—On the other hand, is it not an advantage, when you have to deal with these irregulars, to have a young man rather than some older man who has grown up in the traditions of regular troops?

2664. GENERAL AYLMER.—I certainly think that the man selected must have had some education leading up to the appointment. It would be a bad thing to take a man from a down-country regiment, for example.

2665. PRESIDENT.—Would their selection rest with the General Staff or with the Adjutant-General?

2666. GENERAL AYLMER.—The selections all lie with the Military Secretary now, sir.

2667. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider it necessary that the Zhob Levy posts on the Baluchistan-Afghan Frontier, west of Domandi, should be maintained?

2668. GENERAL AYLMER.—Undoubtedly it is necessary. The country is under our protection, and we must protect it in some way. Till a better method than the present one is discovered, the Zhob Levy posts should continue. Probably the present line of posts could be drawn back a good deal so as only to include the Kunar valley. If posts were done away with, there would have to be some form of mobile defence.

2669. SIR P. LAKE.—Do you know how many raids have taken place in that part of the border during recent years?

2670. GENERAL AYLMER.—A great many; they are constantly calling for reinforcements at Fort Sandeman.

2671. PRESIDENT.—If these posts were withdrawn, could a sufficient number of the Zhob Levy Corps be concentrated at Fort Sandeman to allow of the regular Indian infantry battalion being taken away from that place?

2672. GENERAL AYLMER.—I do not think so. The call for reinforcements in this country is very frequent; it is much exposed to raids from the north and east. I do not think that under existing conditions it would be advisable to reduce the Fort Sandeman military garrison below four companies, and even this would be somewhat of an extreme measure.

2673. SIR W. MEYER.—Lord Kitchener's scheme proposed, in times of trouble, to raise corps of native yeomanry from Indian gentry who would provide their own men. Do you think this feasible or desirable?

2674. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think so, undoubtedly. In the case of people who have proved themselves loyal in India, we could accept their assistance *con amore*.

2675. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you attach them to the internal defence troops?

2676. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think very often you could make moveable columns of them to assist you, as was done in Edwardes's time.

2677. PRESIDENT.—Generally speaking, how far do you consider that the Volunteers are an efficient force to be relied on for valuable assistance in internal disturbance? Do you consider that their efficiency has increased of late years?

2678. GENERAL AYLMER.—Taking into account the means at their disposal, I regard the larger portion of Volunteers as very efficient. The railway corps are very valuable. I consider that the Volunteers are well worth the money spent on them, and that more might be given with advantage. They will be a most valuable asset in times of internal disturbance. I consider that they should be encouraged in every possible way. I think that many of the difficulties foreseen as regards their employment will disappear when they are really required. I consider that their efficiency has increased of late years. I had a great deal to do with the inspection of Volunteers when on the staff at Calcutta, Madras and Rangoon.

2679. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think it advisable to spend more money on Volunteers and decrease the native army a little?

2680. GENERAL AYLMER.—In that case, you immediately run into the number of troops you can get fit for active service. As a matter of fact, if you cannot spare enough money to make your native troops quite contented with their lot, as at present, you may possibly make the army more efficient by disbanding some of them, and spend some of the money on Volunteers. The limit is the availability of the Volunteers to go out and do drills. There are ways by which you can make the service a great deal more popular.

2681. SIR W. MEYER.—I was told the other day that the artillery Volunteers at Calcutta only had enough ammunition given them for occasional practice, and that the bulk of the ammunition they would require, was kept in some relatively distant place. Do you know anything about that?

2682. GENERAL AYLMER.—No.

2683. SIR W. MEYER.—In Lord Kitchener's scheme we get constant references to bodies of Volunteers able to co-operate in internal defence in any portion of their local defence areas. On the other hand, in the General Staff Memorandum of 1911, it stated that, except in the planting districts and Presidency towns, the Volunteers would be required practically for the defence of the places in which they lived. The two things are inconsistent. Which opinion do you support?

2684. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think that when a real urgency arises, these Volunteers will prove much more valuable than you think. In practice, they would sacrifice home considerations and fight like men. As regards the system of obligatory garrisons, I think it is possibly a mistake. I am for more elasticity about them. When a comparatively highly placed civilian drills his company of Volunteers, I think it is an admirable example. A good many military clerks and such people belong to them. We know they would not be available in war, but it keeps them going as soldiers.

2685. PRESIDENT.—It gives a fictitious appearance of strength?

2686. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes sir, but I think most of the Volunteers—probably 80 or 90 per cent.—would be available. They would be very useful in Simla if the hill tribes were to rise.

2687. PRESIDENT.—Do you think it would be desirable to recruit one or two Eurasian battalions, or to employ Eurasians with inland defence artillery?

2688. GENERAL AYLMER.—I am at present President of a committee on this subject.

The raising of an Anglo-Indian unit is essentially an experiment. We do not know if really desirable young men will enlist or not. We cannot reduce our other forces until the experiment has proved a success, therefore it will mean extra expenditure. An Anglo-Indian regiment would cost a great deal of money to raise. The experiment would take at least three years and would cost some twenty-five lakhs. Another disadvantage of raising a battalion of these men is that it does not lead to any future civil employment, which is what the Anglo-Indian wants. The committee is therefore inclined to oppose the raising of a battalion or battalions.

The committee so far does not like the idea of garrison companies of Eurasian artillery. The physique of recruits is not good enough. At present our views are strongly in favour of a signalling company which will not be too expensive and will lead to future employment in other departments.

2689. PRESIDENT.—If you consulted all the previous records on the case, you would no doubt find that some high military authorities, including Lord Roberts, have always been strongly opposed to any such proposals.

2690. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes, and at Home the War Office was strongly opposed to it.

2691. PRESIDENT.—You have no experience of their fighting qualifications?

2692. GENERAL AYLMER.—No, sir; I am not very sure of them.

2693. SIR W. MEYER.—Did they not do very good service in the Mutiny?

2694. GENERAL AYLMER.—I believe so. There was a Eurasian battery which was put down as having done very well in the Bhutan Expedition.

2695. SIR W. MEYER.—Assuming that a Eurasian battalion would be inferior in fighting qualities to a British battalion, you have this advantage on the other side, that you can have a short service system from which you can get a reserve.

2696. GENERAL AYLMER.—There are various objections to that; it is an expensive experiment costing twenty-five lakhs, and if it has got to be carried out, it should be on a small scale. We want to get lads straight from school for our signalling company. I think if the signalling company is successful, it might lead up to the principle being adopted. Four signalling companies have been raised, and in addition to them there are two companies called Army Companies—nominally of about a hundred men each. The others are called divisional companies. Besides these we have the wireless telegraph troop. The highest rank attainable is that of non-commissioned officer.

2697. PRESIDENT.—As non-commissioned officers would they be entitled to exercise command over British soldiers?

2698. GENERAL AYLMER.—They would ordinarily have to exercise command over their own people, and I think that a great many of the difficulties as regards regulars could be got over. The legal authorities say that we can get over most of these troubles, and at present we are engaged in an inquiry into them.

2699. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider that the former theory is still valid which reckoned one British soldier as equivalent, for purposes of internal security, etc., to two-and-a-half Indian?

2700. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think the question really means; is one British soldier *better* than two-and-a-half native soldiers? If so, I should agree. This however, is dependent on two main factors:—

(1) The British units should have their full complement of officers.

(2) The artillery should be thoroughly efficient and in suitable proportion to the other arms.

There is a marked inclination in existing schemes to deprive the British units remaining for internal defence of their officers in order to supply deficiencies and wastage in the Field Army. Similarly, internal defence batteries, already on a lower scale of establishment, are to be heavily drawn on and will become mere skeletons. If these things are done, the proportion mentioned does not hold good. A good deal of consideration must also be given to total numbers. For example, two-and-a-half companies of Indian infantry, with the advantage of a certain amount of surprise, would probably overcome one British company fairly easily, but a British mixed force, say about a brigade, would be able to defeat three or four times the same number of native troops possessing

only a make-shift artillery, if any. A great danger seems to lie in mixing up small British detachments with greatly superior numbers of native troops.

2701. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider it desirable that a large proportion of the British troops in India should be on the hills for considerable periods during the hot weather ?

2702. GENERAL AYLMER.—Generally, yes ; but it is undoubtedly necessary to take into account anything in the way of unfavourable tendencies in the local troops and population. This point should receive careful attention.

2703. SIR W. MEYER.—That is to say, if for one reason or other a place was deemed dangerous, you would not move the troops to the hills that year ?

2704. GENERAL AYLMER.—No, you would keep them down.

2705. PRESIDENT.—Do you think it desirable that an important place like Jhelum should be left without any British troops ?

2706. GENERAL AYLMER.—I have no great objection provided that there are not too many natives of one sort. To my mind the danger lies greatly in surprise, and I would much prefer that Rawalpindi should be overwhelmingly British and Jhelum all native than that one of the British regiments from Rawalpindi should change places with a native regiment from Jhelum. This is quite apart from any question of the great importance of the bridge at Jhelum.

2707. SIR W. MEYER.—The following passage regarding the Frontier Province occurs in the General Staff “Strategical Study of the conditions in India and Burma.” “*Strategical conclusions.* The first thing that will strike the reader as being abnormal in this Province is the very small proportion of British troops quartered in it. Of the armed forces therein, less than one-tenth are British troops, while in addition, spread along the frontier, are some 300,000 independent tribesmen armed with 70,000 breech-loading and 50,000 muzzle-loading rifles. This brings up the population, if armed men alone are counted, to forty Indian to one British rifle within the zone itself. It shows clearly how much we depend on the loyalty of our native troops, and on the want of power among the tribesmen to combine against us ; it demonstrates how, in case of serious trouble arising in the Province, reliance must be placed on assistance from the cis-Indus side of Hindustan.”

Do you consider that satisfactory ?

2708. GENERAL AYLMER.—I do not quite see how you are going to get your British troops along that strip of country ; neither do I see how you can send them to Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, etc.

2709. SIR W. MEYER.—Need we have so many native troops there ?

2710. GENERAL AYLMER.—It rather isolates the native troops in a way by putting them across the Indus. I do not think they would join up with the tribesmen.

2711. SIR W. MEYER.—It has recently been proposed to increase the garrison of Peshawar by a native infantry battalion. What is your view ?

2712. GENERAL AYLMER.—I forget exactly what the proportion of British to native troops is at present at Peshawar. I would not like to answer that question without a great deal of consideration ; it is rather a concrete case.

2713. SIR W. MEYER.—The existing proportion of British to native troops is a matter you would desire to take into consideration in such a case ?

2714. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes.

2715. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that adequate precautions are taken to guard arsenals and military factories by British troops, and that orders issued to this effect from headquarters are properly observed ?

2716. GENERAL AYLMER.—I have no reason to believe that orders on this subject are not observed. I think that after a general mobilization the British guards over arsenals and military factories may occasionally be very weak. The usual obligatory garrisons at an arsenal station is two companies of British

infantry. I do not see how more can be allotted without taking away a dangerous number of British troops from mobile work which is of the utmost importance. The insufficiency of artillery to man the guns is dealt with elsewhere.

2717. SIR W. MEYER.—In time of peace some years ago, the Ferozepore arsenal guards and garrison consisted largely of Sikhs.

2718. GENERAL AYLMER.—So far as I know, when I was quartered in Ferozepore the guard was British. There was a period when the British troops quartered there were prostrated with fever, etc., and one regiment was sent away in consequence. This may have been the time when native guards were used.

2719. SIR W. MEYER.—Could you find out for us if there have been any cases of late years of guards composed of Sikhs being mounted over the Ferozepore arsenal?

2720. SIR P. LAKE.—I will find out.

2721. SIR W. MEYER.—Then I was informed of another case regarding the 10th Jats; men of this regiment were guarding the local cordite stores?

2722. SIR R. SCALLON.—I can answer that question. Yes, they were there—at Dum Dum.

2723. SIR W. MEYER.—Is there much cordite there?

2724. SIR R. SCALLON.—Not very much.

2725. SIR W. MEYER.—In the case of the despatch of rifles from arsenals and factories, once the rifles are put on board a train I understand that the arsenal or rifle factory people trouble themselves no more about them? My informant told me that once a box of rifles was lost, and afterwards found lying on the platform of some wayside station.

2726. GENERAL AYLMER.—Such cases generally mean only temporary loss.

2727. SIR R. SCALLON.—It is laid down what steps should be taken to guard rifles in transit. A good deal of the ammunition for the rifle meeting at Meerut one year went astray.

2728. SIR W. MEYER.—My point is that while there are most intricate rules requiring a battalion to account for every cartridge, boxes of rifles may apparently go about the country unguarded.

2729. GENERAL AYLMER.—The question of revising these rules is under consideration.

2730. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that there is risk in the policy adopted of late years of recruiting the native army mainly from a few sources, such as Gurkhas, Pathans, Sikhs, and Punjabi Muhammadans?

2731. GENERAL AYLMER.—I do. The more castes, classes, religions, and tribes we tap, the better. Class regiments are wrong in principle. Even if certain of the classes enlisted have somewhat inferior military qualifications, the strength of the army as a whole is increased, by broadening the basis of recruitment.

2732. SIR W. MEYER.—You think then we have too many of the classes mentioned?

2733. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think there is a tendency to take too many of them.

2734. SIR W. MEYER.—There was a letter the other day from Sir Edmund Barrow* stating that a class regiment was less dangerous than a class company regiment, because if you had reason to suspect a class unit you could move it away, but in the case of two or three companies you would have to move the whole battalion.

* In connection with 10th Jats incident (not reproduced).

2735. GENERAL AYLMER.—It is one of those problems which have been argued by very clever people over and over again. I really think it is a very difficult question; my own private opinion is against class regiments.

2736. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that the Gurkhas can be implicitly relied on ?

2737. GENERAL AYLMER.—I do not. It may be possible that they may prove one of our greatest dangers. As long as the Nepal Darbar is really friendly, our Gurkha troops will be all right. This unfortunately cannot be ensured. Nepal has a relatively powerful army. The leaders and people have strong military instincts. They want an outlet for these and I believe they are looking forward to a good fight with someone, no matter with whom. This is the impression I gathered when at Khatmandu. In the event of a great crisis, if our star appeared to be setting, I think it might well appear to the Ruler of Nepal that he had more to gain by going against us than by remaining faithful to his alliance. The rich plains of Bengal and its unwarlike people would be at his mercy, and would invite invasion. Our enemies might make him very handsome promises, while we, on the other hand, might offer possibly a G. C. B. I also think it possible that the Gurkhas might be dragged into the cow-killing controversy. I do not think they really care a bit, but they rather like to pose as very orthodox on occasions. I would also point out here that the Gurkha battalions as at present constituted, with only a hundred reservists per battalion, are unsuitable for a protracted war. Even if we had more reservists, a very slight pressure from the Nepal Darbar would make it impossible for them as well as furlough men to rejoin. I consider that the best plan would be to give the Gurkha army an outlet. Definitely tell them that we will take a brigade on mobilization. They will serve as hostages. Invite down a brigade to take part in manœuvres, paying expenses if necessary. I think the whole question of Gurkhas wants much consideration.

2738. SIR W. MEYER.—Have the Nepal Darbar ever offered us the use of their troops ?

2739. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes, on several occasions, I believe.

2740. SIR W. MEYER.—You would at once accept such an offer ?

2741. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes, but I would hold them as hostages.

2742. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider that we may have trouble from Sikhs, Jats or Rajputs ?

2743. GENERAL AYLMER.—As far as I know, these classes have been a good deal mixed up with sedition. They are much affected by the Arya-Samaj. They are at present the people from whom I would first expect trouble. I believe that the anti-cow-killing agitation appeals strongly to them. The real Rajputs of Rajputana are reliable, I think. At least their Chiefs are.

2744. PRESIDENT.—Is there no class of the native army on which you place reliance ?

2745. GENERAL AYLMER.—No class of the native army is above suspicion.

2746. PRESIDENT.—Would you place implicit trust in the Carnatic regiments ?

2747. GENERAL AYLMER.—No, I would not. They are all aliens ; they have no patriotism. Their loyalty depends on their contentment.

2748. SIR W. MEYER.—A previous witness told us that if it was decided to enlist more Rajputs, he would not take them from Rajputana but from the Rajputs of Oudh.

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2749. GENERAL AYLMER.—The Rajputs of Oudh form a very big class already ; I would not add to the Rajputs from Oudh.

2750. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider that the present proportion of Sikhs in the native army is excessive, and will be difficult to maintain in view of existing conditions in the Punjab ? If so, and supposing the army to be maintained at its present strength, how would you fill the deficiency ?

2751. GENERAL AYLMER.—I consider the establishment of Sikhs excessive on both political and recruiting grounds. Steps are at present being taken

gradually to cut down the numbers enlisted, especially as regards Jat Sikhs. Such steps must, I think, be gradual or they will only make matters worse. In a good many regiments the Sikhs have undoubtedly fallen off. Many reasons are given for this, and among them I may mention sedition, the general prosperity of the Sikhs, plague, the adventurous spirit which takes them to distant countries, the insufficient pecuniary attractions of the army, etc., etc.

The following classes could be more fully enlisted :—

MUHAMMADANS.

Meos, of Rajputana ; reported as good soldiers, only some 250 enlisted, a large class.

Merats, of Rajputana ; a few more available.

Dekhani Musalmans.—A very large class, many outlying districts now quite untouched.

Men from Central India and Central Provinces—Moguls, Pathans, etc.—This class is hardly touched.

Moplahs.—A few companies might be tried.

HINDUS.

Gujars, of Rajputana ; at present very lightly recruited.

Minas, of Rajputana ; promising material, lightly recruited.

Rajputs, from Central Provinces ; hardly touched at present.

OTHERS.

Kachins, Lashis, Marus, etc., might eventually supply a regiment for local service in Burma.

Assam tribes.—Possible source of supply.

If considered unobjectionable to take more recruits from the Punjab :—

Dogras.—More might be got.

Punjabi Muhammadans.—There are several classes little recruited, such as *Kambohs* and *Arains*.

Ahirs.—The reports on these are good ; more might be got.

The United Provinces and Oudh are at present very lightly recruited.

2752. **SIR W. MEYER**.—You spoke just now of the reduction of Sikh recruitment. What are you substituting ?

2753. **GENERAL AYLMER**.—We have held up our scheme pending the result of this Committee. In several regiments which had companies with a mixture of Jat and other Sikhs we have not been able to get the Jats, and are therefore eliminating the Jats, and we have approached the Burma Government to stop recruiting Jat Sikhs in the police. We wish to improve our quality and diminish our quantity of Jat Sikhs.

2754. **SIR W. MEYER**.—Your policy is to let the regiments go below sanctioned strength ?

2755. **GENERAL AYLMER**.—No.

2756. **SIR W. MEYER**.—Are you reducing the recruitment of Sikhs as a whole ?

2757. **GENERAL AYLMER**.—In some cases we are reducing the number of Sikhs. This policy was forced on us by the difficulty of getting good Sikhs in some regiments.

2758. **PRESIDENT**.—In the event of a serious war on the frontier accompanied by actual or potential serious disturbance in the interior of India, would your policy be to move to the front all native regiments of whose fidelity you were somewhat doubtful ?

2759. GENERAL AYLMER.—I have always considered that our great internal danger is our native army, and prior to the Redistribution Scheme of 1904, in a note to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, I strongly urged an extended use of native troops in the Field Army, as native troops at the front were less apt to go wrong than when kicking their heels in cantonments and exposed to seditious preaching.

If a regiment is severely tainted it should be instantly disbanded. If it belongs to a class that we particularly suspect, it should be sent to the front.

In this connexion, our reserves should, if numerous, be organized in two categories. We can thus secure the power of regulating sedition to some extent. If our peace establishment is low, we gain further control. For units in the Field Army we need only call out the first category at once. Time will shew what classes in the second category would be dangerous and should not be called out. For units remaining behind we need not call out undesirable classes in the first category, and we will gain further knowledge as time goes on as to whether we should call out the second category and if so what classes of it. We can thus keep our loyal classes in the native army strong and the disloyal ones weak.

The "A" reserve would be men who had lately gone away from the ranks; the "B" reserve, older men.

2760. PRESIDENT.—How about the training of them?

2761. GENERAL AYLMER.—They would all come up for training, it may be in different years; two months every two years.

2762. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that the Pathan and Punjabi Muhammadan troops could be relied on in the event of war with Afghanistan or the tribes, with a *jihad* preached from Kabul?

2763. GENERAL AYLMER.—If we keep them well-contented and make our service really popular, I think that they will stick to us. If we starve the army and give the men insufficient inducements to remain loyal, I do not think we can rely on them in such a case. Better pensions now, better pay in a few years, and a great improvement in the position of our native officers are the main inducements required. This refers to the majority. A minority will remain true to the end, no matter what happens.

2764. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that there is any risk at present of an anti-British combination of Muhammadan and Hindu troops?

2765. GENERAL AYLMER.—Although I have seen hints of a possible combination, I consider that any such danger is small at present. Any tendency in this direction should be carefully watched.

2766. PRESIDENT.—Which do you think eventually the greater danger, a Hindu or a Muhammadan rising?

2767. GENERAL AYLMER.—I am inclined to think that a Muhammadan rising would be the more dangerous. There is a more universal bond of union between Muhammadans. Their rising would probably involve that of the frontier tribes and assistance from Afghanistan. There would be a great many other points in the Empire where the effect would be felt.

2768. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that there is danger of the allegiance of the native troops being tampered with?

2769. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes, unless we keep them really contented and make it worth their while to serve us faithfully. I think I have already sufficiently indicated the means of doing this. This question is of the utmost importance.

2770. PRESIDENT.—Is it possible that the seditious tendencies now alleged have long existed, but that they have been more carefully watched of late years?

2771. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think that they have been gradually growing up for many years in the civil population. I think that even before 1907

they had slightly affected the native army. I noticed a slight change of tone, a tendency to criticize the actions of the Government. By 1907, the poor pay of the Indian army and the partial abolition of pensions in 1887 had their natural result in making the native soldier listen to and talk sedition. Since then, we have certainly watched and noted much more carefully. The concessions of pay and pension possibly came a little too soon after 1907 to be received altogether in a healthy state of mind by the few, though the many were deeply grateful for them. I think the point is not to allow any further concessions which may be granted to appear as if made under compulsion. They should not come too late. If the last had been given a few years earlier, we would not have had the experience of 1907.

2772. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think that the victories of Japan over Russia had any influence with native troops?

2773. GENERAL AYLMER.—I think they had a great effect in India generally, and the idea arose that the Asiatic could beat the European if affairs were properly managed.

2774. PRESIDENT.—Are you satisfied with the strength and efficiency of the Carnatic regiments; would you have a smaller number of regiments at higher strength?

2775. GENERAL AYLMER.—I am not satisfied. I would keep the existing number and raise their peace establishment to what is necessary for sufficient training. I would also give them the same number of reservists as other regiments. They should in every way be made available for active service. My reason is that we should have as many classes of Indian troops as possible.

2776. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that the Madrasi is deficient in fighting characteristics? If not, can you suggest from what source further recruitment could be made? Do you consider that the Moplah battalions experimentally raised and condemned a few years ago, were fairly dealt with, or that Moplahs could be expediently recruited hereafter?

2777. GENERAL AYLMER.—I do not think that the Madrasi is as good a fighting man as men of the northern races, but I consider that his fighting characteristics have been unnecessarily run down. I do not think that he has had a fair chance. Before the war test in Upper Burma the Madras regiments had been allowed to vegetate. The factors which militated against their efficiency were—

- (1) Absurd condition of the British officers list as regards ranks.
- (2) The best officers were not in Madras.
- (3) Huge married establishments.
- (4) Stagnation at small stations, etc., etc.

If Madras regiments thought they were going to be treated like others, I do not think that there would be any trouble after a bit in working up the present number of regiments to full strength, including reserves.

I am not enthusiastic about Moplahs. On the whole, although arrangements were far from perfect, they were given a chance and failed. In one case they were given a very severe trial, but they had been in existence some time before being put to the test. Some companies of them might be tried again, but not whole battalions.

2778. PRESIDENT.—They committed many irregularities, did they not?

2779. GENERAL AYLMER.—They behaved like children. Their physique was poor. I do not think they had altogether a good chance, but they certainly had a fair one.

2780. SIR W. MEYER.—In these days of long-range shooting, do the personal qualities of a man count as much as they formerly did?

2781. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes, undoubtedly, you want a better class of man to fight a battle now than formerly.

2782. **PRESIDENT.**—You hold, it is understood, that, in order to mobilize the British artillery units of the Field Army, it would be necessary to deplete the units allotted for internal defence by a third of their strength, thus rendering them inefficient for active service ; and you consider this a very unsatisfactory state of things, in view of the fact that we rely so much on artillery against a possible revolt of native troops ? If this is a correct statement of your views, do you think that the difficulty could be met by reducing the number of artillery units assigned to the Field Army ?

2783. **GENERAL AYLMER.**—This is a correct statement of my views. I go further and say that the present state of things is not only unsatisfactory but disastrous. The amount of artillery in the Field Army is already very small. I cannot recommend any reduction. It is necessary to increase the personnel of the artillery. The question of horses is one for the Quartermaster-General.

2784. **PRESIDENT.**—You consider that the amount of artillery in the Field Army is small, and you are not in favour of any reduction. The Field Army is designed for service across the frontier. Having regard to the history of the Afghan War, and the trouble we had in using even the small number of guns we had, are you of opinion that the proportion of artillery which it is proposed to take is excessive ?

2785. **GENERAL AYLMER.**—I do not think the number of guns is excessive. Besides the divisional artillery you have in the Field Army six field batteries, a howitzer brigade with three batteries, and six heavy batteries ; these are army troops and are to be detailed for whatever part of the force it may be necessary to increase.

2786. **PRESIDENT.**—The reason why I have asked this question is that when Lord Kitchener's scheme went Home it was referred to the War Office, and I believe Lord Roberts to have said that, such was the difficulty in feeding horses and maintaining artillery in Afghanistan, he considered the amount of artillery allotted to be in excess of the possibilities of feeding and using it. My experience of Afghanistan on both the Kandahar and Kabul side was that in the passes there is great difficulty in moving field or horse artillery, and we took no artillery except mountain batteries upon our march from Kabul to Kandahar.

2787. **SIR W. MEYER.**—There was a proposal sent up to the Secretary of State recently about the reorganization of ammunition columns ?

2788. **GENERAL AYLMER.**—I have seen the despatch.*

* No. 90 of 1912
(not reproduced).

2789. **SIR W. MEYER.**—Do you approve of that scheme ?

2790. **GENERAL AYLMER.**—The scheme seems quite feasible except in one particular, *viz.*, that the cost of replacing the existing transport, which is going to be absorbed by the ammunition columns, has not been taken into account. I do not think the Quartermaster-General could supply that amount of transport out of his allotment.

2791. **SIR W. MEYER.**—Are you satisfied with the reserve of artillery horses ?

2792. **GENERAL AYLMER.**—As far as I can state at present, I think it is satisfactory for five or six years to come if the proposal in the ammunition column despatch is approved ; if not approved, I do not think the state of the horses is satisfactory. It is a very small reserve. Formerly we had a reserve of 2,500 artillery horses in India.

2793. **PRESIDENT.**—Do you concur in the proposal that has been made to reduce three companies of Royal Garrison Artillery and to add an equivalent strength of gunners and drivers to Horse and Field Artillery units ?

2794. **GENERAL AYLMER.**—All forts, inland defences, and defensive posts have recently been armed with modern B. L. guns. Such armament seems to me to require an amount of technical skill which cannot be given by infantry. The armament mentioned requires, I am informed, 169 officers and 1,978 men to work it. The whole ten companies of Royal Garrison Artillery can only supply 50 officers and 1,300 men for the purpose. Under such

conditions the breaking up of three companies hardly seems desirable. If the three companies are broken up, their equivalent will be required to assist in supplying the deficiencies in all artillery units, not only in the Royal Horse and Royal Field Artillery, because much more than this is required for efficiency. I regard the question of the efficiency of the artillery as one of the utmost urgency and importance.

2795. PRESIDENT.—You have already a deficiency in the garrison artillery—a considerable deficiency?

2796. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes, sir. My own view is that the reduction of the Royal Garrison Artillery in India is not desirable in view of the large number of modern guns now mounted in our defences.

2797. SIR W. MEYER.—But if you could not get the rather costly additions to cadres which you suggested just now, would you, as a last resort, strengthen the ordinary artillery units by reducing garrison artillery companies?

2798. GENERAL AYLMER.—Yes, as a last resort, but not otherwise. In any case this is not enough.

2799. PRESIDENT.—Have you any knowledge of the character and efficiency of the armed police? Would you supply them with better weapons than those they now have, that is, bored-out Martinis for the greater part?

2800. GENERAL AYLMER.—I have very little personal knowledge of them, but from what I have heard and read I have no particular reason to suspect the loyalty of the police more than that of the native troops. Their efficiency is probably as high as desirable. Their present armament is suitable. The classes that proved loyal in an outbreak could probably be better armed and organized when required. In time of trouble you might give the classes who were above suspicion a better rifle.

2801. PRESIDENT.—In present circumstances, would you be in favour of reducing the peace strength of the army by maintaining the existing cadres on a lower peace footing with adequate reserves? We only require a general answer to this question at present; further details will be put to you at a later stage.

2802. GENERAL AYLMER.—I recognize that, in order to obtain a high average efficiency throughout the army, economy in some directions will be necessary. I consider this one of the least objectionable methods of cutting down expenditure. By such a means we also have the power of regulating numbers in case of disaffection. It would also make it less easy to “rush” British troops. Generally speaking, I am prepared to say that it would not be dangerous as an experiment to cut down native infantry battalions to a peace establishment of 832. The highest peace establishment at present is 912 giving a war establishment of 752. I would like a uniform establishment throughout the army. There are five establishments at present.

2803. SIR W. MEYER.—If you are going to experiment, why not try some battalions at 832 and others at 712?

2804. GENERAL AYLMER.—I am not in favour of starting by reducing units to 712; you would get a great deal of economy from reducing them to 832. Reserves cost about a quarter of what a man with a regiment costs. If you increase your reserves, you have to increase the number of recruits. As a first experiment you could cut down to 832. I would let men go to the reserve after four years' service in the native army.

2805. SIR W. MEYER.—Is it not the fact that the peace strength of many Home battalions is considerably below 712?

2806. GENERAL AYLMER.—I do not recollect the Home strengths.

2807. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider that in the event of war there would be difficulty in getting recruits?

2808. GENERAL AYLMER.—I do. The last Afghan War proved it.

2809. PRESIDENT.—Do you concur in the estimate of war wastages put forward in paragraph 5, Appendix X, of the General Staff Memorandum of 1911 on the duties and requirements of the army in India ?

2810. GENERAL AYLMER.—I am inclined to think that the wastage in the Field Army is placed a little high. I do not think that our native troops would stand such losses. Perhaps ten per cent. might be taken off, not more.

As regards internal defence, the wastage allowed is far too low. I see no reason why it should not be the same, or nearly the same, as that of the Field Army. We reduce internal defence forces to a minimum and then apparently assume that they are going to have no hard work or fighting. They may have to fight just as desperately as the Field Army.

I also think that the wastage of horses given is far too low.

2811. SIR W. MEYER.—These percentages were for the officers, were they not ?

2812. GENERAL AYLMER.—Also for the men.

2813. SIR R. SCALLON.—Has the present system under which units are often stationed long distances from their recruiting ground affected their recruiting ?

2814. GENERAL AYLMER.—The native troops have many concessions given them. I have never heard any complaints made about it.

2815. SIR P. LAKE.—At present there is very liberal leave and furlough allowance which makes many regiments rather weak during the summer. Would it be safe to reduce the leave ?

2816. GENERAL AYLMER.—The leave rules are too liberal and are capable of being reduced, that is, the rules regarding short leave. It would not cause discontent. The forty per cent. allowed to be on leave is never worked up to. The furlough rules were introduced because most of the men are married, and they have to look after their fields, etc., and I would not interfere with them.

2817. SIR W. MEYER.—Is it safe to have a Sikh battalion at Amritsar ?

2818. GENERAL AYLMER.—No, nor do I think the Sikh troops like it. Pathan troops like Peshawar for about a fortnight, but after a time they hate it because their relations come and sponge on them.

2819. SIR W. MEYER.—If we were at war with the tribes, could we use aeroplanes ?

2820. GENERAL AYLMER.—The airmen would have a bad time if they had to land anywhere in tribal territory outside the small areas temporarily occupied by our own troops, but I see no reason why they should not be used with advantage.

(The witness then withdrew.)

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

18th Meeting—Tuesday, 9th July 1912.

The Hon. Mr. H. V. Lovett, C.S.I., I.C.S., Commissioner of Lucknow and Mr. H. Waterfield, Inspector-General of Police, Central India Agency attended as witnesses and were examined.

EVIDENCE OF MR. LOVETT.

2821. PRESIDENT.—Mr. Lovett, you are Commissioner of Lucknow and you have had great experience of the United Provinces ?

2822. MR. LOVETT.—I have been nearly twenty-eight years in what are now the United Provinces.

2823. PRESIDENT.—Do you anticipate that there would be any difficulty in maintaining order should the bulk of the troops be withdrawn from Oudh on mobilization ? You are probably aware of the recent proposals for increasing the forces to be left behind, in case of mobilization, for the maintenance of internal order in the United Provinces ; do you think they go far enough ? Take for instance the obligatory garrisons of Agra, Allahabad and Cawnpore ?

2824. MR. LOVETT.—I think that if the mobilization took place on the occasion of a war with Afghanistan or the tribes, there being no simultaneous grave complications in Europe, order could be maintained by firm government, even if the war were prolonged and attended by vicissitudes. If, however, there were simultaneous war between Great Britain and one of the great Powers, the British strength and especially mounted strength of the obligatory forces proposed for the Meerut and Lucknow divisional area should, to provide adequately against all possible contingencies, be increased. Very wide tracts of country would be affected, tracts which ever since the Mutiny have been accustomed to the presence of a large number of troops, tracts which partly adjoin many Native States. The United Provinces were the cockpit of the Mutiny, and are 'the heart of India.' We might, too, have disloyalty to reckon with in sections of our native army ; or the attitude of Gwalior might be doubtful. Subject to these general remarks, I see no reason to take exception to any particular obligatory garrison proposed. (See Annexure I, paragraph 2.)

2825. SIR W. MEYER.—You say that in the event of a war with a great European Power, besides complications on the frontier, the obligatory garrisons which the Government of India propose to provide, would not be enough ? Can you say how they could be increased ?

2826. MR. LOVETT.—I think, under the circumstances, the British forces provided would be somewhat small against all possible contingencies. I am not in a position to say how they could be increased.

2827. SIR W. MEYER.—You have taken into account that the last scheme provides a brigade for Delhi, a brigade for Allahabad, and a brigade at Mhow ?

2828. MR. LOVETT.—I refer only to British troops. I did not know of the brigade at Mhow.

2829. SIR W. MEYER.—In the circumstances you mention, would you like a few more British troops ?

2830. MR. LOVETT.—Yes.

2831. SIR W. MEYER.—Take Allahabad the capital of the Province ; there is an obligatory garrison there of only one company of garrison artillery and two companies of British infantry ; is that sufficient in the event of serious disturbances ?

2832. MR. LOVETT.—Not under the particular circumstances I have mentioned. This is one of the places where I should like more British troops.

2833. PRESIDENT.—Except under the conditions you specify, you do not anticipate serious disturbance?

2834. MR. LOVETT.—No, I do not.

2835. PRESIDENT.—It has been stated that the Talukdars of Oudh are perfectly loyal to the Government. Do you concur in that opinion? Have they any leader? Has Rampur any influence among the Muhammadan Talukdars?

2836. MR. LOVETT.—The Talukdars of Oudh are perfectly loyal to the Government. They have no authoritative leader. The Maharaja of Balrampur is President of their association, but I have reason to think that the Rajas of Jahangirabad and Partabgarh each possesses more influence than Balrampur. I have never seen reason to consider that there is much connection between Rampur and the Muhammadan Talukdars. (See Annexure I, paragraph 7.)

2837. SIR W. MEYER.—Are these prominent Talukdars all Hindus?

2838. MR. LOVETT.—No; the Raja of Jahangirabad is a Musalman. He and Partabgarh owe their influence to their natural force of character.

2839. SIR W. MEYER.—Have these Talukdars an association?

2840. MR. LOVETT.—Yes, the British-India Association.

2841. SIR W. MEYER.—Does it consider economic questions primarily?

2842. MR. LOVETT.—It concerns itself entirely with the Talukdars' interests; it is possible that the members might discuss political matters if they thought that such matters concerned them, but, they are perfectly loyal.

2843. SIR W. MEYER.—At the time of the Mutiny, Oudh was one of the most disloyal centres in India. Since when have the Talukdars of Oudh been loyal?

2844. MR. LOVETT.—After the Mutiny, we went in for what is called a *talukdari* policy. We considered all their claims carefully, and our tendency since the Mutiny has been not to err on the side of not considering them properly.

2845. SIR W. MEYER.—Have there not been Rent Acts passed to protect their tenants against them?

2846. MR. LOVETT.—Yes, but they consented to what was done then.

2847. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that they have been treated with too great kindness?

2848. MR. LOVETT.—They have certainly been treated with great consideration. They have been taught that their own interests lie in supporting Government. (See Annexure I, paragraph 7.)

2849. SIR R. SCALLON.—Are there many other Talukdars like the Maharaja of Kapurthala?

2850. MR. LOVETT.—None exactly in his position. He has large estates in Oudh, and comes down now and then.

2851. SIR W. MEYER.—Is not Oudh a centre of Hindu orthodoxy?

2852. MR. LOVETT.—Not so much as Benares. (See Annexure I, paragraph 8.)

2853. SIR W. MEYER.—What is the attitude of the Brahmans? We have had it from various witnesses that the Poona Brahmans are absolutely unfriendly. Is there any feeling against us on the part of the Brahmans of the United Provinces and the people they can influence?

2854. MR. LOVETT.—I have no reason to say that there is a particular Brahman feeling against us in the United Provinces. (See Annexure I, paragraph 8.)

2855. PRESIDENT.—Has not the Maharaja of Benares been given extended powers lately ?

2856. MR. LOVETT.—Yes.

2857. PRESIDENT.—Is he well disposed towards the British ?

2858. MR. LOVETT.—Very strongly so ; one of the reasons he was given ruling powers was because he has always been so loyal.

2859. PRESIDENT.—It is understood that the United Provinces remained quiet during the seditious agitation of 1907-08. To what do you ascribe this ?

2860. MR. LOVETT.—I think that the United Provinces owe their quietude during 1907-08 to the following causes :—

- (a) The liberal and considerate land revenue policy of the United Provinces Government for years past ; and its generosity to the agricultural classes.
- (b) The abstinence of the Government from measures and acts of administration likely to harass the people ; and the early escape of the Provinces from the rigorous and inquisitorial anti-plague policy originally adopted in India.
- (c) The loyal attitude of the conservative Hindu aristocracy and of the Talukdars of Oudh, who have always been well-treated and appreciate this. Moreover, these people have small affinity with Neo-Hinduism which they regard as claptrap, and they cordially detest Arya Samajism. They will always be loyal so long as they feel that the Government is strong and gives them a clear lead. Their influence counters that of the advanced educated Hindus, who are often consequently rude to them in newspapers. (See Annexure I, paragraphs 3-4.)
- (d) The influence of advanced Hinduism has also been countered by such district officers as the late Mr. Radice of Benares and by the general respect for the Government entertained by the people of the United Provinces. They have never felt that the Government was not behind its officers, or that the Allahabad High Court was in the least antagonistic to the interests of proper order.
- (e) The United Provinces Government has been most vigilant in thwarting every sort of malignant endeavour. Its aim has been to nip trouble in the bud and to expel or neutralize hostile influence.
- (f) The Provinces were the cockpit of the Mutiny, and the lessons then taught have been impressed by the continuous presence of a large garrison.
- (g) I believe that our revenue administration brings the executive officers of the Government more regularly and frequently into touch with the people than the Bengal system.
- (h) The Lieutenant-Governor has trusted his officers and has been both feared and liked by the people of the Provinces.

2861. SIR W. MEYER.—Has that excellent attitude on the part of the people of the United Provinces always existed ? Was not Sir Charles Crosthwaite anxious, for good reason, in 1894 or thereabouts ?

2862. MR. LOVETT.—He was anxious about the anti-cow-killing riots. There was a very strong Hindu movement to prevent cow-killing, but the movement was primarily anti-Muhammadan and only secondarily anti-Government. Wherever there were Government officers, the riots were mostly directed against the Muhammadans, not the Government officers. On one occasion there was only a single British officer with a small force of police ; afterwards a British doctor turned up to inspect his dispensary ; this small force managed to make the Hindu rioters go away without attempting the slightest attack on the Government officers, although they killed some of the Muhammadans. (See Annexure I, paragraph 13, and Annexure II.)

2863. SIR W. MEYER.—Has the anti-cow-killing movement risen again ?

2864. MR. LOVETT.—It is still there, but it has not shewn itself in an aggressively troublesome form. (See Annexure II.)

2865. SIR W. MEYER.—Is there a strong antagonism throughout the United Provinces between Muhammadans and Hindus ?

2866. MR. LOVETT.—To a large extent. (See Annexure I, paragraph 10 and Annexure III.)

2867. SIR W. MEYER.—What was the attitude of the Provinces in 1897-98 ?

2868. MR. LOVETT.—We all got confidential letters from Lord MacDonnell who was very anxious about the attitude of the Muhammadans ; but I could never see anything at all in the attitude of the Muhammadans that need have disturbed him. I was then serving only in the eastern part of the Provinces, but I believe in the western part there was cause for anxiety.

2869. SIR W. MEYER.—What was the effect on the Hindus ?

2870. MR. LOVETT.—The Hindus I had anything to do with did not care twopence one way or the other.

2871. SIR W. MEYER.—Are the Press and Seditious Meetings Acts worked in the Provinces ?

2872. MR. LOVETT.—The Press Act is worked.

2873. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you had any occasion to use the provisions of the present law in regard to the prohibition of public meetings and the like ?

2874. MR. LOVETT.—No, I have never had any occasion to do so.

2875. SIR W. MEYER.—There has been quiet in the United Provinces because the Government acts promptly when there is any sedition ?

2876. MR. LOVETT.—Yes.

2877. PRESIDENT.—Do the educated Muhammadans of the Provinces exercise much influence over the Muhammadan population within and outside their boundaries ?

2878. MR. LOVETT.—I do not think that at the present time the educated Muhammadans of the Provinces exercise as much influence over the general Musalman population as they would like to exercise ; but their leaders are trying hard to gain more. Their methods appear to be to improve such occasions as the events in Persia, and to try and enlist religious sentiment in support of Islam ; they endeavour to lift *Sunnis* and *Shias* out of the circle of local quarrels into a wider field of interests. Their efforts, are, I think, confined to cities.

2879. PRESIDENT.—Have you many *Shias* ?

2880. MR. LOVETT.—There are a great many ; in Lucknow especially.

2881. SIR W. MEYER.—Do they quarrel much with the *Sunnis* ?

2882. MR. LOVETT.—In Lucknow they quarrel a great deal, but they can combine on occasions. (See Annexure I, paragraph 10 and Annexure III.)

2883. SIR W. MEYER.—When you speak of the educated Muhammadans, do you mean the Aligarh school ?

2884. MR. LOVETT.—Yes, that is what I mean. The general idea is that there is a sort of Young Muhammadan influence emanating from Aligarh which finds strong support in Lucknow.

2885. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think that these Young Muhammadans, if they get all the power they want, will be a troublesome factor ?

2886. MR. LOVETT.—I do not think they ever will get all the power they want.

2887. SIR W. MEYER.—In so far as they can get any, will they be troublesome ?

2888. MR. LOVETT.—It is rather difficult to say. I think that they have considerable aspirations; they do not quite know what they do want. Amongst other things, they want considerable electoral representation.

2889. SIR W. MEYER.—Is there any section among them that would like to get rid of British rule?

2890. MR. LOVETT.—They might like to in a way, but they would not seriously think of doing it.

2891. SIR W. MEYER.—What would be the effect of a Muhammadan university?

2892. MR. LOVETT.—Unless it was under Government control, it would give a great deal of trouble. There is not only an idea for a Muhammadan university, but for a Hindu university at Benares as well. Both institutions should be kept strictly under Government control, or they will give a great deal of trouble. (See Annexure I, paragraph 11.)

2893. PRESIDENT.—It is understood that the population of the Rampur State was formerly more or less turbulent. Do you think that the Nawab would have any difficulty in maintaining order, should the Imperial Service Troops be withdrawn?

2894. MR. LOVETT.—The Commissioner of Rohilkhand informs me that in a time of trouble the Nawab of Rampur would have some difficulty in maintaining order, should the Imperial Service Troops be withdrawn. I may say that I have no personal experience of Rampur and have never served in any districts round Rampur State. I therefore wrote to the Commissioner, who knows that part well, and asked him his views on your question. (See Annexure I, paragraph 18.)

2895. SIR W. MEYER.—Have we any troops in Rampur?

2896. MR. LOVETT.—No, but at Bareilly.

2897. PRESIDENT.—Can you give us the strength of the armed police in the United Provinces? What is their race constitution? Are all the United Provinces' police trained to arms, or only the portion which constitutes the armed police force?

2898. MR. LOVETT.—The strength of the armed police in the United Provinces is 70 sub-inspectors, 1,067 head-constables and 6,249 constables. The mounted police comprise 4 sub-inspectors, 10 head-constables and 2,246 constables. I am not in a position to give accurate information regarding the race constitution. All the United Province police are trained to arms. Their race constitution is:—*Officers*.—210 Christians, 1,212 Muhammadans, 327 Brahmans, 206 Rajputs, 3 Gurkhas, 72 Sikhs and 427 miscellaneous Hindus. *Men*.—6 Christians, 14,745 Musalmans, 4,632 Brahmans, 6,905 Rajputs, 242 Gurkhas, 290 Sikhs and 5,853 miscellaneous Hindus. As regards the race constitution, I communicated with the Inspector-General of Police in Naini Tal; he could not give me the race constitution of the armed police straight away, but he gave me the total race composition of the police. A return received from the Chief Secretary shews the race composition of the armed police to be as follows:—

Christians	2
Muhammadans	2,018
Brahmans	1,052
Rajputs	2,276
Gurkhas	115
Sikhs	183
Other Hindus	1,039
Vacancies etc.	99
Total					6,784

(See Annexure I, paragraph 19.)

2899. SIR W. MEYER.—Are the police generally raised in their own districts?

2900. MR. LOVETT.—No, not necessarily. The general aim is not to have them from their own districts.

2901. SIR W. MEYER.—In other provinces I think they have special recruitment for reserve and other special police, but the ordinary police are largely raised locally?

2902. MR. LOVETT.—The constables may be. I would rather the Inspector-General of Police were asked about that.

2903. SIR W. MEYER.—Is it not a rather new departure in your province that all the police should be trained to arms?

2904. MR. LOVETT.—Yes, it is. (See Annexure I, paragraph 19.)

2905. PRESIDENT.—What proportion of the armed police is concentrated in formed bodies at district headquarters or elsewhere?

2906. MR. LOVETT.—I communicated with the Inspector-General on this subject. I have not received any information yet.

2907. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that the United Provinces' police are, generally speaking, loyal? Is there any evidence that sedition-mongers have tried to seduce them from their loyalty?

2908. MR. LOVETT.—As a body, the United Provinces police are certainly loyal. I know of no evidence that sedition-mongers have tried to seduce them from loyalty. I have heard from the Inspector-General of Police that no efforts whatever have been made in this direction.

2909. SIR W. MEYER.—We were told, as regards other provinces, that one reason for that was that the policy of the agitators had been to attack the Government through the police, and it was now too late to win the police over?

2910. MR. LOVETT.—I think there is a strong feeling among the police against agitators.

2911. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you know anything about the police being discontented as regards the present system of promotion?

2912. MR. LOVETT.—No. But, I am not in a position to answer this question.

2913. PRESIDENT.—It has been suggested that in the event of deep-seated disloyalty in the native army, the police generally could not be relied on for use in quelling disturbance. Do you agree in that opinion?

2914. MR. LOVETT.—In the event of deep-seated disloyalty in the native army I would not rely on the police generally for use in quelling disturbances. (See Annexure I, paragraph 19.)

2915. SIR W. MEYER.—I suppose that if the disloyalty was only sectional, if, for instance it was confined to Sikh regiments you could count on the police who were not Sikhs?

2916. MR. LOVETT.—It is rather difficult to answer that in general terms. It might be conceivable that, if there were only disloyalty in the Sikh section of the police, there would be no reason to distrust the other police.

2917. SIR W. MEYER.—You think that in certain circumstances, assuming that the disaffection was confined to the non-Muhammadian portion of the police, the Muhammadian portion might be influenced too?

2918. PRESIDENT.—It would depend upon their forecast of the probable course of events, I suppose?

2919. MR. LOVETT.—Yes, precisely.

2920. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that in times of disaffection, provided the army remained loyal, the police could generally be trusted to do so also? Is it likely that the police would be less trustworthy than the army?

2921. MR. LOVETT.—I think that in times of disaffection, provided the army remained loyal, the police could generally be trusted to do so also. It

is unlikely that the police would be less trustworthy than the army.

2922. PRESIDENT.—Is any difficulty experienced now in recruiting for the police? If so, have the difficulties arisen recently?

2923. MR. LOVETT.—Slight difficulty has been experienced in recruiting for the police in some districts. I would suggest that the Hon. Mr. Douglas Straight be questioned on this subject.

2924. PRESIDENT.—Have you any idea why difficulty should have arisen?

2925. MR. LOVETT.—No, I think it is dissatisfaction with pay, etc.

2926. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you have much to do with the police as Commissioner?

2927. MR. LOVETT.—Nothing except to review the annual police reports for the year. My review and the report go to the Inspector-General. Of course proper police administration is essential to the well-being of a district; and so far, it claims the general attention of a Commissioner. Reports too are sent to him of specially serious crimes.

2928. PRESIDENT.—Is the general feeling in the United Provinces favourable to the Government?

2929. MR. LOVETT.—The general feeling in the United Provinces is favourable to the Government. There are, however, considerations which should not be lost sight of in drawing deductions from this fact. In the Meerut, Agra, and Rohilkhand Divisions there is a lawless turbulent element, sometimes recruited from neighbouring Native States, which requires continuously vigilant and firm handling. In the eastern divisions widespread and simultaneous anti-cow-killing riots in 1893 showed a remarkable power of Hindu combination and took the authorities largely by surprise. In the Oudh districts outbreaks of rather widespread dacoity are not uncommon. Cawnpore was in 1900 distinguished by an anti-Government plague riot of unusual ferocity. At present, Bengalis swarm in Benares and Allahabad, and are found everywhere; the Arya Samaj is represented by 260 branches working in different parts of the Provinces; the tendencies of the Young Muhammadans are dubious; much poisonous seed has of recent years been sown among the general student community.

It can, moreover, hardly be expected that serious depletion of the garrison, to which the Provinces have so long been accustomed, would be unattended by loss of prestige to the Government.

The Provinces have well been called 'the heart of India.' If they went wrong, very little would remain right. They adjoin the powerful State of Gwalior and other minor Native States. (See Annexure I, paragraphs 3-6 and Annexure II.)

2930. SIR W. MEYER.—What about the development of industries at Cawnpore and elsewhere? Does it lead to turbulence on the part of the mill hands, etc.?

2931. MR. LOVETT.—Cawnpore is the only real industrial centre in the United Provinces, and the mill hands there have on occasion joined in serious riots, but I know of no other cases where mill hands have distinguished themselves in this direction.

2932. SIR W. MEYER.—One feature in Calcutta and other industrial places is that a large proportion of the factory hands come from outside. Does that apply in the United Provinces?

2933. MR. LOVETT.—No, the industrial firms obtain most of their men on the spot. (See Annexure I, paragraph 15.)

2934. PRESIDENT.—Is there any party in the Provinces which desires to shake off British rule?

2935. MR. LOVETT.—No party in the United Provinces desires to shake off British rule. The most advanced Hindu section now contents itself with

dreams of local self-government within the Empire, or Hindu predominance in an India protected by Great Britain. During the unrest, however, considerable anti-British racial feeling manifested itself from time to time among Bengalis and advanced Hindus. This feeling still exists although it appears less frequently. It is of course partly inevitable.

There are a few journalists and Arya Samaj preachers who are believed to hold extremist (fanatical and revolutionary) views.

2936. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think that the victories of the Japanese over the Russians exerted much influence?

2937. MR. LOVETT.—At the time they certainly did. (See Annexure I, paragraph 1.)

2938. SIR W. MEYER.—It is understood that the National Congress people want an autonomous India?

2939. MR. LOVETT.—Yes, I think it is a serious ideal with a small section of them, but not with the generality of them. I am speaking of course of the people of my own provinces. (See Annexure I, paragraph 12.)

2940. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you consider the Congress people you know, dangerous as a class?

2941. MR. LOVETT.—I think their teeth have been drawn to a large extent.

2942. SIR W. MEYER.—You think they might have been dangerous, but that just at present they are not so?

2943. MR. LOVETT.—They have come to see that the only ideal they can hope to realize is a sort of autonomous India within the Empire, and I think they may add much noise and fury to what they say. They are afraid to say as much now as they used to.

2944. SIR W. MEYER.—And the ideal of an autonomous India within the Empire does not appeal to the Muhammadans?

2945. MR. LOVETT.—I think the Young Muhammadans think that they may have a share in it, judging by their papers.

2946. PRESIDENT.—What effect have religious societies had on the population of the United Provinces?

2947. MR. LOVETT.—There can be no doubt that the very numerous Arya Samaj societies have had practically no outward political effect on the people of the Provinces. Sometimes they have been countered by Dharm Samajis, (societies for the maintenance of Hindu orthodoxy), and sometimes their adherents have been Government servants or persons not at all inclined to quarrel with the Government. Whatever may be the spirit of the leaders of the Arya Samaj, many of their followers have no political aims.

Nor can it be said that the Gaurakshani or Gaushala Sabhas have, since 1894, worked in an anti-Government spirit, although these associations must always possess a considerable capacity for mischief.

The Bengalis of Benares are much inclined to form *sabhas* or societies of their own, and we had carefully to watch these, which often gave dramatic performances reported to possess political flavour, but I do not remember any distinctively religious Bengali society. The students in cities and towns were certainly infected by the newspaper articles which spread poison before the passing of the Press Act, by means of pamphlets from abroad, and through the instrumentality of disloyal tutors and professors. The seed which has been too often and too generally sown among them may bear fruit later on. (See Annexure I, paragraph 6.)

2948. SIR W. MEYER.—Besides Benares, you have a great religious centre at Allahabad where a great many *yogis* and other people assemble. Is their influence pernicious?

2949. MR. LOVETT.—Near Hardwar there is an Arya Samaj association which is likely to be mischievous. Of course, in Muttra, Bengalis and Punjabis

meet a great deal, and I believe Muttra gave some anxiety to the United Provinces Government a little time ago. As regards Allahabad, I do not think there is a religious society there from which any harm could be anticipated.

2950. SIR W. MEYER.—You get a great *mela* at Allahabad now and again, do you not ?

2951. MR. LOVETT.—Yes, but the genuine *sadhus* are not seditious.

2952. SIR W. MEYER.—I understand that some of the agitators have been trying to propagate their doctrines under the guise of *sadhus* ?

2953. MR. LOVETT.—Yes, to a certain extent. (See Annexure I, paragraph 16.)

2954. SIR W. MEYER.—Might they influence the people from a religious point of view ?

2955. MR. LOVETT.—I think there has been very little of that.

2956. PRESIDENT.—It would surely be very unpleasant for them to pose as *sadhus* ?

2957. MR. LOVETT.—Yes, but a little time ago there was a very strong anti-foreign spirit among some of the students; and there were young men who would not hesitate to do that kind of thing.

2958. PRESIDENT.—What are the main centres where trouble might be anticipated in the event of political unrest becoming acute ?

2959. MR. LOVETT.—In the event of political unrest becoming acute, trouble might be anticipated at the following main centres :—

Benares, Allahabad, Lucknow (for Muhammadans), Agra, Bareilly (for Muhammadans) Cawnpore, Aligarh (for Muhammadans).

Jhansi is a very important railway centre; at Muttra Bengalis meet people from the Punjab; Hardwar is in close proximity to the Arya Samaj *gurukul* at Kangri and is a great gathering place for Hindu *sadhus*.

2960. SIR W. MEYER.—Lord Kitchener in his original scheme for the redistribution of the army mentioned that in the event of trouble Volunteers might be able to hold the fort at Agra. Would you trust the fort at Agra to Volunteers ?

2961. MR. LOVETT.—If they had to hold it against troops from Gwalior or disaffected troops of our own, they would be hardly strong enough in numbers, discipline, and training. (See Annexure I, paragraph 20.)

2962. SIR P. LAKE.—It would depend upon the numbers on each side largely ?

2963. MR. LOVETT.—Yes; of course the fort at Agra is a big place.

2964. PRESIDENT.—You also lay stress on the fact that they are not up to the standard of the regular army in discipline or training ?

2965. MR. LOVETT.—That is so. I have a note here of the exact strength of the Volunteer force in the Provinces which I could give you.

Volunteer Forces in the United Provinces.—

United Provinces Horse.—

1st Regiment.—

Enrolled strength 351, efficient 326.

Reserve.—

Enrolled strength, 83, efficient 80.

Ghazipur, Gorakhpur, Oudh, Allahabad squadrons (8 troops and 1 reserve section).

2nd Regiment.—

Enrolled strength, 402, efficient 271.

(7 troops and 1 reserve section.)

Lucknow Volunteer Rifles.—

Enrolled strength 517, efficient 496.

(1 reserve and 2 cadet companies.)

Armament.—Lee-Metford rifles and carbines.

Naini Tal Volunteer Rifles.—

Enrolled strength 698, efficient 673.

(3 cadet and 1 reserve company.)

Oudh and Rohilkhund Railway Volunteers.—

Enrolled strength 532, efficient 507.

(1 reserve company.)

Armament.—Lee-Metford rifles.

Mussoorie Volunteer Rifles.—

Enrolled strength 767, efficient 732.

(3 reserve and 5 cadet companies.)

Armament.—Lee-Metford rifles.

Allahabad Volunteer Rifles.—

Enrolled strength 491, efficient 491.

(1 reserve company.)

Armament.—Lee-Metford rifles.

Bengal and North-Western Railway Volunteer Rifles.—

Enrolled strength 506, efficient 500.

(1 reserve section.)

Armament.—Lee-Metford rifles.

Cawnpore Volunteer Rifles.—

Enrolled strength 322, efficient 319.

(1 reserve company.)

Armament.—Lee-Metford rifles.

Agra Volunteer Rifles.—

Enrolled strength 404, efficient 370 (this includes reserves).

Armament.—Lee-Metford rifles for adults, Lee-Metford carbines for cadets.

2966. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you Volunteer reserves?

2967. MR. LOVETT.—Yes, but I do not think they are very formidable. Every year we send in a return of Europeans and Eurasians who are not Volunteers and who may possibly become reservists. Of course, reservists are small in number.

2968. PRESIDENT.—Are the cadets included in that number?

2969. MR. LOVETT.—At Lucknow there are strong companies of cadets—the Martinière School cadets for example. Cadets are not reservists.

2970. PRESIDENT.—Are Eurasians any good as Volunteers?

2971. MR. LOVETT.—They are often very good shots.

2972. SIR W. MEYER.—Would they be any good in the open, or are they mainly useful for holding defensive positions? What experience have you had of Volunteers?

2973. MR. LOVETT.—For holding defensive positions. I have had some experience of Volunteers; I commanded a troop of light horse for five years at Benares, and prior to that I served in the ranks. I am now a colonel in the infantry.

2974. SIR W. MEYER.—Should you say from your experience of the Volunteers in your provinces that they would be able, in times of acute disturbance, to do more than assist in the defence of the places where they live?

2975. MR. LOVETT.—No, I do not think they would. I would add, "and of the districts in which those places are."

2976. PRESIDENT.—Have the Muhammadans of the United Provinces taken much interest in the proceedings of the Turco-Italian war and the course of events in Morocco and Persia? Are they much affected by the Pan-Islamic movement? Have you any knowledge of correspondence having taken place between Muhammadans of the United Provinces and Kabul in 1897?

2977. MR. LOVETT.—Muhammadan politicians of the United Provinces have been considerably interested in the Turco-Italian war and the course of events in Persia. I have seen no sign of interest in Morocco. Both they and advanced Hindus have carefully observed political developments in Egypt, and it is satisfactory for India that matters in that country have settled down lately. Muhammadan politicians are attracted by the Pan-Islamic movement and many of them are striving hard to imbue their co-religionists generally with their own sentiments. I do not, however, think that so far they have met with much success, although they have played on the religious feelings of Lucknow Musalmans. I have no knowledge of correspondence between Musalmans of the United Provinces and Kabul in 1897. But I would suggest a reference to the United Provinces Government on this subject. I remember hearing some vague talk about correspondence between Muhammadans of the Bulandshahr district and the frontier tribes in that year. (See Annexure I, paragraph 10 and Annexure III.)

2978. SIR W. MEYER.—Have the Hindu native papers taken advantage of affairs in Tripoli, for instance, to trouble the British Government by professing sympathy with the Muhammadans?

2979. MR. LOVETT.—I do not think so—not in the United Provinces.

2980. SIR W. MEYER.—So far as your provinces are concerned, I gather that such feeling as exists about Tripoli is a Muhammadan feeling?

2981. MR. LOVETT.—Well, I remember when I was in Benares last November, the Hindu (Bengali) Raja of Tahirpur (rather a prominent character) called a meeting which was intended as a sort of Indian demonstration in sympathy with Muhammadan feeling in Tripoli. He asked me to consent to Volunteers going to Tripoli to render Red Cross aid to the Turks there. I told him the volunteers proposal was an absurd one, and it was dropped. It was not taken up seriously, and I think its promoter is a bit of a crank.

2982. PRESIDENT.—It has been suggested that the Muhammadans of India have no real community of interest and are not a homogeneous body. What are your views on the subject as regards the Muhammadans of the United Provinces? Are they likely to be affected in the event of a war with Afghanistan, the tribes, or with any outside Muhammadan Power?

2983. MR. LOVETT.—There can be no doubt that there is strong community of interest between the various sections of Muhammadans in the United Provinces. Were they to become convinced that we neglect or slight them, that we allow Hindus to dominate them on local bodies and to seize an unfair proportion of places and offices, they would become seriously discontented. The most active of their leaders are now continuously trying to weld them together,

and to appeal to their religious feeling and their traditions. In the event of Muhammadan discontent arising from the causes I have indicated, United Provinces' Muhammadans are certainly likely to be affected in the event of a protracted war with Afghanistan or of any war with Turkey. I do not think that as a community they would ever be drawn towards the North-West Frontier tribes, whom they regard as uncivilized. Nor is it likely that they would ever desire Afghan domination. But if they were seriously annoyed with us, a long war with Afghanistan would certainly unsettle them and they would need careful watching. (See Annexure I, paragraph 10.)

2984. SIR W. MEYER.—It has been said by previous witnesses that they are more concerned with affairs in Turkey than with Afghanistan, and that they would therefore be more seriously excited if we were at war with Turkey?

2985. MR. LOVETT.—I have practically said that this is the case.

2986. SIR R. SCALLON.—Are not the Muhammadans very poor in the United Provinces?

2987. MR. LOVETT.—There are a great many poor people of course, but there are also some very wealthy people.

2988. PRESIDENT.—What do you consider to be the political character and aims of the Arya Samaj? Is it powerful in the United Provinces? What are its relations with agitators in other provinces?

2989. MR. LOVETT.—The political character and aims of the Arya Samaj are anti-Muhammadan, anti-Christian, and anti-foreign. It, however, contains very many adherents who have no political aims and are genuinely attracted by the religious emancipation, and sometimes improved social standing, which their new creed offers. The society is powerful in the Meerut Division, but not elsewhere, although it has a very large number of small branches. It possesses considerable funds, as even in Benares, where its supporters are few and poor, it has recently established a rather imposing local habitation in the heart of the city. Mr. L. C. Porter, now Secretary to the Government of India, and lately Magistrate and Collector of Meerut, informs me that Arya Samajists largely "dominate" the Meerut Division, and abound in the Government offices; that they have many Jat adherents who cheerfully put down money in aid of the society, also rich *banias* who are attracted by the prospect of equality with Brahmans; and that they are trying to capture the outcasts, such as the Christian *chamars*. The strings of the movement are pulled from outside the Provinces. When I was Commissioner of Benares, Arya Samajism there received an impetus from the arrival of a Khattri Arya Samajist, named, I think, Kesho Deo Shastri, from the Punjab. He set up a newspaper and sold medicines. But Arya Samajism in Benares encounters strong opposition.

The Arya Samajist *gurukul* at Kangri near Hardwar will soon be sending its disciples into the world. Their operations should be carefully watched.

In some ways Arya Samajism resembles theosophy, but there are various differences, and whereas it is impossible to believe in a substantial future for theosophy, I have no doubt that Arya Samajism will go on and prosper. (See Annexure I, paragraph 6.)

2990. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you consider the theosophists as being of political importance?

2991. MR. LOVETT.—They are of very small importance now. (See Annexure I, paragraph 14.)

2992. SIR W. MEYER.—Have they a tendency to quarrel among themselves?

2993. MR. LOVETT.—Yes.

2994. SIR W. MEYER.—You say that Bengalis and others meet at Muttra, and converse with agitators in the United Provinces; do you think there is any regular system of correspondence between the agitators of the United Provinces and elsewhere?

2995. MR. LOVETT.—I think there is, undoubtedly. Their method of working is as follows:—There is a certain knot of advanced Hindus at Allahabad and elsewhere, and advanced Hindus with political ambitions work through this

knot which carries on operations all over the Provinces. They put up candidates for local boards, and there are men of their own whom they try to put in to local Government appointments. At Benares, one of these men used to come down and give an impetus when one of his friends wanted it. The way has been to work through this particular clique at Allahabad.

2996. SIR W. MEYER.—Are they moderates or extremists?

2997. MR. LOVETT.—Moderates. The only extremists are a few itinerant journalists and the like. The extremists are not a clique at all.

2998. SIR W. MEYER.—You spoke of Arya Samajists in Government offices. Do you think their presence there a danger?

2999. MR. LOVETT.—It would be just as well if there were not so many of them.

3000. SIR W. MEYER.—Are any steps taken to restrict their numbers?

3001. MR. LOVETT.—Our clerks are so badly paid that we cannot afford to pick and choose. Whether a man is an Arya Samajist or not, if he comes and wants employment and there is a vacancy for him, we have to take what we can get.

3002. SIR W. MEYER.—In the higher ranks there is a great deal of competition. Do you make any effort to distribute the posts there?

3003. MR. LOVETT.—These are filled by nomination. Numerous candidates come forward, and the Commissioner and the district officers between them, before making any nomination, make careful inquiries. I should never make any nomination unless I was satisfied that the man was politically above suspicion.

3004. PRESIDENT.—Are these people badly paid?

3005. MR. LOVETT.—The clerks, etc., are very badly paid, but the *tahsildars* and people of that description are not.

3006. PRESIDENT.—Would the Muhammadans of the United Provinces be likely to move against us in common with the Hindus? Is there any difference in this respect in the attitude of the Young Muhammadan leaders?

3007. MR. LOVETT.—The United Provinces' Muhammadans have moved against us before in common with the Hindus, and may do so at some future time, if they consider our strength decayed and our power moribund. The Young Muhammadan leaders are less loyal than the majority of their co-religionists. They are keen Pan-Islamists and closely watch events in Turkey, Persia and Egypt. A remarkable reception given two months ago by Lucknow Musalmans to Saiyid Rashid Raza, editor of the Egyptian paper *Al-Manar* and a noted Pan-Islamist, united *Shias* and *Sunnis* and surprised me.

It is remarkable that, while in England there is so strong a tendency to short-sighted materialism, in India idealism has lately made marked progress. His Majesty the King-Emperor's visit could not have come at a more opportune time. It is, however, unfortunate that Young Muhammadan leaders ascribe Hindu political successes to agitation, and are inclined to admire the persistence of the Hindu "advanced" leaders, from whom, however, rivalry for posts and offices and quarrelling over electoral representation, seems likely to keep them apart. (See Annexure I, paragraph 17.)

3008. SIR W. MEYER.—It used to be said that the great danger to us from Muhammadans arose from their fanaticism and lack of education. You hold that the spread of education has made them more dangerous? Would these educated Muhammadans exercise any considerable influence over *moulvies*, etc.?

3009. MR. LOVETT.—I do not think they have done so hitherto. Here is a letter from the Deputy Commissioner at Lucknow, giving an account of a

meeting held there. The meeting was convened by the educated Muhammadan leaders to lament over the proceedings of the Russians in Persia :—

“The Rifa-i-am Muhammadan meeting went off quietly. The promoters wrote to me saying that Yusuf would try to wreck it so I gave Sardar Mal Singh (police inspector) written authority to turn out Yusuf or anyone else whom the promoters should consider undesirable. Yusuf and his friends never went near the meeting. I have grown tired of Mr. Yusuf and have twice refused to receive his visits. The man is a nuisance to everybody and it is high time to ignore him.

The chairman of the meeting was Maulana Abdul Majid, one of the leading *Sunnis* of Firangi Mahal. He made an excellent speech, a fine example of the old style, free from the agitator's advertising and vote-catching claptrap. His diction was much admired from what I hear. He made a passing allusion to the action of the *Shiahs* in keeping aloof from the former meeting, to protest against Italy's attack on Tripoli, and did not attempt to compose the differences between the two sects. He stated the facts of the Meshed affair, as known to him, and explained how they affected the followers of Islam whether *Sunnis* or *Shiahs*.

The Raja of Mahmudabad went much further. His speech was an example of the modern style based on the present day principle that nothing can nowadays be obtained without agitation. He emphasized the unity of the interests of the two sects and went beyond religion into politics. In urging that the British Government should be asked to use its influence in forcing Russia to make restitution of the treasures looted from the Roza of Imam Raza, he argued amongst other things, that, as the loot was worth thirty-two crores of rupees, it would be dangerous to England to allow it to remain in Russian hands.

His speech made the *Shiahs* produce handkerchiefs to wipe away the tears from their streaming eyes, and was punctuated with loud lamentations from the audience.

The *Shiah* Wazir Hassan was another speaker who appealed to passion. Shahanshah Hussan was very hot and used rather strong language. Nabi Ullah, the rival of Shahid Hussan for the Legislative Council, made a halting and non-committal speech. There were speeches by Zahur Ahmad of the Municipal Board, Hamid Ali Khan and some others which did not attract attention. The three speeches of the day were Abdul Majid's for dignified eloquence, Mahmudabad's for action, Shahanshah's for invective.

I wish it to be clearly understood that I am reporting what I hear only. The speeches will be reported *in extenso* by the police at the end of the week, and very probably there will be differences between what I hear and what was actually said. I must not be held responsible for that.

* * * * *

The head *moulvi* of the Reid College published a pamphlet urging the *Sunnis* to keep away from the meeting because the *Shiahs* had not joined the *Sunnis'* protest against Italy. It had not much effect. The meeting was as large as the place allowed. About 5,000, I am told.

There was one opposition show, and a successful one, at the mosque in Fahsinganj; four or five thousand attended; sermons were preached from the pulpit all about the Meshed affair. This was a *Shiah* show also run by Moulvi Syed Ahmed, the man about whom we had to make all those enquiries as to whether he was a *mujtahid* or not. The position he has taken up is that it is useless to pass resolutions such as those passed at the Rifa-i-am. What Persia wants is not protection from outside aggression, but internal reform. Why was no resolution passed urging the Persians to make themselves fit to take their place among the enlightened nations of the world?

* * * * *

You will observe that the *Shiahs* are far from being of one mind even in this matter. Men like the Raja of Mahmudabad are trying to show Mr. Montagu that all Muhammadans are one. With this object in view they have striven to organize simultaneous meetings all over India. I do not suggest that there was no real feeling behind all these outward manifestations, but the occasion has been improved without doubt, in my opinion, to serve the purpose indicated.”

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3010.—SIR W. MEYER.—Do you keep yourselves informed about sermons in the mosques?

3011.—MR. LOVETT.—The police do that, and we get information from people calling on us. The Young Muhammadans have made Muhammadans generally more dangerous to the Government. They have made the prospect of Muhammadan-Hindu combination more probable in the long run; on the other hand, they have produced a more enlightened set of Muhammadans whose knowledge of the world must enable them to see that there is very little political future for India apart from the British Raj.

3012. SIR W. MEYER.—To what do you ascribe the lack of interest in Morocco?

3013. MR. LOVETT.—I have never heard any agitation about Morocco at all.

3014. SIR W. MEYER.—Is this, perhaps, due to the fact that Morocco split off from the Bagdad Kaliphate at an early date and has always been more or less isolated from the rest of Islam?

3015. MR. LOVETT.—This may be the explanation.

3016. SIR W. MEYER.—Hindus and Muhammadans combined before in the Mutiny, but they then had a common figurehead in the shape of the titular Mughal Emperor at Delhi. Do you think that the absence of such a figurehead now would make a difference?

3017. MR. LOVETT.—I think it might, but to the Hindus in the Mutiny the King of Delhi was rather a pretended than a real figurehead.

3018. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you consider that the Muhammadan may prove more dangerous than the Hindu, under influence from events outside India over which we have no control?

3019. MR. LOVETT.—I think the Hindu is decidedly more dangerous. There is a strong advanced Hindu influence in India inclining against us, which has been partly prompted by downright nationalism. It has been largely supported by constant preaching of legends of a Hindu golden age before the foreigner came. It is difficult to say how far this legend has been inspired by the belief of the Marathas that, but for us, they would have become lords of India.

The Hindu nationalism of which I speak is the doctrine of a limited school which has hardly touched the United Provinces and has shrunk back into the shade in India generally. But its influence seems to me apparent now and then; and should it become more obtrusive and popular it would be, in my opinion, more dangerous than anything which may be expected from the Muhammadans.

3020. PRESIDENT.—How have recent territorial re-arrangements in Eastern Bengal and elsewhere been regarded by the Muhammadans and others in the United Provinces?

3021. MR. LOVETT.—The territorial arrangements notified at Delhi have been regarded by Muhammadan politicians as a concession to Bengali agitation. Muhammadans of good position, who are not politicians, care little about their co-religionists in Eastern Bengal, and are, on the whole, sentimentally gratified by the re-establishment of Delhi as the capital.

Advanced Hindu politicians regard the Delhi announcements with complacent satisfaction, but their satisfaction must have been damped by Lord Crewe's recent declaration as to the impossibility of responsible self-government in India.

Those members of the territorial aristocracy with whom I have conversed on the subject are, with one exception—a Muhammadan politician—gratified by the supersession of Calcutta by Delhi and anticipate advantages from the proximity of the latter to the United Provinces. The masses care nothing at all about these matters. (See Annexure I, paragraph 12.)

3022. PRESIDENT.—You say there was an exception—that one Muhammadan objected?

3023. MR. LOVETT.—He was a keen Muhammadan politician, and he was very much annoyed by the arrangement.

3024. PRESIDENT.—Have any attempts to tamper with the loyalty of the troops come to the notice of the United Provinces Government?

3025. MR. LOVETT.—In Jhansi an Arya Samaj missionary was found preaching to soldiers what came near to sedition. I believe that elsewhere *sadhus* were found about the regimental lines, with, it was thought, a political mission. Hoti Lal Varma, an extremist now in the Andamans, had conversations with members of the army at Hong Kong and distributed pamphlets from America which exhorted men not to join the army. A *sadhu* was found preaching sedition in the lines of the 48th Pioneers at Allahabad. He was found to be an ex-sepoy dismissed from the 38th Pioneers. A sepoy of the 48th Pioneers was found attending Arya Samaj and Gaurakshani Sabha meetings. A jemadar of the 16th Cavalry was found in possession of seditious papers and dismissed. A sepoy of the 5th Light Infantry spoke disrespectfully of His late Majesty and was dismissed. A man who appeared to have some political object in view was found in the 48th Pioneers' lines. This regiment contains Jat companies.

In a confidential memorandum published by the United Provinces Government in 1910, it was stated that it is certain that "persistent efforts" were being made to get at the army.

I have had no personal experience of anything of this kind. During the unrest I was at Benares with a garrison of only one native regiment—the 62nd Punjabis, and before that, the 18th Infantry.

A copy of the above memorandum was sent to the General Staff, Army Headquarters. (See Annexure I, paragraph 21.)

3026. SIR W. MEYER.—Do these instances relate to the 1910 period?

3027. MR. LOVETT.—Yes. They are mentioned in that memorandum. They extended over a couple of years—between 1908 and 1910. There are no more recent instances.

3028. PRESIDENT.—It has been suggested that the enlistment of additional Rajputs in the army would provide a useful counterpoise to the present Sikh and Muhammadan elements. Would suitable Rajputs be procurable from Oudh?

3029. MR. LOVETT.—Rajputs are now enlisted from Oudh for the 7th, 8th and 11th Rajputs, also for the old Hyderabad Contingent regiments, the 94th, 95th, etc. If you wanted to enlist more, I think you could. (See Annexure I, paragraph 23.)

3030. SIR W. MEYER.—Would it be politically advisable?

3031. MR. LOVETT.—If they made good soldiers, undoubtedly. There would be no political objection.

3032. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider it advisable to maintain class regiments of Brahmans from Oudh?

3033. MR. LOVETT.—I do not consider it advisable to maintain class regiments of Brahmans from Oudh. A few Kanaujia and many more Sarwariya Brahmans are now enlisted from Oudh for the 1st and 3rd Brahmans. These regiments also draw recruits from the Gorakhpur, Benares, Allahabad, Jhansi and Bundelkhand Divisions, from the Shahjahanpur district, and from Baghelkhand. The Oudh Brahmans are fine men, but I understand that the general view of Commanding Officers is that the further west a man's district is, the better soldier he is likely to make. The present system of enrolling Brahmans seems to me the best. It gives less opportunity for inconvenient combination and for the spread of evil influences. I think it is better not to have too many Brahmans. (See Annexure I, paragraph 23.)

3034. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you prefer to scatter them in companies throughout different regiments?

3035. MR. LOVETT.—That was not what I meant by my answer. I meant, do not have them from precisely the same part of the country. I should say it would be better to have class companies than class regiments.

3036. PRESIDENT.—Would you have Brahmans from other places than Oudh?

3037. MR. LOVETT.—Yes.

3038. SIR W. MEYER.—Assuming Brahmans to become a bit disaffected, if they are in companies they are liable to influence other soldiers, whereas if they are in regiments by themselves that is obviated.

3039. MR. LOVETT.—I am not prepared to give an opinion.

3040. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider it advisable to quarter regiments in the areas from which they are recruited?

3041. MR. LOVETT.—I do not think it advisable to quarter regiments in the areas from which they are recruited. If so quartered, they must be more susceptible to intrigue and popular waves of feeling.

3042. SIR W. MEYER.—From your experience in the United Provinces are regiments there quartered in their own local areas?

3043. MR. LOVETT.—No, I do not think they are. At a time of agitation it would be extremely unfortunate to have regiments at Benares recruited from the Benares Division.

3044. SIR W. MEYER.—Is there habitual communication in your provinces between the civil and military authorities in regard to unrest, public security, and the like?

3045. MR. LOVETT.—I have never had anything of the kind since I have been Commissioner at Lucknow. Whenever the General Officer Commanding has thought that anything concerned me, he has always written to me. When I was Collector at Meerut and Allahabad, such was also the case. (See Annexure I, paragraph 22.)

3046. SIR P. LAKE.—Are you satisfied with the general proposals for internal security as regards your district?

3047. MR. LOVETT.—Yes.

3048. SIR W. MEYER.—Do the same remarks apply to Rajputs as to Brahmans; would you say that they also should not be enlisted too copiously from one particular district of the United Provinces—in one regiment I mean?

3049. MR. LOVETT.—I have never met with any troublesome combination among Rajputs at all. There is not the same danger with Rajputs.

3050. SIR R. SCALLON.—Is there any cause of civil discontent among Rajputs?

3051. MR. LOVETT.—On the whole, I think they are happy enough.

3052. SIR R. SCALLON.—I have put this question because when villages are discontented, the recruits drawn from that district are discontented also?

3053. MR. LOVETT.—I believe there was apprehension among some recruits in regiments who were influenced by popular feeling in the early days of the plague policy. There are waves of feeling that rise and fall among the people.

(The witness then withdrew.)

ANNEXURE I.

Note by the Honourable Sir John Hewett, G.C.S.I., C.I.E., Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces, on Mr. Lovett's evidence.

1. Nothing has, in my opinion, influenced the people of India as to their political future more than the victory of Japan over Russia. A general idea of my views on the political situation in India is to be obtained from the confidential paper dated the 1st of September 1909, which I made over to the President of the Committee for perusal by himself and the members, but not for inclusion in the formal record of the Committee. There has been a great change for the better since I wrote that note, but it will indicate where danger appears to me to be likely to arise in the future.

See answer
2937.

2. I agree with Mr. Lovett that if operations on the frontier were being conducted simultaneously with a war with a great European Power, our obligatory garrison in the United Provinces would not be adequately provided with European troops.

See answer
2824.

3. I agree with M. Lovett's views as to the general feeling of the people of the United Provinces towards the Government. I think, however, that there are, among the educated community, considerable numbers of men who if not kept in order, might make themselves just as troublesome in this province as they have been elsewhere. These people want the loaves and fishes, and, without thinking too much of what would happen to themselves were the British Government to remove itself or be removed, do, I think, resent the fact that the British are in India at all. This party will grow, and may grow rapidly. The educated class is hostile to the landowners, but the latter have hitherto been rather afraid of them. There are signs that the relations between the two classes may become more distant. The lawyers recently refused to attend a party given to me at Allahabad by the landholders of Agra on the ground that I had endeavoured by legislation, and otherwise, to give special protection to the landholders.

See answers
2860 (c)
and 2929.

A great deal of harm has been done by people being allowed to write and speak for the last five-and-a-half years about Swaraj being possible in future. Had this idea been condemned authoritatively long ago much harm would have been prevented. We ought to have the pluck to say that we are here, not only for the good of the people of India, but for our own good and that we intend to stay here for both these reasons. There were many waverers who did not know what the Government meant by its silence, while they were made to feel that agitators would make it unpleasant for them if they actively supported the Government.

4. In almost all the large cities or towns of the province there is a considerable Bengali colony which has its own *Kalabari* or secret club, the proceedings of which are kept very quiet. Except possibly at Allahabad and Benares, the influence of the Bengali community over the general population is very slight, for the simple reason that the people of the province will not let it become powerful. At Lucknow, when Lord Minto visited it two or three years ago notices were put up that Bengalis need not apply for seats on the processional route. At the same time the educated community is, to a certain extent, liable to influence by Bengalis both those resident in the province and from outside, and this influence is generally exercised for the bad. The military accounts office was transferred from Calcutta to Lucknow without the local Government being consulted. Directly it arrived the Bengalis on the establishment started an anti-partition celebration.

See answers
2860 (c)
and 2929.

5. With reference to what Mr. Lovett says on page 193 regarding the Congress, it may be said that the enlargement of the Councils has had a most excellent effect. Educated people have realized that they have in the enlarged Councils a means of pressing their wishes on the attention of the Government, which is much more effective than the Congress was. Their attention has thus been attracted by a more constitutional means of obtaining power than the Congress presented. At the same time, this attitude of the more sober people is, I think, being resented by the Congress leaders, and they now are making every effort to assert themselves as much as possible. Thus the Congress

See answers
2929,
2941, and
2943.

Committee of the United Provinces has, with a view to arrogating for itself the position of a guide to the public in such matters, despatched a message and a letter to the Secretary of State regarding the position of the Public Services Commission.

See answers
2929, 2947
and 2989.

6. The census shows that there are less than 140,000 Aryas in the United Provinces. It is possible that many refused to record themselves as Aryas. The recorded Aryas number about the same as the Indian Christians and have increased by about the same number since the last census. We have in these Provinces at Kangri, near Hardwar, an Arya Samaj *gurukul* or college. This is entirely controlled by the Punjabi Arya Samaj. Gatherings there are attended by representatives of our police, but we know very little about the actual management of the college. The statistics show that the Arya Samaj has increased pretty rapidly among the classes from which recruits are obtained for the army, namely, the Brahmans, the Rajputs and the Jats. Speaking generally the Samaj, as it exists in the United Provinces is not, in my opinion, political, but there are a number of members, some of them in our own offices, who have distinct political tendencies, and the north-western portion is liable to intervention by fire-brands from the Punjab Arya Samaj society. There is certainly a risk—and a genuine risk—that the Aryas in the United Provinces will become more political.

See answers
2836 and
2848.

7. I agree with Mr. Lovett in regarding the Talukdars of Oudh as perfectly loyal. So, in my opinion, is His Highness the Nawab of Rampur. He has no influence worth considering over the Muhammadan Talukdars of Oudh. The landholders of the Agra Province are also, I think, loyal, and recognize that their interests are identical with those of the British Government. Ill-considered rent litigation might have a great effect in alienating Talukdars from the Government. My opinion is that the Government should pay the greatest possible attention to keeping the landowners on its side. The landowners are certain, in the case of trouble, to be able to control the tenantry. India to my mind has passed beyond the stage when we can be as ready as we were in the past to interfere between landlords and tenants, and I have no sympathy whatever with those who think it necessary to intervene between landlord and tenant in the matter of rents when competition comes in. I am all in favour of giving security of tenure to the tenantry, but not of making unfair bargains with the landlords as to the amount of rent which they should pay.

See answers
2852 and
2854.

8. It can certainly be said that the Hindus of Oudh are strictly orthodox. Very few Hindus from Oudh, and hardly any Hindu Talukdars, have visited England and their general attitude is opposed to foreign travel. Oudh does not contain a centre of orthodox Hindu theological teaching like Benares, though Ajodhya is the site of some important fairs.

I would go further than Mr. Lovett and would say that orthodox Brahman feeling in the United Provinces is distinctly on our side. There are historical reasons why Poona Brahmans should be unfriendly to British rule, having regard to the fact that at the close of the 18th century their influence over the Marathas, who then possessed great political power, was very large. At that time nearly all the area now included in the United Provinces was held by Muhammadans. There were, for instance, Muhammadan states in Rohilkhand, the Central Doab (Nawab of Farrukhabad) and Oudh (which then included parts of Rohilkhand, the Gorakhpur Division and the eastern Doab). Benares was then a feudatory of the Nawab of Oudh. The only portion under Hindu supremacy was the upper Doab, part of the Agra Division and Bundelkhand, which were held by the Marathas. The last traces of Hindu power were swept away in the Mutiny. The few Deccan Brahman families which now remain in Bundelkhand are either pensioners of the Government or have no political influence.

9. The increase in the number of Indian Christians is, I think, a very important matter. At one time I did not think that this movement was likely to do much for the stability of the British Government, but now I think that it will be of distinct help to us. It is indeed true that, when employed in the Volunteers or in the police, the Indian Christians have not always proved themselves to be very well suited for bearing arms, but their interests are ours and,

in the event of any trouble, we may rely on their giving us information which otherwise we might not be able to obtain. There are now in these Provinces a few Indian gentlemen of very high position who have become Christians.

10. My views as to the present state of feeling among the Muhammadans are given in an official letter to the Home Department dated the 16th July 1912. The report of the proceedings of the annual meeting of the All-India Muslim League in London, justifies what I wrote about the possibility of a temporary rapprochement between Hindus and Muhammadans. I do not believe in a permanent alliance between them. There is no record of any correspondence between Muhammadans and Kabul in 1897, but information was received showing that some men in these Provinces were in communication with the Muhammadans of the tribal country in that year. I consider the Muhammadans of the United Provinces to be a homogeneous body. It is true that there are a good many *Shiahs* in places like Lucknow and Jaunpur, and that disputes between *Shiahs* and *Sunnis*, about the celebration of the Muharram are sometimes serious. Nevertheless, it will be observed that the *Sunnis* have been participating with the *Shiahs* (*vide* our letter of 16th July last) in protesting against the desecration of the shrine at Meshed, and I do not think that there is any real and permanent reason why in any political trouble, whether affecting their own interests only or their attitude towards Government, *Shiahs* and *Sunnis* should be separate from one another. (See Annexure III.)

See answers
2866 and
2882, 2977
and 2983.

11. I am opposed to denominational universities (*vide* my opinion recorded as a member of the Universities Commission) and therefore do not like the idea of either a Muhammadan or a Hindu university. I think that there is danger that both of them might be used for political purposes. The danger appears to me greater in respect of the Muhammadan than in respect of the Hindu university, for the reason that similar Muhammadan institutions exist outside India. The decision of the Secretary of State (i) not to allow sectarian universities to affiliate institutions outside the places in which the universities are situated : (ii) not to permit the Muhammadan university to be called the Muslim University and (iii) refusing the proposal that the Viceroy should be Chancellor of that university, will add greatly to the grievances which the Muhammadans feel at present. They contend that they had reason to expect that their request in these three matters would be accepted.

See answer
2892.

12. Since Mr. Lovett gave his evidence, the discussion in the British Parliament regarding paragraph 3 of the despatch of the Government of India of August 25th 1911, has aroused considerable excitement in the United Provinces. Native newspapers of all shades of opinion have been unanimous in complaining of Lord Crewe's decision, and it seems clear that, by many educated people, the hope of development in the direction of colonial self-government is strongly cherished. Whatever may be the merits of the interpretation of paragraph 3 of that despatch, there is no doubt that the public here do believe that it had, and was intended to have, the meaning which has now been repudiated. Nevertheless, the declaration by the Secretary of State is, in my humble opinion, exactly what was wanted, and ought to do a lot of good.

See answers
2939 and
3021.

13. The greatest political danger to my mind is the possibility of the revival of the anti-cow-killing agitation. The protection movement has distinctly increased during the last few years. Subscriptions are being collected by various means. Up to the present no general movement towards active opposition has displayed itself, and I do not think that there is any immediate likelihood of an agitation. The danger of course would be that such a movement might set the rural population—mostly Hindus or at least with Hindu sympathies—against the Government. Papers relating to the anti-cow-killing agitation are appended. (See Annexure II.)

See answer
2862.

14. The Theosophists are, I think, of no political importance.

See answer
2991.

15. The United Provinces furnish factory hands for Calcutta, and, to some extent, for Bombay. It is in the matter of labour an exporting, and not an importing province.

See answer
2933.

16. There is a movement in progress in these Provinces for the education of *sadhus*. This will tend probably to increase their political importance,

See answer
2953.

though at present it has not had much effect. It is the case that some educated agitators have been in the habit of going about the country in the guise of *sadhus*. I have myself seen one or two at Dehra Dun, and Sir Charles Crosthwaite, when he was Lieutenant-Governor, got into conversation with one in the neighbourhood of Rikhikesh above Hardwar.

See answer
3007.

17. I do not believe that in the case of serious internal trouble, Hindus and Muhammadans would, under existing circumstances, unite under a common figurehead. The movement would, so far as one can in present circumstances foresee, be more likely, in the first instance at all events, to take the form of a republic, although people at the stage in which the inhabitants of this Province are just now, are not likely to be attracted by the abstract idea of a republic. The Province contains a turbulent and inflammable element. It requires a firm hand. But so long as the Government keeps faith with it, and the landholders are not alienated by any unfair treatment, disloyalty is not, in my opinion, likely to exhibit itself except on the part of the discontented and disappointed educated community.

See answer
2894.

18. I am decidedly of opinion that His Highness the Nawab of Rampur might find it difficult to maintain order should the Imperial Service Troops be withdrawn from his State. The population of Rohilkhand generally is still inclined to be turbulent. In case troops were removed there is little doubt that this tract would give cause for anxiety, not so much on account of distinct anti-British feeling, as because the people are naturally disposed towards lawlessness which would probably, on such an opportunity, not fall short of serious interference with the ordinary course of administration. To the tracts mentioned by Mr. Lovett, as containing a comparatively lawless population, should be added Bundelkhand. This area is one in which agricultural conditions constantly present difficulties owing to its liability to famine. The inhabitants at such times frequently turn to dacoity and co-operate with bands from Native States.

See answers
2898 and
2904 and
2914.

19. The statement that "all the United Provinces' police are trained to arms" needs a little qualification. Here, as in Bombay, the police is divided into "armed" and "civil" police, the former being trained to arms regularly, the latter given some comparatively simple instruction for a year after joining the force and a short annual training. The general direction of the force is in the hands of 147 gazetted officers, all Europeans; 73 European inspectors; 185 Indian inspectors and 52 European sergeants. The total of the force is 35,832: distributed into:—*Armed Police*, sub-inspectors and head-constables 1129, constables 6243; *Civil Police*, sub-inspectors and head-constables 4492, constables 23,256; *Mounted Police*, head constables 10, constables 246. I think that the police are to be depended upon. The best proof is that the seditionists hate them even more than they hate the Government. It would be asking too much to expect them to remain loyal if there were deep-rooted disloyalty in the native army. If there were trouble in Sikh regiments only, our police would remain unaffected.

See answer
2961.

20. The Volunteers could not possibly hold Agra fort in the event of trouble. At the same time, if properly armed, they would be far more valuable than they were in 1857, because their weapons would be immeasurably superior to any that the people could bring against them, while the latter would not be as experienced in the use of arms as they were then. One grave defect in respect of the Volunteer force, is that many of the Volunteers are very badly armed. I have been representing for years to the Army Department that if you have a Volunteer force of over 4,000 men, as you have in these Provinces—a large proportion of which is either extra efficient or efficient—it is unfair not to give them good weapons. The United Provinces Horse are at present armed with a carbine which was discarded after the Boer war. It cannot shoot straight at the shortest distances and this has been tested and proved not only by the officers of the corps, but also by General Campbell—himself a very good shot—when he was Inspector of Volunteers. The rifles in the hands of the infantry are many of them old and practically worn out. There are a number of persons anxious to become Volunteers who have offered to pay for,

their own weapons, provided that they could get new and un-used rifles, but this concession has so far been denied to them by the Ordnance Department.

21. For information regarding attempts to pervert troops serving in the United Provinces, I invite a reference to the Hon. Mr. Holms' demi-official letter No. 14-N-32, dated 23rd May 1907 to Sir Herbert Risley.*

22. Information regarding outrages of a political character is, under standing orders, communicated at once by Commissioners to officers commanding stations if the outrage takes place near a station where there are troops, otherwise notice is sent to the General Officer Commanding the brigade. Subsequently the local Government if necessary, communicates to the General Officer Commanding the division. So much about communication from the civil side to the military one. Communication from the military to the civil is not always adequate. On the 24th January 1910 the Chief of the Staff wired a secret telegram in the following sense :—

See answer
3025.

“States necessity for drawing up of plans and orders in detail for measures to support civil authorities in stations within a brigade in the event of riots. Where General Officer Commanding or officer commanding the station is absent plans must be given confidentially to the next in seniority. Absolute secrecy to be ensured.”

See answer
3045.

No information was given to the local Government of the despatch of this telegram and a number of the military commanders connected the telegram, which is in itself quite free from objection, with the extension of the Seditious Meetings Act and the Criminal Law Amendment Act to the United Provinces on the 13th January 1910, and assumed that the civil authorities had some special reasons for requiring assistance. The result was that some very curious things happened in these Provinces. In one station a very junior officer of a British cavalry regiment was in charge, and the men under him are reported to have slept in their boots. This got known and there was a certain amount of scare and all sorts of rumours got about. One was that a native cavalry regiment had mutinied and that the General Officer Commanding and all his staff had been shot. This might have been avoided had a little more explanation been given to the military officers as to why the orders were being given, and if the civil officers had also been told that such orders were being issued.

23. The cessation of recruitment in Oudh has had a considerable economic effect which may almost be deemed serious enough to justify the term political. For example, it used to be the case that one squadron of the 4th Bengal Cavalry was recruited in Oudh from Hindustani Muhammadans, but it is believed that at present men for this squadron are obtained from the Jaipur State and its neighbourhood. No notice of the change appears to have been received by the civil Government. There have been questions recently in the local Council regarding this matter and there is a good deal of feeling among retired officers and men because their sons are no longer eligible for recruitment. It seems to me that the civil Government ought to receive more information about recruiting centres than it has at present. The only general statement on this subject available is contained in a memorandum of 1897 or 1898, drawn up by Brigadier-General Young, which is I am told, now regarded as obsolete by the military authorities. This is to some extent supplemented and brought up to date by the monographs on castes recruited which have been issued by the Government of India. But no information is available to the civil Government as regards specific alterations in the place of recruitment.

See answers
3029 and
3033.

I hope that no suggestion will be made to reduce the 1st and 3rd Brahmans. The question whether it is better to have class companies or a class regiment is one on which the military authorities are more fitted to give an opinion than I am. My general view is in favour of class companies as against class regiments, but I am not sure that for Brahmans a class regiment is not the best.

J. P. HEWETT,

NAINI TAL :

The 16th August 1912.

Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces.

ANNEXURE II.

(See answers 2862, 2864 and 2929.)

Papers relating to the anti-cow-killing agitation.

(EXTRACT FROM MR. CLAY'S PRÉCIS.)

* * * * *

There has been evidence that during the past eighteen months some extension of the public interest in Gaurakshina matters has taken place. But in the first place the speeches and pamphlets on the subject have not shown the same tendency to violence of language which was noticeable in 1893-4. Further, despite the efforts of lecturers and pamphleteers, no trace of any central organization or control of the various scattered *sabhas* and organizations has come to light. They seem to depend for their success very largely on the efforts of individual enthusiasts, and even their eloquence has frequently met with a very discouraging response. There are, nevertheless, signs in the eastern districts, and in Bundelkhand particularly, that a careful watch on the movement will have to be maintained. I cannot conclude more suitably than by a reference to the admirably lucid remarks on the whole subject contained in paragraphs 5 to 14 of the Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces' minute on Mr. Cleveland's confidential report. The latter's views are recorded at pages 21 and 22 of the report.

*3rd December 1910.**Conclusions arrived at by the Government of the United Provinces after considering events connected with the anti-cow-killing agitation during 1911.*

As will be seen from the above summary of the file, the past year has been an important one in the history of the cow-killing movement, and for the first time the agitation has enjoyed some sort of organization and coherence. The various agents have been bound together by the common object of collecting signatures for the monster petitions. This object has been so simple and immediate, and has entailed so little sacrifice from the subscribers, that it is easy to understand that the attempt to collect signatures has met with considerable success. On the other hand, efforts to obtain subscriptions, except from local *gaushalas*, have not been equally fortunate. A fair deduction from this state of affairs is, that the feeling aroused by the movement is, in nearly all cases, superficial. For the moment, indeed, there have been signs of a closing up in the Hindu ranks and of a more cordial *entente* between the members of the various sects, but there is no reason to suppose that the causes of their original difference have been removed, or that their antagonisms will remain in abeyance when the collecting of signatures has come to an end, and the bond which gave the workers for this end a temporary unity of purpose has ceased to exist. In consequence, it seems probable that there will be a considerable decrease in the agitation during the next year, unless the leaders of the movement are fortunate enough to discover some other party cry as useful as was the idea of the monster petition. The success of this idea was due to three things—it cost nothing, it was easy to understand, and its ostensible object was one to which no Hindu could take exception: it will be extremely difficult to replace. In the meantime, the movement will continue to need close attention and the active and cordial support which it has received from the Arya Samaj must not be forgotten. By their activities the members of this society have for the time propitiated the *Sanatan Dharam*, at one time their bitterest opponents, and have endeavoured to use the agitation to galvanize the moribund *swadeshi* boycott of foreign sugar.

The 13th January 1912.

ANNEXURE III.

(See answers 2866, 2882 and 2977.)

Letter No. 54-L., dated Simla, the 16th July 1912, from the Hon. Mr. R. Burn, I.C.S., Chief Secretary to the Government, United Provinces, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department.

I am directed to address you regarding the present state of feeling among Muhammadans in this Province with special reference to the war in progress

between Italy and Turkey, and recent events in Persia. The Muhammadan population of the Province did not exhibit any great amount of feeling about the war until after it had, so far as Sir John Hewett is able to judge, begun to excite the feelings of their brethren in other provinces more seriously. But for a considerable period it has been evident to Sir John Hewett from the selections from vernacular papers published in various parts of India and from conversations he has held with influential Muhammadans that a state of exacerbation exists which is of sufficient importance to be brought prominently to the notice of the Government of India.

2. Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities between Italy and Turkey an outburst of feeling took place in favour of the latter country, which found vent in appeals to the Government of India to move the British Government to intervene (*vide* Mr. Clarke's letter no. 2058-E.B., dated the 27th October 1911).^{*} In its early stages the feeling was not confined to Muhammadans, but was also shared by Hindus, and suggestions were even received that Indians should be sent to assist the wounded Turks. Meetings to express sympathy were held in various places, and considerable sums of money were subscribed.

3. In January of the present year the attention of Indian Muhammadans was attracted to events which were taking place in Persia, and the Government of India were asked direct by the All-India Muslim League to move the Imperial Government to secure and maintain the independence and integrity of Persia (*vide* Mr. Clarke's letter no. 138-E.A., dated January 16th 1912).^{*} Meetings continued to be held to discuss this subject and addresses were received by both the Government of India and the local Government, while the strength of the feeling aroused was manifest from the articles which appeared in the Press. The receipt of the news of the bombardment of the shrine of Imam Reaa at Meshed, in the beginning of April, still further excited Muhammadans of all classes. Owing to the scanty and contradictory information on this topic given in the telegrams supplied by Reuter's agency the full effect was delayed. But when fuller details were received in English newspapers, particularly in some picture papers, indignation reached its highest pitch. The Lieutenant-Governor is informed that articles by Professor E. G. Browne in the "Manchester Guardian" have been especially responsible for the warmth engendered.

4. At the end of May there was some danger of serious trouble at Lucknow. One Yusuf Husain, a barrister, and *mujtahid* named Násir Husain made an attempt to get up a meeting of *Shiahs* in the Victoria Park at that place to protest against Russian misdeeds. Yusuf Husain is a member of the Congress, and it has been stated that he is in communication with the Hon. Nawab Saiyid Muhammad Bahadur of Madras. He announced his intention of making Russian flags and burning them publicly, and he also wished to pass resolutions urging Britain to declare war against Russia. Though he is a man with little following it would have been quite possible for him to inflame the feelings of the mob. The situation was handled with great tact by the Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner of Lucknow, who were successful in persuading the leaders of the Muhammadans to dissociate themselves from action of the kind contemplated by Yusuf Husain. On June 9th, a meeting was held at Lucknow which was addressed by a number of influential Muhammadans. A remarkable feature of the position, in view of the fact that the shrine at Meshed is one of importance to *Shiahs* only, lies in the fact that *Sunnis* also joined the meeting. The chairman, in fact, was Maulana Abdul Majid, one of the leading *Sunnis* of Lucknow. In his speech special stress was laid on the fact that the affair of Meshed was one which affected both communities in Islam. He was followed by the Hon. Raja Sir Muhammad Ali Muhammad Khan of Mahmudabad (a *Shiah*) who went considerably further than the first speaker. In emphasizing the unity of interests of the two sects he travelled beyond religion into politics. The report of his speech shows, the Lieutenant-Governor regrets to have to say, that his reference to the behaviour of the Italians was misleading and inflammatory. He stated that the Italian Foreign minister informed the Turkish Government that if the latter failed to settle affairs in Tripoli and make over possession quietly Italian airships would demolish the sanctuary at Mecca. And the words attributed to him show that he led his audience to believe that an attack on Mecca was at the time when he spoke still a possible contingency.

^{*} Not printed.

He omitted all reference to the fact which had been already announced to the public that the British Government had successfully intervened in order to ensure protection of the sacred places. In regard to Meshed he estimated that Russians had by the loot of the Shrine, secured treasure worth thirty crores of rupees or twenty millions sterling. which, he suggested, would be used to build a fleet. He laid special stress on the fact that the treasures of a shrine are not the property of the ruler of the country, and that the outrage was one against religion.

5. Sir John Hewett was so impressed by the marks of excitement which had become evident that he had enquiries made confidentially in all parts of the Province to gauge the state of public feeling, and I am to communicate the result for the information of the Government of India. Copies of the telegrams and addresses received from time to time have already been forwarded to the Government of India (Foreign Department). It would appear that even the great bulk of illiterate Muhammadans have heard of the Turco-Italian war. They regard it as a contest between Muslims and non-Muslims and their sympathies are entirely with the Turks. The incidents at Meshed have not yet become so fully known, but news of them is likely to be spread by the meetings and agitation now going on. Among this class public questions and foreign affairs ordinarily excite no interest. But if any subject is connected with religion fanaticism is easily aroused. There is already a vague feeling very wide-spread that His Majesty the King-Emperor ought to have intervened in favour of the Turks.

6. Among the more educated Muhammadans a more definite spirit exists, and is being fostered by papers, pamphlets and public meetings. I am to enclose a copy of a confidential report, dated June 14th, 1912, (Annexure IV) received from Mr. Lovett, Commissioner of Lucknow, which appears to His Honour to convey an accurate description of the attitude of educated Muslims at that very important centre of *Shiah* life and influence. In connection with his first remarks on the inability of the British Government to play a marked part in mediation with Italy, I am to forward an abstract in English of a Hindustani pamphlet (*Muhakma-i-Nadir*) (Annexure V) recently published by one Nadir Ali, a *vakil* of Agra. Sir John Hewett thinks that this pamphlet is cleverly written and will not be without its effect on the Muhammadan community. Indian Muhammadans, as a rule, regard the Sultan as the representative of the Khalifat. He is the custodian of the green flag of the Prophet, the guardian of Mecca, Medina and other sacred shrines, and the defender of the faith. There is a tradition that the downfall of the Turkish Empire would be one of the principal signs of the approach of the day of judgment (*Qiyamat*). Any event that affects the stability of the Turkish Empire attracts the notice and arrests the attention of Muhammadans. Even during the war with Russia excitement in India was intense. During the last thirty-five years the decline of the Turkish power has been watched with concern and anxiety. A hope has always been cherished that something would happen to arrest it, and there has been an undefined impression in the minds of Muhammadans that the help and co-operation of Great Britain would be available. In the pamphlet referred to above, however, the present attitude of Great Britain is contrasted unfavourably with the agitation raised over Turkish actions in Armenia. The fact that that agitation was unfruitful is ignored. It is sufficient for the argument of the writer that when Christians were thought to be in danger at the hands of Turks, Great Britain was prepared to take active steps in their favour. At present when a Muhammadan Power is suffering from unprovoked attack by a Christian Power, the British Government is unwilling to make any protest.

7. A considerable body of Muhammadan feeling believes or affects to believe that the Christian nations of Europe would not be displeased were the Turkish Empire in Europe to disappear. And, though it is of less wide prevalence, a belief has been reported from more than one source that a secret Christian coalition exists to overthrow Muhammadan Powers all over the world and ultimately to suppress the religion of Islam. By some the coalition is definitely stated to include Russia, France and Italy. The action of the Powers at the close of the war between Turkey and Greece is recalled, when combined efforts were made by European nations including England to restore Greek possessions. A rumour is even current, apparently based on the publication of the Foreign Enlistment

Act, that the Government has issued a circular prohibiting Indian Muhammadans from showing practical sympathy with their co-religionists in Tripoli.

8. Mr. Lovett and other officers consulted have referred to the effect of the territorial changes announced at the Coronation Darbar. It is generally felt that the British Government has failed to exert influence, which it might have used, in restraining Italy and Russia, and the Lieutenant-Governor regards it as an undeniable fact that the reunion of eastern and western Bengal is regarded by the Muhammadans of the United Provinces generally as a concession to agitation which to some minds even appears as a mark of weakness. Such a feeling, if it is at all widespread, is likely to have embarrassing results in the future. Three years ago, when preparations were being made for Council elections, a tendency was observed on the part of the younger educated Muhammadans to throw in their lot with the Congress. The expectation was not fulfilled owing to the general satisfaction with which the Council regulations were received by Muhammadans. But it is now reported that the movement has revived. It is true that the success of the Council reforms has largely detracted from the influence of the Congress on public thought. The larger association of non-officials with the work of Government has created a sense of responsibility and has reduced the importance of an organization which was in perpetual opposition and devoted its attention to destructive criticism. It would be a matter for regret if a similar spirit were revived in a stronger form by the coalition of the two principal sections of the Indian people. The Lieutenant-Governor does not believe that such a coalition would ever be permanent, but he does regard it as possible for temporary and transitory purposes. Within the last fortnight it has been pressed very strongly on his notice both by visitors, Hindus as well as Muhammadans, of position and authority, as well as by articles in newspapers such as the *Comrade* and the *Aligarh Institute Gazette* that a serious attempt is to be made to unite Muhammadans with Hindus in a protest against the remarks made by His Majesty's Secretary of State in the House of Lords about paragraph 3 of the Government of India's despatch, dated the 25th August 1911. The Lieutenant-Governor is not able to judge how far this attempt is likely to be successful, but he has received many assurances from responsible and reliable persons that the interpretation placed by the general public who had read the despatch was that which has now been repudiated by the Secretary of State.

9. To sum up briefly, Sir John Hewett considers that the present situation is full of anxiety. He has been particularly impressed by the views of Muhammadan officials, by conversations with Muhammadans of high position in the United Provinces, including His Highness the Nawab of Rampur, and by the state of things at Lucknow and in Rohilkhand. The complete effect of the Russian attack on the shrine at Meshed may not yet have been felt. It is probable that the excitement caused by the war between Italy and Turkey has to some extent subsided. But the reason for this is not altogether a matter for congratulation. Resentment is still felt at what is regarded as supine inaction on the part of the British Government. And the improvement in the situation is due solely to the belief that the Turks and Arabs are successfully maintaining their own. The announcement by His Excellency the Viceroy that owing to British representations the Italians had undertaken not to interfere with the pilgrimage to Arabia was of untold value. Some gratification was also expressed by the announcement that immediately after the affair at Meshed Sir Edward Grey addressed the Russian Government. But the results of the latter proceeding have not been marked, and there is a considerable danger of ill-feeling spreading still further. The Lieutenant-Governor will exercise a close watch over future developments, but His Honour thinks it desirable to bring to the notice of the Government of India the existing state of affairs as it appears to him.

ANNEXURE IV.

(Referred to in paragraph 6, Annexure III.)

Copy of a demi-official letter, dated the 14th June 1912, from the Commissioner, Lucknow Division, to the Chief Secretary to Government.

Your confidential letter No. 712-C. The following causes have been working together, and are working together now, to lower our prestige among

Muhammadan politicians and thinkers :—

- (a) Our inability to play a marked part in mediation with Italy and the apparent absence of all British effort to help the Sultan of Turkey out of his difficulties.
- (b) The behaviour of the Russians at Meshed and towards Persia generally in spite of the Anglo-Russian Agreement.
- (c) The alteration of the partition of Bengal. It is unfortunate that the last of these should be coincident with the other two. It has given an edge to an impression of our weakness derived from them. For, whatever Mr. Montagu may say, Muhammadan politicians do emphatically regard recent Bengal arrangements as a reversal of the partition and a surrender to agitation.

2. I have, in conversation with two or three Musalman gentlemen, had occasion to point out the measures taken by Government to safeguard the interests of their co-religionists in Eastern Bengal and the concession to Musalman sentiment in the restoration of Delhi as the capital of India. I have on these occasions found the former depreciated as unlikely to be lasting or substantial and the latter declared to be of small *practical* benefit. I generally now avoid the subject altogether with educated Muhammadans. I have known it give an unpleasant turn to discussion. I have heard Muhammadans, not politicians, speak with appreciation of the transfer of the capital to Delhi; but I have only met one Muhammadan taking an active interest in political affairs who did so.

3. Educated Muhammadan opinion understands our powerlessness in regard to Tripoli, although it contrasts our inaction now with our championship of Turkey in former days. But it seriously resents the behaviour of the Russians in Persia and especially at Meshed which it considers to be far more aggressive and insolent than it would have been had there been instead of an Anglo-Russian agreement an independent Great Britain to say 'hands off' to Russia. There is an impression that we are now more afraid of Russia than we used to be; and it is possible that this impression has been deepened by the idea gathered by some from perusal of the English newspapers that our Empire has passed its zenith and is in danger of collapse.

4. I do not see how any one, who is in frequent contact with Muhammadans interested in politics, can be of opinion that our prestige with them stands where it did a year ago. At the same time they are well aware that their interests are bound up with ours. What we have to anticipate from them is far more active and persistent agitation to gain their objects than we have ever experienced in the past, and a more aggressive tone if we are not firm in showing what we mean to give them and what we do not mean to give them. They are of course the small minority of Musalmans; but they are quite able to extend their influence greatly among their co-religionists and are endeavouring to do so. This may do us no good.

5. About a month ago a loyal Muhammadan gentleman, thoroughly conversant with Muhammadan politics and aspirations, whom I have known for twenty years, said to me: "I warn you confidentially that just now there is serious discontent among Muhammadans. They are angered at the reversal of the partition and at the apparent inaction of the Government in regard to Tripoli and Persia. They are agitating a good deal among themselves. If I were you, I would not allow any meetings to be held at Lucknow which may tend to inflame the masses." I should state that he introduced the subject of Muhammadan feeling into our conversation. I did not.

5. We are apt to suppose in India, that because we see on the surface a good deal of somewhat hollow agitation and obvious wirepulling that there is little worthy of careful attention underground. But, what we have had occasion to learn is that such things may be manifestations of a gradual change of sentiment seriously inimical to the prestige of our rule.

ANNEXURE V.

(Referred to in paragraph 6, Annexure III.)

The Urdu pamphlet entitled "Muhakma-i-Nadir" (Nadir's verdict or opinion) is a work of Nadir Ali, Vakil, Agra, printed, in 1912 at the Shamsi Press Agra.

The writer says at the commencement that he has two objects in view in writing this pamphlet. One of them is to impress upon his countrymen that they should regard the various changes announced at the Coronation Darbar as beneficial, and not allow themselves to be misled into wrong notions and thereby make their whole nation liable to the charge of ingratitude; and the second is to point out that if Government did not care for the susceptibilities of the people (in important matters), it would lay itself open to the charge of ignoring a law of nature.

In dealing with the second object first the writer proceeds as follows:—

"A man, whether he be a ruler or the ruled, is after all a *man*. To treat the natural tendencies and religious susceptibilities of man with indifference is the greatest mistake which the statesmen of a government can commit. The absence of such human tendencies and susceptibilities in a nation is incompatible with its continued existence and is a sign of its being dead, while to ignore them is not to recognize a law of nature. The passing of a kingdom from the hands of one nation into those of another is but the working out of the will of the Ruler of the Universe. Ever since the world was created and during all the time it will endure, such changes have always taken place and will always continue to occur. But so long as the human being is so constituted as he is at present the natural tendencies and the susceptibilities referred to above will always be found to exist in him, and it is these tendencies and susceptibilities on which the entire fabric of the human society and the political organization of the world are based. For instance, when a person is in distress, it is (felt to be) the duty of all those who bear a relationship to him—whether they are his relations or connected with him by religious ties, or belong to the same species as he—to render him help. Though this idea of help, considered from the standpoint of high-mindedness (self-respect), is, on the one hand, humiliating to the person standing in need thereof, it is, on the other hand, very generous and noble on the part of the giver and necessary for the preservation of society.

"A boy can never grow up if its parents do not consider it their duty to bring it up. A sick person cannot have relief without the help and care of a doctor and a nurse. (Similarly) a weak person cannot be saved from the clutches of a strong one, unless some other strong person comes to the rescue of the former.

"Among the recognized civilized ruling nations the principle of rendering assistance finds so much favour and is so much acted upon that whenever a weak community in any country is reported to be oppressed even by its own government, other governments give friendly advice to, and even bring pressure to bear upon, the government concerned to ameliorate the condition of the community in question. Hence when according to his religion it is taken to be the duty of a person to do all in his power to protect his co-religionists, he is not to blame if he, on learning that oppression and high-handedness are being practised on his co-religionists in other countries—either led by human tendencies or impelled by religious injunctions—has recourse to each and every lawful (constitutional) means to help him. To be weak is, no doubt, a matter for derision and a disgrace; but it is no sin or crime. With what little wisdom the people of a country may conduct its affairs, the people of another country have no other right, but that of might and force, to interfere in the affairs of the former, and then to slaughter their innocent children, helpless women, cripples and old men, when they stand up for the defence of their country. Every man can realize what effect the news of such (dread) deeds would produce on the minds of the co-religionists of the oppressed (in other countries), and to what extent their religious feelings would be stirred up and their sense of human honour roused (offended). When by means of royal orders and announcements the (Indian) Musalmans are prevented from showing their practical sympathy (with their co-religionists in trouble in other countries) they have no other remedy in their hands but to request their rulers that when they do not allow their obedient subjects (*i.e.*, Musalmans) to

do anything in the matter, they should themselves do something, for they can do it. But when no heed is paid to such a request of the people, we beg pardon for taking the liberty to express our views on the subject as follows lest we should be guilty of shirking our duty to Government in the matter:—

“When Government takes no account of the request of its subjects, it is quite possible that the people may be led to think that the Government (itself) is in some way or other concerned in the upshot (of the affair about which the request is made). Hence, just as it is our duty to acquaint the Government with grave apprehensions of this nature, Government should not also on its part treat the request of its subjects for help as a supplication (for favour). This request is not such as a shameless beggar would put forward, but it is one made in view of the right that has accrued to the people in virtue of their compliance with the (prohibitory) royal announcements on the subject.

“I admit that a Power that wants to remain neutral in a war entered upon by two other Powers should not under the international law allow its subjects also to side with any party. But it is much more necessary to pay due regard to the law (principles) which nature has implanted in the human mind. The Government is therefore bound to see also that those matters in which the honour and reputation of its subjects are involved are not lost sight of. It is necessary for the (preservation of the) prestige of Indian Musalmans that so far as possible the Powers in other countries, that profess the same religion as they, should not be allowed to be trampled upon, and that no hostile power is permitted to do an act which is calculated to affect (strike at the root of) the national existence of a very large number of the subjects of the (British) Government. When all the powerful nations of the world make up their minds (conspire) that a particular religion should be destroyed or the sovereignty and existence of a particular nation should be blotted out of the surface of the earth, and its innocent women, children and old persons be put to the sword without cause (any provocation), (it is a pity that) the Indian co-religionists of such a nation be, on the one hand, prohibited from rendering any help to the latter, and their request (for interference) be, on the other hand, treated with ridicule and contempt! The wound caused by such a course of action cannot be healed by any after treatment; and the leaders of the Liberal party will be held responsible for the dangers that will arise, and the evil consequences that will flow to the (British) Government sooner or later from such a policy.

“It is a striking phenomenon of the omnipotence of the Ruler of the Universe that a nation that fills the continent of Asia, forms a large portion of the British subjects, and will always be a dominant factor in British politics, should have become or are becoming a peace-loving people owing to the good luck of the just and highly moral (civilized) British Government. If, owing to any narrow-mindedness or selfish policy, no regard is paid to the feelings of such a people, and the idea that the destruction of their national honour and prestige is aimed at gets somehow deeply rooted in their minds, it would not be strange if the heat (fire) of their sense of honour (and indignation) slowly rising in their cold ashes (peaceable minds), flared up in flames of excitement in some place where any such thing was least expected; and we assure (warn the Government) that the peace of the whole world would be disturbed in attempting to extinguish this fire. This is a picture of the state of things that may possibly arise at some future time. But there is another danger that is to be guarded against at the present time, and I would not be doing my duty if I did not draw the attention of the rulers of this country to it.

“Loyalty, whether in the friends (allies) or in the subjects, is always the result of that trust which is produced in them by the sympathy of the Government (with the former). When the people become distrustful, whether on real or fancied grounds (rightly or wrongly), they naturally turn to those from whom they expect sympathy, or whose attitude and conduct encourage them to turn towards them. Just as Nature has placed mountains on one side of India and the sea on the other, so there are Asiatic Powers round about it whom the British statesmen should always bear in mind in their dealings with their Indian subjects. It should also be remembered well that, for the preservation of the

internal peace of the country, it is the loyalty of the people alone which can serve as an iron wall (against all comers from outside) and that forts, armies and ships are ineffective safeguards as compared with the people's loyalty.

"The people cannot tell the whole truth either in speech or writing on very many occasions ; and they obey the orders of the rulers simply in view of their present objects (existing circumstances). But the conduct of the ruling nation on such occasions furnishes historians with ready means to arrive at conclusions which are damaging to the reputation of that nation.

"The representations which the (Indian) Musalmans made to their Government to interfere in the affairs of Persia and Tripoli were based on the same deep principles which guided the policy of Mr. Gladstone, but the British Ministers have ignored them, and paid no heed to the advice and good will of those who gave them the best counsel in the matter. It would not perhaps be improper for me to submit that the representations which the Right Hon. Maulvi Saiyid Amir Ali, the pride of this country, and Nawab Maulvi Mushtaq Husain, the ornament of the (Muhammadan) nation, made to the British rulers and nation were a true expression of the religious feeling and sentiments of the Muhammadans though they were couched in guarded language, or that they were a faint echo of the same feelings of the late Mr. Gladstone, the lover of his country and nation, and devoted champion of his religion, who, moved by the unrest among the Armenians in the Turkish Empire, created by his utterances a great excitement and sensation in the minds of the British people ; but Gladstone's voice was the powerful voice of a leader of a powerful and living nation, while the representations of the Hon. Mr. Amir Ali and Nawab Mushtaq Husain are but the cry of the leaders of a weak people."

Turning now to his first object of bringing out this pamphlet, the writer observes that unless a person first thoroughly understands the rules that should govern his own conduct and makes himself conversant with the duties of a householder, he cannot be considered competent to give his advice in matters relating to the administration of a town, city or country. When a nation is backward in these qualifications, the Almighty Lord, who controls and watches over the affairs of the universe, appoints a foreign Power to rule over it, and thus saves it from the consequences of its own indiscretions and follies. But, however wisely a foreign nation may rule over a country, it is confronted with difficulties at every step on account of the inability of the natives to understand the true merits of the measures adopted by the former.

"The consultative (representative) system of government is all very well in a country like Europe, where the people are almost all educated and whose interests responsibilities, etc., are identical. Such is, however, not the case in India, and its people would be ill-advised to seek undue interference in matters political. The ruler of a country has full power to make what places he thinks proper the head-quarters of his governors and other officers ; and the people have no right to oppose it on grounds of their personal comforts and other interests. The people may of course respectfully offer their advice to Government in any matter, but they cannot insist that such and such a thing must be done in the manner approved of by them. For instance, they cannot demand that the army shall wear such and such a uniform or arms, or the high officers of the Government shall reside in such and such a place, or a particular district shall be included in a particular division, and so on. Properly speaking, it is sheer indulgence on the part of Government that it allows the people even to express their views on such matters, and the latter ought not to take undue advantage of the freedom of speech Government has very kindly granted them. When a person, or a party or a government, makes a promise, it means that the promise would be made good if the circumstances permitted it, and it not unoften happens that statesmen find it expedient to modify their measures. It is useless for one to discuss the changes that took place in the past ; and recent changes should be discussed only so far as they affect one's right and interests. And when, in bringing about any administrative or territorial change, the Government assures a community that its interests and rights will be fully safeguarded, it ought not to seek to oppose it. It is no fault of the Government if one community of a province has made greater progress than another when

the facilities given by the Government have been the same. It is true that the social and educational condition of the Muhammadans of Eastern Bengal has been very pitiable, and that it had begun to improve somewhat under the late change. But even with the new change they need not be disheartened and should rest assured that the ever-watchful Government is well aware of their condition, and as it has given its word it will not shirk safeguarding their interests. Surely, Government is not likely to act like those short-sighted persons whose loyalty would change with the change of circumstances. There will (of course) be found some thoughtless persons (among the Muhammadans) who would advise that under the changed circumstances that are distasteful to them they should cast in their lot with those undesirable (obnoxious) bodies that are at variance with the wishes and interests of the Government. In respect of such advisers suffice it to say that they resemble that impatient sick man who, unable to bear the sufferings of his ailment, is led to commit suicide. Whether the Congress is a good or bad body, it would be a clear case of madness on the part of the Musalmans to join it, when their leaders have all along considered it improper to do so, and have chalked out a different course of action for themselves. If one does not agree in any matter, and fretting like a child gives up a good line of action and takes to another, and then when disagreement arises in his new sphere also, as arise it must, how reprehensible (humiliating) it would be for him to retrace his steps and fall into the old groove again. There are very many men in both the Hindu and Muhammadan communities who hold quite different views from one another, so that if a few discontented or misguided members of one community join an association of another, this association cannot possibly be called a representative assembly of the whole country. It is of course very desirable that the men of this country should cultivate good-will and fellow-feeling with all classes of the people, but one should not adopt a course of action that is disapproved by Government. A policy that is hostile to the British Government will always prove suicidal to the community that adopts it. There are two courses open to the Indian Musalmans. They may adopt a course of action which will enable them to become friends with the other Indian communities as well as helpful to the Government; or adopt a different course which will neither make the other communities their friends nor the Government sympathetic towards them. Would to God that the thoughts of the people of India turned towards union and good-will among themselves, but all the steps that have hitherto been taken in this direction have not proved a complete success. Differences of opinion have occurred in the Congress camp as well as in the (various) Conferences."

The writer then, turning to the question of the change of the Indian capital from Calcutta to Delhi, observes that just as Nature has, with a view to secure proper adjustment of the various parts of the human body, appointed the seat of every organ in its proper place, in the same way it requires that the seat of the government of a country should be fixed in accordance with the political requirements of the people. The seat of a government may, according to the whims of a particular ruler, be removed from its proper locality for a time, but as soon as affairs assume their normal condition again, the headquarters of the government in every country will be re-established in the same place where it should be according to the local requirements or political exigencies of the land. The conquerors of a country generally make that place their capital which occurs in the centre of the land. The very fact of Calcutta having been made the capital of India implies that the British people did not make it their headquarters as conquerors. They came into this country as traders, and in course of time they succeeded in establishing their residence in the village which is now called Calcutta. This place continued to grow in importance and prosperity as British power extended in other parts of the country until it acquired its present dimensions. Thus the British people had no opportunity at the very outset to choose the best site for their capital in India; but now that God has made them undisputed rulers of the whole country, and peace reigns supreme from one end of the land to the other, they got the opportunity to transfer the capital from Calcutta to the place which lies almost in the centre of the country. Why, wise men have long been wondering as to what was the reason that the seat of the Imperial Government was not being transferred from Calcutta to Delhi.

Besides the centrality of Delhi, the Imperial Government would find greater facilities there in learning the affairs of the whole country; will have to bear smaller expenses for the annual exodus from Simla; shall be in greater proximity to other Asiatic and European Powers, and may, in course of time, have even to shift to Lahore on the ground of political exigencies; will be better able to encourage a graceful blending of western and eastern arts and industries at Delhi, which still retains India's ancient arts and industries more than any other place in the country; will be able to give an impetus to trade and commerce in Delhi, which is already distinguished for them and thereby enable many a young educated up-country man to obtain employment and not grow discontented; will by this change afford special gratification to both Hindus and Musalmans inasmuch as Delhi is the monument of the ancient greatness and glory of both the communities; will be able to enable another part of India to derive the same benefits of civilization, etc., from the presence of the Imperial Government in its midst as Bengal has reaped so long.

EVIDENCE OF MR. WATERFIELD.

3054. PRESIDENT.—Mr. Waterfield, you are Inspector-General of Police in the Central India Agency ?

3055. MR. WATERFIELD.—Yes, sir.

3056. PRESIDENT.—Have you had considerable experience of that part of India ?

3057. MR. WATERFIELD.—I have been there for the last seventeen years.

3058. PRESIDENT.—What are the duties of the Central India Agency police ? Are they maintained in formed bodies or distributed in small detachments over the Agency ? What is the strength of the force under you ? How many are armed ?

3059. MR. WATERFIELD.—I must explain that the Central India Agency police are practically divided into three branches,—the district, the criminal branch, which are really the remnant of the Thagi and Dacoity Department, and the military police which were formed from the Bhil battalion. The district police do ordinary watch and ward work at various places. The seven divisions in which they work are:—Indore Residency, Mhow Cantonment, Manpur District and Agency, Neemuch Cantonment, Sehore Cantonment and Agency, and Sutna Agency. They also provide guards for treasuries. The criminal branch carry on the work of the old Thagi and Dacoity Department throughout the Central India States, with sub-agencies at Gwalior, Sehore, Nowgong, Neemuch and Manpur; their headquarters are at Indore. The military police are employed on guard duties at outstations with headquarters at Indore.

The strength of the police serving under me is 527.

3060. PRESIDENT.—Are any of them armed ?

3061. MR. WATERFIELD.—Yes; 314 are armed; the criminal branch have the old Martini carbine, the others have smooth-bores. There are 60 rifles altogether.

I might add that the strength of the military police is 616; these are all riflemen, armed with M. H. rifle and are distributed as follows. They have taken the place of the old Malwa Bhil Corps :—

Headquarters	...	9	Native officers, 364 non-commissioned officers and men.			
Nowgong	...	2	"	"	72	" " "
Sehore	2	"	"	72	" " "
Gwalior Residency	...	1	"	"	36	" " "
Manpur	...	1	"	"	18	" " "
Sutna	1	"	"	18	" " "
Neemuch	"	"	18	" " "
Total		...	16		616	

3062. PRESIDENT.—Are the police recruited from the inhabitants of the Central India States or from British territory ? What generally is their class composition ?

3063. MR. WATERFIELD.—They almost all come from British India. Those of the criminal branch are all from British India.

Recruiting is bad for the district police because of the poor pay; in it we have Muhammadans and Hindus from the United Provinces and Punjab, that is, 225 Muhammadans, 277 Hindus, 1 Sikh and 4 others.

The criminal branch is composed of similar classes.

The military police are recruited purely from the Bhils of the Agency, with a few Bombay men as well.

3064. PRESIDENT.—In case of widespread disturbance could they be trusted to co-operate with the British military authorities in quelling it ?

3065. MR. WATERFIELD.—The criminal branch could, but the others could not unless they had British officers present. The Bhils would be staunch and keen. (See also paragraphs 1 and 2 of Annexure.)

3066. PRESIDENT.—Would the district police join the people in the disturbance ?

3067. MR. WATERFIELD.—No, they are not local enough.

3068. PRESIDENT.—As regards the district police, the force is so small that I do not suppose you could spare any reserve for, as it were, field operations ?

3069. MR. WATERFIELD.—No, sir.

3070. PRESIDENT.—Under whom do the military police serve ?

3071. MR. WATERFIELD.—They are directly under the Agent to the Governor General ; but if I want men, I am able to draw on them.

3072. PRESIDENT.—Have they any British officers ?

3073. MR. WATERFIELD.—Yes, they have two, a commandant and an assistant commandant.

3074. PRESIDENT.—Are these Bhils good men ?

3075. MR. WATERFIELD.—Yes, sir, quite good. They were greatly elated at being taken for Gurkhas at the Darbar.

3076. SIR W. MEYER.—Is it easy to enlist them ?

3077. MR. WATERFIELD.—Yes, it is now, though it has not always been so. One commandant derided the idea. But they have been on line building for the last year and there have been no desertions. I have had them out after Bhils themselves and they have done well. The only disadvantage is that they like to have their families with them, to cook for them, etc. ; but they are getting over that.

3078. PRESIDENT.—I gather that for the suppression of disturbance on any scale, the force we could possibly rely on is the Bhil corps ; we could not rely on the others because they are so scattered and they have no officers ?

3079. MR. WATERFIELD.—Yes. (See also paragraphs 1 and 2 of Annexure.)

3080. PRESIDENT.—Your duties take you about a good deal among Native States ; so far as you have observed, what is the general feeling towards the Government in them ? What is the attitude of the States' authorities towards anti-British agitation ?

3081. MR. WATERFIELD.—In all States the feeling is absolutely favourable towards the Government, more especially in the smaller States as they know they would not exist long if we were to go. The measures taken by the States against agitators have been severely repressive. In Dhar, boys were expelled and masters turned out of the State. Indore also effected some deportations. Gwalior State was late in taking action because the State authorities had been convinced that nothing was going on. We found, however, that there was a connexion between Gwalior and Indore and the Nasik case. Gwalior took very strong action when the truth was realized. (See also paragraphs 3 and 7 of Annexure.)

3082. PRESIDENT.—I suppose the Maharaja imprisoned the intriguers ?

3083. MR. WATERFIELD.—Yes, and most of them are still in prison.

3084. SIR W. MEYER.—Indore took prompt measures ?

3085. MR. WATERFIELD.—Yes.

3066 SIR W. MEYER.—But the State was then under our administration ?

3087. MR. WATERFIELD.—Yes.

3088. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think it would have been equally prompt if there had been a *de facto* Native Ruler ?

3089. MR. WATERFIELD.—The Ruler is rather young, but I think I might answer 'yes' to that.

3090. SIR W. MEYER.—Speaking generally, when you have had occasion to communicate with Native States with regard to seditionists, have you found prompt co-operation ?

3091. MR. WATERFIELD.—Yes.

3092. SIR W. MEYER.—Are there many Chitpavan Brahmans employed ?

3093. MR. WATERFIELD.—Not now.

3094. SIR W. MEYER.—Were there a number employed before ?

3095. MR. WATERFIELD.—There were ; Indore cut them down to thirty per cent. which gave great offence.

3096. SIR W. MEYER.—And Gwalior ?

3097. MR. WATERFIELD.—He has not issued any orders.

3098. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you regard them as a mischievous body ?

3099. MR. WATERFIELD.—Certainly. There are two men I am constantly watching in Gwalior ; they are in Sindhia's service and are men in very high positions. The Maharaja has been warned, but he does not get rid of them because they are clever men and useful to him.

3100. SIR W. MEYER.—Has he been positively asked to get rid of them ?

3101. MR. WATERFIELD.—No, their names were included with a number of others.

3102. PRESIDENT.—I suppose the mischievous Chitpavans are in correspondence with Poona ?

3103. MR. WATERFIELD.—Before the Bombay case we found that a number of these people were intimately acquainted with the seditionists.

3104. SIR W. MEYER.—Which would you consider to be the most dangerous centre in the event of trouble ?

3105. MR. WATERFIELD.—I should say Indore.

3106. SIR W. MEYER.—And Gwalior ?

3107. MR. WATERFIELD.—No, the seditionists are not sufficiently numerous there. In Indore those who are not employed in the State are the descendants of those Deccani Brahmans who came up originally with their families and settled there.

3108. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you any reason to suppose that they are, or have been, in correspondence with agitators in Bombay and Bengal ?

3109. MR. WATERFIELD.—With those of Bombay and Bengal certainly, and perhaps with those of the Punjab, for almost all the Arya Samaj preachers who come to Indore turn out to be Punjabis.

3110. SIR W. MEYER.—Does the anti-cow-killing movement give any cause for anxiety ?

3111. MR. WATERFIELD.—It is active at present in Central India ; it is the peg on which they hang everything. (See also paragraph 4 of Annexure).

A. 2929. 3112. SIR W. MEYER.—Mr. Lovett told us this morning that these movements went in cycles.

3113. MR. WATERFIELD.—I share that view. In 1882, and every time there has been sedition (which may be said to have been flourishing in 1893-5 and lastly in 1907-09), anti-cow-killing has come up. Even in 1872 the Kuka rising was primarily due to anti-cow-killing views,

3114. SIR W. MEYER.—When would you say that the anti-cow-killing movement had reached its zenith in Central India ?

3115. MR. WATERFIELD.—I should say that it is at its zenith now.

3116. PRESIDENT.—In Gwalior itself they do not kill cows ?

3117. MR. WATERFIELD.—They do, when the Muhammadans cannot get bullocks ; but the number of Muhammadans is not large. A curious thing is that Muhammadans and Hindus intermingle a good deal in the States of Central India. They associate quite freely during each others' festivals.

3118. SIR W. MEYER.—Would the Muhammadans of Central India be excited by such an event as the alteration of the partition of Bengal ?

3119. MR. WATERFIELD.—I have never heard a word said.

3120. SIR W. MEYER.—Or about the war in Tripoli ?

3121. MR. WATERFIELD.—There has been a little of that kind of thing, for instance, the selling of pictures which always make the Turks win, etc. ; there have been no meetings.

3122. PRESIDENT.—The most important of the Native States in the Central India Agency are the two Maratha States of Gwalior and Indore and the Muhammadan State of Bhopal. It has been stated that reliance cannot be placed either on the loyalty of the Maratha States or on the fidelity of the State troops to their Rulers. Do you concur in this view ? Do you consider the forces maintained by the States generally a potential source of danger to the Government ?

3123. MR. WATERFIELD.—Not as far as the States are concerned, if the Chiefs or Darbars are meant, as I am perfectly convinced that both are loyal. There is a State I would mention which has not been alluded to, and that is Rewa. The Maharaja does not like us, but he is much too shrewd to take any action against the ruling power.

3124. PRESIDENT.—Is Rewa a big State ?

3125. MR. WATERFIELD.—Bigger than Bhopal in area. The Maharaja is always increasing his troops and has introduced a form of conscription ; the civil officials have also to serve in the army ; he is keen himself and will often go and do a day's work as a sepoy. (See also paragraph 6 annexure.)

3126. SIR W. MEYER.—What is his age ?

3127. MR. WATERFIELD.—He is only 35.

3128. SIR W. MEYER.—Is he capable ?

3129. MR. WATERFIELD.—Decidedly.

3130. SIR W. MEYER.—Is it actually a fact that he has enforced a kind of conscription ? What does the Agent to the Governor General think of it ?

3131. MR. WATERFIELD.—Yes, officials in civil appointments have also to serve in the army, but this is done also by the Maharaja Sindhia. Also villagers are impressed, and I know of a case when several men drowned themselves in order to escape military service. It has been reported several times. The United Provinces Government have made many reports on the subject. (See also paragraph 6 of Annexure.)

3132. SIR W. MEYER.—What is your own opinion about it ?

3133. MR. WATERFIELD.—Personally I do not know him very well, and I could not say much. He has not got the courage to be openly disloyal, though he is disloyal at heart. (See also paragraph 6 of Annexure.)

3134. SIR R. SCALLON.—Do you know if he has any retired native officers in his service ?

3135. MR. WATERFIELD.—I believe he has two subadars, but he thinks himself such a soldier that he does a good deal himself.

3136. SIR W. MEYER.—Do the people like his methods ?

3137. MR. WATERFIELD.—His people dislike them so much that they try to leave the State, which is very sparsely populated considering its size. There was a fall of 13 per cent. in the population between 1891 and 1901, partly due to famine in 1897, and I believe the 1911 census shows a return only to the 1891 figures.

3138. SIR W. MEYER.—How would you have described the late Maharaja of Indore ?

3139. MR. WATERFIELD.—As absolutely disloyal ; he also was too astute to shew it. (See also paragraph 5 of Annexure.)

3140. SIR W. MEYER.—You are aware of course that in 1857 the troops of Holkar and Sindhia went and joined the mutineers to a large extent ? Do you think there is a possibility of that happening again in like circumstances ?

3141. MR. WATERFIELD.—I do not think the Indore troops would, because they know the strength of the garrison at Mhow. The case of Gwalior is different ; it is a considerable distance from Jhansi.

3142. SIR W. MEYER.—A previous witness told us that, although the Maharaja Sindhia took great pains with his army, he did not think the local army was worth much as a fighting force.

3143. MR. WATERFIELD.—I do not think Sindhia's troops are worth much as a fighting force, that is, leaving out the Imperial Service Troops.

3144. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing a portion of the Indian army were to mutiny, what do you think would happen as regards the Imperial Service Troops ?

3145. MR. WATERFIELD.—Their fidelity would rather depend on the fidelity of our own troops who were nearest to them.

3146. PRESIDENT.—A considerable number of guns are in the possession of the Central India States. Have you had opportunities of seeing any gun practice with them ? Do you think that any of them would be effective in the hands of the present personnel ? Do the States maintain stocks of ammunition ; if so, where is it procured from ?

3147. MR. WATERFIELD.—I have only seen blank ammunition used when I have been out at manœuvres with the Gwalior army, and on ceremonial occasions in the case of many other States.

3148. PRESIDENT.—You never saw practice on an artillery range ?

3149. MR. WATERFIELD.—No.

3150. PRESIDENT.—As far as you know, it never occurs ?

3151. MR. WATERFIELD.—Not as far as I know. They might have practice in Gwalior. As regards ammunition, they all keep a certain amount of powder, mostly of local manufacture. For Imperial Service Troops, of course, it all comes from the Kirki arsenal and a return of that is kept. All other stuff they make themselves. I may add that the Indore Darbar have just shut up their arsenal, but they have got a large stock of powder in hand. Gwalior makes its own cartridges.

3152. PRESIDENT.—Have you had any opportunities of judging of the efficiency and training of the Imperial Service Troops or of the local State troops maintained by the Native States in the Central India Agency ? If so, what generally are your views regarding them ?

3153. MR. WATERFIELD.—I have seen them at parades and official ceremonies for the Viceroy and on occasions of that sort. I should say that the Imperial Service Troops are fairly efficient, the rest may be considered as not so. The transport services of Indore and Gwalior are both serviceable. The United Provinces and the Central Provinces have much to say of Rewa, but I only know that his horses are good, as he is able to get a good supply owing to his having a large interest in Baldock's business in Bombay. (See paragraphs 8 and 9 of Annexure.)

3154. PRESIDENT.—Important lines of railway run through the Central India Agency; what measures do the Civil authorities contemplate taking in time of disturbance to assist the military in guarding the lines?

3155. MR. WATERFIELD.—There is a peculiar anomaly in Central India; we have got nothing to do with the railways or the railway police. (See also paragraph 11 of Annexure.)

3156. SIR W. MEYER.—Who run the railway police?

3157. MR. WATERFIELD.—They are divided up into three portions and come under the administration of Rajputana, the Central Provinces, and United Provinces. The duties of the railway police are watch and ward in station yards and enquiry into cases within their limits.

I get no criminal intelligence even from the railway police. No action has been contemplated beyond what has been laid down in the defence schemes, from which we understand that the railway Volunteers and the military will be responsible for the defence of the lines. (See also paragraph 10 of Annexure.)

3158. PRESIDENT.—From what classes are the superior native railway employes in Central India recruited? Have you noticed any preponderance of Maratha Brahmans among them?

3159. MR. WATERFIELD.—Officially, I cannot say, but from my own experience I should say that the majority are Gujaratis; there is a considerable Maratha Brahman element.

3160. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you know anything about the telegraphs; are there a great number of these Brahmans employed in that service?

3161. MR. WATERFIELD.—In 1907 we made enquiries and obtained returns; the result was that several Brahmans were transferred. What their strength is now I could not say.

3162. PRESIDENT.—Have the Chiefs adopted any measures to guard against the spread of sedition in their States?

3163. MR. WATERFIELD.—Yes, many of them have done so by the proscription of newspapers, the reduction in the strength of Deccani Brahmans in their employ, the prosecution of seditionists, the expulsion of students, pleaders and teachers, the search of suspects' houses, the search of Arya Samaj premises, and the watching of suspects. They exchange information regarding suspects with us.

Two or three weeks ago searches were made in the junior Dewas State, and some Arya Samaj leaders were expelled from the State and their property was confiscated.

3164. PRESIDENT.—In the event of the Imperial Service Troops being withdrawn on mobilization, would adequate and suitable forces remain available for the suppression of disorder in the States?

3165. MR. WATERFIELD.—Yes, unless the disorder came from outside, in which case they could not keep it down. Sindhia has a fair force for dealing with disorder, as when his army was reduced under pressure from the Government, he converted some three regiments into State police.

3166. SIR W. MEYER.—It has been represented that some States at any rate would be reluctant to let all their Imperial Service Troops go to the front because of the difficulty of keeping order. Would that apply to Central India?

3167. MR. WATERFIELD.—I should think the only possible place would be Gwalior; in the other places the Imperial Service Troops units are too small to signify.

3168. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider the obligatory garrisons of Mhow and Jhansi, as at present proposed, adequate?

3169. MR. WATERFIELD.—The obligatory garrisons by themselves would not be sufficient. We ought to have some guns at Mhow to keep Indore City quiet—either field or horse artillery guns; we should want a whole company of British infantry at Indore alone; and if the country were going to rise in revolt, cavalry would certainly be necessary, more especially if the Central India

Horse regiments were mobilized and removed from Central India. (See also paragraph 12 of Annexure.)

3170. SIR W. MEYER.—It is also proposed to have a mobile brigade at Mhow and Jhansi.

3171. MR. WATERFIELD.—That would be all right, provided people, *i.e.*, the countryside and towns-people, knew it was there.

3172. SIR W. MEYER.—About Volunteers; are the Volunteers strong in Central India?

3173. MR. WATERFIELD.—The whole of the eastern portion of the Agency lies within the sphere of activity of the Indian Midland Railway Volunteers, while to the west the Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway Volunteers comprise our Volunteer corps with a light horse unit attached.

3174. SIR W. MEYER.—Beyond the railway Volunteers, there is practically nothing? Taking the Agency as a whole, and allowing for the fact that the railway Volunteers would be largely required for railway work, you could not get much assistance?

3175. MR. WATERFIELD.—No.

3176. SIR W. MEYER.—Are you aware of attempts to tamper with native troops in Central India?

3177. MR. WATERFIELD.—I have known three cases. The last attempt was made about three years ago in Nowgong. A man named Aziz-ud-din in the 5th Light Infantry, a writer clerk attached to the battalion, was concerned in it.

3178. SIR W. MEYER.—You found that he was trying to excite the sepoys against the Government? What happened to him?

3179. MR. WATERFIELD.—He was turned out.

3180. SIR W. MEYER.—And the other cases?

3181. MR. WATERFIELD.—These were simply cases of seditious preachers, one in Indore and another in Mhow. They both occurred in 1909. The second was an anti-cow-killing case, and the man, a Deccani Brahman of the name of Narayen Shivram Barwe, was caught in Mhow. There have been no cases since then.

3182. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you exchange information with the military authorities as regards sedition?

3183. MR. WATERFIELD.—Yes; everything that the military authorities obviously ought to know, I send to them at once.

3184. SIR W. MEYER.—Do the military authorities communicate with you?

3185. MR. WATERFIELD.—Yes.

3186. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you met Major Jackson?

3187. MR. WATERFIELD.—Yes, I attended a lecture he gave to the local military authorities.

3188. SIR W. MEYER.—Before he gave his lecture, did he communicate with you at all?

3189. MR. WATERFIELD.—No.

3190. SIR R. SCALLON.—Are there any communities in Central India who might give trouble?

3191. MR. WATERFIELD.—There are the Bhils and the Bhilalas (a mixture of Rajputs and Bhils). The Bhils are giving a little trouble now over famine.

3192. SIR R. SCALLON.—In case of trouble, could agitators get these people to do their fighting for them?

3193. MR. WATERFIELD.—No, the Bhils have no intercourse with anybody.

(The witness then withdrew.)

ANNEXURE.

*Remarks by the Agent to the Governor-General in Central India on
Mr. Waterfield's evidence.*

1. The Agency police would be useful in the cantonments, etc., where they are posted in time of disturbance, up to a point. They could deal with a bazar rabble and minor rioting, but not much more than that.

2. The Malwa Bhil Corps should be able to deal with disturbances in their own, the Bhil, tracts, unless they were very acute and widespread. The Indore Residency is now their headquarters, and they guard four of the Agencies. They ought to be able to do this, but in critical times they would need strengthening. They did not do well in the attack on the Indore Residency in 1857, but they are a loyal corps, outside the scope of Hindu or Muhammadan disaffection.

See answers
3065 and
3979.

3. I hold that the native Darbars, collectively, are loyal. The anti-British agitation of the past decade has not been encouraged by them, and has been regarded with disfavour and even reprobation. In Central India such symptoms as were observed have been adequately dealt with and have given no real anxiety.

See answer
3081.

4. Cow-killing has always been a difficulty, as Mr. Waterfield says. I certainly think that any measures that could, without prohibitive expense, be taken for reducing the necessity of cow-killing would be most beneficial. That was a view taken after the Mutiny by experienced officials, and it is a sound view. The importation of frozen meat and establishment of cold storages would be most welcome measures.

See answer
3111.

5. As to the feeling in Native States generally, one might write or say a great deal; but for the purpose of these remarks I will be brief. Mr. Waterfield is wrong in his estimate of the late Sivaji Rao Holkar. His mind was disordered but he was not disloyal. That is the opinion of those who knew him best. The present young Maharaja has yet to show his worth.

See answer
3139.

6. Mr. Waterfield is, I believe, entirely astray in his estimate of the Rewa Chief. No one can read the hearts of the Chiefs; but so far from being disloyal the Rewa Chief, in the opinion of Colonel Godfrey, the political agent who knows him best, is quite loyal. I think I may say with confidence that Mr. O'Dwyer holds no other view. The Rewa State is primitive and backward, the Maharaja a shy and reserved man, educated by us, who has not always been fortunate in the political officers with whom he has dealt, and who has believed himself to be under a cloud since he declined to join in the Imperial Service movement some 10 years ago. He is fond of his army; it has always been a great fancy of his, and in so far as he has cavalry it is very well horsed. His army is not above the sanctioned strength; he has not increased it. Had he done so, it would be a very serious matter. There is no form of conscription or compulsory service; he makes some of his civil officials take up army rank and duties on, I suppose, much the same principle that we encourage civil officers to volunteer. But that is all. He is certainly not unpopular with his people. He rules them in a sort of patriarchal way not unsatisfactorily. He does object to their leaving his State to work as labourers on large works in progress in neighbouring British districts for long terms, and I am not so sure that he is unreasonable in this. The contractors concerned are believed to be at the bottom of a number of anonymous complaints we receive about Rewa, and I think that Mr. Waterfield's information rests largely on foundations of this kind. Treated with suspicion and reserve the Maharaja might become a sullen and unwilling Ruler, and it is exactly this that we are endeavouring to avoid, with success I am glad to say. I beg the Committee to free their minds of this Rewa military bogey. It is to the best of my information an absolute bogey, pure and simple.

See answers
3125 and
3133.

7. As to the other Darbars, Bhopal has always been loyal. Sindhia proved his fidelity in the Mutiny. The small Rajput chiefs are loyal. So are the Marathas, Dhar and Dewas; and so too I would class the Indore Darbar.

See answer
3081.

They are loyal. Self-interest, other feelings apart, makes them so. What the Hindu chiefs dread is a revival of Muhammadan rule if our own Government were done away with. That was an opinion expressed unsolicited and in confidence by this very Rewa Chief to Colonel Godfrey, and I believe that the others share it. Personally I think that they are not far wrong. They know that the trans-border country is filled with well-armed Muhammadans, Afghans and independent tribes; they know that we have a very large number of armed Muhammadan militias, over and above our regular troops; they (probably) know that we have issued many thousand breech-loading rifles to villagers pure and simple on our borders, and they know for certain that if they applied for a rearmament of their own feeble forces on anything of the same scale, they have been, and would be, refused. I think that we have been, and are, over strict in dealing with the States in this connection, but I need not probably develop this further. To my mind disaffection in our own army is our great danger, and the Native Chiefs know that too.

See answer
3153.

8. As to the military value of the various Native State troops it is difficult for a civilian to say much that is useful. The Imperial Service Troops are understood to be good, although very far from being in a line with our own best regiments. Apart from them it cannot, I think, be held that these troops are worth much as a military force. Their weapons, pay, and probably officers, preclude the idea; their artillery is muzzle-loading and of no value against a superior arm.

See answer
3153.

9. As to their fidelity to their own Chiefs I have no doubt that they are faithful and would obey them. But no one can conjecture the precise amount of strain that they would stand. If British garrisons were in mutiny I have no doubt that some Native State troops would follow suit, as Mr. Waterfield says; but I think that they would stand a good deal of strain. I think that the fidelity of the Gwalior troops, whose efficiency is regarded as of a comparatively high order, would be pretty constant to the Maharaja, who has remarkable personal qualities, and is, moreover, very rich, as is Holkar. I do not think Holkar's troops would go so long as the Presidency remained occupied, and the company of British infantry remained there. The Native State treasuries in Central India must contain far more treasure than our own treasuries do.

See answer
3157.

10. As to the railways, the intention of the defence scheme is that their additional protection, when required, is to be furnished by the troops. The important bridges are the main points. The present railway police force is not, as Mr. Waterfield observes, under this administration; it does the watch and ward of the lines.

See answer
3155.

11. I would certainly be willing on occasion to supplement the railway police by Native State police, or troops carefully selected, and I believe that they would do excellent work. Much in all these contingencies would depend on the qualities of the political officer on the spot.

See answer
3169.

12. Minimum obligatory garrisons for the time are settled, subject to the result of the Committee's deliberations (secret correspondence ending with Government of India's letter No. 20—^{1A}/_C—, dated April 19th, 1912). Mr. O'Dwyer has concurred in the strength and dispositions laid down in that correspondence, and I have no suggestion to offer regarding them, beyond saying that I concur with Mr. O'Dwyer. I am very glad that it is proposed to defend the Indore Residency, a point to my mind of the utmost importance.

A. L. P. TUCKER,
*Offg. Agent to the Governor General,
in Central India.*

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

19th Meeting—Friday, 12th July 1912.

The Hon. Lieutenant-Colonel Sir A. H. McMahon, G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, attended as a witness and was examined.

EVIDENCE OF SIR HENRY McMAHON.

3194. PRESIDENT.—Sir Henry, you are Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, and have had great experience in the Political Department in Malakand, Seistan, Chitral and elsewhere ?

3195. SIR H. McMAHON.—I have served in those places.

3196. PRESIDENT.—What is our policy in regard to our future relations with Russia ? Should we aim at a closer agreement with her and, in the event of the Amir giving trouble, at an eventual partition of Afghanistan ?

3197. SIR H. McMAHON.—As regards the first part of the question, so far as is known here, the policy of His Majesty's Government is to endeavour to maintain and strengthen the present *entente* on the basis of our Convention ; to observe the terms of that Convention and endeavour to make Russia similarly adhere to them. With regard to the second portion, we have no object at present in aiming at a closer agreement, but necessity might arise for doing so. Thirdly, nothing short of serious and active hostilities by the Afghan Government against ourselves should ever be permitted to induce us to consider the question of invading or occupying any portion of Afghanistan—still less of effecting a partition of that country with Russia. Apart from the strategic objections, on which it is not my province to dilate, the political objections are overwhelming owing to the importance which is attached to Afghanistan by the Muhammadan world, as one of the two last independent Muhammadan kingdoms in existence. Persia is no longer of account, and *Shiah* at that. Turkey and Afghanistan alone remain. Any attempt to impair or destroy the integrity of Afghanistan will be bitterly resented by Muhammadans throughout the world, and more especially by those in India. The effect it will have in disturbing the minds of so large a number of Indian Muhammadans must not be lightly regarded. If, however, the provocation given to us by Afghanistan be of a nature that does not admit of our tolerating it without loss of dignity or confession of weakness, the matter assumes a different aspect altogether, as in the East there is greater danger in showing weakness than in offending even religious susceptibilities.

3198. SIR W. MEYER.—I take it you imply that, assuming that war is forced on us by Afghanistan, it may be good policy to get Russia to join in and make an end of the Afghan monarchy as at present constituted ?

3199. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, but not otherwise.

3200. PRESIDENT.—You would be prepared for the partition of Afghanistan ?

3201. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, because owing to our understanding with Russia, if we removed Afghanistan as a buffer State, the Russians would not hear of any other arrangement except partition.

3202. PRESIDENT.—You would, however, deprecate the partition for political reasons and also on account of the removal of the buffer State ?

3203. SIR H. McMAHON.—I would deprecate it for every reason, and would only consent to it in a case of absolute necessity.

3204. SIR W. MEYER.—We had a witness who said that the buffer State was an unsatisfactory one; in the event of war with Russia, with the Afghans as our allies, the latter would commit so many atrocities on the enemy that our last state would be worse than the first.

3205. SIR H. McMAHON.—I cannot agree with that.

3206. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think the present situation is exactly satisfactory? Has not the Amir the power to a certain extent to force our hands?

3207. SIR H. McMAHON.—But the Agreement with Afghanistan is carefully worded, it is full of safeguards, and we are only called upon to give the Amir assistance if he follows our advice. It is so far from being the object of the Afghans to force our hands that, up to the present, they have done their best to take our advice and to avoid friction with Russia.

3208. SIR W. MEYER.—At the time of the Dane Mission was not the Amir rather inclined to force our hands?

3209. SIR H. McMAHON.—I think that was only bluff and by way of showing that he was of some account in the matter.

3210. SIR W. MEYER.—Your view is that the Agreement is so cautiously worded that we need not fight Russia for the Amir unless we choose?

3211. SIR H. McMAHON.—Quite so, but I think that in certain circumstances we must choose.

3212. PRESIDENT.—To what extent, if any, has the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 affected our Agreement and relations with the Amir?

3213. SIR H. McMAHON.—It put a severe strain for a time on our relations with the Amir as it caused much ill-feeling in Afghanistan against us, which would probably have found expression in acts but for the good effect on the Amir of his then recent visit to India. The Amir has never consented to the Afghan clauses of the Convention and probably will never do so. On the whole, however, the Convention has but little affected our relations.

3214. SIR W. MEYER.—Should you describe our relations with the Amir during the last few years as uniformly friendly?

3215. SIR H. McMAHON.—Certainly.

3216. SIR W. MEYER.—For some years had we a number of grievances against him?

3217. SIR H. McMAHON.—We always have a few grievances against him, but those cannot be helped. He also has many against us. I think they about counterbalance.

3218. PRESIDENT.—It has been stated that the causes most likely to lead to our being involved in difficulties with Russia are:—

(a) The anarchy in Persia which may bring about a partition of that country.

(b) The discharge of our obligations to the Amir of Afghanistan.

(c) The fulfilment of the undertakings in our Treaty with Japan.

What is your opinion on the above?

3219. SIR H. McMAHON.—As regards (a). The danger is that Russia is inclined to go to inconvenient lengths in dealing with anarchy in Persia—lengths that may be difficult to reconcile with the maintenance of the integrity of Persia and our Convention. The recent Blue Book has shewn the strain to which the *entente* has already been subjected in regard to Russian action in north-west Persia. Since then the outrage at Meshed has occurred, also the occupation of Meshed by Russian troops. The continued occupation of Meshed, and thereby Khorassan, will necessitate our seriously considering our own interests which are thereby threatened through Afghanistan and Seistan, and south-eastern Persia.

The Russians appear to be taking measures which, if continued, will look as if they desire to force upon us the partition of Persia, although the Russian Government maintain that this is not the case.

3220. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you not think that when the Convention was framed—although it was not expressed—there was the ultimate idea that the partition of Persia might have to come?

3221. SIR H. McMAHON.—That may have been at the back of the Russian mind, but it certainly was not at the back of ours as far as we know, and we have some very solid assurances by the Czar himself.

3222. SIR W. MEYER.—But circumstances may alter assurances; take our own case in Egypt?

3223. SIR H. McMAHON.—There is no doubt that things are better with the Convention than they would have been without it. Russia has said that she is going to withdraw her troops, and we had the remark of Sir Edward Grey yesterday that she was going to withdraw from Khorassan.

3224. PRESIDENT.—It would place a great strain on the Indian army to occupy southern Persia?

3225. SIR H. McMAHON.—We could not do it with the present army.

3226. SIR W. MEYER.—We might occupy places in the Gulf?

3227. SIR H. McMAHON.—Those places do not lend themselves to defence from the land side and the fleet might not always be available.

I now come to (b). The actual wording of our obligations to the Amir is as follows:—

“If any Foreign Power should attempt to interfere in Afghanistan and if such interference should lead to unprovoked aggression on the Amir’s dominions, in that event the British Government would be prepared to aid the Amir to such extent and in such manner as might appear to the British Government necessary in repelling it, provided that the Amir followed unreservedly the advice of the British Government in regard to his external relations.”

There are several verbal loopholes provided in the above terms for escaping from our obligations, but we will presumably feel ourselves bound by the spirit as well as the letter of the Agreement. The danger is that Russian encroachment in Khorassan may have much the same disturbing effect on the Afghan mind, as Turkish activity in north-western Persia has had on Russia. Relations on the border may get strained and incidents occur by which our obligations to the Amir may come into inconvenient prominence.

3228. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing that, owing to the death of the Amir or to some other cause, there was a state of anarchy prevailing in Afghanistan, and the Russians said “We cannot stand this, and if you cannot pacify the country, we must march troops into it”?

3229. SIR H. McMAHON.—That is one danger, but it presupposes that the Amir dies and that his successor has no authority over the country, also that Russia is anxious to burn her fingers in northern Afghanistan, which we are not certain she wants to do.

3230. SIR W. MEYER.—Was the succession of the present Amir to the throne of Afghanistan the first peaceful one?

3231. SIR H. McMAHON.—Well, I must explain that the late Amir was the first Amir of the whole of Afghanistan—previous Amirs governed only portions of the country; he united the whole Government under himself and by a fortunate succession of circumstances, the present Amir came in without trouble. And I think that, as things stand at present, if the throne went on his demise to his son or brother, nothing would be said.

As regards (c). England can only be brought into conflict with Russia, in connection with her relations towards Japan, if aggressive action is taken by Russia. In view of the recent agreement between Japan and Russia, of Russia’s military weakness in Asia, of Russia’s interest in affairs in Europe, and of the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it is not likely that such

aggressive action will be taken so long as the above conditions exist. In addition to that, one must consider the very good feelings which are now growing up between Japan and Russia.

3232. SIR P. LAKE.—Do you think that Japan finds the Alliance irksome?

3233. SIR H. McMAHON.—I am diffident about replying to that; we have nothing except hearsay to go on.

3234. SIR W. MEYER.—Is it possible that the cordiality of the Alliance might be weakened by anti-Japanese feeling in Canada or Australia?

3235. SIR H. McMAHON.—There has been a great deal of that before and since the Alliance came about; it has not affected the Alliance up to the present; the Alliance seems to be a purely business agreement between the two countries for their best interests, and the Japanese seem to prefer to shut their eyes to everything else rather than give it up. What their inner feelings may be, I do not know.

3236. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think we might look on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as a strong factor for peace?

3237. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, taken in conjunction with the Anglo-Russian Convention.

3238. PRESIDENT.—Is the validity of the Anglo-Russian Convention affected by the Amir's not having subscribed to it? What is the exact meaning of the statement made by Mr. Montagu in the House of Commons with regard to Russian action in Afghanistan, as reported in the "Times" of the 27th March 1912?

3239. SIR H. McMAHON.—In a conversation in October 1908 with Sir Edward Grey, M. Isvolsky said that the consent of the Amir was not, in his opinion, necessary to the working of the Convention, and he proposed that we should continue to work it without waiting for the Amir's consent. He said he was quite willing to do so. To this proposal Lord Morley and Sir Edward Grey cordially agreed.

Sir Arthur Nicholson in writing to Sir Edward Grey (3rd November 1908) said:—"I observed to the Emperor to-day, that both you and Lord Morley had been specially gratified with the willingness of M. Isvolsky to act upon the assumption that the Convention concerning Afghanistan was in force, although the consent of the Amir had not yet been received. This had been considered a most satisfactory assurance * * * *. The Emperor said that he quite understood the position."

In both the above conversations, however, it was mentioned that efforts were still being made to obtain the Amir's consent, but no hope was held out of this being effected at any early date. We may conclude from the above that the validity of the Convention is not at present affected by the Amir's not having subscribed to it, but it is doubtless open to Russia in the future, if and when she so desires, to question its validity on this ground.

3240. SIR W. MEYER.—In your opinion the Amir is never likely to subscribe to the Convention?

3241. SIR H. McMAHON.—Never.

3242. PRESIDENT.—Is there any reason to believe that an influential party exists in Russia which would gladly see the Convention abrogated?

3243. SIR H. McMAHON.—We understand that there is in Russia a party of Grand Dukes and members of the forward school, who, as in the case of Corea, wish to bring about a more forward policy than the Russian Government desire. They would naturally like to see the Convention set aside. That they influence Russian consulates in Persia is proved by the Russian Minister recently complaining of an "orgy of insubordination" on the part of these. The power and influence of this party however depend entirely on the control, or absence of control, exercised over them by the Emperor. We understand that the Emperor does exercise effective control over them, and that he

does not wish the Convention abrogated. It is not, and cannot be, to the interest of the Russian Government to break off from the present *entente* for many years to come. In fact, the political situation in Europe and the Balkans will make Russia increasingly dependent on our goodwill and support.

3244. PRESIDENT.—How far have the anarchical conditions prevailing in Persia put a strain on the Convention? Has Russia in any way given grounds for suspicion that she is disposed to make the Convention unworkable, or that she desires to sap the foundations of Persian independence?

3245. SIR H. McMAHON.—The recent Blue Book published on Persia shows that a great strain was put on the Convention by the anarchy in Persia, and the measures taken by Russia to deal with it in north-eastern Persia.

His Majesty's Government maintain that Russia is honestly endeavouring to respect the integrity of Persia, and only sends her troops into the country to restore order and assist the Persian Government. The Russian Emperor has told our Ambassador at St. Petersburg (14th January 1912) that "the Persian Government could not possibly preserve order by themselves, and must be helped to do so in the north by Russian, and in the south by British troops," and assured him that "since his word had been given that no portion of Persian territory would be annexed, that promise would be kept." The danger is that the Russian Government, in their efforts to restore order in Persia, may make demands of the Persian Government or take measures, such as those recently taken in Meshed, which may be misunderstood in England as opposed to the Convention and the integrity of Persia, thus making the former unworkable, and raising the whole question of our foreign policy with Russia.

3246. SIR W. MEYER.—We too have sent troops to Persia and threatened to send more?

3247. SIR H. McMAHON.—We have, but we have restrained ourselves very greatly in that matter, and, as you know, we are doing our best to withdraw those which have been sent at the earliest favourable opportunity.

3248. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think the present Persian Government will succeed in restoring orderly conditions in the country?

3249. SIR H. McMAHON.—It is difficult to say, but the chances are that they will not.

3250. SIR W. MEYER.—Then we must inevitably be faced with some revision of the Convention?

3251. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, it would appear so, but the time has not arrived yet; we are backing up the Persian Government with financial assistance; there is a proposal to bring back a strong minister, and Russia proposes to assist from the north.

3252. SIR W. MEYER.—They have failed during the last three years and the chances are that they will continue to fail?

3253. SIR H. McMAHON.—The situation does not look promising.

3254. PRESIDENT.—You no doubt would ascribe that to the adoption in an Asiatic country of a parliamentary constitution for which the inhabitants are not fitted?

3255. SIR H. McMAHON.—Largely, and to a disinclination on the part of Russia to let Persia rehabilitate herself.

3256. SIR W. MEYER.—What would be your solution of the problem if the Persian Government were to break down absolutely?

3257. SIR H. McMAHON.—I think the whole question will be focussed and decided by the Trans-Persian Railway. In whatever way that railway is made, in that way will follow the future government of Persia. If the line is constructed jointly by Great Britain and Russia, it means the partition of Persia; if internationally, it must lead to the internationalization of Persia.

3258. SIR W. MEYER.—But that railway cannot materialize for several years to come?

3259. SIR H. McMAHON.—No.

3260. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you anticipate the continuance of anarchy during all those years?

3261. SIR H. McMAHON.—There seems every likelihood of it. But in the various processes of surveying, etc., of the railway, the question of the administration of the country must crop up.

3262. SIR W. MEYER.—Russia has made an agreement with the Germans in regard to railways in Persia that enabled the Germans in certain circumstances to build lines?

3263. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes.

3264. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you regard that as having any bearing on our policy?

3265. SIR H. McMAHON.—Not in Persia itself; it did not involve giving Germany any foothold in Persia.

3266. SIR P. LAKE.—I think you are referring to the 'neutral zone', and whether Germany would have a look in there?

3267. SIR H. McMAHON.—We have not got to the bottom of the Potsdam Agreement, but we understand it favours Germany's commercial interests in the neutral zone.

3268. SIR W. MEYER.—Were we informed by Russia of the terms of the Potsdam Agreement?

3269. SIR H. McMAHON.—No.

3270. PRESIDENT.—Our trade interests with Persia are comparatively small?

3271. SIR H. McMAHON.—Large.

3272. PRESIDENT.—Only about three millions a year?

3273. SIR H. McMAHON.—Small in value, but preponderating as regards other countries.

3274. PRESIDENT.—Then as regards the reference to Germany; is it the case that it would be extraordinarily difficult for Germany, under her present military system, to maintain garrisons of German troops in Persia?

3275. SIR H. McMAHON.—Most difficult.

3276. PRESIDENT.—Therefore permanent military occupation by Germany is a matter that need not be very much apprehended?

3277. SIR H. McMAHON.—I think not.

3278. PRESIDENT.—Would it be reasonable to assume that it is just as probable that in the event of circumstances demanding a change in the terms of the Convention, it will be modified by the two contracting parties in a friendly spirit, as to assume that it will fail?

3279. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, because it must be to the increasing interest of Russia for many years to come to maintain a friendly understanding with us. At the same time, a change in the terms of the Convention is to be as far as possible deprecated. To suggest a change even on one point will be likely to throw the whole Convention into the melting pot, without any assurance as to the shape in which it may emerge therefrom.

3280. SIR W. MEYER.—What about affairs in Tibet; what do you think the present outlook is?

3281. SIR H. McMAHON.—I think there will be as much necessity for verbal changes in the Convention in regard to Tibet as in regard to Persia.

3282. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think the Dalai Lama will succeed and that Tibet will become autonomous?

3283. SIR H. McMAHON.—I will not say that it will become autonomous, but the Dalai Lama will succeed in establishing himself temporarily and, we hope, permanently.

3284. SIR W. MEYER.—At present I take it the British Government's idea is to stand by the Convention?

3285. SIR H. McMAHON.—A week ago I would have said 'yes', but to-day I would not say so, because the first man to meet the Dalai Lama on his return to Tibet was Dorjjeff who is a Russian subject, owing to whose action in Tibet we were forced to send the 1904 Mission. Russia says he is not her agent, and he says he is not her agent, but we know he is; and we may be obliged on our own account to put in somebody of corresponding status.

3286. PRESIDENT.—What is the exact interpretation placed upon the phrase "Eastern Asia and India" as used in the Preamble of the Treaty* with Japan of the 30th July 1911? * Not reproduced.

3287. SIR H. McMAHON.—Nothing is known here of the exact interpretation, but it may be assumed that the term is intentionally thus worded so as to comprise every region that does not fall within some other recognized term, such as Asia Minor or Central Asia, and in which the contracting parties are interested in the maintenance of peace, or, as in the case of Preamble (c) possess territorial rights.

3288. SIR W. MEYER.—The main difficulty in our minds was as regards Afghanistan; is Afghanistan "India" for the purposes of the Treaty?

3289. SIR H. McMAHON.—Eastern Asia certainly. It is not in Asia Minor, nor in Central Asia.

3290. SIR W. MEYER.—Has it always been assumed by the authorities in India, that in the event of our being at war with Russia in Afghanistan, we could count, under the Treaty with Japan, on Japanese assistance?

3291. SIR H. McMAHON.—I have always understood it so.

3292. PRESIDENT.—It would not follow that we should desire the assistance of Japanese troops in this country; it might be preferable for Japan to operate against Russia in the northern parts of Manchuria or at other places?

3293. SIR H. McMAHON.—Certainly, that is what I have always understood.

3294. PRESIDENT.—For the purposes of the present enquiry may it be accepted that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Anglo-Russian Convention are likely to prove of equal permanence?

3295. SIR H. McMAHON.—The term of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement is ten years, subject to one year's notice of cancellation on either side. The term of the Anglo-Russian Convention is unlimited. For the purposes of the present enquiry they may be accepted as likely to prove of equal permanence.

3296. PRESIDENT.—What value can be attached to the Agreement with the Amir? Is it a personal or a national compact, that is, if there should be a change of ruler in Afghanistan, would the Agreement nevertheless hold good?

3297. SIR H. McMAHON.—The Agreement has the very highest value. The Amir is never likely to break that Agreement as long as we ourselves adhere to it.

As to the second portion of the question, we regard the Agreement as personal to the Amir. The present Amir on his accession ratified the same treaty that his father made with us. I may add that Lord Lansdowne, in the debate in the House of Lords on the 2nd June, 1905, distinctly stated that the Agreement was personal and not dynastic. The Amir himself tried to make

us regard the present Agreement as national, and, in all probability, his successor will endeavour to make us regard it as such. We shall, however, insist on a ratification.

3298. SIR W. MEYER.—I think that when Abdur Rahman died we held up the subsidy pending the conclusion of a fresh Agreement ?

3299. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, and we should do the same if His present Majesty died.

3300. SIR W. MEYER.—And whether we should renew it or not would depend on expediency and the attitude of the Afghan Ruler towards us ?

3301. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes.

3302. PRESIDENT.—What is the attitude of the people of Afghan-Turkistan towards the Russians ? Are they more friendly towards them than towards their own (Afghan) officials ?

3303. SIR H. McMAHON.—Mr. Dobbs, when, in that country in 1904, was much struck by their friendliness towards the Russians, largely due to their trading dealings with them. The people of Afghan-Turkistan are not Afghans and have little or no national spirit. They have been accustomed from earliest times to alien rule. They would soon become reconciled to a change from Afghan rule. It is difficult to say whether they would resist the change at the outset, but if they did, it would be solely due to religious feelings aroused by the attack on the Muhammadan kingdom of Afghanistan. Their resistance in any case would not be of any importance as they are not a warlike or fighting people.

3304. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think we could ever keep the Russians out of Afghan-Turkistan if they wanted to take it ?

3305. SIR H. McMAHON.—No, certainly not.

3306. SIR W. MEYER.—And would it matter to us very much if they were there or not ?

3307. SIR H. McMAHON.—It would matter very largely ; they would come in for the richest portion of Afghanistan and be so much nearer the portions of Afghanistan which are considered of vital importance to ourselves.

3308. SIR W. MEYER.—It might be unpleasant from that point of view, but if we cannot keep them out, is it a prudent thing to have an Agreement which practically obliges us to try and keep them out ?

3309. SIR H. McMAHON.—I think the Russians would think very deeply before they attempted to dismember Afghanistan. Unfortunately the north is a much easier part of the country to take and keep than the south, but it would create very strong feeling amongst all Muhammadans in Central Asia, which the Russians themselves could not contemplate with equanimity.

3310. SIR W. MEYER.—Well, the Agreement being, as you say, personal to the present ruler, if he were to disappear, should we, in making a fresh Agreement, be more prudent if we did not undertake to defend his territory ?

3311. SIR H. McMAHON.—We are so placed that any weakness or treachery towards Afghanistan would hit ourselves in the end. We must act fairly with Afghanistan, we have done so throughout, and should it become known that we were going to surrender the country during the present Amir's time or during his successor's time, it would create very great difficulties with our own Muhammadans.

3312. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think Muhammadans can sit down quietly and permanently under a Christian government ?

3313. SIR H. McMAHON.—Certainly.

3314. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think that, if we came to blows with Russia over Afghanistan, we might count upon support from Afghanistan ?

3315. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes.

3316. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that Afghanistan has increased in military strength since the accession of the present Amir ?

3317. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, the present Amir has done much to weed out old and unfit men from his regiments and replace them by better material. He has raised the pay of the army, and improved its discipline, training, instruction, and equipment. His arms factory has also been improved and the army is better armed than it was.

3318. SIR W. MEYER.—You get, of course, as full information as can be got of the state of things in Afghanistan, from a military point of view ?

3319. SIR H. McMAHON.—We endeavour to do so.

3320. SIR W. MEYER.—I suppose the General Staff are in communication with you on the subject ?

3321. SIR H. McMAHON.—They make frequent enquiries to which we endeavour to reply.

3322. SIR W. MEYER.—I have here a note* of the military resources of Afghanistan prepared for us by Colonel Bingley ; have you seen it ?

* Appendix II.

3323. SIR H. McMAHON.—I have not.

3324. SIR W. MEYER.—He puts the war strength of Afghanistan at 90,000 regular soldiers and a peace strength of about 50,000. Would you accept that ?

3325. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes.

3326. SIR W. MEYER.—Then he speaks of a reserve system of "one in eight" by which each household may be called upon to provide a recruit if sufficient volunteers are not forthcoming ; is that rule often applied ?

3327. SIR H. McMAHON.—Frequently.

3328. SIR W. MEYER.—Are pay and pensions regularly disbursed ?

3329. SIR H. McMAHON.—They are now more regularly disbursed than they used to be. There is a very good report† on the army by our late agent† written before he left the country on the 19th September 1910. I imagine it is the basis of the report you are now dealing with.

† Not reproduced.

3330. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think the Turkish instructors employed by the Amir are doing good work ?

3331. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, in smartening up the rank and file.

3332. SIR W. MEYER.—What about the cavalry ?

3333. SIR H. McMAHON.—I have had a good deal to do with the Afghan cavalry. Doubtless it would not be much use for charging, but for rough work, getting over hills, and from the point of view of mounted infantry, I should say that they are very hard to beat. They are beautifully mounted, the animals are strong, and they go everywhere and carry everything with them.

As regards the artillery, the Amir himself takes a good deal of interest in this branch of his army ; he is himself an inventor of fuses and the like, and there is a good deal of gun practice in the neighbourhood of Kabul, but nowhere else, as they are very miserly with ammunition.

3334. SIR W. MEYER.—Then it is said that the guns are of a great many patterns ?

3335. SIR H. McMAHON.—They are badly circumstanced in having so many different guns, because they have constantly in the past bought the latest types. The Afghan, however, is, a curious creature and adapts himself very readily to conditions of that kind. I have myself seen what extraordinary work they get out of an old gun and the way they move their guns about. Their aiming and firing are not very good.

3336. SIR W. MEYER.—You think then that if we were at war with them they might give us some trouble ?

3337. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes. But with regard to Afghanistan generally, I always consider that the irregular army of tribesmen would give more trouble than the regulars.

3338. SIR W. MEYER.—What about the fidelity of the people to the Amir?

3339. SIR H. McMAHON.—You may regard the army almost in the same light as the people; they are recruited territorially and they will go with the Amir or against him according to the feeling prevailing in their districts.

3340. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think the whole of the people would follow him?

3341. SIR H. McMAHON.—With the exception perhaps of the Ghilzais.

3342. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think the army has shewn up well in Khost?

3343. SIR H. McMAHON.—I do not think one can fairly judge them on the Khost affair, because I think the Amir realized from the beginning what was the cause of the trouble in Khost. I do not think he was impressed with the danger of the rising, and was slow to take action in the hope that he would be able to effect a settlement by less forceful measures.

3344. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think Abdur Rahman would have done the same?

3345. SIR H. McMAHON.—Certainly not, he would have wiped out the rebels.

3346. SIR W. MEYER.—Might not the procrastinating method adopted by the present Amir endanger his throne?

3347. SIR H. McMAHON.—A few years ago one might have thought so, but the people are getting used to his ways.

3348. SIR W. MEYER.—Then you think he is as strong as his father, though perhaps in a different way?

3349. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes.

3350. SIR W. MEYER.—What sort of powder do the Afghans make?

3351. SIR H. McMAHON.—The Amir is very anxious to make cordite, but his experiments have not been very successful. His smokeless powder also is not good. The poor quality of the constituents available is a severe handicap. Otherwise, the factories turn out very good work; they always work under European supervision.

3352. SIR W. MEYER.—We pass arms on to the Amir free of duty?

3353. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, we are bound to give him all reasonable assistance.

3354. SIR W. MEYER.—Could we put pressure on him in case of necessity?

3355. SIR H. McMAHON.—Certainly, we have done so on former occasions.

3356. SIR W. MEYER.—Has he been drawing much of his subsidy?

3357. SIR H. McMAHON.—No, he has been drawing very leisurely on it.

3358. SIR W. MEYER.—What is his object in leaving this large balance in our hands?

3359. SIR H. McMAHON.—I do not think he has any object. He uses it very largely for payments in India and Europe.

3360. SIR W. MEYER.—We understand that there is no surplus food supply in the country?

3361. SIR H. McMAHON.—I think there is a large surplus down in the south, and in the north also, but there is not much in the neighbourhood of Jalalabad or Kabul.

3362. SIR W. MEYER.—We should have to feed our men ourselves from India ?

3363. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes.

3364. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think the *khasadars* are efficient ?

3365. SIR H. McMAHON.—No, very inefficient, except as guerillas.

3366. SIR W. MEYER.—And the irregular *sowars* ?

3367. SIR H. McMAHON.—They are more efficient than the *khasadars*, but they too are fit only for irregular warfare and not very good at that. The fact is that they are recruited tribally. The tribal headmen pocket most of the pay of the *khasadars* and *sowars* with the result that the better class of tribesmen will not serve as such.

3368. SIR W. MEYER.—We are told that the forts in Afghanistan are of very poor character.

3369. SIR H. McMAHON.—Well, perhaps howitzers would damage them, but their mud walls are of great thickness.

3370. SIR W. MEYER.—Mr. Hayden who was in Afghanistan some years ago, said it would be difficult for Russia to use the passes of the Hindu Kush for the transport of guns. Would you agree with that ?

3371. SIR H. McMAHON.—The roads are difficult undoubtedly, but we have pulled guns over very bad places in the past, and I do not see why this should not be done in the future.

3372. SIR W. MEYER.—The Amir is supposed to keep enough rifles at Kabul to arm the population in certain eventualities ?

3373. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, he has a great many.

3374. SIR W. MEYER.—Is Kabul an open market for the supply of rifles, and are the frontier tribes taking advantage of it ?

3375. SIR H. McMAHON.—They used to do so to a large extent, but the supply is now limited owing to our operations in the Persian Gulf.

3376. PRESIDENT.—Has the present Amir encouraged the armament of the North-West Frontier tribes ?

3377. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, at the same time as he has encouraged the armament of his own subjects, that is, indirectly. I do not think he has meant to do so, but the tribesmen have taken advantage of the arming of his own people.

3378. SIR W. MEYER.—One more question about the information we get from Kabul ; we keep an agent there ? Is he allowed to see anything ? Does he send valuable information ?

3379. SIR H. McMAHON.—It depends entirely on the nature of the individual. The last agent we had sent valuable information on all points ; our present man is not so good.

3380. SIR W. MEYER.—I suppose the Amir does not let him know more than he can help ?

3381. SIR H. McMAHON.—He keeps him very carefully guarded and it is difficult for him to find out things, but he manages to do so.

3382. SIR W. MEYER.—And the Amir's agent who is with us, can he do so ?

3383. SIR H. McMAHON.—We do not try to bindfold him, but Providence has always sent a man who does not bother himself much.

3384. SIR W. MEYER.—Do we pay the Amir's agent's salary ?

3385. SIR H. McMAHON.—I am not sure. I could not tell you that. The Amir, on the other hand, pays all sorts of expenses for our agent.

3386. PRESIDENT.—What chance is there of the present Amir being deposed and of the break-up of the Afghan Kingdom ?

3387. SIR H. McMAHON.—We know nothing that would lead us to think that there is any such likelihood. He seems to have secured himself very firmly on the throne. There is a large faction of *mullahs* and conservative people who would prefer his brother Nasrulla Khan as Amir owing to the latter's religious fanaticism, and his dislike to Western improvements and innovations which the Amir favours, but Nasrulla Khan does not appear to lend himself to their designs. If he had had aims on the throne he could have seized it long ago. There is no one else at present who could succeed in deposing the Amir. Afghanistan as a whole seems fairly contented at present, and although some tribes, such as the Ghilzais, do not like the present dynasty, they would have no chance of success in any attempt to oust it. There is therefore no immediate prospect of a break-up of the Afghan Kingdom.

3388. SIR W. MEYER.—Is the Amir still taking an active part in the administration of the country ?

3389. SIR H. McMAHON.—He does so in fits and starts. The last report we had was that he was working very hard indeed.

3390. PRESIDENT.—He was a little unpopular on his return from India ?

3391. SIR H. McMAHON.—He had a very large opposition to face, but he said he would have no more of it and took extreme measures in some cases.

3392. PRESIDENT.—How do you view our obligations in respect of Afghanistan ?

3393. SIR H. McMAHON.—I may sum them up by saying that we should carry them out to the letter. Apart from moral obligations to do so, there is the importance attached to the Afghan Kingdom by the Muhammadan world, and our failure to assist Afghanistan would alienate our Muhammadan subjects.

3394. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think that the Amir—I am speaking of the late Amir as well as the present one—has kept his part of the Agreement ?

3395. SIR H. McMAHON.—I should say, certainly.

3396. SIR W. MEYER.—Assuming a possible war with Russia, it would be desirable that British officers who know the country should be able to give the Afghan troops their assistance ?

3397. SIR H. McMAHON.—The Amir recognizes that himself, but at the same time he recognizes the difficulties and dangers. He says that his people would not stand it ; it would be too much responsibility for him to take on his shoulders.

3398. SIR W. MEYER.—What are his views about the introduction into the country of railways ?

3399. SIR H. McMAHON.—He is teaching his people as hard as he can about railways. He is doing his best to accustom them to the idea. Only a few weeks ago he sent round a circular to Kandahar and Herat reminding them about his wanting good roads, and also that he was doing this with a view to running railways.

3400. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think his friendship is likely to continue ?

3401. SIR H. McMAHON.—That he is sincerely fond of us, I am firmly convinced. I get letters from him about once a month.

3402. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think it might be advantageous if he were to repeat his visit to India ?

3403. SIR H. McMAHON.—His ambition is to make a trip to Europe and I think he means to carry it out as soon as he gets the opportunity. I think it would be a thing to encourage. He is bound to suggest it sooner or later.

3404. PRESIDENT.—When we have minor troubles with the Amir can we bring him to reason by closing the Khyber ?

3405. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes. This was done with success in 1909, when the Sarhang of Dakka seized a small *kafila* on our side of the boundary on the Dakka-Khyber road. The same remark applies to the closing of the road to Kandahar.

3406. SIR P. LAKE.—Did he regard our closing the Khyber as a very unfriendly action ?

3407. SIR H. McMAHON.—He looked upon it as undignified.

3408. SIR W. MEYER.—Then there was a time, comparatively recently, when our relations with him were not good ?

3409. SIR H. McMAHON.—I should not say that ; this was trouble given by his subordinates in Jalalabad and Dakka ; it was local action and the Amir stepped in at once and settled the business.

3410. PRESIDENT.—How far, in the event of conflict with Russia, would it be necessary or feasible to throw large masses of troops into Kabul and Kandahar ? Could the country support them, and would the Russians move as quickly or in such force as General Duff, in the evidence he gave before the Mowatt Committee in 1907, anticipated ?

3411. SIR H. McMAHON.—(1) I feel diffidence in replying to this as it is essentially a military question. No British-Indian troops should cross the Afghan boundary until the Afghan Government ask for armed assistance. I regard this request as a most important essential, as on it depends the subsequent attitude of the country towards our troops. The request having been made, it will doubtless be necessary to push large forces on to Kabul and Kandahar. There will be comparatively little difficulty in this in the case of Kandahar, as the line of communications will be comparatively short and safe and the resources of the Kandahar province very large.

With Kabul the case is well known to be different. The food resources of Kabul and its neighbourhood are comparatively small and the line of communications long and dangerous, the country difficult, and the people undependable. Whoever attempts to stay in Kabul, whether as friend or foe, will probably soon have the people against him. A British force should, therefore, never be sent to Kabul unless necessity absolutely demands it, and the less time it spends in the actual neighbourhood of Kabul the better.

For the above reasons it would seem preferable, if other factors permit, to make Kandahar the main line of advance and to engage the enemy as far beyond Kandahar as possible, while making the Afghans do their best to delay the enemy on the Hindu Kush north of Kabul with such assistance as we can conveniently supply. If resistance there be hopeless the enemy should be drawn into the difficulties of the Kabul position and kept as busily occupied there as possible, while the major movements are being made on the west.

(2) Kandahar can support a large force, Kabul cannot.

(3) I hesitate to reply on this subject, but personally I am sceptical about the rapidity with which it is assumed that the Russians will be able to move. It would, however, be unwise to suppose that they could not get to the crest of the Hindu Kush in much less time and greater numbers than we could.

And as regards the last portion of the question I hesitate to reply because I have never seen the evidence given before the Mowatt Committee.

3412. SIR W. MEYER.—There are two schools, one says the Russians would over-run Afghan Turkistan and consolidate their position there ; the second school says they would push forward to Kabul. Which do you think the more likely ?

3413. SIR H. McMAHON.—I am very strongly of opinion that the Russians would never dream of going to Kabul direct. They would advance slowly and consolidate their position in the north before they tried to cross the Hindu Kush.

3414. **PRESIDENT.**—Assuming the eventual partition of Afghanistan and Persia, where should the lines demarcating our sphere in each be drawn?

3415. **SIR H. McMAHON.**—Commencing from the east, the most desirable line of division would be the crest of the Hindu Kush westwards and thence the watershed between northern and southern Afghanistan. This line hits the Persian boundary near Yezdun. Thence it should run when possible along the northern watershed of the main drainage systems such as those flowing into Seistan, the Namak Sar and Gaukhana lakes, and along the northern watershed of the Karun river and thence westwards, between Dizful and Khurremabad to some point on the Perso-Turkish border. This would leave Yezd, Ispahan and Dizful on our side and run between Luristan on the north and the Bakhtiari country on the south.

Such a partition is, however, not feasible since it would be impossible for the British Indian army under present conditions to hold such an extended frontier.

3416. **PRESIDENT.**—In such circumstances the only way would be to make use of the inhabitants of these countries and to form troops out of them?

3417. **SIR H. McMAHON.**—I think so. I know of nothing in the south of Persia that would prevent our working on some such lines as in Baluchistan. The people possibly would develop certain good traits of character which at present we could not find in them. I think we could do with a minimum of troops by working on the tribal system.

3418. **SIR W. MEYER.**—Have you ever considered the military force that would be necessary in the event of war with Afghanistan?

3419. **SIR H. McMAHON.**—I have never considered that, as it is not a question one would have to deal with in the Foreign Department; but I think a larger force than has been used before would now be necessary, though I do not think it would amount to six divisions.

3420. **SIR W. MEYER.**—Do you think it would be safe to calculate on Ghilzai camels and drivers?

3421. **SIR H. McMAHON.**—I have several times been asked a similar question. I think on the whole we could always rely upon Ghilzai camels for our use; for one reason, we have such a hold on the Ghilzais. They have to come into our territory for the winter; all their trading is with India and their grazing grounds—those of the camel-owning people—are very largely in Baluchistan north of Zhob. Also you may rely upon their antipathy to the present dynasty; in fact, taking everything into consideration I think we could always rely on their camels.

3422. **SIR W. MEYER.**—Might they not be afraid that while they were serving in our ranks, the Afghans might be massacring their people?

3423. **SIR H. McMAHON.**—I myself have put them to fairly hard tests when I was on demarcation duty. In serving me they ignored many threats from the Afghan officials.

3424. **SIR W. MEYER.**—Would you say, from your experience of the country, that anti-foreign feeling in Afghanistan is stronger or weaker than it was thirty years ago?

3425. **SIR H. McMAHON.**—This is a very difficult question to answer.

The late Amir Abdur Rahman Khan endeavoured to create a national spirit among the various component races and tribes of Afghanistan, and this has been the policy of the Afghan Government ever since. One of the essential features of this policy is the encouragement of an anti-foreign feeling. Of this Sardar Nasrulla Khan is at present the chief exponent, and for years he has laboured to encourage this anti-foreign feeling especially among our independent frontier tribes, whom he regards as a useful buffer against our aggression into Afghanistan. He has thereby succeeded in instilling and strengthening a fanatical feeling, which in the event of hostilities would bear fruit. Notwithstanding this, it would not be correct to say that the anti-foreign feeling is

stronger in Afghanistan as a whole than it was thirty years ago, because other influences also have been at work. There is very considerable intercourse between the south and west of Afghanistan and ourselves *via* Kandahar and Quetta and across the Baluchistan border, and during the long recent period of peace on the North-West Frontier many of the independent tribes on that frontier have got to know us better than they did. The results have been to our advantage and the longer peaceful conditions continue the better those results will be. A fairly correct answer therefore to this question would be that, although an anti-foreign feeling in Afghanistan has been encouraged and has doubtless therefore increased throughout Afghanistan as a whole during the past thirty years, increased intercourse and recent peaceful relations with us have in the case of south-west Afghanistan and the independent tribes of the North-West Frontier, tended to mitigate that feeling and make it less than it was thirty years ago.

3426. PRESIDENT.—Seistan has been represented as being capable of producing large quantities of grain. To what extent is this statement correct?

3427. SIR H. McMAHON.—Only a very small proportion of the total irrigable and culturable area of Seistan, namely some 150,000 out of 2,500,000 acres is cultivated at the present time, but owing to the abundance of water and the very great fertility of the soil, the outturn from this small area is very large, even under the oppressive administration and primitive system of agriculture now in force. From the very thorough and searching investigations of the Seistan Mission it was ascertained that in normal years the produce of the country amounts to 1,302,000 *maunds* (Indian) of wheat and 546,000 *maunds* of barley, besides large quantities of pulses and millet. The surplus grain at present available annually, over and above the needs of the local people varies from 220,000 to 1,000,000 *maunds* according to the nature of the harvest. Good harvests, it may be noted, are more usual in Seistan than bad ones.

So oppressive is the present Persian system of administration of Seistan, and so discouraging to energy and enterprise, that no one dares to grow more grain than he thinks sufficient for his own needs, lest the suspicion of affluence bring ruin on him and his family. With improved administration the potential possibilities of Seistan are enormous. Without the need of any new irrigation system, the cultivated area could at once be increased from 150,000 to 200,000 acres and the outturn per acre largely augmented, thus increasing the available annual surplus by very large amounts. By an extension of the irrigation system of Seistan, which careful investigation has proved to be quite feasible, the irrigated area can be increased to no less than 2,500,000 acres, of which 1,000,000 acres could be cultivated each year. This represents, after deducting the area which would be devoted to cotton, melons and other crops, a normal outturn of 10,000,000 Indian *maunds* of grain. These figures are based on a most thorough, careful and reliable revenue and irrigation survey of the country extending over two years, and should suffice to illustrate the value and importance of Seistan as a granary.

Seistan produces many other products besides grain, notably *ghi* of which large quantities are made. It possesses also large herds of cattle and flocks of sheep.

3428. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you consider it expedient for us to endeavour to get cultivation increased in this way?

3429. SIR H. McMAHON.—I do not think it matters a bit to us, but we should take every step to prevent its being increased by anybody else.

3430. SIR W. MEYER.—It is in our sphere at present?

3431. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, but the danger is that under cover of the present Convention Russia is getting so close to it.

3432. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you fight to keep the Russians out of Seistan?

3433. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, certainly. There is another reason; there are large colonies of Baluchis in Seistan and anyone who holds the place has it

in his hands to intrigue and influence the whole of Baluchistan. It is more Baluchi at present than anything else. The Russians have always recognized that.

3434. PRESIDENT.—What effect would the advent of the Baghdad Railway to the shores of the Persian Gulf be likely to have on the Muhammadan population of India? What is the attitude of the Government of India with regard to the proposed Trans-Persian Railway?

3435. SIR H. McMAHON.—(i) It will interest the intelligent, and possibly be used by the mischievous minded as a fresh indication of sinister designs of the West on the East; but the general effect on Indian Muhammadans is likely to be but small.

(ii) One of watchful interest. We recognize that it must add to the military and other difficult problems of India; and that although it may benefit Indian trade, its disadvantages outweigh its advantages. Nevertheless, we also recognize that railway communication between India and Europe is inevitable, and that we may benefit ourselves more by joining in the present proposal on our own terms, than by having hereafter to link up with some other Persian railway system on less favourable terms.

3436. SIR W. MEYER.—An essential of our terms would be a break of gauge?

3437. SIR H. McMAHON.—The most important would be the alignment, control, break of gauge and the conditions regarding any branch lines within our own sphere, which we should insist on constructing ourselves.

3438. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think it desirable that the alignment should run along the coast?

3439. SIR H. McMAHON.—The general consensus of opinion is that the line should run along the coast for a reasonable distance.

3440. SIR W. MEYER.—The Karachi people favour a different route?

3441. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, in the commercial interests of Karachi.

3442. SIR W. MEYER.—But it is intended to stick to the coast line for a certain distance for military reasons?

3443. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes.

3444. PRESIDENT.—The Treaty with the Sultan of Muscat is one of considerable importance, is it not?

3445. SIR H. McMAHON.—There are several treaties with Muscat. They are all of great importance, more especially our Commercial Treaty and the one relating to the non-cession of territory to other Powers.

3446. PRESIDENT.—Would there be any objection to letting Russia obtain a port on the Persian Gulf, if we secured Bundar Abbas and were thus able to close the Gulf?

3447. SIR H. McMAHON.—A Russian port in the Persian Gulf would be largely neutralized by our securing Bundar Abbas and the neighbouring islands and thus closing the Gulf. There are, however, very serious objections to allowing Russia to obtain such a port:—

(i) As stated by the Government of India in despatch No. 83, dated the 7th November 1901, relating to Russian designs, "it has been a commonplace of British statesmanship throughout the past century that in southern Persia and the Persian Gulf British influence should remain supreme, and * * the creation of rival political interests in that quarter cannot be permitted without seriously compromising the interests of India and therefore of Great Britain."

(ii) A Russian port in the Gulf would involve the loss of our predominant position there and entail great loss of prestige.

(iii) It would involve great expense in the construction and maintenance of the Bundar Abbas-Musandim position.

(iv) It would necessitate the presence of a naval force which might be needed elsewhere.

(v) We would gain no compensating advantage of any kind whatsoever.

3448. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think we can keep the Gulf to ourselves?

3449. SIR H. McMAHON.—I think we are making every effort, and, I trust, with some success to do so.

3450. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think the English people would back up a war to keep Germany or Russia out of the Gulf?

3451. SIR H. McMAHON.—I think we are getting so many treaties with people along the Gulf littoral that we are closing it to other people.

3452. SIR W. MEYER.—Anyhow, you are against the policy of allowing other European Powers to come into the Gulf? You would fight to keep them out?

3453. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes.

3454. SIR W. MEYER.—I suppose we may take it that you are throughout answering for the Government of India in the Foreign Department, except where you expressly state otherwise?

3455. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes. In a few cases, for instance the questions regarding Kabul and the attitude of the tribes, I have given my own opinions.

3456. PRESIDENT.—It has been stated that during a period of over thirty years little has been done to improve our communications through the Khyber. What, in general terms is the present state of the roads from Peshawar to Kabul and from Quetta to Kandahar, as compared with what it was in 1878-80?

3457. SIR H. McMAHON.—In 1880 there was but one road, and that an indifferent cart track, from Peshawar through the Khyber to Dakka. From Dakka there was a still more indifferent track, unfit for carts, to Kabul. Now there is a broad gauge line to Jamrud; a widened, well-aligned and metalled driving road of easy gradients through the Khyber to Dakka; an equally good double road from Jamrud to Ali Masjid; and an alternative road from Jamrud through the Mullagori country to Landi Kotal. From Dakka there is now a road fit for motors to Kabul. A motor has been able to go from Kabul to Landi Kotal in a day, and a few weeks ago the Amir with his suite in eight motors went from Jalalabad to Kabul in eight hours inclusive of halts.

In 1880 there was an indifferent track from Quetta over the Khojak Pass to Chaman and thence to Kandahar. Now there is a broad gauge railway line to Chaman and the road beyond to Kandahar is good enough to admit of the Amir's steam traction engines taking heavy guns and machinery along it, with, however, we must admit, the aid of abundant hand labour, owing to the nullahs on the road being devoid of bridges.

The Amir has on several occasions ordered the road from Kandahar to Kabul to be made fit for motors. As he has not since travelled by that route we do not know how far this order has been carried out.

3458. SIR W. MEYER.—How would you account for the failure of the traction engines we tried some years ago in Baluchistan?

3459. SIR H. McMAHON.—They were of too heavy a type.

3460. PRESIDENT.—What is wanted is a self-propelled vehicle with solid rubber tyres?

3461. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes.

3462. PRESIDENT.—What subsidies are paid by the Amir and ourselves to the tribesmen, and on what conditions?

3463. SIR H. McMAHON.—Statements on these points have already been given to the Committee.*

* Appendix III.

3464. SIR W. MEYER.—The gist of these statements was that Nasrulla Khan, at any rate, gave money to the tribesmen with the object of inciting them against us?

3465. SIR H. McMAHON.—Not entirely. You must remember that the tribesmen are as big a nuisance to Afghanistan as they are to ourselves. The Amir subsidizes some tribes partly to keep them in good order with regard to himself.

3466. PRESIDENT.—How far could peaceful penetration on the Sandeman system be tried on the North-West Frontier?

3467. SIR H. McMAHON.—On the North-West Frontier where we ourselves have for many years done so much, in pursuance of a different policy, to engender, increase, emphasize, and crystalize a knowledge and spirit of independence among the frontier tribes, the time has long since passed when any sudden or general attempt at “peaceful penetration” on Sandeman lines would have any prospect of success. Much could, however, still be done, slowly and gradually, on somewhat similar lines by taking advantage of safe opportunities that from time to time occur. Success would depend on caution and patience. Opportunities have often occurred in the past and will occur in the future. The more promising spheres of progress on these lines are in Swat and Dir, where the disputes between the Swat tribes and the Khan of Dir, and between the Khan of Dir and his local *khans*, give openings for an extension of our influence and for penetration. Also in the Orakzai country where, as in the case of the Mishti and Shia Orakzais in 1905, the difficulties of their situation occasionally induce them to ask us to take them over, and in the Darwesh Khel Wazir country.

Our political officers, especially in advanced posts on the frontier such as Swat, the Khyber, the Tochi, and Wano, could do much to extend their spheres of influence and usefulness and prepare the way for further progress by tendering assistance, when appealed to, in the settlement of feuds and disputes, individual or tribal. This has, except in the Swat-Dir agency where the Sandeman system has to a small extent been followed, been hitherto strictly discouraged by the Government, and the Secretary of State has said that while “fully alive to the force of the arguments in favour of a policy of gradual and continuous extension of the field of our political control, and to the anomalies arising from the absence of such control, His Majesty’s Government are convinced that the established policy of avoiding any increase of our responsibilities is a sound one.”

If opportunities arose, we should, of course, ask for a reconsideration of the above orders.

3468. PRESIDENT.—How does the present system of maintaining order along the North-West Frontier compare with that which was in force in 1895?

3469. SIR H. McMAHON.—The contrast lies in the withdrawal of regular troops from beyond or on the actual frontier, and their replacement by irregular forces. The present system compares very favourably with the previous one, especially if, in estimating the efficiency of the present system, we take into consideration the enormous extent to which our position and frontier responsibilities have increased since 1895—for instance in Chitral, Dir, Bajaur and Swat, Kurram, Tochi, Wano, and, further west, in the Zhob, Chagai and Mekran districts of Baluchistan. The weak point of the present system hitherto has been the inefficiency of the Border Military Police, who from want of supervision, discipline, training and inadequate pay, etc., have been practically useless. This state of affairs is now being remedied, and we hope to have a well-organized force of improved personnel under an adequate number of whole-time British officers.

3470. PRESIDENT.—The Border Militia are under the control and at the disposal of the civil authorities; do you think any advantage would result from placing them under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief?

3471. SIR H. McMAHON.—I would be strongly against that, for very good reasons. The Border Militia are maintained for certain purposes and objects;

there is no one who can so well understand what they are to do as the person in charge of the district or agency, and unless he can employ them at his own discretion they would be no use at all. If they were under the Commander-in-Chief the first tendency would be to make them much more regular. Their equipment would be so much improved that one could not take them out in the rain, etc.

3472. SIR W. MEYER.—General Aylmer says that at present you get a young political officer who might provoke disturbances on the frontier which would require military strength to put down, and for that reason he thought they should be under the military authorities.

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3473. SIR H. McMAHON.—The proof of the pudding is in the eating. They have been in existence for many years and none of these things has happened. Since the adoption of the Curzon system we have had a much quieter time on the frontier than before.

3474. SIR W. MEYER.—You are acquainted with the proposals of a Committee, which was presided over by the Hon. Sir Harcourt Butler in 1911, as regards the state of affairs on the frontier. The Committee proposed *inter alia* the withdrawal of troops from Wano and Tochi. Has any action been taken on their proposals?

3475. SIR H. McMAHON.—The proposals have been largely modified. The withdrawal from Wano and Tochi has been dropped entirely. The improvement of the Border Military Police has been proceeded with, the holding of the Thal-Idak line continued, and the improvement of the Border Militia has been taken in hand by giving them extra pay.

3476. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you got the sanction of the Secretary of State for the improvement of the Border Military Police?

3477. SIR H. McMAHON.—No, but the despatch has gone Home. We are undertaking the improvement of the Border Militia ourselves, as the alterations contemplated do not require the sanction of the Secretary of State.

3478. PRESIDENT.—In the event of a general rising taking place amongst the North-West Frontier tribes, what policy is contemplated with regard to the frontier militia and levy corps?

3479. SIR H. McMAHON.—The scheme for the redistribution of the army in India, 1905, contemplates the assistance of the frontier militia and levy corps in the general defence of the frontier, irrespective of whether the necessity for defence arises from a general tribal rising or not. I know of no definite policy ever having been considered in regard to these forces in the event of a general rising, nor do I think any useful result would be attained by laying down a policy other than that hitherto followed, namely one of confidence in our irregular frontier forces. Unless the cause and nature of the rising be very different from such risings in the past, we may, I think, expect to find that our irregular forces will as in the past be loyal to us even when used against their own kith and kin. They were faithful at Malakand and in the Khyber, and may be expected to be so again. To minimize risks, it is wise to have in all frontier corps a judicious mixture of different races and tribes, and to keep up a small leavening of men of other and distant parts of the country. This system is followed in the Khyber Rifles, in the Northern and Southern Waziristan Militia, and in the Zhob, Chagai and Mekran Levy Corps. The employment of local people in our frontier corps, subject to the above precautions, conduces greatly to the maintenance and restoration of peace. Their influence on the side of peace makes itself felt in the tribes to which they belong. More is to be gained by a policy of trust and confidence in them, than by one which might savour of suspicion or distrust.

3480. SIR W. MEYER.—It is hardly correct to say that the Khyber Rifles fought for us in 1897?

3481. SIR H. McMAHON.—Their break-up then was due to mismanagement. If there had been any attempt to support them, they would have done well.

3482. SIR W. MEYER.—The bringing of outside men into these corps is a departure from the original plan?

3483. SIR H. McMAHON.—It is a very small leavening in most cases: the only case it has been departed from to any extent is in the Southern Waziristan Militia, where we had to drop the original plan owing to the habit they had of shooting their officers.

3484. SIR W. MEYER.—The presence of a battalion of Indian infantry on the Samana conflicts with the principle of not posting regulars outside our administrative frontier?

3485. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, but the battalion has been there for a long time, and I regard this as a salutary exception. The Samana is useful to the Kohat Brigade as a summer station.

3486. PRESIDENT.—What is the general character of the tribes on the frontier? How far are our present relations with them friendly or otherwise? What are their relations with each other?

3487. SIR H. McMAHON.—The character of each tribe along the frontier differs so much from that of its neighbours that it would be impossible within the limits of this reply to deal adequately with the subject. The chief characteristics which in their primitive state they possess in common are hardiness, courage, hospitality and love of independence on the one hand, and avarice, jealousy, revengefulness and treachery on the other. They are shrewd and intelligent, and yet extraordinarily credulous and easily led by false rumours. When taken away from their native surroundings they are, as a rule, very amenable to discipline and good treatment, and are loyal to their employers.

Our present relations with the tribes on the North-West Frontier are as a whole more satisfactory than they have been in the past. The troubles we at present experience on the border are due to incursions by our own outlaws and their gangs, and not to tribal raids. In fact there would appear to be a general desire on the part of the tribes as a whole to maintain peaceful relations with us, and this too in spite of the persuasion of such firebrands as the Mullah Powindah in Waziristan. How long this state of affairs will last it is impossible to say.

The relations of the tribes of the North-West Frontier to one another are difficult to define except in general terms. As a rule, there is little love lost between them, and each tribe views its neighbours with jealousy and mistrust. Feuds and outstanding disputes exist between them all and suffice to prevent the free intercourse necessary to establish friendly relations. Little or nothing is known by them of tribes at a distance, but efforts are being made from Afghanistan to bring them more and more into touch with each other.

3488. SIR W. MEYER.—Have we tried subsidizing the *mullahs*?

3489. SIR H. McMAHON.—We sometimes minimize the value of a *mullah* by rewarding him. Some do us a great deal of good; these we do not reward openly.

3490. PRESIDENT.—What are the steps taken to find out what is going on in the tribal areas and to get information as to their armaments, etc.? Can the statistics compiled in this respect be really relied upon?

3491. SIR H. McMAHON.—(1) The existence and increasingly efficient working of our frontier political agencies at Chitral, Malakand, Khyber, Kurram, Tochi and Wano, render it difficult for anything of moment to occur in any tribal area without our getting early information of it. It is impossible for a Pathan to keep a secret, and news hastens in through friendly *maliks*, self-seeking individuals or paid informers, of all that is thought to be of interest or worthy of reward.

(2) Periodical returns are called for from political officers of the armament of the tribes with whom they are concerned. The information recorded in those returns is obtained by general inquiry from members of tribes and others who are supposed to know most about them.

(3) The statistics can only be regarded as a rough estimate of the relative armaments of the tribes. They cannot be relied upon for accuracy as to the actual armament of individual tribes. Exactitude in the circumstances is impossible, but year by year the statistics must tend to become more accurate.

3492. SIR P. LAKE.—The general conclusion would be that they are fairly reliable ?

3493. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes.

3494. SIR W. MEYER.—I have a return here from the General Staff the figures of which go into units. Do you not think it is misleading to go down to actual units ?

3495. SIR H. McMAHON.—In some cases we can speak pretty accurately ; in others it must be more a matter of guess work, but we may say with confidence for instance that one tribe is better armed than another.

3496. SIR W. MEYER.—Can you discriminate as to the arms maintained ?

3497. SIR H. McMAHON.—I think so. There have been instructions given of late years to improve the accuracy of these returns, but still one must be careful.

3498. SIR W. MEYER.—Could you give us a statement on the lines you mentioned just now, discriminating, that is, between figures in regard to which you can be pretty confident, and others ?

3499. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, I will have one prepared.

3500. PRESIDENT.—What has been the effect of our operations in the Persian Gulf on the arms supply of the tribes ? How can these tribesmen raise the relatively enormous sums of money required to purchase modern rifles ?

3501. SIR H. McMAHON.—(1) The blockade in the Gulf has been completely successful in so far as stopping the import of arms and ammunition into Persian Baluchistan, from whence the Afghan arms traders used to obtain their supplies of arms, is concerned. So successful have the operations been, that few, if any, Afghan arms traders have thought it worth while to go to Persia or the Gulf during the past gun-running season. This stoppage of the trade has already begun to affect the supply of arms to frontier tribes, as shewn by the rise in prices of arms and especially ammunition ; but the real effect will not be seen for some short time yet owing to the large supply still available in Afghanistan as the result of the successful traffic of previous years. When this stock becomes depleted, as it soon must, the supply will drop and prices rise, more especially the price of ammunition. Unfortunately, the supply and quality of rifles made in the Kohat Pass is steadily increasing, but want of ammunition will minimize the evil of this.

(2) When the possession of a modern rifle and ammunition is considered of such vital importance, as it now is on the North-West Frontier, all other considerations are set aside in the effort to obtain them. The price of a rifle often represents all else that its owner possesses or values, whether it be his land or women. To buy one he will do anything that will bring in money, whether by labour or robbery. The losses incurred by the Pass Afridi arms traders in their last Gulf venture nearly drove the tribe into arms against us.

3502. SIR W. MEYER.—I have seen somewhere that at one time they paid so much as Rs. 800 for a rifle.

3503. SIR H. McMAHON.—The price has gone up to Rs. 1,000 for a Lee-Metford.

3504. SIR W. MEYER.—That is an enormous amount for an individual to pay ?

3505. SIR H. McMAHON.—It is extraordinary how they can produce it, but, as I say, they will give up everything in life for it.

3506. SIR W. MEYER.—In view of the success of these blockade operations, does the Government of India intend to continue them as a regular matter ?

3507. SIR H. McMAHON.—Well, His Majesty's Government, who have to pay a portion of the cost, are always reminding us that we should discontinue them; but we always say we should carry on with them.

3508. SIR W. MEYER.—Blockades will go on then?

3509. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, but we are going higher up the Gulf to stop importation into Persia.

3510. SIR W. MEYER.—It is possible that hereafter, as the tribes see their supplies cut off and the prices of rifles and ammunition raised, they might in desperation attack us?

3511. SIR H. McMAHON.—I do not think so; their courage will diminish with their ammunition.

3512. SIR W. MEYER.—One more question; we have been under the impression that the expenditure on military operations in Persia is shared equally by the British and Indian Governments?

3513. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, that is so.

3514. PRESIDENT.—What is the likelihood of any large or general combination against us? How far would the tribes be subject to incitement to a *jihad* preached from Kabul, or independently by their own *mullahs*?

3515. SIR H. McMAHON.—(1) The possibility of a large and general combination of frontier tribes against us is a contingency that must always be recognized. Also that, like the rising of 1897 in Swat, it may come about with a suddenness that surprises the tribes themselves almost as much as it surprises us. It is true that in 1897, the initial rising in Swat was premature and upset the plans of the combination against us, but this may not always happen. Since then, much has been done by Sardar Nasrulla Khan and his agents to bring the leading religious leaders on the frontier, and also the representatives of tribes, into closer touch with one another. This is effected by conference of *mullahs* and headmen at Kabul and Jalalabad, and by sending *mullahs* and agents to visit each tribe to preach the necessity of combination and co-operation. The machinery for effecting a general combination and a simultaneous rising will be very much more complete and efficient on the next occasion than on the last. Whether it will suffice to overcome the natural distrust of each other, and the lack of cohesion and discipline among the tribes, remains to be seen. It must always be remembered, however, that any large combination of the tribes involving combined action outside the territorial limits of each is out of the question, owing to the impossibility of their feeding themselves. Even a tribal gathering inside tribal limits is limited by the few days' food which they can bring with them.

(2) The tribes of the North-West Frontier will always be subject to incitement to *jihad*, whether it be preached from Kabul or by their own *mullahs*, so long as they maintain their present independence. Fanaticism is subject to no logic or law that would enable us to estimate the extent to which the call of a *jihad* would arouse an individual tribe or group of tribes. The people of lower Swat in 1897 had no knowledge in the morning of the likelihood of a rising that afternoon, nor did they know themselves why they joined in the *jihad* except that the 'Mad fakir' possessed miraculous powers, and join in they must at his command. On the other hand, the Mullah Powindah preaches *jihad* half a dozen times a year and none but a few hotheads obey his call. With the loss of independence, inducements to *jihad* are less effective. The tribes become richer and have more at stake, and are more cautious about committing themselves. The correct attitude of the Afghan tribes of Baluchistan in 1897, notwithstanding the preachings of the fanatical priests of Ghazni and Maruf, is an instance of this.

The question of a *jihad* preached from Kabul is on quite a different footing to local *jihads*. The Amir, as head of the only Muhammadan independent Power in the world except Turkey, holds a very important place in Muhammadan eyes. A *jihad* emanating from him would, apart from its novelty, which in itself would itself appeal to public imagination, stir up not only the border tribes but disturb the Muhammadans of the whole of India. It is necessary

to remember that it would also disturb the *sunni* Muhammadans of northern Afghanistan and Central Asia and greatly increase the difficulties of Russia in an attack on the integrity of Afghanistan if preached against her.

3516. SIR W. MEYER.—From the earlier part of your answer, it appears that the Afghan Government is habitually breaking the Durand Agreement?

3517. SIR H. McMAHON.—You could hardly say these efforts are directed against the Agreement, because the Amir's brother is working from purely religious motives. His object is to make the tribes a more efficient buffer if at some future date we wanted to destroy the integrity of Afghanistan.

3518. SIR W. MEYER.—Have any remonstrances been addressed to Kabul on this subject?

3519. SIR H. McMAHON.—We have remonstrated, but it generally leads to a list of remonstrances against us.

3520. SIR W. MEYER.—In this respect the influence of Kabul is a pernicious influence?

3521. SIR H. McMAHON.—It instils a fanatical spirit into the people. The independent tribes are not getting richer, because we give them no opportunities of becoming so; and thus we leave them more susceptible to that influence.

3522. SIR W. MEYER.—What would your remedy be if you had a free hand?

3523. SIR H. McMAHON.—I would take the opportunities which I have mentioned in previous replies, of "peaceful penetration."

3524. SIR W. MEYER.—Are you prepared to say with which tribe we are likely to have hostilities first?

3525. SIR H. McMAHON.—The Mahsuds.

3526. SIR W. MEYER.—And the Afridis?

3527. SIR H. McMAHON.—I think the Afridis are becoming subject to peaceful influences. I do not think they want any trouble with us. We find we can always trust one section to counterbalance the influence of another.

3528. SIR W. MEYER.—That is a large asset in our favour, is it not?

3529. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, and as regards the relations between the two tribes, the Afridis hardly know the Mahsuds by name.

3530. SIR W. MEYER.—So that, unless the Government were very inept, we should not have a general combination of the tribes against us?

3531. SIR H. McMAHON.—That is so.

3532. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing we had this trouble with the Mahsuds, do you think it likely that we could beat them severely without the other tribes worrying themselves about it?

3533. SIR H. McMAHON.—The other tribes would not worry about it if we had a good excuse for fighting. It need not in any way upset the Afridis, but, for reasons I have stated elsewhere, attempts would be made by Afghan agents to stir them up.

3534. PRESIDENT.—What is to be the policy in the event of our having to march into the tribal area? Would we simply withdraw as previously or, if circumstances seemed favourable, establish posts there?

3535. SIR H. McMAHON.—No definite general policy has been laid down except that prescribed in the Secretary of State's despatch No. 1 of the 28th January 1898, paragraph 18, "No new responsibility should be taken unless absolutely required by actual strategical necessities and the protection of the Indian border." In connection with troubles with the Mahsuds in 1906-07 and 1909, when an expedition seemed inevitable, the Government of India on each occasion recorded their opinion that, if an expedition were undertaken, it should not be one of the "week end" or "burn and scuttle" class; but that it

should be followed by occupation, with a simple system of administration by means of irregular local forces and a small backing of regular troops. This I am strongly of opinion should be the policy in every case where a tribe drives us into hostilities against it.

3536. SIR W. MEYER.—The Secretary of State has not committed himself for or against this proposed modification of previous policy?

3537. SIR H. McMAHON.—No.

3538. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing we were to have a fight with the Afridis and, as a result, occupied portions of their country, would the other tribes go against us?

3539. SIR H. McMAHON.—Not necessarily so. I think every effort would be made from the Afghan side to bring about a hostile combination against us, but it does not necessarily follow that the other tribes would take action. I would take the risk. One thing is perfectly certain, and that is, that the first example which is made with this new policy would be thoroughly appreciated by the rest of the frontier, and would minimize trouble with the tribes in the future.

3540. SIR W. MEYER.—To carry out this policy you would have to put troops into the tribal area?

3541. SIR H. McMAHON.—You would have to occupy the country with regular troops and then reduce them gradually and as rapidly as circumstances allowed. That is what we did in Zhob. At present we have one regiment in Zhob, and even that is destined to be withdrawn on mobilization.

3542. PRESIDENT.—We could make decent roads into the tribal country?

3543. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, roads and hospitals, which would appeal to the people.

3544. PRESIDENT.—What would be the probable attitude of the tribes if we were at war with Afghanistan, or of Afghanistan if we were fighting some of the tribes?

3545. SIR H. McMAHON.—(a) The attitude of the frontier tribes and of the Afghan Government under certain contingencies has been so fully dealt with by Sir Harold Deane and myself in our memoranda* of July 1906 and September 1907 that I invite reference to them. Briefly stated, the attitude of the frontier tribes, if we were at war with Afghanistan, would be likely to be one of hostility. Much has been done of late years by Sardar Nasrulla Khan to instil into the independent tribes of the North-West Frontier a national spirit by stirring up their religious fanaticism and teaching them that their interests and those of Afghanistan are one and the same. This policy, in the event of our fighting Afghanistan, will bear fruit, and we must expect to find the tribes against us.

The integrity of Afghanistan as a Muhammadan kingdom is becoming more and more an object of vital interest to the Muhammadan world, and the frontier tribes will be the first to come under the influence of the fanatical feeling which a war with Afghanistan will arouse.

There are likely to be exceptions to this among the Afghan tribes of Baluchistan and the Ghilzai clans. In Baluchistan, because the tribes have settled down peacefully under our rule, have become richer and having more at stake will be cautious before committing themselves. The Ghilzais, because they hate Durani rule, and because hostility to us will shut them off from their trade in India and their winter quarters in the Derajat. They are more likely to continue to supply us as before with the bulk of our camel transport.

(b) To fight some of our frontier tribes is no new experience, and we therefore know fairly accurately what will be the attitude of Afghanistan should we have to do so again. The sympathy of Afghanistan will be as hitherto on the side of the tribes, and a certain amount of encouragement and assistance will come to them in the shape of men and arms from the Afghan side. The Afghan Government however will observe the Durand Line and Agreement and, as hitherto, will abstain from any open action which would afford evidence of its assisting the tribes against us.

* Not reproduced.

3546. SIR W. MEYER.—What do you think would be the attitude of our Pathan troops in the event of a war with Afghanistan? Would you be doubtful about them?

3547. SIR H. McMAHON.—We have had many instances in the past in which we have had to put our Pathan troops against even their own villages, and they have entered into the game *con amore*. We have also had instances in which we have given our Pathan troops leave, during which we have met them in the field against us.

3548. SIR W. MEYER.—We have had reservists and ex-sepoys fighting against us?

3549. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes.

3550. PRESIDENT.—In the Afghan War, with few exceptions, the Pathans and the Afridis fought extremely well on our side.

3551. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, while at the very same time their kinsmen in the Khyber have fought against us.

3552. SIR W. MEYER.—What would be the attitude of the Pathan troops in the event of a war with Turkey?

3553. SIR H. McMAHON.—That is a very difficult problem. One has to realize the fact that, to a large extent without their knowing why, the people of India and Afghanistan are gradually coming to consider that the Amir is the Head of Islam in regard to them, and the importance of Turkey has receded somewhat into the background. This was exemplified when the revolution in Turkey occurred and the Sultan was deposed; some slight stir was made in Kabul, but it was not worth speaking about, and this might be taken as a guide as to the extent of feeling in the future.

3554. SIR W. MEYER.—I do not quite follow your argument, because Sultans have been repeatedly deposed in the past.

3555. SIR H. McMAHON.—It is the only occasion in recent history on which the Sultan has been deposed.

3556. PRESIDENT.—At that time the new Turkish movement gave some vague assurance that all the various nationalities in the Turkish Empire would be treated in exactly the same way?

3557. SIR H. McMAHON.—The priests in Afghanistan tried to make out that it was owing to mischief from the west. They were trying to misrepresent the whole thing, but the stir created was much less than might have been expected. In my opinion, it was the Turco-Greek War which led to the rising in 1897. Turkey's influence is waning, but taking it at the present moment, it is a dangerous factor and we would pause before we opposed ourselves to Turkey as a Muhammadan Power.

3558. SIR W. MEYER.—You think that as time goes on the Muhammadans of India will look more to the Amir than to the Sultan?

3559. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes. The tendency to look to the Sultan is declining. I was very much impressed when the Amir was in India by the way in which the Indian Muhammadans always posed as if he were the Head of Islam.

3560. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you ever have an opportunity of gauging the Amir's own feelings towards the Sultan?

3561. SIR H. McMAHON.—No. He sent a big subscription to Tripoli for the Red Cross. We also know that he takes the very greatest interest in the war.

3562. PRESIDENT.—What are your views as to the possibility or desirability of reducing the strength of the North-West Frontier Militia or of merging them in the regular Indian army?

3563. SIR H. McMAHON.—(1) I do not think that it is possible or desirable to reduce the strength of the North-West Frontier Militia under present conditions on the frontier. On the contrary, I would like to see them slightly increased so as to enable them to hold the Thal-Idak line without the aid of the present military garrisons in the Lower Tochi posts.

(2) It is not desirable to merge the North-West Frontier, or any other Frontier Militia into the regular Indian army for many reasons :—

(i) Irregular troops are better suited to the conditions of the country and the work than regulars.

(ii) Regulars would not have the local men or the local experience necessary for the work required.

(iii) Regulars are subject to frequent reliefs and transfers which destroy continuity of knowledge and experience.

(iv) They are subject to reduction or removal altogether on mobilization, just at critical or disturbed times when local changes or diminution of strength is most dangerous. Previous assurances to the contrary on the part of the military authorities cannot and must not be depended on in this matter, as the temptation to add to some military force elsewhere may be irresistible.

(v) The cost of replacing these irregulars by regulars would be prohibitive. The pay, food, clothing, equipment, and above all accommodation of regulars, whether in lines or in posts, are on a far higher scale than that of irregulars.

A post suitable for irregulars is never found suitable either in size, situation, strength, or design, for regulars, and the cost of the one is calculated in thousands, and of the other in lakhs, of rupees.

3564. PRESIDENT.—As the administrative frontier is pushed forward would you be prepared to raise new irregular corps? We began first with the Punjab Frontier Force, who fought very well and as time went on were absorbed into the regular army, and fresh militia was raised. The advantage of that would seem to be that we would utilize for the army the best fighting material available.

3565. SIR H. McMAHON.—I have nothing to say against that, but the actual people employed across the border should be irregulars.

3566. PRESIDENT.—But you will admit that they are the best fighting men we have?

3567. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, and the cheapest.

3568. SIR W. MEYER.—General Dickie told us the other day that the Military Works built quarters and lines for these frontier militia; is that so?

3569. SIR H. McMAHON.—That is right with regard to the North-West Frontier Province, but the posts are built on much less ambitious designs than similar posts would be built for regulars.

3570. SIR W. MEYER.—Could you give us a rough idea of the total cost of these various frontier militias?

3571. SIR H. McMAHON.—I could not give it off hand. I will let you have a written statement.*

3572. PRESIDENT.—Was the strength of the Khyber Rifles considerably increased in connection with the now abandoned Loi-Shilman railway?

3573. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, by 354 infantry and 80 sowars, at a cost of Rs. 85,000 per annum. This additional force has now been allotted to the protection of the Peshawar border from the Kabul River to the Kohat Pass with very satisfactory results, and a reduction has been made in the Border Military Police.

3574. SIR W. MEYER.—So you do not advocate any reduction of the Khyber Rifles?

* Appendix IV.

3575. SIR H. McMAHON.—No.

3576. PRESIDENT.—They are a very efficient body ?

3577. SIR H. McMAHON.—Extremely efficient.

3578. PRESIDENT.—Do the Nepalese acknowledge the suzerainty of Great Britain ?

3579. SIR H. McMAHON.—Nepal has never openly acknowledged the suzerainty of Great Britain, and no such suzerainty is indicated in any treaty, or by the recognition of our right to control her foreign relations. China, on the other hand, claims suzerainty over Nepal by virtue of the allegiance acknowledged to the Emperor of China in the Nepal-Tibet Treaty of 1856. The only evidence of direct political relations is the somewhat irregular quinquennial mission sent by the Maharaja of Nepal to the Emperor. Recently Nepal has repudiated allegiance to China.

In discussing the whole question in 1909, the Government of India came to the conclusion that “ Whatever her theoretical claims may be, we could no longer in practice permit Nepal to exercise any independence in her foreign relations.” The occupation of Tibet by China re-opened the question of the status of Nepal, and with the permission of His Majesty’s Government, the Government of India, in reply to a reference on the subject by the Nepal Darbar, informed them “ that the British Government will support and protect Nepal in the event of an unprovoked attack from any quarter ; and that, so long as the Prime Minister consults the British Government and follows their advice when given, and pursues his present correct and friendly attitude, His Majesty’s Government will not allow the interests and rights of Nepal to be affected or prejudiced by any administrative changes in Tibet.” This assurance was gratefully acknowledged by the Nepal Prime Minister in May 1911.

His Majesty’s Government in 1910 informed China that they would not allow any administrative changes in Tibet to affect or prejudice the integrity of Nepal, and that they were prepared to protect the interests and rights of that State. China replied by saying that Nepal was her vassal. The position therefore, as it now stands, is one of *de facto* although not *de jure* suzerainty to us, tacitly acknowledged by Nepal, but denied by China.

3580. SIR W. MEYER.—Do the Chinese maintain a permanent legation at Katmandu ?

3581. SIR H. McMAHON.—No.

3582. SIR W. MEYER.—Has there ever been evidence of any Russian intrigue in Nepal ?

3583. SIR H. McMAHON.—Never.

3584. PRESIDENT.—What chances would there be of our obtaining the permission of the Nepal Darbar to increase the number of Gurkha reservists in the Indian army :—

(a) If the peace establishment of the units were lowered,

(b) If the establishment were to remain as it is at present ?

3585. SIR H. McMAHON.—This is a question to which probably no one could give a really reliable reply except Colonel Manners-Smith, (see annexure) who unfortunately is now on leave in England. It was he who negotiated the present Gurkha reserve. Personally, I am inclined to think that we would be risking a good deal in asking for more reservists than we already have. It is easy to see from the correspondence on the subject that the Prime Minister went a good deal out of his way to grant the present concession, and he gave a polite hint, when we got the number of reservists raised from 1,800 to 2,000, that he hoped we would not ask for more. The difficulty as regards the Nepal Darbar is that they cannot take a reservist into their own service, as he is likely to be called away. To press the Darbar too far might lose us much in other respects, and in connexion with our present recruiting facilities, etc., etc.

3586. SIR W. MEYER.—The present situation is that the establishment of a Gurkha regiment is 912 and we are allowed a reserve of 100. Supposing we were to say we do not want a peace establishment of more than 712?

3587. SIR H. McMAHON.—It would reduce the number of trained men they could take into their own army.

3588. SIR W. MEYER.—As matters now stand, each Gurkha battalion has 1,012 men (100 with the reserve) on its rolls. If instead of this we had 712 in each battalion and 300 in its reserve, the situation is not altered. The Darbar would merely supply 200 men less for our actual peace strength.

3589. SIR H. McMAHON.—They do not mind that, but what they object to is that every reservist that we have means a man they cannot rely on for their own army. They have never made any objections to our proposals except to hint that they hoped we would not ask for more reservists.

3590. SIR P. LAKE.—Would there be any difficulty if we proposed to utilize Gurkhas in the military police as reservists?

3591. SIR H. McMAHON.—The objection is that many Gurkhas settle in Burma, China and elsewhere, and the Nepal Darbar views this with disfavour.

3592. PRESIDENT.—How far can this agreement with Nepal be considered a formal and binding treaty?

3593. SIR H. McMAHON.—The arrangement with Nepal on the subject of Gurkha reservists has definitely been stated in an un-official letter by the Prime Minister to be a permanent one. This cannot be said to be a formal or binding treaty, but in view of the scrupulously correct manner in which the Nepal Darbar have always observed their engagements with us, there is no reason to think that this will prove to be an exception.

3594. PRESIDENT.—What is the probability of Nepal becoming embroiled with China, irrespective of the relations existing between the Government of India and the Darbar?

3595. SIR H. McMAHON.—Nepal has suffered considerably by the overthrow of the *status quo* prior to 1903 in Tibet. The Chinese occupation brought an aggressive neighbour to her frontier, and the subsequent chaos now existing, owing to the rebellion of Tibet against China, has injured her subjects, property and interests in Tibet. Nepal does not want the Chinese back in that country. She has an account to square with China over these last troubles, and also has a northern frontier which she has long been desirous of rectifying. We may not be able to restrain Nepal from aggressive action either in the attempt of China to re-occupy Tibet, or in failure of the future Chinese representative in Tibet to pay Nepal adequate compensation for recent losses. I had a letter from the Prime Minister of Nepal this morning calling attention to these losses and stating that they reserved the right of taking compensation from Tibet.

3596. PRESIDENT.—What is the present strength of the armed forces of Nepal?

3597. SIR H. McMAHON.—(a) 123 cavalry; 32,493 infantry; 200 armed police; 257 guns, of which 117 are serviceable; and 2,517 artillerymen. Total all ranks; 35,333. The troops are armed with Martini-Henry rifles, but the Government of India have just presented Nepal with 2,000 new short Lee-Enfield rifles and 500,000 rounds of ammunition.

3598. SIR P. LAKE.—What kind of rights has Nepal in Tibet?

3599. SIR H. McMAHON.—Rights somewhat similar to our own trading rights, but no other. She keeps a representative there.

3600. SIR W. MEYER.—Are the troops (the numbers of which you have given us), permanently with the colours?

3601. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes. They are well organized, well trained, smart looking men.

3602. SIR W. MEYER.—Have they anything in the shape of a reserve?

3603. SIR H. McMAHON.—I could not tell you.

3604. PRESIDENT.—Has the Nepal Darbar on any recent occasion offered military assistance to the Government of India?

3605. SIR H. McMAHON.—In August 1903, the Prime Minister of Nepal informed the Resident that in case of the adoption of coercive measures by the Government of India, Nepal would be quite prepared to make a demonstration against Tibet or actively co-operate with us. The Prime Minister also offered us yaks for the transport of the Tibet Mission. He offered 500 at once and 8,000 later. The offer was accepted. The Nepal Darbar also assisted us during the operations in Tibet with coolies for transport.

During the King's visit to Nepal last winter, the Prime Minister on more than one occasion assured His Majesty that the whole of the army of Nepal would be at his disposal whenever it was required. I am confident that this was really meant.

3606. SIR W. MEYER.—In the event of a war with Afghanistan or Russia, would that offer be repeated?

3607. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes.

3608. SIR W. MEYER.—General Aylmer said he did not share the general view that the Gurkha troops could be relied on. What do you say to that?

3609. SIR H. McMAHON.—I strongly disagree. I do not think there is any justification for that. Of all the people with whom we deal, there are none more consistently loyal and obliging than the Nepalese Darbar.

3610. SIR W. MEYER.—Every nation has ambitions, has it not?

3611. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, but I do not think that the ambitions of Nepal tend towards India, neither do I think the Nepalese have any intention of expanding in our direction. There is a very strong military spirit, but I do not think they have any designs against us.

3612. SIR W. MEYER.—Do they not take into consideration that we took a part of their territory about a hundred years ago?

3613. SIR H. McMAHON.—They remember it, certainly.

3614. SIR W. MEYER.—Would a war with Russia ending disastrously for us alter their attitude?

3615. SIR H. McMAHON.—They would stick to us until we were absolutely cleared out.

3616. PRESIDENT.—What information is there regarding the influence of Germany in China?

3617. SIR H. McMAHON.—All that is known here of the influence of Germany in China is contained in the Annual Report on China for 1910 by His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Peking. It would appear therefrom that the Germans are always ready to sacrifice their pride and principles in ingratiating themselves with the Chinese at the expense of other foreigners in order to gain some small and temporary advantage for German trade; and that the German Legation always sides with the Chinese against us. There is no mention of their influence being great.

3618. PRESIDENT.—There was a vague idea that the Germans sent emissaries to the extreme frontier of Burma for the purpose of inciting the inhabitants to show an aggressive tendency in Burma.

3619. SIR H. McMAHON.—I think it is unlikely, but their influence is always against us in China.

3620. PRESIDENT.—What probabilities are there of trouble arising between the Governments of India and China in connection with the suzerainty which the latter claims to have over the States of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan?

3621. SIR H. McMAHON.—China has admitted that Sikkim is by treaty under the protection of Great Britain, but she continues to claim Nepal and Bhutan as vassal states, notwithstanding our repudiation of that claim. It follows that if China re-establishes herself in strength in Tibet, trouble will sooner or later inevitably arise between her and the Government of India over this question. This trouble may be precipitated by aggressive action on the part of Nepal, which repudiates Chinese suzerainty, and may feel compelled by force of circumstances to assist Tibet in keeping the Chinese out.

3622. SIR W. MEYER.—If it came to serious trouble with China, whether with regard to Nepal or Bhutan, or on the Burma frontier, do you think that it would be necessary to make any serious military effort on those frontiers, or would our best line be to attack China on her coasts?

3623. SIR H. McMAHON.—A year ago we would unhesitatingly have said that we should attack China by sea, but at present we do not know to what extent China is divided into separate administrations. If certain provinces become independent we would have to deal with them across the border by military force.

3624. SIR W. MEYER.—Would a serious military effort be required even then?

3625. SIR H. McMAHON.—They had a respectable army a little while ago, but we cannot talk very definitely in India about it. Colonel Willoughby, the British Military Attaché at Peking, writes very fully about it, but I have not his reports with me.

3626. SIR P. LAKE.—Has China ever explicitly disavowed her intention completely to absorb Tibet?

3627. SIR H. McMAHON.—In a proclamation by the Chinese Government it was stated that Tibet and Mongolia were regular provinces of China. I do not know what the result of our protest at Peking against that has been.

3628. SIR W. MEYER.—It was rather unfortunate, was it not, that when we withdrew from Tibet we left it at the mercy of China?

3629. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, our intention was that the *status quo* should be maintained; the Chinese Government interpreted it as the military occupation of the whole of Tibet.

3630. PRESIDENT.—What are the terms under which Imperial Service Troops are allowed to be maintained by Native States? If these troops are a potential source of danger to the Government of India, should their maintenance be encouraged? How far would it be possible to induce Native States to reduce the numbers of their irregular troops?

3631. SIR H. McMAHON.—(a) The principle governing the maintenance of Imperial Service Troops by Native States is that each force will remain a purely State force, recruited in the territories of its Chief and serving within them, the troops composing it being gradually made so efficient as to enable the Imperial Government to use them as part of its available resources to meet any external danger.

(b) Imperial Service Troops stand in much the same position to us as our Indian army. They are alien mercenaries and subject to limitations as such. In some cases they are alien to the States by whom they are employed and therefore alien mercenaries in a double sense. In some respects they are no more a potential source of danger than our Indian army, but in some respects more so, because their loyalty to their own Chiefs might in certain circumstances be doubtful, and hostility to their own Chiefs would commit them to hostility towards us. They serve a useful purpose in providing a useful outlet for the martial instincts of manly races, and in giving Chiefs a suitable means of rendering service to the Government. It would be unwise to discourage their maintenance in cases where willingness to maintain them is expressed and known to be felt, but no hindrance should be placed in the way of reduction in cases where Chiefs shew a desire for it. Natural causes, such as the expense of

maintaining Imperial Service Troops at the recognized standard of efficiency, must in time tend to bring about their gradual reduction.

(c) In recent times we have advised States to reduce the number of their irregular forces, for instance, Hyderabad, Indore and Datia. [The Nizam has reduced some 13,000 men in the last 20 years. In 1902 he agreed to reduce his irregular forces from 19,500 to 12,000.] In 1892 the irregulars and police in Native States numbered 321,892, whereas, in 1911 this number had fallen to 158,525, giving a reduction of over 150,000 men. Our accepted policy is to allow the irregular forces gradually to dwindle away. This they are doing. The great majority of these irregular forces are badly paid, badly clothed, badly equipped, badly trained, and badly-led rabbles. Their arms are useless and are becoming more so every day. They are useful for purposes of *izzat*, guards of honour, palace and zanana guards, etc. As the taste for polo, motor cars and trips to Europe develops, Chiefs are from day to day becoming more disinclined to spend much money on the upkeep of these picturesque anachronisms. We do not provide arms for these forces, but we present certain States with smooth-bore Martinis in restricted numbers for their police in order to enable the latter to perform legitimate police duties.

3632. SIR W. MEYER.—With regard to the large numbers of Native States troops you have given, the Imperial Gazetteer, published in 1907, says that the Native States maintained 93,000 irregulars in all, and yet you speak of a reduction of 150,000?

3633. SIR H. McMAHON.—These are the total figures—

In 1892 the irregulars and police numbered 321,892 and in 1911, 158,525. I do not mean levies and people like that; I mean irregular troops.

3634. SIR W. MEYER.—How do you account for the much smaller figures of the Imperial Gazetteer, which was seen at the time by the Foreign Department?

3635. SIR H. McMAHON.—I cannot tell you. These figures are from the returns which we get every six months; I think it is a return called the "Armament Return."

3636. SIR W. MEYER.—Are Native States allowed to increase their armies without reference to the Government of India?

3637. SIR H. McMAHON.—There is nothing to prevent them. All political officers have instructions to encourage the decrease of the irregular forces, and there is a tendency on the part of the States in this direction.

3638. SIR W. MEYER.—In the case of the Imperial Service Troops, was there not formerly a certain amount of pressure to increase them?

3639. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes.

3640. SIR W. MEYER.—Is the pressure the other way now?

3641. SIR H. McMAHON.—We are making a great favour of allowing fresh applications to participate in the movement. An instance of this is Udaipur was refused twice before sanction was accorded him.

3642. SIR W. MEYER.—One of the principles was that each State's Imperial Service Troops should be drawn from the State itself; is that the case in practice?

3643. SIR H. McMAHON.—I am sorry to say that it is sometimes disregarded in practice.

3644. SIR W. MEYER.—According to the terms under which the Imperial Service Troops were raised, they were to be put at the disposal of the Government of India in any emergency, were they not?

3645. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes.

3646. SIR W. MEYER.—It has been stated that some of the States object to this, as it would expose them to local tumults? In the case of war on the frontier, would you send all the Imperial Service Troops there?

3673. SIR W. MEYER.—You do not regard Rewa as powerful for mischief then?

3674. SIR H. McMAHON.—Not at all.

3675. PRESIDENT.—Has the military strength of Native States, whether in armament or training, increased or decreased of late years?

3676. SIR H. McMAHON.—As regards numbers, I take the figures of 1892, the first year that Imperial Service Troops were shown separately in the armament returns, and compare them with those of August 1911, the date of our last returns.

	1892,	1911.
Imperial Service Troops	16,046	22,622*
Irregulars and Police ...	321,892	158,525†

It will be seen that there is a very marked and satisfactory decrease among the irregulars of over 150,000. No doubt the decrease will be steadily maintained. The numbers still remaining are no doubt large, but I have described the character and armament of the bulk of these irregulars before. Their armament has decreased, and is decreasing in value year by year as their weapons become not only more and more obsolete and fit for museums, but more and more inefficient in comparison with continually improving modern weapons. Their training is decreasing as Chiefs yearly move about much more, see modern highly trained troops, and recognize what an amount of rag-tag and bob-tail they maintain. There are of course exceptions. For instance, Sindhia has high military instincts and a passion for efficiency, and trains and drills his irregulars to a fairly high state of efficiency though their arms are obsolete. Rewa does the same, but his men's hearts are not in it. Baroda's army is trained by an ex-British officer, Colonel Birdwood. It is good at ceremonial but useless in the field, and has poor material.

For use among the police forces of Native States, we have during the last two years distributed 3,062 smooth-bore Martinis in return for 1983 old firearms. The former figure includes 420 bored-out Martinis lent to meet special contingencies, such as outbreaks of dacoities: of these 350 have already been returned. The latter figure includes one '303 rifle and two '303 carbines which the Sawbwa of Laihka in Burma had captured from marauders.

3677. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you any other statement of armed forces, because Lord Kitchener in his scheme for the redistribution of the army gives entirely different figures for the armies of the Native States. In the statement† here, I find, taking Hyderabad, the strength of the local army given as 5,748 men and 15 guns. In your return it would be far more than that?

† *Vide* Redistribution Scheme, Appendix C.

3678. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, I will look it up.

3679. PRESIDENT.—It is said that the Hyderabad forces are very badly disciplined?

3680. SIR H. McMAHON.—In some States the irregular troops are a very great nuisance.

3681. PRESIDENT.—Is there any evidence to shew that the Tureo-Italian war has had any effect upon Indian Muhammadans?

3682. SIR H. McMAHON.—There is much evidence to shew this. The Government of India have received and are receiving numerous petitions from Muslim leagues from all parts of India expressing their indignation at the interference by the Italians with the pilgrim traffic in the Red Sea. If further interference occurs when the traffic opens next August, very great indignation will be aroused. The utterances of the Muhammadan Press on the subject show that the war is arousing much resentment, although not perhaps so much as the desecration of the Meshed shrine by the Russians.

* Including 8,129 men employed in Transport Corps.

† Includes swordsmen, spearmen, etc., very many of these are armed men merely to the same extent that a *Jemadar Chaprasi* in the Foreign Office is with his knife of office.

3683. SIR W. MEYER.—You think that it is real indignation, and not merely the interference of a few busy-bodies ?

3684. SIR H. McMAHON.—I think in some cases it is the latter, but one might say there is general indignation.

3685. SIR W. MEYER.—Has any similar feeling been excited by events in Morocco ?

3686. SIR H. McMAHON.—There has been no indignation in India about Morocco. Very few Indian people know anything about Morocco. Of course the Italians in Tripoli affect them more directly.

3687. PRESIDENT.—What is your opinion regarding the Pan-Islamic movement amongst Muhammadans in India ?

3688. SIR H. McMAHON.—It is difficult to acquire reliable information as to the progress of the Pan-Islamic movement in India. If viewed from the aspect of a regenerative force whose aim is the progress and prosperity of Islam at the expense of other religions and interests, I think we need not consider it seriously in India.

We must, however, regard it in a different aspect, namely that of a movement to retain and maintain what is now left of Islamic power in the world. Education is opening the eyes of India to what is going on in the rest of the world, and one of the first lessons it has taught the Muhammadans of India is that the secular power of Islam is fast waning, and that the Muhammadan kingdoms have nearly all disappeared. Only three are now left, of which one—Persia—shows signs of early decease, and only Turkey and Afghanistan remain with any semblance of real independence. This fact is, I think, rapidly impressing itself upon the Muhammadan mind of India. Hence we notice the resentment which is being caused by the Italian attacks on Turkey and Russian doings in Persia. It is welding the Muhammadans of India into a body more alive to their mutual interests, and more capable of combination and co-operation in the defence of those interests than was ever the case before. This is a factor which should be remembered in connexion with designs against the integrity of the remaining Muhammadan kingdoms of the world, whether on our own part or on that of other Powers; more especially should it be kept in mind in regard to Turkey and Afghanistan, who, as *Sunni* Muhammadans, attract the greater attention. Persia is not only a *Shiah* country, but its shortcomings both as a Government and a people are known to all intelligent Indian Muhammadans, who are inclined to regard it as doomed. Their comparative indifference in regard to Persia does not, however, extend to acts directed against their religion, such as the Russian desecration of the Meshed shrine.

3689. SIR W. MEYER.—Did not the late Sultan encourage the visits of Indian Muhammadans to Constantinople ?

3690. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, in a way; more so perhaps than is done now.

3691. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think it was part of any serious policy, or just to advertize himself as Caliph ?

3692. SIR H. McMAHON.—I think it was more with the latter object than any other. Turkey, I think, looks upon India and Indians with considerable contempt.

3693. SIR W. MEYER.—We asked one or two of our witnesses whether they considered the Hindu danger or the Muhammadan danger the greater to British Rule, what is your opinion ?

3694. SIR H. McMAHON.—The Hindu is certainly the greater danger.

3695. SIR W. MEYER.—Although the Muhammadan may be influenced by considerations outside India over which we have no control ?

3696. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, he is liable at fitful intervals to voice his resentment and indignation, but, taking it all round, and regarding the future as a long future, I should say the Hindu was certainly more dangerous than the Muhammadan.

3697. SIR W. MEYER.—You think the Hindus will become more homogeneous, and forget caste prejudices and so on?

3698. SIR H. McMAHON.—I think that, whatever the tendency may be, it is as much directed against the Muhammadans as against ourselves. I exclude all side issues like the Turco-Italian War, etc.

3699. PRESIDENT.—Are there any grounds for suspecting that the Phulkian States have become tainted with the prevailing spirit of unrest?

3700. SIR H. McMAHON.—It is a matter of common knowledge that the Arya Samaj and other preachers of disaffection have made a determined set at the Sikhs generally, and in consequence have turned their particular attention to the Sikh States. The Tat Khalsa, or Progressive Sikh party, whose aims for the time being have been diverted from laudable and religious, to doubtful political objects, have also devoted their attention to the Sikh States. We have therefore in the Phulkian States a small party of mischievously-minded men of considerable personal influence, who need careful watching. It cannot, however, be said that these States are largely tainted with unrest, for the vast bulk of the people have not begun to interest themselves in such matters. The danger lies in their learning to do so. Much rests with the Chiefs themselves. We have no reason for doubting the loyalty of any of them, but they are naturally susceptible to the insidious flattery and influence of these clever exponents of progressive ideas. The situation has not assumed a dangerous phase, but requires careful watching, and the Chiefs need wholesome advice and able guidance.

3701. SIR W. MEYER.—We have had doubt thrown on the loyalty of Patiala and Nabha.

3702. SIR H. McMAHON.—I do not share this view. Patiala is a young fellow and likes flattery, but I would call him whole-heartedly loyal. As regards Nabha, I think he is loyal. He has of course advanced ideas, but I would not go so far as to call him disloyal.

3703. SIR W. MEYER.—There was some apprehension when Lord Minto visited Patiala about 1910?

3704. SIR H. McMAHON.—For a moment it was doubtful whether the young Chief would be installed, but this had nothing to do with his own personal loyalty. We were afraid of giving him powers and leaving him at the mercy of evil influences. Nabha is a young misguided egotist who wants to have special privileges in regard to his installation which we will not give in to.

3705. PRESIDENT.—What grounds are there for believing that the Maratha States are disloyal? Are the troops maintained by these States likely to prove unfaithful to their Chiefs?

3706. SIR H. McMAHON.—The question is a difficult one to answer because every State is made up of the following components, (1) the Chief, (2) the nobles, (3) the officials and (4) the people.

Any general statement as to the attitude of a State based on that of one of these components might be quite unjust and inaccurate in respect to one or all of the other components.

The only just and safe method of arriving at reliable conclusions is to consider the attitude of each class separately.

(1) *Chiefs*.—It may confidently be stated that, with the single doubtful exception of the Gaikwar of Baroda, all the Maratha Chiefs of India are thoroughly loyal. With the exception of Baroda, all have taken spontaneous measures in the form of speeches, laws and regulations to prevent sedition taking root in their territories, and have acted with effective promptness in dealing with cases of sedition coming to their notice. The loyalty of the Kolhapur Chief—himself the descendant of Sivaji, the hero of the Deccan seditionists—has brought upon him the open hostility of all the seditious leaders, the adherents of Tilak and their Press. They are always maligning him and making false allegations as to his maladministration and vicious private life. In 1910 he was so anxious about his own safety and that of the European

community, that he expressed a great desire for "good white British troops" to be stationed at Kolhapur. The Gaikwar of Baroda has only recently taken steps of any kind to deal with sedition. It is impossible to acquit him of the charge of disloyalty, but it would be unfair to call him actively seditious. He suffers from megalomania, which renders him an easy prey to flattery and the influence of seditious intrigues. He is known to have personal dealings with Madame Kama and other leading seditious, and he has taken into his personal service men known to be actively seditious.

(2) *Nobles*.—The Maratha States are permeated with the influence of the pestilential Deccani Brahman. Some of the nobility of each State must naturally have come under this influence, but the guaranteed Thakurs of Central India and the Girasias of Baroda, whose rights and possessions depend entirely on the guarantee and protection of the British Government, knowing as they do, that they must stand or fall with that Government, are immune from seditious influences. They are loyal to the British Government but their loyalty to the Chiefs of their States is a matter of some doubt.

(3) *Officials*.—Among the officials the Deccani Brahman influence is rampant, far too many of the officials are themselves Deccani Brahmans. These may be said as a class to be actively disloyal and seditious.

(4) *People*.—The seditious influence of the Deccani Brahman has doubtless affected those of the people who come into close touch with State officials, but the vast bulk of the people in the Maratha States, as elsewhere in India, can hardly be said to be either disloyal or seditious.

The following are instances of active sedition in the Maratha States :—

Gwalior.—In 1909, seditious emissaries went from Gwalior to stir up trouble in Indore. Maharaja Sindhia punished the chief offenders with two years imprisonment.

In 1908, the existence in Gwalior of numerous revolutionary societies came to light. The Maharaja took energetic steps to discover and punish them. Thirty-three were convicted by a special tribunal of judges and sentenced to imprisonment extending up to seven years.

Indore.—The state of affairs in 1909 became very serious. There were a large number of Deccani Brahmans in State service, and they carried on sedition openly on the supposition that the Maharaja was indifferent. The Darbar, however, took action and some of the offenders were punished, but many escaped owing to the fear people had of giving evidence against them.

Dhar.—The Chief had to take steps to check sedition in 1907, and evicted an offender from the State.

Baroda.—Enquiries made last year into the printing and publication of seditious books in the Baroda State established the existence of widespread sedition among the leading State officials. In consequence of this the Gaikwar was at last induced to take steps against sedition by the passing of a Press Act, Explosives Act and amendments to his Penal Code to include sedition. He also proposes to place his police force under a British officer.

With regard to the last part of the question, only the following leading States need be considered :—

Name of State.				Imperial Service Troops.	Irregulars.	Armed Police.	Total.
Baroda		<i>Nil</i>	4,775	2,549	7,324
Kolhapur		<i>Nil</i>	712	246	958
Do. Jagirs		<i>Nil</i>	27	67	94
Gwalior		4,135	6,981	...	11,116
Indore		519	1,624	1,618	3,761
Dhar		<i>Nil</i>	346	332	678

There is every ground for believing that these troops are likely to prove unfaithful to their Chiefs. They have been so in the past. In 1857 the Gwalior troops were unfaithful to Sindhia, and the Indore troops to Holkar. The Maharaja of Kolhapur has openly admitted his doubts as to the loyalty of his troops. The Gwalior army is full of aliens, as Marathas dislike military service, and there is even now considerable discontent in the ranks. Sindhia himself doubts the loyalty of his nobles who, if trouble arose, would doubtless influence the army. Summed up, you might say that, with the doubtful exception of Baroda, all the Chiefs are loyal.

3707. SIR W. MEYER.—When you say the Chiefs are loyal, do you mean that they would stand by us in the event of disaster?

3708. SIR H. McMAHON.—I think up to the very last moment. They realize that they cannot stand without us. Not a single Maratha Chief would last a day if we left; that is why Gwalior has raised such a large army. There was a feeling two years ago that we were going to leave the country and it gave them all cause to think, but I know that in Gwalior's case he keeps his army up with the idea that if we have to go he would have to stand the racket himself, and he would like to come out "top dog."

3709. SIR W. MEYER.—You would not associate yourself with the opinion that, if Gwalior thought our rule was going to finish, he would be the first to strike at it?

3710. SIR H. McMAHON.—No, I do not think that at all.

3711. SIR W. MEYER.—Has Gwalior much influence outside his own State?

3712. SIR H. McMAHON.—He has influence among many States because he is looked upon as a very clever and shrewd administrator, and many Chiefs come to him for advice regarding administration. Bikaner is fond of him and is influenced by him to a certain extent. I do not think his influence among other States can be called a mischievous influence.

3713. SIR W. MEYER.—Are you aware of the views entertained by Mr. Bosanquet about the Maharaja of Baroda?

3714. SIR H. McMAHON.—I have seen his evidence. I have said here that the Gaikwar is not actively seditious, but his Penal Code contained no clause by which it was an offence to be seditious against the British Government, neither did he have till lately a Press Act or other Acts which all the other States found necessary to bring in to check sedition—but I put it all down to "swollen head."

3715. SIR W. MEYER.—Have the recent incident at the Darbar and its consequences exercised any salutary effect, do you think?

3716. SIR H. McMAHON.—It has resulted in Baroda having a Press Act and other needed reforms.

3717. SIR W. MEYER.—An acute observer told me last year that on revisiting India after an absence of some years he was struck by the fact that whereas the Native Chiefs of India formerly said "we should like the Government of India to do this or that" they now said "we intend" to take such and such action.

3718. SIR H. McMAHON.—Their relations with the Government of India have not, I think, undergone any change.

3719. SIR W. MEYER.—There was a rather famous speech by Lord Minto in which he spoke of allowing Native States to look after their own affairs?

3720. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, it was taken very literally by some of the Chiefs, but I think very few failed to realize that it did not mean all that was said in it.

3721. SIR W. MEYER.—I understand we are bound under an old treaty to maintain a battalion of native infantry at Baroda. Mr. Bosanquet said that

if the Maharaja was left a detachment for ceremonial purposes he would be satisfied. Do you associate yourself with that ?

3722. SIR H. McMAHON.—I think he would be glad to see the emblem of our authority taken away. I would not be in favour of removing the regiment. Recently we seriously considered the question of putting more troops into Baroda.

3723. SIR W. MEYER.—Is it not possible that the fidelity of the regiment might be tampered with ?

3724. SIR H. McMAHON.—Hardly ; I do not think there is much sympathy in our army with Marathas.

3725. PRESIDENT.—Is there any reason to anticipate the extension of the Orenburg-Tashkent Railway to Termez in the immediate future ? This extension has been under discussion for some years past, has it not ?

3726. SIR H. McMAHON.—An extension of the railway from the Trans-Caspian and later from the Orenburg-Tashkent lines has been under consideration for many years past. We heard that the question was shelved in 1906 for financial reasons. A recent Meshel Diary, however, mentioned that a survey had been completed from Kaghan (Bokhara) to Termez.

3727. PRESIDENT.—Was it a wise policy to stop work on the Loi-Shilman railway and the Parachinar railway ? If such work were resumed, which line should be taken first ?

3728. SIR H. McMAHON.—(1) Loi-Shilman line.—I do not question the wisdom of stopping it, when, as was the case, it was to lead to a railhead *en l'air* with no hope of extension within any reasonable time.

It would have been better to continue and complete the Parachinar line.

(2) Lord Kitchener in 1905 pronounced the Loi-Shilman line of the greater importance strategically. The relative importance of the two lines would, however, seem to depend on the nature of their railheads. Unless and until we are in a position to push the Khyber line forthwith to a suitable and workable railhead out in the Dakka plain, common sense would dictate the expediency of first undertaking the Parachinar line which has the solid advantage of a suitable and accessible railhead within ninety-five miles of Kabul. The Loi-Shilman line leaves us in a valley out of which it would take some 3 years' work to get the line to Dakka. Similarly the river line leaves us in an enclosed bay shut off from Dakka by a mountain spur running into the river.

3729. SIR W. MEYER.—Was not one of the railways pulled up ?

3730. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, the Loi-Shilman line. It was done in order to save the cost of maintenance.

3731. SIR W. MEYER.—Is not a considerable waste of money entailed in this policy of beginning a line and then tearing it up again ?

3732. SIR H. McMAHON.—Yes, a great waste, but the tunnels, galleries and permanent way remain. It would not take long to lay the rails down again.

3733. PRESIDENT.—Was there not a divergence of views between Lord Kitchener and the Foreign Department as to the alignment of the Loi-Shilman Railway after mile 300 ?

3734. SIR H. McMAHON.—There was great divergence of opinion, but the line of cleavage was not well defined between the Foreign Department and Lord Kitchener. Lord Curzon's leanings were towards the Loi-Shilman route advocated by Lord Kitchener. Lord Minto and General Duff inclined towards the river route advocated by Sir Louis Dane (then Foreign Secretary), which was also recommended by the railway authorities.

3735. SIR P. LAKE.—What would be the attitude of the tribes towards the construction of the line in our own territory ?

3736. SIR H. McMAHON.—They are reconciled to the idea and perfectly friendly towards it ; we could have made it up to the limit of our territory.

3737. SIR P. LAKE.—With regard to the Parachinar line, do you know how long the route to Kabul is closed by snow during the winter ?

3738. SIR H. McMAHON.—It depends upon the severity of the winter ; in a bad winter it would be closed for two or three months. Personally I prefer the Loi-Shilman route.

3739. SIR W. MEYER.—I have heard that Lord Kitchener's final idea was to take the railway through the Bazar Valley ?

3740. SIR H. McMAHON.—I think we should have trouble with the people there.

3741. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think there is any serious risk of trouble in Baluchistan in the event of a big war and internal commotions in India ?

3742. SIR H. McMAHON.—I think not. There is no more danger in Baluchistan than there is in India, except influences which would affect Baluchistan as a frontier country in regard to a war with Afghanistan or a war with Russia. The dangers there are very much less than those in other portions of the frontier.

3743. SIR W. MEYER.—Is there likely to be any trouble with the Khan of Kelat ?

3744. SIR H. McMAHON.—None whatever. He is a nonentity.

A. 2668. 3745. SIR W. MEYER.—We asked General Aylmer whether the Zhob Levy posts should be maintained west of Domandi ?

3746. SIR H. McMAHON.—This being the Afghan border, we must have some posts there. We are reducing some already.

3747. SIR W. MEYER.—Might the Zhob Levy Corps be concentrated at Fort Sandeman, to allow the regular garrison there to be withdrawn ?

3748. SIR H. McMAHON.—If it were withdrawn, the Zhob Levy Corps would have to be increased in proportion.

3749. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think that in present circumstances it would be advisable to withdraw it ?

3750. SIR H. McMAHON.—Certainly not. They are the only regular troops in that district with an area of 12,000 square miles and an Afghan frontier some 300 miles long.

3751. PRESIDENT.—Are there any other points upon which you could give us useful information ?

3752. SIR H. McMAHON.—The recent encroachment of Russia into Chinese Turkistan presents certain interesting features. Russia has now 700 troops in Kashgar. It is only the beginning of the end I imagine, and it means a fresh occupation by Russia of that border.

3753. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think it is a serious menace to India ?

3754. SIR H. McMAHON.—It removes another buffer, and it brings Russia right on to our frontier there, which will raise questions about the rights of our own people in one or two very debatable tracts in the province. Besides, it will give us for the first time a contiguous boundary with Russia ; it will have a disturbing and embarrassing effect on the country generally.

3755. SIR P. LAKE.—It is mentioned in the General Staff "Appreciation" ?

3756. SIR H. McMAHON.—When you wrote that you did not know that the troops had actually arrived. There are now 700 troops there. It creates another factor in regard to Kashmir because it gives her a Russian frontier.

3757. SIR W. MEYER.—We cannot take Kashgar ourselves, I presume ?

3758. SIR H. McMAHON.—That is so. I merely mentioned this as it had not been referred to.

(The witness then withdrew.)

ANNEXURE.

(See Answer 3585).

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel J. Manners-Smith, V.C., C.V.O., C.I.E., Resident in Nepal, to the Secretary, Army in India Committee, dated London, 6th September 1912.

I write in reply to your letter, dated Simla, the 1st August 1912 in which my opinion is asked whether it is likely that there would be any objection on the part of the Nepal Darbar to an increase in the number of Gurkha Reservists—

- (a) If the present establishment of our Gurkha battalions is maintained ; and
- (b) If they were reduced to a peace strength.

I have read the evidence given before the Army in India Committee by Sir Henry McMahon which forms the enclosure of your letter.

The inference which has been drawn by the Foreign Secretary as to the attitude of the Darbar towards the question of our maintaining a reserve force of Gurkhas in Nepal is entirely correct. The concession when originally made was carried through by the Prime Minister—Maharaja Sir Chandra Shum Sher Jung against the judgment of his advisers and I am convinced that he would not be willing and moreover that he would find it a difficult task even were he willing—to countenance an extension of the number of reservists.

The objection on the part of the Darbar to the maintenance in our pay of Gurkhas in Nepal is not only due to the fact that such men are lost to the Nepal army, but also to the danger which the system opens up of interference in their internal arrangements. It is not unnatural to suppose that if we were to maintain a large reserve of men living in their homes in Nepal territory we might require a closer supervision and more rapid method of communicating with them than it would be convenient for the Durbar to grant. It would in my opinion be difficult to devise any plan that would be both satisfactory to ourselves and to the Durbar in this matter.

So far as the Gurkha Brigade is concerned it would I think be best to leave well alone and to maintain the present establishment as nearly at a war strength as our recruiting facilities render possible and be content with the small reserve of 100 men per battalion which has already been agreed to by the Durbar.

In the event of war we should I think trust to the loyalty of the Durbar and make use of the offer which has repeatedly been made and which will always be open to us—of the services of the state troops. When once any of them have crossed the border to join our forces they would be entirely at our disposal to attach to and work with our own Gurkha regiments. It would not take long for them to fall into line and hold their own from the keen sense of rivalry and *esprit-de-corps* which it would be easy to inspire in them.

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

20th Meeting—Tuesday, the 16th July 1912.

General Sir Edmund Barrow, G.C.B., A.D.C. Gen., Commanding Southern Army, attended as a witness and was examined.

EVIDENCE OF GENERAL SIR E. G. BARROW.

3760. PRESIDENT.—You are the General Officer Commanding the Southern Army, and have held regimental and divisional commands; you were also for a considerable time employed on the army staff and in the late Military Department of the Government of India?

3761. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

3762. PRESIDENT.—The Kitchener scheme proposed to make every divisional area self-contained, both as regards its contribution to the Field Army and the internal defence troops. As a matter of fact, it appears that every one of the present nine divisional areas in India proper would require to obtain a portion of its war or internal defence troops, or both, from outside; and that the full working out of the Kitchener scheme in this respect would involve large expenditure. Do you consider that this expenditure need be incurred, or that the full working out of the scheme might be abandoned?

3763. SIR E. BARROW.—If expense were no object, I should advocate the immediate completion of the Kitchener scheme, as in my opinion nine divisions are none too many. As things are, we must cut our coat according to the cloth, and only incur such expenditure as is absolutely necessary. The whole question really resolves itself into what number of troops are required for the Field Army. The General Staff calculate our requirements at:—

(i) Eight-and-a-quarter divisions in case of war with Afghanistan.

(ii) Six-and-a-third divisions in case of a frontier war involving all the tribes from Swat to the Gomal.

(iii) Three divisions in case of war with China or Turkey.

In my view the worst case for which we should provide is a Pan-Islamic conflagration when, even acting defensively, we might require:—

(i) Reinforcements for Egypt—one division, which would probably have been sent there previously.

(ii) For the defence of the Peshawar-Khyber area—two divisions.

(iii) For the control of the Malakand-Chitral road—one division.

(iv) For the defence of the Kohat-Derajat frontier—one division *plus* the three independent brigades now on the frontier.

(v) For defensive—offensive action on the Kandahar side, as such action would best neutralize the Afghan offensive in the north,—three divisions.

This gives eight divisions as the minimum required to meet a very possible situation, but with our present establishments we cannot put even eight divisions into the field.

The General Staff advocate a spare division to meet eventualities (*vide* paragraph 24, page 40 of the General Staff Memorandum of July 1911); so that I cannot regard the scheme as unduly optimistic in its inception, though feeble in its execution. I believe myself that it is quite feasible to organize nine divisions without very excessive expenditure, but not on the present lines.

3764. SIR W. MEYER.—The question was rather this:—When Lord Kitchener advocated nine divisions, his idea was to make every divisional area self-contained. As stated in the question, that has not been worked up to; nearly every division practically would have to borrow troops from other divisions. Do you consider that we should go on spending money to complete the Kitchener scheme, or that we should give it up and spend the money on other things?

3765. SIR E. BARROW.—I did not consider that such great expenditure on redistribution was necessary; but we did require the whole amount allocated during Lord Kitchener's time for his nine divisions, for other purposes.

3766. SIR W. MEYER.—I presume that to get these nine divisions you would have to scrape up some brigades from different places?

3767. SIR E. BARROW.—You would have to even now.

3768. SIR W. MEYER.—According to the Kitchener scheme, we ought to push on with expenditure on new lines, etc., in order to make every divisional area self-contained; would that be Utopian, or would you push on with such expenditure?

3769. SIR E. BARROW.—I consider that idea Utopian. It is not necessary to have all the troops located in peace within the divisional area. For instance, I see no particular disadvantage in bringing up brigades on mobilization to reinforce the Peshawar Division.

3770. SIR W. MEYER.—You would rather apply the money that we could get to other purposes?

3771. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, I think other things are much more essential than the Redistribution Scheme.

3772. SIR P. LAKE.—If new barracks have to be built would you build them so as to fit in with the scheme?

3773. SIR E. BARROW.—That would depend upon local conditions, and the political situation.

3774. SIR W. MEYER.—You would not spend money on them if it involved abandoning habitable barracks?

3775. SIR E. BARROW.—Certainly not, unless on medical grounds.

3776. SIR W. MEYER.—You said just now that we have not got the nine divisions either as regards men or equipment?

3777. SIR E. BARROW.—I estimate that seven divisions and two brigades is the maximum we can count on.

3778. SIR W. MEYER.—My own impression was that the divisions were actually in existence, but that you got the Mhow Division, for example, short of a brigade, etc.

3779. SIR E. BARROW.—I contend we have not got nine divisions. We only have nine divisions if we rob Peter to pay Paul. For instance, take the 1st (Peshawar) Division; I think the General Staff at present contemplates taking two battalions of Indian infantry from Kohat. I entirely disagree with this proposal. It would be wrong to rob the frontier of so many troops.

3780. SIR W. MEYER.—Your opinion is, I gather, that we could not make up nine divisions by scraping up troops from various places, without danger?

3781. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

3782. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider that the position on the North-West Frontier is analogous to the frontier between France and Germany?

3783. SIR E. BARROW.—No, it is absolutely dissimilar. France and Germany are contiguous and have to concentrate their armies in a very short time, whereas we as a rule have ample time before we need bring our forces into play.

3784. PRESIDENT.—Is it a governing factor in mobilization that it takes a considerable time to collect the second-line of transport ?

3785. SIR E. BARROW.—Undoubtedly.

3786. PRESIDENT.—The troops stationed on or near the frontier could move with greater rapidity only by utilizing the mule transport which is allotted proportionately to other divisions further back ?

3787. SIR E. BARROW.—I understand the General Staff contemplate sending the whole of the transport up to the bases of operations, and there distributing it to divisions, which may afterwards be concentrated on these points.

3788. SIR P. LAKE.—That is the plan ; you can get transport to these places as quickly as you can get troops ; roughly, the transport for six divisions would take two months to concentrate, and we could get the troops to the bases in three months.

3789. SIR E. BARROW.—When I was dealing with these questions I always understood that we could get the troops there in a month.

3790. SIR P. LAKE.—I am assuming a large mobilization. The railways say they must have twenty-one days' notice.

3791. SIR E. BARROW.—The Germans make their preliminary arrangements in peace time, and require only a few hours' notice.

3792. SIR P. LAKE.—At present the question is being revised in consultation with the railway people, but I am definitely informed that twenty-one days' notice is necessary.

3793. PRESIDENT.—Is it the case that in former years the time-tables were prepared beforehand by the railway officials at Simla ?

3794. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, that is my recollection.

3795. PRESIDENT.—As regards transport, and the question of equipping certain bodies of troops with the best transport and leaving other troops to be equipped with the leavings ; is it the case that sometimes the most serious operations may not be contemplated at the beginning of a disturbance ? In the case of the frontier rising in 1897-98, the Tochi column was equipped with very fine transport indeed. The Malakand and Mohmand forces had next to be equipped ; then the most serious affair of the lot happened, and the best transport having been utilized, the Tirah force was equipped with the odds and ends of transport ?

3796. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, to a certain extent, but we did get some good transport diverted from the Tochi and Mohmand forces.

3797. PRESIDENT.—Your experience is, I gather, that troops could be collected at places of concentration much quicker than transport could be supplied ?

3798. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, for a large force.

3799. SIR W. MEYER.—Are the nine divisions, taking them on the whole, deficient in other particulars ?

3800. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, extremely deficient.

3801. SIR W. MEYER.—Should you say that it would be better to have seven divisions fully equipped in every respect, than nine divisions partially equipped ?

3802. SIR E. BARROW.—At the present time, irrespective of transport, I do not believe we have the troops to mobilize more than twenty-three infantry brigades and seven cavalry brigades. Before we talk about mobilizing nine divisions we ought to complete the requirements for the troops we have actually available.

3803. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you rather have 100,000 men fully equipped than 120,000 men partially equipped ?

3804. SIR E. BARROW.—My view is this; transport is a thing you can expand; if we cannot maintain the full complement in peace time for all our divisions, I would like to have cadres for expansion on mobilization for whatever force India relies on.

3805. SIR W. MEYER.—Your total of eight divisions included the division which would be required for Egypt. Is not Egypt an Imperial liability?

3806. SIR E. BARROW.—I should think the Government would prefer to send over a division from India if it could be spared, rather than one from England. It is possible that we might already have despatched that division over seas, before mobilization in India was ordered.

3807. SIR W. MEYER.—So, excluding Egypt, your estimate would work down to seven divisions?

3808. SIR E. BARROW.—Seven divisions would be sufficient for the contingency we are now considering.

3809. PRESIDENT.—You referred just now to the absence of the necessary establishments and equipment for the mobilization of the Field Army. With regard to the medical services in the field, so far as you have been acquainted with the North-West Frontier, do you consider that dholie-bearers for the sick are necessary?

3810. SIR E. BARROW.—Certainly; under present topographical conditions I see no alternative but to have organized bearer corps. If we have no bearer corps, we are reduced to the position we were in in Tirah, that is to say, troops will have to carry the wounded, thus deducting so many men from the fighting force.

3811. PRESIDENT.—On the conclusion of the North-West Frontier disturbances of 1897-98, was this matter considered under the orders of the Government of India?

3812. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, it was very fully considered by the Government of India and a Committee was assembled under General Gaselee to report on the subject. I was a member of that Committee, and we made certain recommendations. We recommended a peace organization of thirty-five Army Bearer Corps companies, with ten cadre companies; the total amounted to 8,000 men. That was the proposal made by the Committee, and the Government of India fully approved of its recommendations, but I think on financial grounds they cut the numbers down to 3,000 men. These 3,000 men were organized in companies and lines were built for them. The scheme was making fair progress, but Lord Kitchener wanted money for some other object and he halved the establishment of the Corps, thus reducing it to what we now have, namely, 1,500 men.

3813. PRESIDENT.—Your experience is that it is practically impossible in an emergency to obtain bearers that are worth anything?

3814. SIR E. BARROW.—We proved it in 1897; we got the scum of every bazar in the Punjab. They could not even carry empty dholies.

3815. PRESIDENT.—You vacated the command of the 1st Division just before the Zakka Khel affair?

3816. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

3817. PRESIDENT.—And the command was taken by General Willcocks. Were arrangements then existing to admit of the carriage of sick and wounded?

3818. SIR E. BARROW.—No. Before the expedition came off, and after the establishment of the Corps had been reduced from two companies to one company, which had also to find detachments. For Chitral and the Malakand I reported officially to the Quartermaster-General that we were unable to carry even eight sick men by dholies in trans-frontier operations. The expedition came off after I left. After the expedition, I met two medical officers who had been with me in Peshawar—my Principal Medical Officer and the Senior Medical Officer. I said "How on earth did you carry out the ambulance

arrangements?" The reply was "We never had eight men to carry in dhoolies and we were within one march of the tonga line."

Subsequently, for the Mohmand expedition Army Bearer Corps men were scraped together from every division in India, and India was practically left without any trained bearers. But even then it was found impossible to carry all the sick and wounded, and I am told that recourse was had to the old make-shift of detailing sepoy for the duty.

3819. PRESIDENT.—The Mohmand expedition was on a very small scale, was it not?

3820. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, and both it and the Zakka Khel expedition had the advantage of the organized transport of the Khyber and Malakand Moveable Columns.

3821. PRESIDENT.—Taking the Army Bearer Corps; you consider that in this respect the army in India is absolutely unprepared for war?

3822. SIR E. BARROW.—Absolutely; that is, in districts where you cannot use wheeled transport.

3823. SIR W. MEYER.—Were Lord Kitchener's orders regarding the reduction of the Army Bearer Corps issued in 1906?

3824. SIR E. BARROW.—I think so.

3825. SIR W. MEYER.—I understand he did not reduce the number of companies; he halved their strength?

3826. SIR E. BARROW.—There are now only eleven companies. The present strength is 1,500 men or thereabouts.

3827. SIR W. MEYER.—Lord Kitchener left you about one company per division?

3828. SIR E. BARROW.—In the Peshawar Division there was only one company, which was reduced by having to find detachments. I rather think there were fifteen or sixteen organized companies before the reduction took place, but I am not quite certain.

3829. SIR W. MEYER.—Did Lord Kitchener cut down the strength by about one half?

3830. SIR E. BARROW.—That was the net result. The Corps was reduced to 1,500 men. The General Staff calculate that our requirements will be 14,608.

3831. PRESIDENT.—Are you aware whether the General Staff consulted the department at Army Headquarters which would be responsible for these men?

3832. SIR E. BARROW.—No, the papers were sent to me by Sir Douglas Haig under the special direction of Sir O'Moore Creagh, with whom I have discussed the matter personally.

3833. SIR W. MEYER.—Ordinarily speaking, you are not consulted as to war requirements?

3834. SIR E. BARROW.—Never officially.

* *Vide* Appendix F. Memorandum on the preparation of the Army in India for war.

3835. PRESIDENT.—Lord Kitchener remarked* in 1904 "Over 18,000 bearers will be required for the Field Army and suitable arrangements will have to be made for obtaining them. The proposals hitherto made for obtaining the necessary men for even four divisions do not appear to have been successful."

3836. SIR E. BARROW.—That was the net result and is still the net result.

3837. PRESIDENT.—Lord Kitchener was able to provide nine divisions for the field, as opposed to four (subsequently raised to six) contemplated in previous arrangements, (a) by reducing the proportion of British troops

formerly held necessary for the Field Army, and, (b) by reducing the strength of the troops formerly considered to be necessary for obligatory garrisons, etc.

(i) As regards (b) do you consider that Lord Kitchener's scheme adequately provided for the necessities of internal security and defence?

(ii) Might a larger Field Army have been provided without the complete recasting of previous arrangements?

3838. SIR E. BARROW.—Lord Kitchener was *never* able to provide nine divisions except on paper. In fact, taking into consideration all necessary transport and medical requirements, I doubt if he was really able to provide more than five or six divisions. The frontier campaigns of 1908 were no criterion, as the Khyber and Malakand moveable columns existed long before his time.

With reference to (i).—Certainly not, so far as his original proposals are concerned. Modifications and improvements have since been made, and with certain exceptions I think the scheme is now reasonably adequate for all but exceptional circumstances, such as the revolt of the native army.

As regards (ii).—The same Field Army could have been provided without the complete recasting of previous arrangements, but I think many of the rearrangements were sound and desirable, though others were both futile and extravagant. I would instance Nowshera and Quetta as examples of the former, and Jubbulpore and Sialkot as illustrating the latter.

3839. SIR P. LAKE.—You were member of a Committee (with General Sir James Wolfe-Murray) which had to report to Lord Kitchener the minimum number of British battalions and batteries that would be required for internal defence?

3840. SIR E. BARROW.—I cannot well remember; I have been on so many committees.

3841. SIR P. LAKE.—The Committee recorded that in its opinion twelve batteries and nineteen battalions of British infantry would be sufficient for internal defence purposes. What was the groundwork of your calculations?

3842. SIR E. BARROW.—I seem to recollect the number—nineteen battalions. You must remember, however, that the conditions of that time were totally different to what they are now.

3843. SIR P. LAKE.—I saw the recommendations of the Committee yesterday, and they bear on the present question. There was no explanation of the basis for the figures given. The object of the Committee was to suggest to Lord Kitchener the minimum number of British batteries and battalions required for internal security, in order that he might allocate the balance available for the purposes of the Field Army.

3844. SIR E. BARROW.—I think it was twelve batteries we recommended. We also counted on all the other troops, *including depôts*, that could be utilized under the prescribed conditions, namely, that the country would be on the side of the Government in the event of a war with Russia. Moreover, I think the War Office at that time promised us certain reinforcements.

3845. SIR W. MEYER.—In Lord Kitchener's scheme reference is made more than once to the impossibility of reckoning on any reinforcements from Home within any specified date?

3846. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, that view was advanced probably in order to get the nine divisions. Lord Kitchener wanted, at the same time, to have internal defence garrisons reduced to an absolute minimum, so as to get the nine divisions.

3847. SIR W. MEYER.—When the Committee put down nineteen British battalions, did they contemplate any reinforcements from Home?

3848. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, certainly. Moreover we did not contemplate that active unrest would manifest itself in India, at any rate at the outset.

3849 SIR W. MEYER.—You mentioned depôts; the primary object of the depôt is to feed the unit in the field. You cannot count it twice over?

3850. SIR E. BARROW.—It is actually present in India, and therefore, is a check on the native population.

3851. SIR W. MEYER.—Then if it is employed for internal defence, it can be of no use to the Field Army?

3852. SIR E. BARROW.—If it had to be employed in India, we could not send it into the field, and *vice versa*.

3853. SIR P. LAKE.—During the Afghan War my own depôt consisted of only seventy-five men reported unfit for the field, but they were quite fit for internal defence.

3854. SIR W. MEYER.—When you say that Lord Kitchener's scheme is inadequate, as regards internal defence, you mean under present conditions which were not foreseen in 1904?

3855. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes. The situation has changed for the worse.

3856. SIR W. MEYER.—I think, roughly speaking, that the scheme now proposed by the General Staff adds three-quarters of a division and three mobile mixed brigades to the previous internal defence requirements?

3857. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes; the three mobile brigades are also earmarked for the Field Army.

3858. SIR W. MEYER.—There is an increase to that extent?

3859. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

3860. SIR W. MEYER.—Lord Kitchener's scheme habitually speaks of the Field Army as having formerly consisted of four divisions. It is within your knowledge perhaps that the Military Department had made arrangements for six divisions?

3861. SIR E. BARROW.—I think that we were ready to put five divisions into the field, and that another division could have been made available when six battalions had reached India from Home.

3862. SIR W. MEYER.—Lord Kitchener's scheme provided for withdrawing small detachments that were scattered all over the country. So far, that would be to the good, would it not?

3863. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

3864. SIR W. MEYER.—Before the introduction of the Redistribution Scheme there was a considerable military force at Bellary. Lord Kitchener proposed to abandon the place as a military cantonment. What was the object of the change?

3865. SIR E. BARROW.—He wanted to concentrate more troops elsewhere.

3866. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think it was desirable to go to the large expense of moving them elsewhere?

3867. SIR E. BARROW.—It meant of course building barracks in other places; nevertheless, there was no reason for retaining the garrison in Bellary. Bellary is not altogether a desirable station and I would not object particularly to its being abandoned.

3868. PRESIDENT.—Even if troops were fully concentrated as under the Kitchener scheme, would they be able to move without their second-line transport, and would that be promptly available?

3869. SIR E. BARROW.—Certainly not. Some of the divisions have not even first line transport, and I imagine it would be months before even seven divisions could be provided with second-line transport.

The existing mobilization scheme makes no specific allotments to divisions. All available transport is sent up to one of the three bases on the North-West

Frontier, and transport is allotted to divisions subsequently. The distribution of transport in peace time bears no relation to the requirements of the war divisions concerned, but very properly is governed by considerations of economy and expediency; and as all arrangements for its mobilization are made at Army Headquarters, it is impossible for any one outside Headquarters to say what the shortage is, and how long it would take to provide for deficiencies. I may, however, make the following remarks regarding the 6th (Poona) Division :—

This division could not move at all without outside assistance and much delay. It has not even half the first-line transport required. It is estimated that the 6th Division needs on mobilization, besides carts, tongas and bullocks :—

1,955 first-line pack mules (rather over $2\frac{1}{2}$ mule corps),

592 second-line draught mules,

2,794 camels,

whereas there is only one mule corps in the division.

Presumably if the 6th Division went to Quetta it would be equipped with transport in fairly reasonable time, but if ordered to Persia or Egypt there might be considerable delay in equipping more than a brigade. The 6th and 9th Divisions are equally badly off. I have taken the 6th Division because it is the one that would probably be first required for overseas expeditions.

3870. SIR P. LAKE.—Do you know how long it would take to get the second-line transport for a division ?

3871. SIR E. BARROW.—No.

3872. PRESIDENT.—We have heard much about the admirable system of decentralization which now exists owing to a divisional organization. I gather that in the matter of transport everything is concentrated, for purposes of field service, at Simla ?

3873. SIR E. BARROW.—All arrangements are made at Simla.

3874. PRESIDENT.—Then there is no decentralization at all ?

3875. SIR E. BARROW.—None whatever.

3876. SIR P. LAKE.—Divisions would be required to take certain steps on mobilization ?

3877. SIR E. BARROW.—I think the only cadres that the divisions are responsible for mobilizing, are bullock cadres.

3878. PRESIDENT.—How could they mobilize the mules, if they have not got them to mobilize ?

3879. SIR E. BARROW.—They could not mobilize them.

3880. SIR P. LAKE.—Do you intend that for a general statement applicable to the whole army ?

3881. SIR E. BARROW.—No, it is applicable to the 6th Division and to some others.

3882. PRESIDENT.—Even in the 1st and some other Divisions, the number of mules and camels is not adequate for the mobilization of these divisions ?

3883. SIR E. BARROW.—I understand that in the 4th they have sufficient.

3884. PRESIDENT.—Then, as regards the concentration of the troops under the Kitchener scheme. Does the divisional General move his troops, or are the railway arrangements made at Army Headquarters ?

3885. SIR E. BARROW.—At Army Headquarters.

3886. PRESIDENT.—Therefore they are not decentralized in that respect ?

3887. SIR E. BARROW.—In that respect there is no decentralization.

3888. SIR W. MEYER.—General Duff before the Mowatt Committee said that the making of concentration arrangements at Army Headquarters resulted in chaos while if the divisional General had the making of these arrangements the result would be order. Do you concur ?

3889. SIR E. BARROW.—Under present conditions, the General Staff prepare a scheme which is issued to divisions, and from it the divisions know which regiments have to move, etc. The actual orders to the units would be given by the divisions direct.

3890. SIR W. MEYER.—There is a cavalry brigade nominally attached to the 6th Division. The units of that brigade belong to three separate divisional areas. Surely Army Headquarters would have to intervene to mobilize that brigade ?

3891. SIR E. BARROW.—The divisional Generals would be responsible for making the arrangements for the moves.

3892. SIR W. MEYER.—Has there been a material improvement in this respect since 1897 ?

3893. SIR E. BARROW.—I am not sure that there has. If a divisional General could not move his troops up by road, he would receive orders to move them in communication with the railway authorities.

3894. PRESIDENT.—During the North-West Frontier disturbances this was invariably done ?

3895. SIR E. BARROW.—Invariably.

3896. PRESIDENT.—Army Headquarters sent up a certain number of regiments from the Bengal Command ?

3897. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, but when I was Deputy-Assistant-Quartermaster-General at Rawalpindi, I had to make the arrangements with the railway authorities. General Duff's statement as to chaos is not quite accurate.

3898. SIR W. MEYER.—The present transport arrangements include eighteen camel corps with their drivers, who are to be obtained from the Ghilzais. Is it safe to rely upon these ?

3899. SIR E. BARROW.—It would not be safe in the case of a war with Afghanistan.

3900. SIR W. MEYER.—So that we should be short at once by 18 camel corps ?

3901. SIR E. BARROW.—Certainly.

3902. SIR W. MEYER.—The mobilization scheme, I understand, absorbs all the available transport for the Field Army and there will be none left for internal defence ?

3903. SIR E. BARROW.—Undoubtedly.

3904. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you consider internal defence arrangements, which include moveable columns that must be immobile owing to lack of transport, satisfactory ?

3905. SIR E. BARROW.—In India you have resources in the interior of the country for moving troops which you have not got on the frontier. I do not think it is essential to have highly organized pack transport for internal defence.

3906. PRESIDENT.—Is the proposition that troops ought to be trained and commanded in peace by those who will lead them in the field capable of being carried out fully in practice, having regard to the limited tenure of commands, and possible unfitness of particular officers for field service, and the periodical reliefs of units ?

3907. SIR E. BARROW.—The principle is obviously the correct one, but its complete application is quite impossible in any but a localized army like that of Germany.

3908. PRESIDENT.—With reference to previous remarks about chaos on mobilization, we have been told that the mobilization arrangements in Lord Roberts' time, made by the original Mobilization Committee, were chaotic. Do you concur?

3909. SIR E. BARROW.—No.

3910. PRESIDENT.—Troops were stationed in India in various cantonments with regard to local requirements and to the suitability of these cantonments as regards the health and comfort of the troops, and, I understand, especially with regard to the relative popularity of the various stations among native troops?

3911. SIR E. BARROW.—When troops were originally stationed at any particular place the arrangements made at the time were no doubt necessary and suitable. In course of time, however, conditions altered, and it was found desirable to abandon certain stations.

3912. PRESIDENT.—The members of the original Mobilization Committee assumed that money was not available for any great redistribution of troops, and accepted the principle of mixed brigades. In formulating their scheme for the Field Army they first decided on its organization; they then considered what troops would be necessary for internal defence purposes. Having thus arrived at the number of troops that could be spared for the Field Army, they took the most efficient units and arranged for moving them up to the places of concentration. That was the system, was it not?

3913. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

3914. PRESIDENT.—Under that general idea, were there not certain advantages? For instance, you were able to select the most efficient units for field service?

3915. SIR E. BARROW.—Undoubtedly.

3916. PRESIDENT.—And when selecting officers to command brigades and for Staff appointments, it was possible to have regard to their special qualifications and pick out the best officers to fill these field and staff appointments?

3917. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

3918. PRESIDENT.—Do these advantages disappear under a cast-iron system of organization, by which it is assumed that the brigade and divisional commanders and the staff will be selected because they are the people who are performing these duties in peace time?

3919. SIR E. BARROW.—I think the present scheme produces other advantages to counterbalance the disadvantages you mention.

3920. SIR W. MEYER.—Is there an advantage, from the point of view of efficiency, in making every unit liable in its turn for field service?

3921. SIR E. BARROW.—I think so; every unit should regard field service as the aim of its existence. The advantage of the present system is that officers are earmarked for special appointments known to themselves, and can therefore prepare themselves for their particular duties.

3922. SIR W. MEYER.—I understand you have not enough Brigadiers even for the Field Army? Supposing you had to mobilize the Field Army, you would have practically no officer of General's rank left, available for internal defence?

3923. SIR E. BARROW.—The number of Brigadiers maintained in peace is quite sufficient for the brigades, but it is one of the great defects of the present scheme that we do not in our calculations allow for any superior officers for internal defence. Everybody of any consequence is practically earmarked for

the Field Army. In case of war I do not know who is to take command of the army in India ; the situation will have to be met by absolutely improvised and chaotic arrangements. That is the worst defect of the whole scheme.

3924. SIR W. MEYER.—General Aylmer suggested that every divisional General should have a General attached to his division for administrative duties in peace who would remain behind to command the internal defence troops on mobilization. What is your opinion ?

3925. SIR E. BARROW.—I think if you have a General attached for administrative purposes to a division, and besides them your Brigadiers for training, little work will be left for the divisional commander. I do not therefore concur with General Aylmer's suggestion.

3926. SIR W. MEYER.—How would you propose to remedy this serious defect of having no commanders for internal defence troops ?

3927. SIR E. BARROW.—The whole system requires re-arrangement. I see no way at present of carrying out the higher administration of the army. If the Commander-in-Chief takes the field, there will be chaos behind. If he does not, you have to detail other officers to command in front.

3928. SIR W. MEYER.—If you go down a step or two lower, you have no General Officers left. How would you remedy that ?

3929. SIR E. BARROW.—In this way : we have a large number of colonels who are capable of commanding brigades, but who are not now General Officers. With a more expansive scheme, a certain proportion of the Generals now in India would be retained for internal defence and administrative purposes, and the deficiency now existing in the Field Army would be made up by selected colonels and lieutenant-colonels. At the time of the Afghan War, many such junior officers were selected for command in the field.

3930. SIR W. MEYER.—The General Staff apparently contemplates sending all the existing General Officers into the field ; troops for internal defence will, therefore, presumably be under the command of promoted lieutenant-colonels ?

3931. SIR P. LAKE.—Are you sure that all the Brigadiers go to the front ?

3932. SIR E. BARROW.—A certain number of Brigadiers will be left behind, for instance, those in such stations as Bombay and Rangoon, but not a single divisional General will remain.

* Not reproduced.

3933. SIR W. MEYER.—You have read the report* of the Johnson Committee on the conditions of officers' service in the Indian army ?

3934. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

3935. SIR W. MEYER.—One of their recommendations was that Colonels on the Staff should be abolished. What is your opinion ?

3936. SIR E. BARROW.—I see no great objection.

3937. SIR W. MEYER.—You would have every officer commanding a brigade holding the rank of Brigadier General at least ?

3938. SIR E. BARROW.—They are now called Brigadier Generals, but I think that 1,800 rupees a month is insufficient pay for the position they have to maintain.

3939. PRESIDENT.—Do you remember the conditions under which the original eight Colonels on the Staff were appointed ? They were to be officers who were not equal to commanding brigades, but sufficiently deserving to command stations, were they not ?

3940. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

3941. PRESIDENT.—They were to be officers of the Indian army in a somewhat parallel position to officers commanding regimental districts at Home ?

3942. SIR E. BARROW.—Quite so.

3943. PRESIDENT.—Has the whole original conception of these officers been changed, and are these station commands now considered as stepping stones to brigade commands ?

3944. SIR E. BARROW.—Undoubtedly.

3945. PRESIDENT.—Each of these officers is now appointed with the prospect before him of succeeding to a brigade command and starting a fresh four years' tenure of command ?

3946. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

3947. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you consider such a system prejudicial to promotion, having regard to the paucity of appointments for senior officers in the army ?

3948. SIR E. BARROW.—I think it is very wrong.

3949. PRESIDENT.—What were the advantages of the original conceptions ?

3950. SIR E. BARROW.—Formerly officers appointed as Colonels on the Staff to command stations, understood that the appointment concluded their career.

3951. PRESIDENT.—Are the officers holding brigade commands performing their duties with efficiency at present ?

3952. SIR E. BARROW.—Most of them ; if they had been judiciously selected they would all have performed their duties with efficiency. Regarding their pay, I think it should be raised, because the officer is placed in the position of a General Officer, and as such has calls upon him which necessitate expenditure of money for which 1,800 rupees are inadequate. I do not think so much was expected of a Colonel on the Staff under the old conditions as is expected from a Brigadier General at the present time.

3953. PRESIDENT.—Where did the advantage lie in calling him a Brigadier General when he was not in command of a brigade ?

3954. SIR E. BARROW.—Formerly he was in command of a station not of a field brigade ; now he usually is in command of the latter.

3955. SIR W. MEYER.—These stations where there is not a brigade, but possibly two or three regiments only ?

3956. SIR E. BARROW.—The Brigadier Generals are all appointed to stations which are supposed to be the headquarters of the brigade, although the units of the brigade may not be all in the station. Troops may be earmarked for his brigade when they go on service.

3957. SIR W. MEYER.—Take the Peshawar Division ; the staff of one of its component brigades is not yet sanctioned. Would there be a Brigadier General for that particular brigade ?

3958. SIR E. BARROW.—On mobilization it would be formed as a component brigade and an officer would be appointed to take command of it.

3959. SIR P. LAKE.—Is one appointed to command it for training ?

3960. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

3961. SIR P. LAKE.—The Peshawar Brigade is trained as a brigade ?

3962. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, so is the Nowshera one.

3963. PRESIDENT.—Having regard to the above considerations, was it desirable to put a large expenditure on redistribution in the forefront of the reform programme ? Might it have been better to confine redistribution at the outset to cases in which it was desirable to concentrate small isolated detachments, and to postpone larger moves until after arrangements had been made to render the proposed Field Army and internal defence troops thoroughly efficient by remedying defects in their armament, equipment, transport appliances, etc. ?

3934. **SIR E. BARROW.**—I think there was a deplorable waste of money. The view I tried to impress on the military authorities was that instead of spending money on bricks and mortar, we should spend it on the concentration of brigades at manœuvres, in the augmentation of the transport and medical services, and in improved communications. If British troops were to be moved, I was entirely opposed to placing them at stations like Ahmadnagar, Jubbulpore and Nasirabad, but advocated more accommodation being provided in the hills, especially in the 1st and 4th divisional areas. I suggested that for the former area, a suitable hill station could be obtained at Bar Charai, opposite and north of the Malakand. It was a place that was used by our troops in 1897 as a summer camp. In winter the men could have been put into hut barracks near Nowshera.

3965. **PRESIDENT.**—You urged this on the military authorities?

3966. **SIR E. BARROW.**—Yes, I urged these views both as Secretary to the Government of India and as General Officer Commanding the 1st (Peshawar) Division. Also, I think, when I was temporarily commanding the forces in the Punjab in 1906-07.

3967. **PRESIDENT.**—I notice that you mention three places—Ahmadnagar, Jubbulpore and Nasirabad.

3968. **SIR E. BARROW.**—Nasirabad is an unsuitable place to spend money on. Water is a difficulty, the climate is inferior and the station is unpopular. I saw no reason for increasing the garrisons at Ahmadnagar and Jubbulpore.

3969. **SIR W. MEYER.**—The original idea of concentrating troops at Nasirabad was not carried out, was it?

3970. **SIR E. BARROW.**—No.

3971. **PRESIDENT.**—One of Lord Kitchener's original proposals was to establish a large cantonment at Torsappar; apart from political objections, do you think this would have been desirable?

3972. **SIR E. BARROW.**—Certainly not. Torsappar is an impossible place. I condemned it strongly when I was General Officer Commanding the 1st Division. Landi Kotal and Suffolk Hill would have been preferable, if we could have got rid of the local population; but what I personally advocated in an official letter to the Quartermaster-General was that, assuming it necessary to have a third brigade actually located in the Peshawar divisional area, it should be located on the Maira, covering the Hari Singh-Warsak railway (Loi Shilman extension) near the Shahgai police post. I would have put three native infantry battalions there and completed the brigade, in war, with one of the British infantry battalions from Peshawar. It could have easily gone into camp for training. Shahgai, or rather Spir Sang, presented no difficulties as regards water. The land there is of less than prairie value, and the training ground is perfection. The position would also have covered the Loi Shilman railway.

3973. **PRESIDENT.**—You referred to manœuvres on a considerable scale as enabling troops who were not assembled in a homogeneous formation to be so assembled in the winter. Was much more expenditure incurred on these manœuvres formerly than is incurred at the present time?

3974. **SIR E. BARROW.**—The money available for manœuvres always seemed to depend upon something else. In some respects we are better off now because the Government of India generally recognize the necessity for manœuvres, and money has perhaps been granted on a more liberal scale than it used to be, though in Lord Robert's time large sums of money were voted.

3975. **PRESIDENT.**—We had large artillery concentrations in those days?

3976. **SIR E. BARROW.**—Yes, and cavalry manœuvres at Meerut.

3977. **PRESIDENT.**—You attach great importance to these winter manœuvres, I understand?

3978. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

3979. SIR P. LAKE.—Especially to the training of the three arms together?

3980. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, that is why I urged that instead of spending money on barracks it should be spent on manœuvres and training.

3981. SIR W. MEYER.—Am I correct in supposing that your manœuvres at present are mainly brigade manœuvres, not divisional manœuvres?

3982. SIR E. BARROW.—Since I have commanded the Southern Army we have had manœuvres in the Poona and Quetta Divisions, besides various smaller manœuvres, but we have had no inter-divisional manœuvres.

3983. PRESIDENT.—In the event of a war with Russia, do you think that the Russians would content themselves, in the first instance, with occupying Afghan Turkistan and consolidating their position there, or that they would make so rapidly for Kabul that we should have to throw troops into that place very quickly? Bearing on this, have you any special knowledge of the difficulties of communication in Afghanistan?

3984. SIR E. BARROW.—I think the Russians would content themselves in the first instance with the occupation of Badakshan, Turkistan and the Herat Province, unless they were invited to Kabul as allies by the Afghans. With reference to the latter part of the question my reply is "yes." Apart from the Afghan and Tirah campaigns, I have been over the whole frontier from the Kilik Pass to Nushki with the exception of the country between the Tochi and Zhob.

3985. PRESIDENT.—Are not the communications there difficult?

3986. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, the most difficult in the world.

3987. SIR W. MEYER.—Lord Kitchener's scheme contemplated the Russians making a dash for Kabul, in which case we should have to move troops in hot haste. Do you think there is very much value in the calculations made?

3988. SIR E. BARROW.—I always contested the alleged ability of the Russians to make this rapid advance on Kabul and Kandahar.

3989. PRESIDENT.—Similarly, you hesitate to accept the view that we could move with equal rapidity?

3990. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

3991. SIR W. MEYER.—Then the situation is more favourable to us than Lord Kitchener contemplated, because it gives us more time?

3992. SIR E. BARROW.—I say it would give us six months instead of the few weeks that Army Headquarters contemplated or assumed.

3993. PRESIDENT.—Are you aware that in all considerations for the defence of India, the Home Government have been prepared to assist us to such an extent as their organization will admit, subject to the condition that the date of the oversea transport of the reinforcements to India cannot be exactly settled?

3994. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, I always understood that the Home Government was prepared to send out reinforcements, but could not fix any definite period within which they would arrive.

3995. SIR P. LAKE.—What would be the effect on India of the Russians being in occupation of Russian Turkistan as far as the Hindu Kush? I mean, the effect on Indian feeling?

3996. SIR E. BARROW.—My own feeling about a Russian advance is that the population of this country are distinctly aware that if the Russians did invade India, they would suffer more than anybody else. We could therefore count on their support if it was a case of war with Russia. I really think

that the people of this country are much more afraid of Russia than we are ourselves.

3997. SIR P. LAKE.—Do you think that it would lead to our increasing our Indian army?

3998. SIR E. BARROW.—That would depend upon the position of Russia in the international situation. If Russia were acting with the support of the Continental powers, it would enable her to mass her forces on our frontier, and we should probably be compelled to seek for reinforcements from Home. But under ordinary conditions, I assume that Russia would be compelled to keep a very large proportion of her troops in Poland, Manchuria, etc., and that her strength would thus be neutralized to a large extent.

3999. SIR W. MEYER.—I gather that your opinion is that assuming a war with Russia, and that the Russians marched into Afghan Turkistan and we were to remain on the defensive, that would not create any ferment in India?

4000. SIR E. BARROW.—I think there would be a ferment; the population would be in a state of alarm and expectation, but the ferment would not be against us.

4001. SIR W. MEYER.—You would say that we might in such a case safely be guided in our strategy by military considerations?

4002. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes. I think that the most rampant seditionist in the country would be anxious for our success. The natives of India fear the Russians more than a few of them dislike us.

4003. PRESIDENT.—In the event of war with Russia, with Afghanistan more or less friendly, do you think that we should endeavour to occupy the Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar line and the Hindu Kush passes at once, or confine ourselves to an advance on Kandahar and Jalalabad, until reinforcements arrived from England?

4004. SIR E. BARROW.—I would confine myself to the Kandahar-Jalalabad plan unless we received urgent appeals from the Amir, with a united people at his back, to advance to Kabul, and then only if the Russian menace was pressing. That is to say, if it was a case of the people in Afghanistan being friendly and if they were afraid of Russia, then I think it would be quite safe for us to go to Kabul, but not otherwise.

A. 2547. 4005. SIR W. MEYER.—General Aylmer thought an alliance with Afghanistan would be more fatal than if Afghanistan remained neutral, because the Afghan troops would commit such atrocities on the Russian wounded and dead as would set the whole of the civilised world against us. Would you risk that?

4006. SIR E. BARROW.—If I thought we had a united people clamouring for our support I would risk that.

4007. PRESIDENT.—In the event of a war with Afghanistan, Russia being friendly or neutral, the General Staff in 1911 estimated that we should require a Field Army of eight-and-a-quarter divisions and four cavalry brigades, with some other units, and a cavalry brigade as an immediate reserve. An additional three-quarters of a division and three cavalry brigades to be sent up later from the internal defence forces, if possible. This was assuming that the frontier tribes gave little trouble, and the scheme contemplated sending four divisions and two cavalry brigades to Kabul—

- (i) Do you consider that so large a force would be required to cope with Afghanistan, and that it would be possible to feed the four divisions, etc., proposed for Kabul?
- (ii) Has the development of railway communication put us in a much better position for dealing with Afghanistan than in 1878-80?
- (iii) Do you think the Afghan army is really formidable *per se* and that any large portion of it could be concentrated against us?

- (iv) In the event of a war with Afghanistan, with Russia friendly, might it be the best course to occupy Kandahar first, and allow the Russians to take Afghan-Turkistan?

4008. SIR E. BARROW.—(i) This estimate presupposes that we should advance by three lines, which to me seems strategically unsound, as it involves three lines of communication, and brings into operation against us all the Afghan tribes from the Kabul River to Kandahar. Moreover, the Thal-Kabul line may be closed by snow for nearly half the year

In my opinion, we should adopt one of the following courses :—

- (a) Occupy the Kandahar province, including Seistan, and act defensively elsewhere, allowing the Afghans to stew in their own juice.
- (b) Occupy the Kandahar and Jalalabad districts and act defensively elsewhere.
- (c) Advance on Kabul, either by the Khyber or the Kurram according to the season, and occupy Kandahar as well.

I would not adopt course (c) unless the railway had previously been constructed to Parachinar and Dakka, except for reasons of the gravest political importance, as I doubt if without the assistance of a railway we can feed so many as four divisions, which is the strength I consider necessary for the whole line from the Khyber to Kabul.

Course (a) is the one I would adopt under present conditions, as the one which would put the least strain on our resources and leave us something in hand for internal or oversea complications. If we go to Kandahar, we can stay there. If we go to Kabul, we have got to get out again.

On the assumptions I have given above, I am of opinion that we should require in case—

- (a) 6 divisions and 4 cavalry brigades.
- (b) 6 divisions and 5 cavalry brigades.
- (c) 7 divisions and 6 cavalry brigades.

I am sceptical as regards the possibility of feeding four divisions at Kabul.

- (ii) Undoubtedly. In 1878-80 our railheads were at Sukkur and Jhelum, now they are at Hari Singh, Thal and Chaman.

- (iii) No, except actually at or near Kabul, where we might also be confronted by an immense gathering of tribesmen.

- (iv) In this case I would adopt course (b) suggested above, that is, occupy the Jalalabad valley, Kandahar and Seistan, and as we can never occupy Turkistan ourselves, I would not object to the Russians doing so, provided they agreed to a modification of the Anglo-Russian Convention elsewhere.

4009. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you be afraid of a partition of Afghanistan?

4010. SIR E. BARROW.—I would preserve as far as possible the buffer between Russian and British territory.

4011. SIR W. MEYER.—You spoke of the occupation in certain circumstances of Seistan : do you mean Afghan Seistan?

4012. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

4013. SIR W. MEYER.—In the event of a war with Afghanistan, would you bring Persia in if it could be avoided?

4014. SIR E. BARROW.—No.

4015. PRESIDENT.—In the case of the partition of Afghanistan between ourselves and Russia, with Russia occupying Afghan Turkistan, would it be possible for the Russians to improve their communications and roads there?

4016. SIR E. BARROW.—Undoubtedly; up to the Hindu Kush.

4017. PRESIDENT.—And we might also improve our communications through the much more turbulent part of Afghanistan which lies to the south?

4018. SIR E. BARROW.—I was advocating that we should not go beyond the Kandahar and Jalalabad provinces, if we could avoid it.

4019. PRESIDENT.—And this would go on until the outposts of Russia and Great Britain came into contact?

4020. SIR E. BARROW.—There would be a long period during which Kabul would still remain a buffer between us.

4021. PRESIDENT.—Under our military system at Home and in India, do you consider that the result of our coming into contact with Russia would be advantageous to us, having regard to the large population and system of conscription in Russia?

4022. SIR E. BARROW.—No.

4023. PRESIDENT.—You realize the great advantage of having a buffer, in spite of its disadvantages?

4024. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes. The present situation is advantageous to us but it is impossible to maintain that position for ever. So long as it exists, I should like, as Mr. Gladstone said, to maintain "a strong, friendly and united Afghanistan."

4025. PRESIDENT.—For a general war with the tribes on the North-West Frontier, the General Staff, in 1911, estimated a force of six-and-one-third divisions as necessary, *plus* several separate units of infantry, cavalry and Pioneers. Do you agree with this estimate? Do you consider that if the Government took prompt measures at the outset, there would be any simultaneous and concerted action of the tribes against us?

4026. SIR E. BARROW.—If we act offensively only in one quarter at a time and defensively elsewhere, we might possibly manage with five divisions, *plus* the three independent brigades. It would be absurd to take the offensive simultaneously against all unless we were compelled to do so, nor do I consider that concerted action on the part of the tribes is likely, unless the rising were engineered by Kabul.

4027. PRESIDENT.—As regards concerted action, is it the case that these tribesmen have no organized transport nor arrangements for feeding themselves?

4028. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

4029. PRESIDENT.—Is it likely that the Afghans would be able to provide them with organized transport?

4030. SIR E. BARROW.—Most unlikely.

4031. PRESIDENT.—Concerted action on the part of the tribesmen would therefore appear to be most improbable?

4032. SIR E. BARROW.—What will happen is, a *jehad* having been preached, the frontier will catch fire.

4033. SIR P. LAKE.—Even then the tribes would not be fighting together, though all fighting at the same time?

4034. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes. There can never be concerted action; for instance, the Wazirs will never support the Afridis.

4035. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think, if we had taken vigorous action in 1897, that we could have avoided the trouble which arose subsequently?

4036. SIR E. BARROW.—If we had supported the Khyber Rifles at once the conflagration would probably never have spread in the rapid way it did.

4037. SIR W. MEYER.—General Duff estimated that for a war with Afghanistan and the tribes we should require a force which might run to 120,000 men. Do you accept that?

4038. SIR E. BARROW.—No. Speaking generally, in my view we should act defensively, and should operate offensively only about Kandahar.

4039. SIR W. MEYER.—What would your rough estimate be for this contingency?

4040. SIR E. BARROW.—In the case of a Pan-Islamic movement, which includes this case, my estimate of requirements amounts to eight divisions, which includes one division for Egypt. For the frontier, I consider that seven divisions, about 85,000 men, would suffice.

4041. SIR P. LAKE.—A division is nominally 13,000 strong; you have not included cavalry brigades which would make another 10,000 men, say, 100,000 men in all.

4042. SIR E. BARROW.—It would be very nearly 100,000 men in the case of a Pan-Islamic movement.

4043. PRESIDENT.—Our experience in the Afghan War shows there was difficulty in feeding horses in Afghanistan.

4044. SIR E. BARROW.—Very considerable difficulty. I am opposed to the present schemes as a great part of our forces should be acting defensively. There would be a cavalry brigade in the Peshawar district and another on the frontier, and I contemplated that we should probably send three cavalry brigades to the Kandahar line. I never contemplated a larger force of cavalry being concentrated in one direction, as we would not be able to feed it.

4045. SIR P. LAKE.—Would you use cavalry very largely for guarding the frontier?

4046. SIR E. BARROW.—I think the Kandahar line is the only one which would allow of any extensive use being made of cavalry across the frontier. This would leave all the more available for guarding the frontier.

4047. SIR W. MEYER.—General Aylmer told us that, so far as he could foresee, we could not count much on aeroplanes for attacking the hill tribes. A. 2820.

4048. SIR E. BARROW.—That must be left for the Aviation Corps of the future to decide.

4049. SIR W. MEYER.—I think he was referring to the difficulty of flying over mountains.

4050. SIR E. BARROW.—There is no necessity for a large Aviation Corps in India, because they will not have to fight other aviators. One might assume that they would meet with no opposition and that they could fly over intervening ranges.

4051. PRESIDENT.—A memorandum prepared by the General Staff estimated the total strength of the tribes as about 300,000 fighting men, with about 62,000 breech-loading rifles or carbines and about 40,000 muzzle-loaders. Do you think these large figures are to be relied on? How do you account for the alleged large purchases of expensive rifles by poor tribesmen?

4052. SIR E. BARROW.—I do not consider these estimates reliable, but I suppose they are better than any I could make. With regard to the last question; I cannot account for them. Perhaps the Criminal Investigation Department and the frontier officers can do so.

4053. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think that the estimates are exaggerated?

4054. SIR E. BARROW.—I do not think we have any basis for these estimates, and I fancy they have been exaggerated. I should think the ammunition would run out in a very short time.

4055. PRESIDENT.—In the event of war with the tribes, are you in favour of continuing the previous policy of withdrawal after a punitive expedition, or would you endeavour to settle permanent garrisons in tribal territory ?

4056. SIR E. BARROW.—In the case of isolated campaigns, I think withdrawal is advisable, as annexation might arouse further hostility with other tribes, but in the event of another general war like 1897, I am for going right up to the Durand line, making roads and freely enlisting tribesmen.

4057. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that the tribesmen, if enlisted by us would make good soldiers ?

4058. SIR E. BARROW.—I do.

4059. PRESIDENT.—The Khyber Rifles have done well on several occasions ?

4060. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

4061. SIR W. MEYER.—If we had trouble with the Afridis, the other tribes remaining quiet, you would not occupy the Afridi territory for fear of bringing down the other tribes upon us ?

4062. SIR E. BARROW.—The thing I fear more than anything else is a Pan-Islamic movement.

4063. SIR W. MEYER.—What tribes are likely to be most dangerous to us in the future ?

4064. SIR E. BARROW.—The Afridis—a tribe which includes a large number of old soldiers.

A. 2583, 4065. SIR W. MEYER.—Other witnesses have mentioned the Mahsuds.

2525. 4066. SIR E. BARROW.—A war with the Mahsuds is likely.

4067. PRESIDENT.—Assuming that friendly relations with Russia continue, what strength do you consider necessary for the Field Army of India ?

4068. SIR E. BARROW.—Even in this case nine divisions is by no means excessive, but eight might suffice, if our resources do not admit of more.

4069. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider it desirable to proceed with the Loi Shilman and Parachinar railways ? If so, which would you take up first ? The Foreign Department desired to run the former line along the Kabul river ; Lord Kitchener suggested an alternative alignment of which you are doubtless aware ; which do you prefer ?

4070. SIR E. BARROW.—I would proceed with both if we could afford to do so, but having regard to expense and expediency, I would take up the Kurram railway first. Of the alternative Khyber alignments, I prefer the river route on account of haulage, if not of economy. The Loi Shilman route was, I believe, advocated by Lord Kitchener because he assumed that the river route could not be guarded. I do not agree in that view. With blockhouses suitably located and garrisoned by Mohmand levies, organized on the same lines as the Khyber Rifles, I maintain that the river route could be made quite safe.

4071. SIR P. LAKE.—You said just now that you did not believe in operating up the Kurram line because the pass would be closed in the winter ?

4072. SIR E. BARROW.—I regard the Kurram line as an alternative line. In summer I would operate by the Kurram line.

4073. SIR P. LAKE.—In the summer you recommend the Kurram ?

4074. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes. At some time we might have operations in the Kurram, and in that case the Parachinar railway would be invaluable.

4075. SIR W. MEYER.—General Aylmer told us that although he would A. 3597. like to push on with both lines, he would make them secondary to other things.

4076. SIR E. BARROW.—I agree; I think there are many more important things than the Kurram line.

4077. PRESIDENT.—Do you think there is much to be gained, having regard to the expense involved—estimated at Rs. 3,18,19,407 in 1907—by establishing direct railway communication between Bombay and Karachi?

4078. SIR E. BARROW.—From a military point of view I would regard it as money wasted, when there are so many more important matters to be dealt with. For the greater part of the year the sea offers a better line, and during the monsoon we can send troops if necessary by Rajputana and Hyderabad.

4079. PRESIDENT.—So far as you have studied the internal situation in India, do you think it materially worse or better now than it was (a) in 1904, and (b) in 1907?

4080. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, so far as I can judge, I consider the situation better now than it was in 1907, but decidedly worse than in 1904 when sedition was sporadic; in 1907 it was almost epidemic. It is now endemic and may at any time again assume epidemic proportions.

4081. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you say that sedition was not with us in 1904?

4082. SIR E. BARROW.—As I have said, in 1904 it was sporadic.

4083. SIR W. MEYER.—Can you assign any reason for the material difference between 1904 and 1907?

4084. SIR E. BARROW.—It is the result of agitation that has been set on foot during the last few years. The seditionists were not very active or organized previous to 1904, but since then they have worked in collaboration and produced the present unfavourable situation.

4085. SIR W. MEYER.—Have the Japanese victories over the Russians had anything to do with it?

4086. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes. The events of the Russo-Japanese War undoubtedly inspired the idea that it was quite feasible for an Oriental race to stand up to Europeans.

4087. PRESIDENT.—In 1907 we checked the tide of sedition?

4088. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, because the outbreaks at Rawalpindi and Lahore were premature. Northern India at that time was in a general state of ferment, and but for these premature outbreaks the trouble might have been more general and therefore more difficult to deal with.

4089. PRESIDENT.—Did the deportation of the agitators have any effect?

4090. SIR E. BARROW.—I think so.

4091. PRESIDENT.—So also did the passing of certain salutary Acts?

4092. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

4093. PRESIDENT.—When a disease becomes endemic, it is less dangerous, is it not?

4094. SIR E. BARROW.—For the time being it is, but some cause or other produces fermentation, and then the disease becomes epidemic.

4095. PRESIDENT.—With a firm Government ready to take prompt action, we could cope with it?

4096. SIR E. BARROW.—I think we could suppress it, given firmness on the part of the Government and a wise policy.

4097. SIR W. MEYER.—If we had a war with Russia, you do not think the disease would spread internally ?

4098. SIR E. BARROW.—No. They are much too afraid of Russia to turn against us at such a time.

4099. SIR W. MEYER.—What would happen in the event of a Pan-Islamic War ?

4100. SIR E. BARROW.—The population of India in that case would be rather favourably inclined to our assumed enemies. The Hindu agitators might possibly seize the opportunity of co-operating with the Musalman agitators; the situation thus created would be entirely different from that arising from the Russian contingency.

A. 2759. 4101. SIR W. MEYER.—They would preach the doctrine of Orientals against Europeans, I suppose. General Aylmer said his policy would be to send up all the doubtful regiments to the frontier in the event of internal troubles. Do you concur ?

4102. SIR E. BARROW.—I would certainly move doubtful troops elsewhere; for instance, I would not trust the Muhammadan regiments to fight against their co-religionists, but I would give them garrison duties. I would move doubtful Hindu regiments up against a Muhammadan enemy. In the Mutiny a Hindu regiment made a bolt across the frontier, and was promptly wiped out by the tribesmen.

4103. PRESIDENT.—Speaking generally, do you concur in the arrangements for increasing the internal defence forces, suggested by the Government of India to local Governments and Administrations in January—March 1912. In particular what is your opinion in regard to the following points :—

- (i) The withdrawal of two battalions of native infantry from the Kohat Brigade.
- (ii) The provision of no European troops, and only one battalion of native infantry and two squadrons of native cavalry for the Nasirabad (Rajputana) area.
- (iii) Do you think that the scheme of numerous and relatively weak movable columns is desirable? Take for instance the column at Belgaum which consists of two companies of native infantry only; and those for Delhi and Meerut (contiguous places). Might it be better here, and in some other instances, to have fewer columns of a stronger character ?

4104. SIR E. BARROW.—I concur generally in the arrangements made by the General Staff, but I would modify certain points. Replying specifically to your questions, I disagree with the proposed reductions in Burma and Kohat.

- (i) I am absolutely opposed to this as in winter, at all events, we shall not be operating by the Kurram line. I regard three lines of advance as strategic folly.
- (ii) I think in this area we must depend on the loyalty of the Chiefs.
- (iii) It is perhaps not desirable, but it seems to me unavoidable. In the case of Belgaum, provided the two companies are of the right sort I think this detachment is advisable. The fort at Belgaum is not only a place of refuge, but carries with it great local prestige. Its loss would be a deplorable event, and, for the reasons given by the late Sir Lewis Jenkins, it is essential to have troops ready at hand to quench local conflagrations. We cannot rely on railways.

4105. SIR W. MEYER.—Are not these schemes for internal defence a little too rigid? Might it not be better to make the arrangements a little more elastic ?

4106. SIR E. BARROW.—Quite so, but at the same time it is advisable to have a scheme prepared as a guide to the officers concerned.

4107. SIR P. LAKE.—Is it not clearly understood that these defence schemes are only intended as a guide to the officer not an order to him to do this or that?

4108. SIR E. BARROW.—Some officers in command would, I fear, consider them final.

4109. PRESIDENT.—Would an average person entrusted with the execution of these defence schemes feel bound to comply with them literally?

4110. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes. Many such persons would take that view.

4111. SIR W. MEYER.—Mr. Waterfield said that he considered the obligatory garrisons at Mhow and Indore inadequate. What is your opinion? A. 3169.

4112. SIR E. BARROW.—I do not see why we should have any troops at Indore.

4113. SIR W. MEYER.—General Aylmer said that in his opinion it was a mistake to break up British units too much. If you have an isolated British company it could possibly be smashed up by two-and-a-half native companies, whereas a British brigade, say, of all arms could account for greatly superior numbers of native troops. A. 2700.

4114. SIR E. BARROW.—I agree with him in that. As regards moveable columns, I would like to see them composed more largely of British troops.

4115. PRESIDENT.—Do you approve of the proposed abolition of the Deoli and Erinpura squadrons?

4116. SIR E. BARROW.—Decidedly. I have already proposed it officially. These squadrons may have been useful once, but are no longer so. If abolished, the three local infantry regiments might be completed to normal strength.

4117. PRESIDENT.—What arrangements have been made for the defence of Bangalore?

4118. SIR E. BARROW.—None, except to prepare a scheme and to detail a garrison for the Agram Intrenchment, where water might, however, be a difficulty if the pipe line were cut. Personally I think the Agram scheme both absurd and unnecessary.

4119. SIR W. MEYER.—I understand you have a considerable number of troops in Bangalore in time of peace?

4120. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

4121. SIR W. MEYER.—Is there any provision for leaving a certain number of troops behind as an obligatory garrison?

4122. SIR E. BARROW.—No, but I presume that the officer commanding would consider what was the temper of the population, and act accordingly?

4123. PRESIDENT.—Is not Bangalore a favourite locality for Eurasians?

4124. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes. I consider that the European and Eurasian population are quite capable of defending themselves.

4125. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider it sound that there should be no special preliminary arrangements for an organized moveable column for the defence of the Madras area?

4126. SIR E. BARROW.—The moveable column does not exist in peace, as it is formed from outside units. Considering the wide area to be controlled, it would be better to have two small columns based on Madras and Bangalore, respectively; thus, two guns, one squadron, and one battalion Native infantry at Madras, and the rest at Bangalore. The two Royal Field Artillery guns could be well spared from the obligatory garrison as there are six 15-pounders in the fort armament, which the Volunteer artillery could work.

4127. **SIR P. LAKE.**—At present you depend upon Bangalore to provide any moveable columns which may be required I presume?

4128. **SIR E. BARROW.**—Yes, but it seems to me that Madras is the place where you most want a moveable column.

4129. **PRESIDENT.**—Do you consider it desirable that in time of peace the whole of the southern portion of the Madras Presidency should depend, as far as troops are concerned, on the weak Indian battalion at Trichinopoly?

4130. **SIR E. BARROW.**—In time of peace the whole of the southern portion of the Madras Presidency does not depend solely on the Indian battalion at Trichinopoly. So long as there are troops available at Bangalore and Madras for reinforcements, one battalion at Trichinopoly is sufficient for the needs of southern India, as every district has a reserve of at least 150 to 200 armed police, which can be quickly reinforced to 300 men from other districts. His Excellency the Governor concurs in this view, but thinks that in war time we should always have a half battalion in Malabar and another half battalion on the east coast, say, at Vizianagram, as in the former case the Moplahs are always an element of danger, and in the latter the Coconada-Masulapatam area is the one most tainted with sedition in the whole Presidency. Sir Harold Stuart thinks that Calicut and Cannanore could do without their British detachments both in peace and war, but that Mallapuram should have an obligatory garrison of one British company at all times. In war time he would also like to see an obligatory garrison of half a battalion of native infantry at Trichinopoly, to control the Muravars and Kallars. Failing this, he would have a military police battalion of Nairs and Moplahs. Similarly, he would like a half battalion of native infantry or military police at Vizianagram. Also the obligatory garrison of Madras should be increased so as to deal with a Muhammadan rising in the Palar valley (Arcot to Trippatur) where the people are poor and lawless. He would like to see the moveable column based on Madras rather than on Bangalore, because it is the seat of Government and the junction of all the railways.

We have a company of British infantry each at Calicut, Cannanore and Mallapuram. I agree generally with these views, but not as to leaving an obligatory garrison at Trichinopoly or Vizianagram. The civil Government should provide for the defence of those places.

4131. **SIR W. MEYER.**—There were serious riots at Tinnevely some years ago, and I was under the impression that the Collector there wired to Trichinopoly for troops, and that on account of the smallness of the battalion there only about 100 men could be sent?

4132. **SIR E. BARROW.**—When did the riot take place?

4133. **SIR W. MEYER.**—About 1908, I think.

4134. **SIR E. BARROW.**—I was not in command of the Southern Army then, but I can quite understand that, during the furlough season, the Trichinopoly garrison might be very weak. The battalion there has an establishment of only 600 men of all ranks. A detachment of 100 men was probably at Ootacamund, and say there were another 100 men on furlough; perhaps the Commanding Officer was not very energetic and possibly said he could not spare more than 100 men.

4135. **SIR W. MEYER.**—Is it not a long journey from Cannanore to Tinnevely?

4136. **SIR E. BARROW.**—I presume troops would be railed from Madras if necessary, not from Cannanore.

4137. **SIR W. MEYER.**—In 1911 you submitted proposals about the reorganization of the Carnatic regiments. You proposed to have four regiments each with a service battalion of 800 and a depôt battalion of 400; one of the depôt battalions was to be stationed at Trichinopoly; that would weaken the garrison still further?

4138. SIR E. BARROW.—The scheme of 1911 was forced on me. There was to be no expense entailed ; there was to be no increase of Carnatics, and the obligatory garrisons were to be considered in the scheme. I do not say that mine was an ideal scheme, but it was the only one I could conceive that would meet the prescribed conditions and ensure the efficiency of the Carnatic regiments. If I had had a freer hand, I should have proposed that all the battalions should be brought up to the 800 strength.

4139. PRESIDENT.—Do you agree that it would be possible to reduce the peace garrison of Burma by a mountain battery, and two, if not three, battalions of Indian infantry ?

4140. SIR E. BARROW.—I agree as to the artillery but not as to the infantry. I think that in view of the disturbed condition of China we require at least six battalions in Burma, namely, two for Rangoon and the Andamans, one for Bhamo, one for Mandalay, and two more at Meiktila and Mandalay to reinforce the frontier or to complete a special brigade for operations in the Tenguah direction.

4141. SIR W. MEYER.—In a big war on the North-West Frontier you would have to move some of these troops ?

4142. SIR E. BARROW.—No, we ought not to do so. I do not agree in the practicability of reducing the garrison of Burma, even in a big war, below two British and six native battalions. You might take away one British infantry battalion in time of stress.

4143. PRESIDENT.—Expenditure has been incurred in providing accommodation for two British infantry battalions at Ahmadnagar, whereas there is now only one there. It has been suggested that in place of the second infantry battalion, two of the British mountain batteries now at Quetta and Rawalpindi should be quartered there. Do you think this a good plan, and that Ahmadnagar is a suitable place for British mountain batteries ?

4144. SIR E. BARROW.—I think two mountain batteries for the 6th Division are essential, but I am doubtful as to whether Ahmadnagar is a good place for them. Deolali would be better if accommodation can be provided there without detriment to the distribution of the infantry. In any case, the batteries should go to Poona or Ahmadnagar for manœuvres. I should also like to see two British mountain batteries at or near Wellington to complete the 9th Division.

4145. SIR W. MEYER.—Where would you get them from ?

4146. SIR E. BARROW.—We would have to raise them.

4147. SIR P. LAKE.—That was the original scheme ?

4148. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

4149. SIR W. MEYER.—Assuming that you cannot obtain additional batteries, would you make the move to Wellington ?

4150. SIR E. BARROW.—I would reduce other units and raise more mountain batteries. For instance, you might reduce British cavalry and horse artillery ; this would enable us to have more mountain batteries and howitzers without extra expense.

4151. PRESIDENT.—Would British cavalry be useful for dealing with internal disturbance ?

4152. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, I quite admit they would be of great use, but I think we want guns more than any other arm.

4153. PRESIDENT.—Were there ever two British infantry battalions at Ahmadnagar ?

4154. SIR E. BARROW.—No.

4155. PRESIDENT.—To what was the intention of having two due ?

4156. SIR E. BARROW.—It was in connexion with the problem of having homogeneous brigades ; the idea was to increase the British infantry of the division so that it could give four British battalions for a homogeneous brigade.

4157. PRESIDENT.—That is true, but you based yourself on the brigade being complete; by having two at Ahmadnagar you could not have satisfied that stipulation?

4158. SIR E. BARROW.—Quite so, it was an anomalous position.

4159. PRESIDENT.—As regards placing two mountain batteries at Deolali, the money spent at Ahmadnagar would then be thrown away? Further, we were informed that the ground near Ahmadnagar is suitable?

4160. SIR E. BARROW.—I do not agree in that; Deolali is better though not ideal. There are barracks for 646 single and 37 married men at Deolali. The peace establishment of two British mountain batteries would be 258 British ranks so that would still leave accommodation for 425 British soldiers. This would just suffice for the three companies of the Aden battalion or for 400 men from the Bombay battalion. Of course, lines would have to be built for the 400 native drivers of the mountain batteries, and stabling for the mules.

Deolali is certainly a better place topographically for mountain artillery than Ahmadnagar, and as regards training with the other arms, the batteries could always go to Ahmadnagar or Poona. As regards present distribution, the intention is, I understand, that the Aden detachment should be located at Kirkee and the Bombay detachment at Deolali. In these circumstances, the old barracks at Ahmadnagar will still remain empty.

4161. PRESIDENT.—The existing scheme places stress on organized brigades being earmarked for the Field Army, while internal defence troops would have to be drawn largely from various and possibly distant sources. Thus, we are informed that the mobile brigade with base at Delhi, proposed under the new internal defence scheme, might perhaps be drawn from the 9th Division.

Again, while Secunderabad is a large military centre, most of the troops stationed there would be earmarked for the Field Army while the troops for the defence of the Hyderabad area—which are more than the equivalent of a brigade—would be drawn from a variety of places. Do you consider these arrangements sound? Might it be preferable to allot internal defence to troops already stationed in or near the places to be principally guarded, and to make the moves from other places in connection with the mobilization of the Field Army?

4162. SIR E. BARROW.—I do not know how the 9th Division could supply a mobile brigade for Delhi. Under the proposals of the General Staff the 26th Brigade of that Division will be broken up and the Division can only mobilize two infantry brigades. The existing arrangements may be capable of improvement, but without an increase in the number of units it is impossible to provide for both the Field Army and internal defence from divisional areas. We must either reduce the Field Army or increase the army as a whole. We cannot eat our cake and have it.

4163. SIR W. MEYER.—I understand that these mobile brigades were to be drawn from the Field Army, and rather than take one from the 8th Division, say, they would break up the 9th.

4164. SIR E. BARROW.—It is not quite clear what was intended.

4165. SIR P. LAKE.—The idea was that you would be guided largely by the pressure of the moment. You might want to keep the 9th Division intact.

4166. SIR W. MEYER.—Take the case of the Peshawar Division. The first two brigades are concentrated at Peshawar and Nowshera respectively; the third is a scratch brigade. At the same time, in order to provide for internal defence the divisional area will have to draw regiments from outside. Might it not be better to face facts and say we shall send the division a brigade short into the field and keep the 3rd Brigade for the defence of the area?

4167. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

4168. SIR W. MEYER.—Similarly, if it is necessary to have a mobile brigade for Delhi, would it not be better to take it from Meerut?

4169. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes ; but the Meerut Division is rather exceptional because it is almost entirely composed of Gurkha battalions, and such a course might be inexpedient.

4170. SIR W. MEYER.—Of course nothing is so fatal as to push general principles to their logical extreme, but it might be accepted as a general principle to be acted on at discretion ?

4171. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, I agree.

4172. PRESIDENT.—Are you consulted by Army Headquarters or the Army Department in such matters as have been dealt with in the above questions ?

4173. SIR E. BARROW.—No, not unless I myself initiate the correspondence on any such subject. Any experience or special knowledge Army Commanders may have on such subjects is absolutely thrown away. For instance, I suppose I know more of the frontier personally than any military officer in India, but I am never consulted thereon.

4174. PRESIDENT.—Supposing that the Field Army were reduced to seven or eight divisions, would you make a similar reduction in the divisional areas and thus render it more easy to have each divisional area self-contained ? In particular—

(a) Why should Burma, if reduced in its garrison, remain a divisional command ?

(b) Might the defects of the Peshawar Division be remedied in some measure at least, by making it include the now independent brigades of Kohat, Bannu and the Derajat ?

4175. SIR E. BARROW.—No. Some of the divisions are much too extensive in area already, for instance, the 5th and 8th. I see no necessity for any such change. Besides, I foresee future augmentations, which will be the easier if the framework for nine divisions already exists.

(a) I would not reduce the Burma garrison, but even if reduced, the extent and importance of the area and its isolation render it desirable to have an experienced senior officer in command.

(b) I was in favour of this solution so far as Kohat was concerned when I commanded the 1st Division, because Peshawar and Kohat were both concerned with the Afridi problem but I am now doubtful of its wisdom.

4176. SIR W. MEYER.—Why ?

4177. SIR E. BARROW.—Because I think we had better keep Kohat distinct. If it is a case of taking troops away just to increase Peshawar, I am not in favour of the idea.

4178. PRESIDENT.—Bannu and the Derajat are somewhat isolated ?

4179. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, they are too far away and have to deal with a different set of propositions.

4180. PRESIDENT.—From what you have seen of the Imperial Service Troops in your command, do you consider them efficient corps, and comparable with regular Indian battalions, etc., of like character ?

4181. SIR E. BARROW.—They are efficient as far as they go, that is to say as regards equitation, musketry, drill, etc., but not comparable with our own troops. Without British officers they are necessarily deficient in leading.

4182. PRESIDENT.—That is an advantage ?

4183. SIR E. BARROW.—I think so ? I mean under certain untoward circumstances.

4184. PRESIDENT.—What is your opinion in regard to the efficiency of the local armies of the States of Hyderabad, Mysore, Baroda, Indore and Gwalior ?

4185. SIR E. BARROW.—Some of the Hyderabad and Gwalior units are fairly well drilled, but all are lacking in the essentials of good troops, namely, officers, training and equipment.

4186. SIR W. MEYER.—I suppose the Imperial Service Troops of those States are much better than the local armies?

4187. SIR E. BARROW.—Decidedly.

4188. SIR W. MEYER.—As a matter of policy, would you use Imperial Service Troops for their declared purpose whenever there was war?

4189. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, I would; for one thing, you do not want to leave efficient troops in the States concerned.

4190. SIR W. MEYER.—Is the artillery of these States any good?

4191. SIR E. BARROW.—No.

4192. PRESIDENT.—It has been alleged that the three Maratha States above mentioned might adopt a dangerous attitude towards us. Do you consider this likely?

4193. SIR E. BARROW.—No, I do not. There is little real sympathy between the Chiefs and their troops, who are not Marathas. Besides, I think the Chiefs would be loyal if only from motives of self-interest.

4194. PRESIDENT.—What is your opinion of the efficiency of the tribal militia on the North-West Frontier; do you think that they can be trusted to fight against their co-tribesmen in case of serious trouble on the border, or would you, in such an event, try and move them elsewhere?

4195. SIR E. BARROW.—I presume this question refers to both the Border Military Police and more highly organized units such as the Khyber Rifles and the Kurram Militia? If so, the question cannot be answered in general terms, and each case must be considered separately. Some corps are more efficient than others, and their loyalty varies greatly in degree. For instance, while the Kurram Militia can be trusted absolutely to fight against the tribes around them, the same reliance cannot be put on some of the other corps, more especially in the case of disturbances of a religious nature. In such a case I think it might be advisable to remove all doubtful elements.

4196. SIR W. MEYER.—How would you remove them?

4197. SIR E. BARROW.—Well, if we were engaged in warlike operations in Afghanistan, and I was beginning to get fidgety about the Afridis on the line of communications, I would think it convenient to send the Afridis up to the forefront of the battle where they would be out of temptation.

4198. SIR W. MEYER.—If you had war with the Afridis?

4199. SIR E. BARROW.—I should be inclined to move them to some other sphere of usefulness.

4200. SIR W. MEYER.—You would not trust them to shoot their brothers?

4201. SIR E. BARROW.—Supposing we were in Bazar, as I presume we should be, (Bazar would probably be our base in operations against the Afridis) in that case, the Khyber Rifles would be behind us and could not venture to be troublesome to us.

4202. PRESIDENT.—Generally speaking, how far do you consider that the Volunteers are an efficient force to be relied on for valuable assistance in internal disturbance; do you consider that their efficiency has increased of late years?

4203. SIR E. BARROW.—I do not consider them an efficient force, but I think a few months of danger and disturbance would rapidly make them so for local defence. I doubt if they have increased much in efficiency of late years.

4204. PRESIDENT.—They have an Inspector General?

4205. SIR E. BARROW.—I do not think that has increased their efficiency a great deal; he has a big area to go through. I should have preferred two

Inspectors, one for the Northern and one for the Southern Army. These would get into closer touch with local Governments and the Volunteers. It is asking too much of one man to inspect the whole of the Volunteers in India.

4206. SIR W. MEYER.—Which do you consider the best Volunteer corps in your command ?

4207. SIR E. BARROW.—I certainly think some corps are better than others. Probably the best is the Southern Provinces Mounted Rifles. This Corps extends all over the Madras Presidency, Mysore and the planting districts in the Eastern Ghauts, but they generally try and concentrate as far as possible at Bangalore for training. It is an absolutely reliable and useful corps. It is composed of a superior class of men, mostly planters and officers of Government in various capacities. The Bombay Artillery is also very efficient. The Bombay mounted unit has also been useful in riots. Incidentally, I might mention the Bihar and Surma Valley mounted corps as useful units.

4208. SIR W. MEYER.—There are a great many Eurasians amongst the Volunteers ?

4209. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, and some are very black. Some at Calicut were blacker than many of the natives around them.

Given time, I think the Volunteers would become efficient, for in times of disturbance we should no doubt rope in the best men.

4210. SIR W. MEYER.—You have a certain number of natives too ?

4211. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, they generally have high-sounding Portuguese names. I am rather inclined to enlist the Native Christians of southern India.

4212. SIR W. MEYER.—The present rule is that natives may be admitted with the consent of the corps to which they seek to belong ?

4213. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, I think the proviso is a very useful safeguard.

4214. SIR W. MEYER.—Under that might we not let in the natives we wanted and keep out the rest ?

4215. SIR E. BARROW.—We might, but there would be great difficulties as we should be said to be differentiating in favour of Christians and so on.

4216. SIR W. MEYER.—Lord Kitchener counted on concentrated bodies of Volunteers to assist in the defence of large areas. Do you think they could do more than purely local defence ?

4217. SIR E. BARROW.—Some might be very useful, but take the Madras Volunteer Guards, I should say it would be better to limit their sphere of activity to the local defence of Madras.

4218. SIR W. MEYER.—Lord Kitchener also counted on the forts at Agra and Delhi being defended by Volunteers ; would you agree to that ?

4219. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, but with a nucleus of regulars.

4220. SIR W. MEYER.—You would not entrust the entire defence to them ?

4221. SIR E. BARROW.—Oh, no.

4222. SIR W. MEYER.—Where do they keep their arms ?

4223. SIR E. BARROW.—The divisional commander is responsible that they are kept in suitable armouries.

4224. SIR W. MEYER.—Are proper precautions taken ?

4225. SIR E. BARROW.—I think they would be in disturbed times. I do not think they are always taken at present.

4226. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you not think that in the event of internal disturbance the people might try a surprise ?

4227. SIR E. BARROW.—Here and there, but I think we should generally get warning; we really had warnings before the Mutiny, but no one ever contemplated the possibility of such an occurrence, and the warnings were disregarded.

4228. SIR W. MEYER.—In your command there are two places that have Volunteer port artillery. Where do they keep their ammunition?

4229. SIR E. BARROW.—Four places, *viz.*, Rangoon, Madras, Bombay and Karachi. The ammunition is probably kept in the arsenals. In the case of Madras I should say the arsenal in the fort. I expect that at Bombay, Rangoon, etc., it is in the forts allocated to the Volunteers.

4230. PRESIDENT.—Do you think it would be desirable to recruit one or two Eurasian battalions or to employ Eurasians with inland defence artillery?

4231. SIR E. BARROW.—I do not think that Eurasian battalions of infantry are desirable. If maintained on a permanent basis, they would be almost as expensive as British infantry and not nearly so efficient or useful. If on a militia basis, they would not have the same prestige or the same moral effect as British regulars. They would not, therefore, adequately fill either the requirements of the Field Army or of internal defence.

I am, however, strongly in favour of employing them in companies of Eurasian artillery militia on a local basis. This, it seems to me, would exactly meet the conditions and needs of the Eurasian community, more particularly as a large number of Eurasians cannot afford to be Volunteers, while such companies are much needed for internal defence. In this connection I would call attention to a note* I prepared in the Military Department in 1887. In that note I pointed out that Eurasian militia, on the basis proposed, would cost about a sixth of the amount British garrison artillery cost, and that therefore the expense of six such companies could be met by the reduction of one company of Royal Garrison Artillery. The objections to Eurasian infantry battalions alluded to above, would not apply to Eurasian garrison artillery behind walls in anything like the same degree.

* Not reproduced.

These local companies might be recruited and located as below :—

Depôt and training station.	Recruiting areas.	Employment on Mobilization.
1. Fort William ...	Bengal and Assam, more especially Calcutta.	To garrison Fort William, thus relieving the Royal Garrison Artillery for the Hughli Defences.
2. Fort St. George ...	Madras and Mysore ...	To supplement the obligatory garrison.
3. Bombay ...	Bombay Presidency ...	Another company is needed for the Bombay Defences, (<i>vide</i> General Staff Memo.)
4. Allahabad ...	Bihar and Orissa and the Eastern half of the United Provinces.	To garrison Allahabad, thus relieving a company of Royal Garrison Artillery.
5. Agra ...	Oudh and the Western half of the United Provinces.	To garrison Agra Fort, thus enabling a whole company of Royal Garrison Artillery to be at Delhi as desired by the General Staff.
6. Lahore ...	The Punjab ...	To garrison Lahore Fort and Govindgarh (<i>vide</i> General Staff Memo.)

I would like to add that the pay and allowances suggested in my note of 1887 were on too low a scale. Pay when embodied should be Rs. 30 per month, and at other times Rs. 10, without subsistence.

4232. SIR W. MEYER.—How do you get the result that their cost would only be one-sixth of that of British garrison artillery?

4233. SIR E. BARROW.—It was all worked out and you could get the note from the Army Department; generally speaking, it was because they were only embodied for a month in the year.

4234. SIR W. MEYER.—How was it that your proposal failed to find acceptance?

4235. SIR E. BARROW.—It was, I think, accepted in principle by the Government of India, but there were more pressing demands.

4236. SIR W. MEYER.—General Aylmer told us he favoured the employment of Eurasians as signallers. A. 2696.

4237. SIR E. BARROW.—They might do all right as such.

4238. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider that the former theory, which reckoned one British soldier as equivalent, for purposes of internal security, etc., to two-and-a-half Indian, is still valid?

4239. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, though man for man there is little difference. The British soldier is infinitely more efficient than he was forty years ago, when I was a recruit; so too is the Indian; but *we* have the control, the officers and the ammunition. Above all, we have the guns, so in my opinion the theory is still valid. That is to say, though 10 Indians may be equal to 10 British, 10,000 British would be quite equal to 25,000 Indians.

4240. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider it desirable that a large proportion of the British troops in India, should be in the hills for considerable periods during the hot weather?

4241. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes. The gain in health, physique, and *moral* is enormous, and in any case we can soon bring them down.

4242. SIR W. MEYER.—If there was a surprise movement against us, it would probably happen in the hot weather when the British troops were in the hills?

4243. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, but I would risk that.

4244. SIR W. MEYER.—Do British troops like the hills?

4245. SIR E. BARROW.—Some do not like them, but it depends on the station from which they come and to which they go.

4246. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you have anything to do with the moves to the hills?

4247. SIR E. BARROW.—No, they are made by divisions.

4248. SIR W. MEYER.—So that a divisional General might allow a place to be weakened considerably, without your knowledge?

4249. SIR E. BARROW.—No, because I get the returns every month, but in any case his hill accommodation is limited and he would exceed his allowance for movements if he attempted to depart from the usual scale.

4250. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you allow Ferozepore to be denuded?

4251. SIR E. BARROW.—I do not think it could be denuded; a certain garrison must always be kept there.

4252. SIR W. MEYER.—For how long do the troops go up to the hills?

4253. SIR E. BARROW.—That depends upon the stations from which and to which, they go. The period varies.

4254. SIR W. MEYER.—You do not think it is desirable to reduce the numbers who go up or the time they stay there?

4255. SIR E. BARROW.—No.

4256. PRESIDENT.—Do you think it desirable that an important place like Jhelum should be left without any British troops?

4257. SIR E. BARROW.—I admit the importance of Jhelum as a link in our chain of communications, but I think a weak British detachment would be a mistake in the presence of a strong brigade of Indian troops. There are four battalions of native infantry there, and I cannot think it would be advisable to have a small British detachment there even on account of the bridge.

4258. SIR W. MEYER.—Taking the Frontier Province as a whole, there is a very large disproportion therein between the British and native troops. It has been proposed to send an additional native battalion to Peshawar on the grounds that the existing native troops are wearied by sentry go and so on; do you think that, having regard to the disproportion of troops, the proposal is advisable?

4259. SIR E. BARROW.—Personally I should have no qualms about putting another regiment there. In Peshawar a good many of the men are in a foreign country; take for instance the Sikhs, Dogras and Rajputs.

4260. SIR W. MEYER.—When you were in Peshawar did you find that the existing native garrison was insufficient for the duties?

4261. SIR E. BARROW.—No.

4262. PRESIDENT.—The garrison has been considerably increased of late years?

4263. SIR E. BARROW.—It was larger in some ways when I first knew it. In 1880 we had four native infantry battalions and two native cavalry regiments, also horse, field, and elephant batteries. Then it was considerably decreased; later, a small increase took place; but when I was in command there were no particularly excessive duties to complain of, at any rate during normal times.

4264. SIR P. LAKE.—When did you leave?

4265. SIR E. BARROW.—On the 10th January 1908.

4266. SIR P. LAKE.—I see the application for extra troops is dated December 1908.

4267. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider that due precautions are taken to guard by British troops, the arsenals and military factories in your command?

4268. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, but increased vigilance may be necessary in times of disturbance or unrest. For instance, it might be then necessary to quarter the obligatory garrison of two companies at the cordite factory instead of at Wellington.

4269. SIR W. MEYER.—What is the normal garrison at the factory itself?

4270. SIR E. BARROW.—A guard of ten men, I think.

4271. SIR W. MEYER.—Are magazines adequately guarded?

4272. SIR E. BARROW.—Every British regiment keeps its own ammunition. The cartridges for native corps are, as a rule, kept in arsenals or in the lines of British corps.

4273. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that there is any risk in the policy adopted of late years, of recruiting the native army mainly from a few sources, such as Gurkhas, Pathans, Sikhs, and Punjabi Muhammadans?

4274. SIR E. BARROW.—The greatest possible danger. I have always inveighed against thus placing all our eggs in one basket. Besides, I am not convinced of the supposed innate superiority of these races. The idea may have been justified when we over-recruited Oudh and the Deccan, while at the same time we got the pick of the Punjab and Nepal. Now the reverse process is going on. Moreover, it is good officers which make good regiments, and formerly the Punjab and Gurkha regiments got the pick.

4275. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing you had, by some means or other, come to know of seditious feeling in a regiment, which would you consider the better course, to hush it up or to take action ?

4276. SIR E. BARROW.—To take action, of course !

4277. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that the Gurkhas can be implicitly relied on ?

4278. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, for the present, except of course in the case of a Nepalese war.

4279. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that we may have trouble from Sikhs, Jats, or Rajputs ?

4280. SIR E. BARROW.—From Sikhs and Jats, yes, as it is just their areas in which the agitator has been most busy, and where the Arya Samaj is most powerful. I do not think the Rajput country has as yet been much affected, but the United Provinces' Government could best advise on this point.

4281. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that the recruitment of Sikhs has been overdone and will be difficult to continue, having regard to the present conditions in the Punjab ? If so, and supposing the army to be maintained at its present strength, how would you fill the deficiencies ?

4282. SIR E. BARROW.—Certainly, I think Sikh recruitment has been overdone. I notice a great deterioration in the Sikh regiments and Sikh companies. I think we may have to make good deficiencies in this respect by enlisting more trans-frontier Pathans and Oudh men.

4283. SIR W. MEYER.—Politically would you think it was advisable to have many more Pathans ?

4284. SIR E. BARROW.—I think the political aspect of recruiting should be carefully considered. At the present moment we could enlist more Pathans.

4285. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that the Pathan and the Punjabi Muhammadan troops could be relied on in the event of war with Afghanistan or the tribes, with a *jihad* preached from Kabul ?

4286. SIR E. BARROW.—It would depend on the causes and other circumstances of the war. In the case of war brought about by a Pan-Islamic revival or an authoritative *jihad*, I do not think we could rely on our Pathans as a body, against the enemy. The same applies in a less degree to Punjabi Muhammadans. All this is an argument in favour of class regiments, which is a system which enables us to segregate doubtful troops. (*Vide* Annexure II.)

4287. SIR W. MEYER.—What do you mean by an authoritative *jihad* ?

4288. SIR E. BARROW.—Well, when some little *mullah* gets up and preaches one it is of little or no consequence. But if the Amir of Afghanistan or the Sultan of Turkey were to proclaim *aji had*, it would be a very serious matter.

4289. SIR W. MEYER.—It has been stated that the Musalmans look more to Constantinople than to the Amir ?

4290. SIR E. BARROW.—Undoubtedly.

4291. SIR W. MEYER.—And if we had a war with Turkey ?

4292. SIR E. BARROW.—The position would be very serious. Omitting Russia, the Pan-Islamic movement is the worst case we have to provide for.

4293. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that there is any risk, at present, of an anti-British combination of Muhammadans and Hindus ?

4294. SIR E. BARROW.—Not at present, but the Hindu agitator will take advantage of any Muhammadan unrest or discontent, and the further apart we keep Hindus and Muhammadans the better.

4295. SIR W. MEYER.—As between the Muhammadan and the Hindu, I gather that you consider the Muhammadan danger the greater potentiality?

4296. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

4297. PRESIDENT.—Are not the Hindus more inclined to sedition and intrigue than the Muhammadans?

4298. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, but we could deal with the Hindus, especially if we had the Muhammadans on our side.

4299. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing a Muhammadan rising in India against British rule, do you think the tribesmen would join in?

4300. SIR E. BARROW.—I think so, and the Afghans also.

4301. PRESIDENT.—Are you aware of seditious agencies, whose object it is to tamper with the allegiance of the native troops or induce men not to enlist? If so, do you consider that these agencies are active at present?

4302. SIR E. BARROW.—No; if I were aware, I should inform the Criminal Investigation Department; but I have not the slightest doubt that efforts are constantly being made to seduce the troops, especially amongst the Sikhs and Jats.

4303. SIR W. MEYER.—Are you supplied by Army Headquarters with such information as they have?

4304. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, they send us every month a printed memorandum shewing what information they have on the subject.

4305. SIR W. MEYER.—It is held that our most dangerous enemies are the Chitpavans; have you any information as to their doings with troops?

4306. SIR E. BARROW.—No, I have often heard rumours, but I cannot say I know of any concrete cases.

4307. SIR P. LAKE.—Would you think there is any special danger, say, from the numbers of them employed in certain pursuits?

4308. SIR E. BARROW.—Most certainly. For instance they control the Bengal-Nagpur Railway. Nearly every station-master and telegraph-master along that line is a Maratha Brahman. My authority for that statement is the late Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces.

4309. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you brought that to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief?

4310. SIR E. BARROW.—I have talked to him about it. The question really arose on a project which Lord Kitchener was keen on—that of abandoning Kamptee. He had practically issued orders for the abandonment when Mr. (now Sir Reginald) Craddock, who was at home at the time, got the subject brought to Lord Morley's notice. The latter agreed with Mr. Craddock and the orders were reversed.

4311. PRESIDENT.—Are you satisfied with the strength and efficiency of the Carnatic battalions; would you have a smaller number of battalions at a higher strength, or keep the existing number and raise their strength to what is necessary for efficient training?

4312. SIR E. BARROW.—Efficiency is impossible as the eight Carnatic battalions are now constituted, but if properly officered and constituted, efficiency could be secured and the political effect might be very great. In 1911 I proposed to reorganize them into two regiments of four battalions each, two battalions per regiment being at a strength of 800 men each and two battalions at 400. This would give a total strength of 4,800 men, as at present, but there would be 48 companies instead of the present 64. I would reduce the Pariah and Christian elements, and introduce Moplahs, Telugus, and possibly Nairs. Of the four service battalions, two should always be in field brigades and one on foreign service (Ceylon or Rangoon). Of the depôt battalions, two should be at the Mount, and one each at Trichinopoly and Cannanore. Of course, if

financial considerations permitted, I would fix the strength of the depôt battalions at 450 rather than 400, which was only adopted by me in obedience to orders.

Personally, in present circumstances, so far from introducing these depôt battalions, I would prefer to raise every battalion to a strength of 800 and I should like to raise a ninth battalion so as to complete three regimental groups of three battalions, as I am not satisfied that we have sufficient Madras troops.

The idea I have always held is that we have put too many eggs into one basket. It is politically unsound. If we had sufficient regiments of every class we should have a counterpoise, which as matters stand, we have not. Another thing, the constant disbanding of Madras regiments has had a very bad political effect. Some places in the Madras Presidency are full of old disappointed sepoys who are thoroughly discontented and who think the Government has treated them badly.

4313. SIR W. MEYER.—You would rather have eight separate battalions 800 strong?

4314. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

4315. SIR W. MEYER.—That means roughly 1,600 extra men. Supposing you cannot increase the strength of the native army as a whole, where would you find the 1,600 so as to make these up?

4316. SIR E. BARROW.—At the present moment we have battalion establishments of 912, 832 etc. I would reduce these to 900 and 800; I do not see any particular advantage in having the extra 12 and 32 men. It does not make much difference.

4317. SIR W. MEYER.—Then you would find them by reducing other regiments; preferably Sikh regiments?

4318. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, to the extent I have indicated.

4319. PRESIDENT.—Does the fact that the Carnatic regiments are not at present held to be fit for field service re-act on the *moral* of the British officers?

4320. SIR E. BARROW.—Naturally it does. There is a strong feeling of resentment and hopeless apathy among them.

4321. PRESIDENT.—Do they become apathetic on account of climate?

4322. SIR E. BARROW.—No, the main reason is that they know they have got a bad name; they are not proud of their service.

4323. SIR W. MEYER.—As a corollary, you would like to place a Carnatic regiment on the frontier?

4324. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, somewhere where they could get training.

4325. SIR W. MEYER.—It is said to be expensive to keep them outside Madras.

4326. SIR E. BARROW.—Then alter the rules. A Madras regiment need not be any more expensive than any other.

4327. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that it is a fair judgment to say that the Madrasi is deficient in fighting characteristics? If not, can you suggest from what source further recruitment could be made? Do you consider that the Moplah battalions, experimentally raised and condemned a few years ago, were fairly dealt with, or that Moplahs could be expediently recruited hereafter?

4328. SIR E. BARROW.—The Madras sepoy has not been given a fair chance. For more than half a century, contemptuous treatment, indifferent officers, weak establishments, and a bad system of recruiting have combined to give us bad or indifferent regiments.

The efficiency of the Madras Sappers and Pioneers under happier conditions shows what can be made of the Madrasi. The Moplahs were most unfairly and stupidly treated. So also the Telugus and Coorgs. I think a complete revision of our policy is necessary.

4329. PRESIDENT.—With reference to your first point. At the time of the Mutiny was a single Madras regiment used to suppress the Mutiny although they were loyal enough ?

4330. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, some were used ; Whitlock's column was composed entirely of them, I think.

4331. PRESIDENT.—But Madras regiments have sometimes been under sympathetic local Commanders-in-Chief. When Upper Burma was being pacified a large number of Madras units were sent there on field service, because it was considered fair that they should go. Did they do well ?

4332. SIR E. BARROW.—No, they did not ; but the Madras army was very badly recruited at that time. I have always held that they were badly recruited. They had their family system and the men who were recruited were line-boys, and everywhere else we notice that the line-boy deteriorates rapidly.

4333. SIR W. MEYER.—At that time the Madras army was largely manned by Telugus ?

4334. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, there was a very large element of Telugus of unsuitable classes. All classes are not unsuitable, but the classes we had were unsuitable. I have discussed this matter with a good many civil officers and I have been told that there are many good Telugus to be found in the back country.

4335. PRESIDENT.—It is a curious thing, because during all those years there were competent officers in command of the Madras army ?

4336. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, but I think the whole tone of the army had become slack. In the northern army there was always the stimulus of employment on the frontier. Down south they had comfortable stations.

4337. PRESIDENT.—What about the Moplahs ?

4338. SIR E. BARROW.—We went to work with the Moplahs in the wrong way. We raised two battalions straight away ; they had not been used before ; we had few officers who knew their language. We had no non-commissioned officers of their own class. We ought to have gone slowly and have enlisted, say, a double-company to start with. I think the introduction of Moplahs would be a good thing, but you must have the depôt in a place where there would be no difficulty of recruiting them.

A. 1318. 4339. SIR W. MEYER.—You propose to put them in regiments with other Madras Muhammadans ? Major Ottley told us that one of the reasons they were considered unsatisfactory was that they were located at Bangalore, which is a Muhammadan centre and there were rows. Would not that, to some extent, affect your proposal to put them with other Muhammadans ?

4340. SIR E. BARROW.—I have no doubt that at first the Madras Muhammadans would think they were being dispossessed but I see no reason why the proposal should not work under proper management.

A. 1310. 4341. PRESIDENT.—Major Ottley mentioned another thing. He said that owing to their head-dress being a fez they, on exposure to the sun, fell to the ground.

4342. SIR E. BARROW.—Then it was a mistake to give them a fez, though I cannot understand it because the Moplah goes about in his own country wearing a small cap, certainly not with a big puggree.

4343. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that the treatment that the previous Moplah battalions received would be likely to stand in the way of recruitment ?

4344. SIR E. BARROW.—I think you would have to take up the question very tactfully, probably through district officers. But if you began in a small way, and employed officers who speak the Malayalam language, you might make a good job of it.

4345. SIR W. MEYER.—Your 1911 proposals included the quartering of a battalion of Moplahs in Cannanore. The Madras Government were formerly very averse to the presence of Moplah soldiers in Malabar. Have you reason to suppose they have altered their opinion about this ?

4346. SIR E. BARROW.—I do not know about the Madras Government collectively, but I showed my 1911 proposals to the then Governor, Sir Arthur Lawley, and he took no objection. I think you must begin by locating a new class near their homes for a time.

4347. PRESIDENT.—It has been alleged that, in order to mobilize the British artillery units of the Field Army, it would be necessary to deplete the units allotted for internal defence by a third of their strength, thus rendering them inefficient for active purposes. Do you concur in this view, and, if so, do you consider this to be a satisfactory state of things, in view of the fact that we rely so much on artillery as against a possible revolt of native troops?

4348. SIR E. BARROW.—The situation would be most unsatisfactory if it were wholly true, but I am doubtful if it is so. Theoretically, there is no depletion of internal defence batteries on mobilization, but unfit men of the mobilized batteries are exchanged for fit men, which may temporarily inconvenience internal defence batteries. The same applies to horses.

Then again, doubtless the same process of exchange will continue during the operations, and there is no provision for a reserve of men to replace casualties, so that, on the whole, I think an increase in the establishments of internal defence batteries is desirable, but the increase in drivers may, I think, with financial advantage be made from native sources.

4349. SIR P. LAKE.—On page 23 of the General Staff Memorandum of 1911 it is calculated that a Royal Horse Artillery battery requires seven British personnel to mobilize it, therefore nine Field Army batteries will require 9×7 or 63 men from the two internal security batteries, or 32 men from each (the establishment of an internal defence battery being 152).

A Royal Field Artillery battery requires eleven men to mobilize it; therefore 33 Field Army batteries (excluding three howitzer batteries) will require 33×11 or 363 men. There are nine internal defence field batteries (148 strength); each would therefore have to provide 40 men.

As regards horses, the Remount Department have calculated that with the present organization (allowing 12 per cent. for unfits on mobilization, against 16 per cent. allowed by Lord Kitchener) there will be a deficiency of 1,310 horses on the mobilization of the Field Army batteries and ammunition columns. The artillery reserve of 500 horses, although only partly trained, would all be absorbed therefore, and the balance of 810 would have to be withdrawn from internal defence batteries, which would have 1,363 less 12 per cent. (164) that is, 1,199 horses wherewith to meet this call. These calculations have been worked out in communication with the Adjutant-General's Branch.

4350. SIR E. BARROW.—Well, my reply is based on a note I received from Brigadier-General S. C. U. Smith, Commanding Royal Artillery, Poona Division. He refers to Table I and paragraph 14 of the Field Service Manual for Horse and Field Artillery, and says that each Royal Horse Artillery battery sends four men to an internal defence battery; and each Royal Field Artillery brigade sends two men to the affiliated internal defence field battery. He adds that it is laid down, however, that any men of the Field Army batteries who are unfit for service are to be exchanged for fit men from the internal defence batteries. The result of this arrangement may make the internal defence batteries inefficient, more particularly the Field Artillery batteries as each of these has three Field Army batteries to feed.

As regards horses, he says none are taken from the Horse Artillery, but that each Field Artillery brigade takes seven horses from the affiliated internal defence battery to mount its brigade staff which does not exist in peace. As regards unfit horses, these, according to the Regulations, will be exchanged in the same way as the personnel.

A note to Table I of the Field Service Manual, states that on mobilization each battery of Royal Horse and Royal Field Artillery will convert four existing gunners into drivers; it would therefore appear that the best way to reduce the possible loss of efficiency in men would be to increase the establishment of drivers in each higher establishment battery by four. Such a course would avoid the above conversion and increase the number of men available for

transfer to replace unfits, and at the same time suffice to keep the internal defence batteries efficient.

An addition of seven horses to the strength of each Field Artillery brigade appears advisable, unless it is quite clear that these horses can be at once procured from remount establishments or elsewhere.

General Smith concludes by saying that in 1911 an amendment was issued to Army Tables for 18-pr. Q. F. batteries, increasing the number of ammunition wagons of internal defence field batteries from six to nine, with a footnote to the effect: 'Horses and personnel not provided for three of these.' If these are to be horsed, it would mean an addition of about two bombardiers, three gunners, nine drivers, and eighteen horses to each internal defence battery.

4351. PRESIDENT.—It seems clear that we should be in difficulties about horses, for of the horses that go into the field a number will die from various causes and these will need to be replaced.

4352. SIR E. BARROW.—That would seem to be the case; but if I were placed in that position, I should utilize bullocks for internal defence batteries. In the old days we used to have bullocks for drawing field guns. At the same time, I say we ought to increase our reserves.

4353. SIR W. MEYER.—What about drivers, are they largely native?

4354. SIR E. BARROW.—Not largely, but we have of late years increased the number of native drivers.

4355. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think that is safe?

4356. SIR E. BARROW.—The gunner will take care the driver does not run away.

4357. SIR W. MEYER.—Are the drivers for ammunition columns largely native?

4358. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

4359. SIR W. MEYER.—You do not think the proportion of natives is dangerous?

4360. SIR E. BARROW.—No, I think it could even be increased. Of course the native is cheaper and, for all but gun teams, he is good enough.

4361. PRESIDENT.—If you consider the present arrangements unsatisfactory, do you think that the difficulty could be met by reducing the number of artillery units assigned to the Field Army?

4362. SIR E. BARROW.—I do not think the number of artillery units assigned to the Field Army is excessive. Thirty guns to a division compares badly with the proportion allotted elsewhere, but I think it is sufficient for the normal conditions of Asiatic warfare.

4363. PRESIDENT.—Warfare against Asiatics anywhere?

4364. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

4365. PRESIDENT.—I have been informed that when Lord Kitchener's scheme went Home it was referred, amongst others, to Lord Roberts, whose criticism of it was to the effect that he thought the amount of cavalry and artillery was considerably more than could be fed in Afghanistan. His experience of the last Afghan war was that the greatest difficulty was experienced in feeding horses of cavalry and artillery, and for that reason and difficulties of movement, he took no field artillery with him from Kabul to Kandahar. The proportion of artillery taken to Afghanistan was very much smaller than the proportion now put down for operations across the frontier.

4366. SIR E. BARROW.—I agree, if we were only concerned with the tribes and the Afghans, but the Kitchener scheme was drawn up on the supposition that we should be opposed by the Russians.

4367. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider heavy batteries are of use across the frontier?

4368. SIR E. BARROW.—There are many other things which are much more useful; more mountain batteries for instance.

4369. SIR W. MEYER.—The paper Sir Percy Lake read from, (*vide* Q. 4349) shews that we have not got sufficient personnel to man both Field Army and internal defence artillery units. Would you say it was more important to have internal defence units adequately manned, or to send up more field units?

4370. SIR E. BARROW.—It depends on the enemy you have to face; if tribesmen, internal defence is probably more important. There are few places on the frontier where we have made roads that field artillery could be moved along.

4371. PRESIDENT.—Do you concur in the proposal that has been made to reduce three companies of Royal Garrison Artillery, and to add an equivalent strength of gunners and drivers to horse and field artillery units?

4372. SIR E. BARROW.—I have not seen these proposals, but if we raise six Eurasian militia companies, as I have suggested, then I think we might dispense with one or even two Royal Garrison Artillery companies. We must, in my opinion, keep six Royal Garrison Artillery companies for the Quetta and Attock Defences and for siege train.

4373. PRESIDENT.—Have you any knowledge of the character and efficiency of the armed police? Would you supply them with better weapons than those they now have, mostly bored-out Martinis?

4374. SIR E. BARROW.—I have no special knowledge, but I do not think we can rely entirely upon their loyalty and steadfastness in the maintenance of order. I would not supply them with better weapons. *Vis à vis* the civil population they are sufficiently well armed.

4375. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you remember that portion of Lord Kitchener's scheme which dealt with armed police; he contemplated concentrating bodies of them at district and other convenient centres?

4376. SIR E. BARROW.—I understand that at the present moment the civil authorities can always concentrate from 150 to 300 men at district headquarters.

4377. SIR W. MEYER.—But as a soldier, do you think they would be any value in scouring the country?

4378. SIR E. BARROW.—That is not their *métier*.

4379. PRESIDENT.—In present circumstances would you be in favour of reducing the peace strength of the army, by maintaining the existing cadres on a lower peace footing with adequate reserves? Could we work down to a peace establishment, of say, 712 per infantry battalion, (the figure in force before 1882), which should give an effective strength on mobilization, without reserves of nearly 600. Then have a first class reserve (the younger men) of 200 per battalion, at Rs. 4 per month, with two months' training every year, and a second class reserve of 300 at Rs. 2 per month and one month's training biennially; it being understood that the first class reserve would ordinarily be called up whenever the battalion was required for field service?

4380. SIR E. BARROW.—I am utterly opposed to reducing *units*, but if we must have reductions I am in favour of lower peace establishments with increased reserves. The 712 strength might do for Cis-Indus regiments, but for regiments on the frontier liable to be called out for active service at a moment's notice, it is insufficient. I speak from experience. In 1878 the Peshawar troops had to take the field in September during the furlough season, which synchronized with the sickly season. Not a single Indian unit could put more than 400 men into the field, while exclusive of recruits I do not suppose there were 50 able-bodied men left in the lines of a regiment for absolutely necessary duties such as guards. My own regiment went out with about 280 men. Recruits were put

on guard. With a vivid recollection of that experience, I think all regiments across the Indus should have an establishment of 900 men. They could then make sure of taking the field with from 500 to 600 men, which is sufficient for a sudden emergency. If units were really linked as battalions of a regiment, as in the British army, I consider that, with a group or regiment of three battalions we might have an establishment of 2,400 men with the colours, and 1,000 or 1,200 reservists, the 2,400 being allotted as follows:—

(a) Battalions across the Indus, battalions on foreign service, Pioneers and two battalion regiments, such as Gurkhas, etc. 900 native ranks.

(b) Battalions allotted to the Field Army, Cis-Indus 800 „

(c) Battalions allotted to internal defence! ... 700 „

If no battalions of a link were included in (a), all three battalions might be at the 900 establishment. Then as regards reserves, I would, as suggested, have two classes, namely, a first reserve available for all emergencies, and a second reserve for general mobilization only. It might be suggested that a large increase of reserves constitutes a political danger. I hold the contrary opinion. Scattered reserves, without arms and without cohesion, must obviously be less of a danger than armed sepoys in regiments, while men who receive pay as reservists are, from mercenary motives, less likely to join in civil disturbances, than soldiers who have cut their names.

4381. SIR P. LAKE.—If you had a larger number of reserves, would you make them train with their own regiments?

4382. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, I attach importance to that.

4383. SIR W. MEYER.—Then you would qualify your previous answer about the Carnatic battalions since you now suggest that if a reserve system were adopted, a battalion that was not detailed for the Field Army might be reduced to an establishment of 700 instead of 800?

4384. SIR E. BARROW.—Certainly. That was the underlying idea.

4385. PRESIDENT.—For simplicity you would perhaps prefer to have all battalions at 800?

4386. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, but I do not think it is possible because of trans-frontier needs. You must have some at 900, and to get that others must be reduced to 700.

4387. SIR W. MEYER.—Having regard to the fact that a considerable time must elapse before the whole of the Field Army could be mobilized, is it necessary to have your non-frontier battalions up to 800; could they not be strengthened by reserves sufficiently quickly?

4388. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, but take the case of the 6th Division or the 9th Division; you might get a telegram to say a force is required to go to southern Persia or to China without delay. If they were at the 700 strength and the demand came in the furlough season the difficulty of completing to service strength would be enhanced.

4389. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing a division is ordered to southern Persia, how long would it take to collect shipping and transport?

4390. SIR E. BARROW.—It would take several weeks.

4391. SIR W. MEYER.—In that time could not your reserves have been called up?

4392. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes. I should hope so.

4393. PRESIDENT.—In some cases, however, as, for instance, in the event of sudden trouble in the Khyber, it might be necessary to send battalions into the field without waiting for the reserves; in that case would you send a battalion as it stood, or would you meet the contingency by keeping certain regiments on the frontier at higher peace establishments?

4394. SIR E. BARROW.—I think regiments on the frontier should be at 900 strength. If so, even allowing for sick and furlough men, such units are sufficiently strong to take the field at once. They can be completed to war strength in a few weeks by the return of furlough men and, if necessary, by reservists.

4395. PRESIDENT.—Do you anticipate serious difficulties in regard to such a reserve scheme in the case of Gurkhas and Pathans?

4396. SIR E. BARROW.—I presume there would be difficulties with the Nepal Darbar in connexion with Gurkhas, but I do not think there would be any difficulties with Pathans except in the case of a war with Islam.

4397. SIR W. MEYER.—Even apart from an Islamic war, Pathan reservists would in the case of hostilities with their tribesmen naturally be on the enemy's side instead of on ours?

4398. SIR E. BARROW.—Exactly so, as in 1897.

4399. SIR W. MEYER.—That is a thing we must risk?

4400. SIR E. BARROW.—You have got to take these risks.

4401. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that there would be difficulties in the calling up of reservists by reason of battalions serving far away from their recruiting grounds?

4402. SIR E. BARROW.—None under a proper and suitable organization.

4403. SIR W. MEYER.—And at present?

4404. SIR E. BARROW.—There are some difficulties at present. I hold greatly to a system of having properly linked regiments; for one thing, in arranging your reliefs you should try and have one battalion on what one might term foreign service, and a due proportion near their homes.

4405. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that it is feasible to reduce the peace establishment of Indian cavalry regiments, or the Indian artillery units, and have a larger reserve?

4406. SIR E. BARROW.—Feasible, but inadvisable. Cavalry and artillery reservists are more liable to deterioration as such than are infantry; at the same time I should like to see larger reserves.

4407. SIR W. MEYER.—It has been suggested that the horse difficulty in the case of cavalry might be obviated by giving reservists a small retaining fee for keeping up their horses.

4408. SIR E. BARROW.—You might do something in that way.

4409. PRESIDENT.—Could the nineteen service companies of Sappers and Miners have their peace establishment reduced from 151 sappers to 121, with a first class reserve of 30 and a second class reserve of 45?

4410. SIR E. BARROW.—Not without loss of efficiency. The Sappers are required in the forefront of an advance, and the reserves would necessarily be a bit rusty. There would be no time to rub up their training, while, as to recruits a sapper takes two years to train. We want both full establishments and large reserves.

4411. SIR W. MEYER.—Then you would keep Sapper companies at their present peace strength and increase their reserves?

4412. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

4413. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider that in the event of war there would be difficulty in getting recruits?

4414. SIR E. BARROW.—That would depend on the nature of the war and the internal condition of India at the time.

4415. PRESIDENT.—Take a war with China.

4416. SIR E. BARROW.—I think a war with China would be very popular, because the last was so well conducted.

4417. SIR W. MEYER.—Afghanistan?

4418. SIR E. BARROW.—Well, our experience was that we could not get men readily during the Afghan war of 1878-80.

4419. SIR W. MEYER.—Russia?

4420. SIR E. BARROW.—I am unable to say. I think the whole country would be with us in a war with Russia. But whether Indians would be prepared to risk their skins I am unable to say.

4421. SIR W. MEYER.—As regards the possible raising of yeomanry in small bodies; in an Islamic war would you trust the Sikh gentry to raise yeomanry corps?

4422. SIR E. BARROW.—They might try, but I am sceptical about these Sikh gentlemen having the power. I had to raise a regiment some years ago and commissions were offered to such as could bring recruits. Every *rais* in the Punjab wrote to me and asked for commissions, stating that they could bring recruits. I held a sort of *darbar* and said "You have all promised me so many men, and so it is obvious I can raise so many thousand men. But I can only give you a few commissions and I will give four commissions to the four who will bring me the required number of good men in the shortest time." Well, not one of them ever could produce more than about six men. One old fellow who had a great reputation brought me a hundred men, but they were all scallywags and I never took a single man from him.

4423. SIR W. MEYER.—Then you think the scheme would not work because you would not be able to get enough efficient men?

4424. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

4425. PRESIDENT.—Lord Kitchener's scheme ultimately provided for twelve British officers for each native cavalry regiment and infantry battalion taking the field, and ten for internal defence units; and, allowing for other requirements, this apparently necessitated a peace establishment of fourteen officers per unit. Do you agree with the opinion expressed by the General Staff in 1911, that this allowance was too high and calculated to stifle the responsibilities of the native officers? If so, would you accept the proposals of the General Staff, which allow ten officers per unit in the Field Army, ten for some and seven for others of the remaining units, with some for depôts of units on field service, leading up in all (after providing an allowance of seven per cent. for sick and an addition for first casualties) to a peace establishment of twelve officers for most units, and a total reduction of 312 officers? Or would you go further in the way of a reduction?

4426. SIR E. BARROW.—I agree with the General Staff that the establishment of British officers per unit is now too high. My Committee of January 1911 particularly urged this point of view. With reference to war establishments, I would generally accept the views and proposals of the General Staff; but as regards the battalions for internal defence, I should prefer to have eight officers with each of these, as their duties will be very heavy, and the officers with these battalions will be practically the only reserve on which the Field Army can ultimately draw. My Committee contemplated an establishment of thirteen officers per unit in peace, and a reserve establishment, equivalent to one officer. I am against reducing the total establishment, counting therein the reserve. As regards the cavalry, I think that each regiment on service should have eleven officers on account of the many detached duties of cavalry, such as those connected with reconnaissance, but I should be content with ten officers for infantry units.

I make a distinction between cavalry and infantry because of the difference between their duties. You want one or two dashing young officers for officers' patrols, etc.

4427. SIR W. MEYER.—You would prefer thirteen officers in peace for each cavalry regiment?

4428. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

4429. SIR W. MEYER.—Then as regards the preponderance of British officers stifling the energies of the native officers ?

4430. SIR E. BARROW.—Well, if you have native officers in command of companies, you must raise them to a certain standard of efficiency. We should take every reasonable step to make them efficient company or troop commanders.

4431. SIR W. MEYER.—You will remember that the Johnson Committee said that if there are too many British officers with Indian units, they would interfere with one another rather than with the Indian officers ?

4432. SIR E. BARROW.—If you have more than a certain number they do interfere with the native officers ; I mean to say that, if you have fourteen officers all present in the cold weather, which is the idea underlying the short leave system, they *do* jostle each other and interfere with the duties of native officers to a large extent.

4433. PRESIDENT.—The General Staff war complement provided for a quartermaster and a transport officer. Might one officer discharge both duties with the aid of a native officer ?

4434. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, provided we had a native officer added to the present establishment.

4435. PRESIDENT.—The General Staff scheme proposes a reserve of 900 officers to be utilized in the event of serious war. Do you consider this number necessary ?

4436. SIR E. BARROW.—Without official figures to refer to, it is impossible for me to give a definite reply, but on a nine division basis, I understand that, allowing for 7 per cent. sick and one year's wastage at 25 per cent., the Supply and Transport Corps alone will require 345 extra officers. Similarly, regiments will require about 300 extra officers to meet wastage, etc. There are also the internal defence requirements to consider, so I presume the estimate may be accepted.

4437. PRESIDENT.—You presided over a Committee in 1911 which dealt *inter alia* with the question of establishing a reserve of officers. What were the main features of your proposals ?

4438. SIR E. BARROW.—My Committee was primarily concerned with relieving the block in the promotion of officers of the Indian army, not with the formation of a reserve. That was only incidental to the main question.

4439. PRESIDENT.—Is there at present any block of promotion ?

4440. SIR E. BARROW.—At the present moment you cannot say there is, because most officers get command of their regiments when they have between twenty-five and twenty-seven years' service. But there must be a block in a very short time. The block will become very serious about 1925. This is due to the fact that a large number of officers were introduced into the army between the years 1903-04.

4441. PRESIDENT.—This introduction of officers took no regard of the future. You are probably aware that in the British service measures are taken to regulate promotion in such a way that officers have a reasonable prospect of arriving at commands of their regiments in a reasonable time, by means of fixing limits of age in the case of captains, majors and lieutenant colonels, on attaining which they must retire. That means, and it was calculated by actuarial methods, that officers are not too old for their positions. Is such a system inapplicable to the India army ?

4442. SIR E. BARROW.—I do not think you could with justice apply it to officers now in the service.

4443. PRESIDENT.—But it might be a remedy for the future ?

4444. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, the Government can lay down what it likes for the future. They have only to consider supply and demand.

4445. PRESIDENT.—Do you think things could be alleviated by strict adherence to the rule of tenure of commands, that is to say, instead of extending the tenure of Commanding Officers as is now permissible? Would not that relieve the congestion?

4446. SIR E. BARROW.—Undoubtedly; I would go further, we might equitably reduce the term to four years.

4447. PRESIDENT.—Then another thing that has been done of late is that when an officer has been selected for promotion to the rank of substantive colonel, the very essence of which implies removal from his corps, it has been the custom to retain him as a supernumerary to his unit and, when he has completed his tenure of higher appointment, to revert him to his corps as second-in-command or commandant.

4448. SIR E. BARROW.—I was not aware that he was eligible.

4449. PRESIDENT.—Nevertheless it is the case. Do you consider that detrimental to the interests of officers as a whole?

4450. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

4451. PRESIDENT.—You think an officer should take the rough with the smooth?

4452. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, I do.

*Not reproduced.

4453. PRESIDENT.—Either in your Committee's report* or in that of the Johnson Committee, it is stated that an officer of the Indian army has a vested interest to serve on until he attains the maximum pension. Is that not an entirely erroneous statement?

4454. SIR E. BARROW.—There is no definite charter, but it is generally understood that officers entering the Indian service have the right to remain until they have earned the full pension.

4455. SIR W. MEYER.—An officer of the Indian army has to retire at the age of about fifty?

4456. SIR E. BARROW.—Not necessarily; those who entered the service before 1881 need not retire until they have completed thirty-eight years' service.

4457. SIR W. MEYER.—There is a rule under which an officer may go on a pension of £700 after completing thirty-two years' service?

4458. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, but he may serve on for the higher pension.

4459. SIR W. MEYER.—But as things at present stand, there is no inducement for him to stay on unless he has definite prospects of rising to a higher post than a regimental command?

4460. SIR E. BARROW.—That is so.

4461. SIR W. MEYER.—The Johnson Committee held that there would be no block to complain of if a man obtained command of his regiment at twenty-eight years' service. Do you agree with that as a general proposition?

4462. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

4463. SIR W. MEYER.—The Committee also held that in that case there would not be any block until the men whose first commissions date from 1900 come up.

4464. SIR E. BARROW.—I should put the Commencement of the block at 1925-26, which is much the same thing.

4465. SIR W. MEYER.—Anyhow, the proposition above referred to implies that since a man becomes a lieutenant-colonel at 26 years' service, there must

be a certain number of lieutenant colonels as seconds-in-command. Do you see any harm in that?

4466. SIR E. BARROW.—No. Provided the number is limited.

4467. SIR W. MEYER.—You estimate that a general block will supervene about 1926. In the meantime there might be a great war?

4468. SIR E. BARROW.—There might be.

4469. SIR W. MEYER.—According to the calculations of the General Staff eighty per cent. of officers will disappear in the first year of a war?

4470. SIR E. BARROW.—But I do not agree with those calculations, they are based on the statistics of very bloody European wars. In our smaller affairs we should have nothing like those losses.

4471. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing a Pan-Islamic war, what would you roughly put wastage at?

4472. SIR E. BARROW.—That is a very sudden question and I am not prepared to answer it off the reel.

4473. SIR W. MEYER.—Referring to your proposals that commandants of units should be called on to vacate their posts after four years, that all regimental officers holding the post of second-in-command should be struck off on attaining the age of 48; and that cavalry commandants should vacate at 50 instead of 52 years of age, do you think these measures would be regarded as grievances?

4474. SIR E. BARROW.—No, taken as a whole, I do not think they would because the officers realize that the block is so great that as matters stand, many of them can never attain to command. If you polled the officers, you would, I think, find a great many in favour of these proposals.

4475. SIR W. MEYER.—As a corollary to these proposals, supposing you get an officer otherwise fit who, on getting command, can only hold it for two years or so, would you say to him "It is your bad fortune and we cannot put you in; we must put in a man who can serve the full term or nearer it"?

4476. SIR E. BARROW.—No, I would not do that; it would not be just. There may be disadvantages, but I think it would be better to give him the promotion. As a matter of fact, a number get command now and only hold it for short periods.

4477. SIR W. MEYER.—In view of your proposal that a cavalry Commanding Officer should vacate at 50, would it not be a logical corollary that a cavalry second-in-command should go at the age of forty-eight?

4478. SIR E. BARROW.—It would be quite logical, and I would agree to such a proposal. I do not know how the point was overlooked by me.

4479. SIR W. MEYER.—Then you proposed to retire unemployed substantive colonels at the age of fifty-five. What is the present state of things?

4480. SIR E. BARROW.—They can go at fifty-seven.

4481. SIR W. MEYER.—Then you desire that when a man has been Colonel on the Staff and subsequently becomes Brigade Commander, his total tenure should not exceed six years?

(Sir E. Barrow here proposed to alter the wording of one of the recommendations of the Barrow Committee which the Secretary noted.)

4482. SIR W. MEYER.—Then you propose, that officers entering the Indian army in future should not get a higher pension than £550 per annum, etc.

The Johnson committee disagreed with that; do you still hold to your view?

4483. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, I do not think an officer who has not been selected for the Command of a regiment or its equivalent is worth more.

4484. SIR W. MEYER.—In your report you condemn ‘incremental’ pensions ; you think they induce men to stay on ?

4485. SIR E. BARROW.—It results, I know, in officers pressing to stay on in order to get a slight increase.

4486. SIR W. MEYER.—On the other hand, if there was a great difference in the increments they would go ?

4487. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

4488. SIR W. MEYER.—Of late years they have introduced a somewhat similar system of incremental pensions in the native army for native officers ?

4489. SIR E. BARROW.—I am not so much against that ; I do not think the influence brought to bear to allow native officers to serve on for higher rates is so strong as in the case of British officers. Of course there are weak Commanding Officers who would do anything.

4490. SIR W. MEYER.—Then you propose that the ranks of captain and major, in the case of new entrants, should be attained after ten and nineteen years’ service, instead of after nine and eighteen as now ; that will create discontent will it not ?

4491. SIR E. BARROW.—The attractions of the Indian army will still be infinitely greater than those of the British army.

4492. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you go further, and increase the term of service for lieutenant colonel ?

4493. SIR E. BARROW.—No, I would not, because I do not want old lieutenant colonels. Retardation would also affect senior officers more seriously than juniors in the matter of pay. It would be less hurtful to make a cut at the junior ranks than it would in the case of seniors.

4494. PRESIDENT.—It would be good to calculate averages so as to fix the new periods ?

4495. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

4496. SIR W. MEYER.—Taking your proposal for retardation in the case of captains and majors, it would save the Government a certain amount, but as regards military efficiency, it would not affect the matter one way or another ?

4497. SIR E. BARROW.—No

4498. SIR W. MEYER.—Was it your idea to relieve the block by getting rid of a certain number of officers ?

4499. SIR E. BARROW.—Primarily it was to get rid of useless officers.

4500. SIR W. MEYER.—Assuming that the block is not going to come for some years, would you still try to get rid of people by offering inducements ?

4501. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, because I think it is a great advantage to get rid of useless officers.

4502. SIR W. MEYER.—Under the terms you suggest you would practically be paying out money to officers without any *quid pro quo* to the State ?

4503. SIR E. BARROW.—Well, if you do not do that the chances are that they will hang on for the first pension of £200 a year. So the State loses financially.

The Committee then adjourned,

21st Meeting—Wednesday, the 17th July 1912.

General Sir Edmund Barrow, G.C.B., A.D.C., Gen. Commanding Southern Army, again attended and the Committee continued his examination.

4504. **SIR W. MEYER.**—Now take the Johnson Committee, page 17, recommendation (vii)—there it is stated that each branch of the service should be represented by a fixed minimum number of officers on the General Officers' and substantive colonels' lists; do you agree with that?

4505. **SIR E. BARROW.**—I am doubtful about the wisdom of that, because we want promotion to be by merit, and if there are more officers of one arm or the other who ought to be promoted, I do not think we ought to stick rigidly to a fixed proportion by arms.

4506. **SIR W. MEYER.**—Then in recommendation (x) it is said "so far as is compatible with efficiency, the number of junior staff appointments held by Indian army officers should be decreased and replaced by an equivalent number of senior staff appointments (Rs. 700 per mensem)." And they argue that that will result in economy, in spite of the higher staff pay, because the junior officer has to be replaced in his regiment, while the senior has not.

4507. **SIR E. BARROW.**—There might be truth in that, but I would like to remark that I think it is an advantage having a proportion of junior officers in staff employment, because they learn their work when young and are consequently better staff officers when they arrive at a higher position.

4508. **SIR W. MEYER.**—Then take recommendation (xiv); "Cavalry officers, on appointment as Brigadiers, should ordinarily be posted to cavalry brigades, being transferred to mixed brigades when younger cavalry Brigadiers become available." Would not that lead to constant changes in command?

4509. **SIR E. BARROW.**—You want young cavalry Brigadiers, but I do not consider that this proposal is quite workable, for the reason, that, if you get a young officer as cavalry Brigadier and then transfer him to a mixed brigade, he thereby cuts out a senior officer.

4510. **SIR W. MEYER.**—The real remedy is to pass over seniors if they are thought too old to command a cavalry brigade efficiently?

4511. **SIR E. BARROW.**—To pass over seniors who are not good enough.

4512. **SIR W. MEYER.**—Then in recommendation (xx) at the top of page 18, they say that the policy of recruiting University candidates should be reconsidered; do you agree with that?

4513. **SIR E. BARROW.**—No, I do not; my opinion is that these men, as a rule, are better than those we get from Sandhurst. They are better educated and have a wider outlook.

4514. **PRESIDENT.**—Are not by far the greater number of officers obtained from the Unattached List?

4515. **SIR W. MEYER.**—Yes.

4516. **SIR W. MEYER.**—Might I put it this way, that, so far from agreeing with this proposition, you would like to recruit more University candidates?

4517. **SIR E. BARROW.**—Yes.

4518. **SIR W. MEYER.**—Then, in recommendation (xxi), it is stated that no officer should be permitted to exchange into the Indian army who is more than two years older or more than two years senior to the officer with whom he exchanges.

4519. **SIR E. BARROW.**—I agree with that.

4520. SIR W. MEYER.—In recommendation (xxii) it is suggested that the finding of employment for a proportionate number of officers of lieutenant-colonel's rank by civil administrations would benefit the service; do you agree with that?

4521. SIR E. BARROW.—I do not see how it is possible in most cases.

4522. PRESIDENT.—Is it not the case that these appointments under civil administrations are under the present system rather a burden on the army? Take the case of Burma; the local Government employ a certain number of subalterns and captains; would it not be quite compatible with the efficiency of the military police if they took a due proportion of majors and lieutenant-colonels?

4523. SIR E. BARROW.—I have already recommended that as a special case to the Commander-in-Chief, but I do not think the system suggested by the Committee should be accepted as a general rule. Let the senior officers be employed if opportunity arises.

4524. SIR W. MEYER.—In recommendation (xxxii) the terms which should be offered to officers to induce them to accept transfer to the Special Reserve are indicated. Have you anything to say about these?

4525. SIR E. BARROW.—I do not altogether agree with these terms, though I have no very great objections to them. I would only remark that the class of officers we want to catch are *young* officers, more particularly captains and to a certain extent majors; we do not want elderly officers, and I think the terms suggested might rather act as an encouragement to senior majors to go to the reserve.

4526. SIR W. MEYER.—You would reduce the term to fifteen years' service?

4527. SIR E. BARROW.—I prefer the conditions that my Committee laid down, except as regards the emoluments the reserve officers would receive; I am quite agreeable to their getting the full pension they would have got had they remained with their regiments for their reserve period.

4528. PRESIDENT.—What reserve would these officers be attached to?

4529. SIR E. BARROW.—Special Reserve or Territorials.

4530. PRESIDENT.—What training would they get in the Territorials?

4531. SIR E. BARROW.—They would go out for eight days a year if with the Territorials.

4532. PRESIDENT.—Commanding Officers of Territorials might take exception to the scheme because the nomination of officers rests with them.

4533. SIR E. BARROW.—In the Johnson's and my Committee's reports it is assumed that there will be no difficulty in putting officers into Special Reserve battalions compulsorily. They could be supplementary to the establishment of course, at the cost of the Indian Government.

4534. PRESIDENT.—But as a matter of fact we have never found it an easy matter to put regular officers into these Special Reserve battalions.

4535. SIR E. BARROW.—But why should not an officer of the Indian army be attached for training?

4536. PRESIDENT.—Yes, there would be no great objection to that. But would it not be better to attach him to a regular battalion?

4537. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, but I thought the Home Government would like to get trained officers for the auxiliary units.

4538. SIR W. MEYER.—It has been suggested that one possible way of getting rid of a block of promotion in the Indian army would be to induce the Home Government to take over a few officers for British battalions. While so serving these officers would receive British rates of pay. I asked my informant why he supposed the Indian army officer would agree to that sort of thing. He

said some might because they would still get the Indian rates of pension. Do you think the suggestion at all a possible one?

4539. SIR E. BARROW.—No, I do not, because it would not be sufficiently attractive.

4540. PRESIDENT.—One more question about the block. You are aware that in Lord Kitchener's time he introduced a rule that although promotion in the Indian army is dependent on length of service, if a junior officer were selected for command of a regiment, he was thereupon to be promoted to the substantive rank of lieutenant colonel. Do you consider that this had the effect of increasing the block of promotion?

4541. SIR E. BARROW.—I do not quite see how it would increase it.

4542. PRESIDENT.—A block means that you have an excessive number of lieutenant colonels and of officers of higher rank for whom no appointments are available; if you take junior officers in addition to those who automatically attain higher rank, you cause a block. Do you think the system was equitable?

4543. SIR E. BARROW.—No, I think it caused a great deal of heart-burning and that altogether it is not conducive to the interests of the service.

4544. SIR W. MEYER.—Are you of opinion that this system should now cease?

4545. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes; I should give only temporary rank in such cases.

4546. PRESIDENT.—An alternative scheme for creating a reserve of officers was proposed by the General Staff in 1911, under which 200 officers would be induced to retire early by the grant of a reserve allowance *plus* a proportionate pension, and the balance would be drawn from planters and other Europeans in civil employ who would receive a retaining fee of Rs. 100 per month. Another scheme proposed the grant to certain officers, after reaching the rank of captain, of £200 per year, in return for which they would join a special reserve and be liable to be called upon for service up to fifty years of age. They would reside in England and receive periodical training with Home troops. What is your opinion of these schemes as compared with your own?

4547. SIR E. BARROW.—The General Staff Scheme embraced two proposals *viz.* :—

(a) Officers of from 18 to 24 years' service to go to the reserve on their earned pensions, *plus* £100 or £50 a year reserve pay, and to retire on £365 at 24 years' service, that is to say, they were to get from £300 to £350 a year whilst in the Reserve.

(b) Planters, business men, etc., of from 20 to 35 years of age to receive a retaining fee of Rs. 100 per mensem. The General Staff hoped to obtain 700 men of this class.

As regards (a), I prefer my scheme, as it aimed at getting young captains, the class we want for regimental duty, whereas this scheme only gives majors.

As regards (b), I would refer the Committee to the report of the "Indian Reserve of Officers Committee, 1888," and the notes in the Military Department leading up thereto. I am in favour of such a scheme, provided the officers are lieutenants only whilst in the Reserve, and on this point I would invite attention to my note of dissent in the Proceedings of the Committee of 1888. The Committee of 1888 proposed having captains and majors in the Reserve; I dissented. I said it would cause great heart-burning in the Indian army, if these planters came in over the heads of officers who had been training the whole time. The alternative scheme suggested by the General Staff, that *namely*, of giving £200 a year to captains up to 50 years of age is, I consider, a bad variant to my scheme. It is not as attractive financially, and, moreover, we do not want elderly officers in the Reserve.

4548. SIR W. MEYER.—But you told us just now that your proposals were subsidiary to the block, and that if you had been called upon to submit something in the way of a scheme for the formation of a reserve you would have made separate proposals? You do not believe in getting men from outside?

4549. SIR E. BARROW.—I do, but as subalterns.

4550. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think many would join the reserve?

4551. SIR E. BARROW.—No, I do not; the planting communities or companies would often not allow their people to join.

4552. SIR W. MEYER.—It practically comes to this that you cannot get a large reserve in India?

4553. SIR E. BARROW.—No, you could get a certain number, but not enough to fill casualties in a great war.

4554. PRESIDENT.—It is conceivable that in the event of serious national emergency, British battalions in this country might promote two non-commissioned officers to take the places of two subalterns acquainted with Hindustani whose services might be placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief for employment with the Indian army. By that means you would get 104 subalterns, that is, two from each of the fifty-two battalions of British infantry in India. That would be a sacrifice on the part of the British army to meet the requirements of the Indian army and it would be a material assistance?

4555. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

4556. SIR W. MEYER.—Then it has been suggested that a certain number of officers coming out in civil employ have been in the Reserve of Officers at Home, and that we might get some of them if civil duties permitted?

4557. SIR E. BARROW.—I think the Committee of 1888 took that view also. You could spare officers from the Forest, say, or the Public Works, Department?

4558. PRESIDENT.—Is it a fact that owing to the increased number of British officers with native regiments, officers are granted leave most liberally; that an officer might, for instance, spend eight months of every year on leave (two months on full pay and six months on furlough pay) as against four months of regimental duty. Do you consider such a method desirable or economical?

4559. SIR E. BARROW.—The state of things is as described. I have known of instances of officers going Home every year. This is hardly desirable from the point of view of efficiency, but of course it does involve a small economy to the State, provided the full proportion of officers allowed leave take it.

4560. SIR W. MEYER.—The State no doubt gains a little in rupees, but does it not lose by decreased efficiency?

4561. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, I am not in favour of officers going on leave to such an extent.

4562. SIR W. MEYER.—If you look at recommendation (xxvi) of the Johnson Committee you will see that they suggest the removal of the present restrictions on combined leave. Would that leave things rather worse than before?

4563. SIR E. BARROW.—No, because at present officers are practically restricted to taking leave in the non-training season; one of the objections to a large establishment of officers in the Indian army is that they are supposed to interfere with native officers and under the present rules there are more British officers present during the drill season than at any other time. Under the proposed rule the leave would be distributed over the whole year.

4564. SIR W. MEYER.—In civil departments a man can only have so much leave by so much actual service. Would you apply a similar system in the army?

4565. SIR E. BARROW.—It would be feasible, but I am not sure that it would be a good thing.

4566. SIR W. MEYER.—Look at recommendation (xxviii), of the Johnson Committee about facilities to attend courses of instruction during the period of leave at Home.

4567. SIR E. BARROW.—I am in favour of that.

4568. PRESIDENT.—Might it be possible to obtain some of the war reserve required for native regiments by the grant of commissions to British non-commissioned officers; one way of doing this being to promote a non-commissioned officer in his British regiment and to detach a British officer therefrom with some knowledge of Hindustani to native troops?

4569. SIR E. BARROW.—I doubt whether this proposal would help us much, as British regiments would be chary of letting experienced officers go, and the 'griffin' would be of little use. Of course, officers could be transferred by order.

4570. PRESIDENT.—We should order and not ask them. Do you consider the present system of recruiting officers for the Indian army with reference simply to the estimated requirements of each year, satisfactory? Does it tend sometimes to a congestion of promotion, and at others to a deficiency of senior officers? Would it be better to regulate recruitments by average requirements on an actuarial basis?

4571. SIR E. BARROW.—I think it would certainly be better to work on average requirements. Of course we should have to get the assistance of the India Office.

4572. SIR W. MEYER.—In the Indian Civil Service we have such a system.

4573. PRESIDENT.—Surely it would be desirable to have an actuary in the Army Department?

4574. SIR E. BARROW.—We could always telegraph Home to the Secretary of State and ask what would be the actuarial results of such and such a proposal.

4575. SIR W. MEYER.—But it might be better to have a man attached to the Government of India, available for service in any department?

4576. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, undoubtedly, if you can afford the luxury.

4577. PRESIDENT.—What advantage is there in the system by which officers of the Indian army ordinarily attain promotion up to the rank of lieutenant colonel automatically by the efflux of time?

4578. SIR E. BARROW.—I think this system is largely responsible for the popularity of the Indian army and the contentment of its officers. I do not say it is the best system, but I would leave well alone.

4579. SIR W. MEYER.—Does it put a premium on mediocrity?

4580. SIR E. BARROW.—It does, but, on the other hand, if you have a system of promotion by selection it opens the door to nepotism.

4581. SIR W. MEYER.—The Johnson Committee also observed that in certain civil departments the time system was being introduced. But there was a corollary; in such departments the top appointments are always to be filled by selection.

4582. SIR E. BARROW.—The same thing applies to the army.

4583. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you say then that if you have a time system, you ought to be very strict about keeping back people who are not fit?

4584. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

4585. SIR W. MEYER.—A man might pass all sorts of examinations and yet be quite unfit to handle men?

4586. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

4587. SIR W. MEYER.—As a matter of fact, have any number of lieutenants been debarred promotion to captain as being unfit, according to the rule in Army Regulations, India, Volume II, 318-B.?

4588. SIR E. BARROW.—I should say it was very rare. It only comes in really when you get to the post of second-in-command.

4589. SIR W. MEYER.—So that as regards juniors, it is merely theoretical?

4590. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

4591. PRESIDENT.—Then you would be inclined to enforce the regulation more strictly?

4592. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, I would like its application to be more stringent.

4593. PRESIDENT.—Might such services as (i) Supply and Transport (ii) Ordnance, and (iii) Army Clothing, be made largely civil in character?

4594. SIR E. BARROW.—As to (i), I am opposed to proposals of this nature, especially as we do not usually make war in civilized countries. As to (ii) and (iii), I have no objection to offer, but I would suggest that (ii) is too technical to be made a civil department in this country.

4595. SIR W. MEYER.—As regards the Ordnance, we would have to get men out from Home?

4596. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

4597. PRESIDENT.—Would you consider it possible to substitute civil for military subordinates in the Military Works Services?

4598. SIR E. BARROW.—It might be possible, but not always advisable.

4599. PRESIDENT.—You perhaps remember the correspondence about the formation of the Military Works Services, and that one of the reasons advanced by Sir George Chesney against the employment of natives was that if you had native subordinates who had continually to go in and out of barracks the British troops would treat them with scant respect, and that therefore it was decided to make the subordinate appointments more military in character?

4600. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

4601. PRESIDENT.—Could pensioners be substituted for effective soldiers in the Barrack Department?

4602. SIR E. BARROW.—Certainly, but they would be more liable to come under corrupt influences.

4603. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that expenditure on reliefs might be curtailed by keeping units for longer periods at the same stations or by other means?

4604. SIR E. BARROW.—Doubtless expenditure under this heading could be curtailed, but the travelling expenses of furlough men in regiments far from their homes would be increased. The great objection to the proposal is, to my mind, the political one. Men kept too long in unpopular stations become discontented. Moreover, if Indian regiments are stationary they become too much identified with the civil population, and the more accessible to the agitator.

4605. SIR W. MEYER.—You rather favour a system of strictly linked battalions, the men of which would be transferable from one battalion of the link to another?

4606. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

4607. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing that system prevailed, you could keep a unit as it stood, but move the men?

4608. SIR E. BARROW.—I am in favour of always having one battalion of a group within its recruiting area.

4609. PRESIDENT.—But would you be in favour of large transfers within linked battalions?

4610. SIR E. BARROW.—No, I am not in favour of such a system; but we ought to be able to transfer men for our own purposes if considered necessary.

4611. SIR W. MEYER.—You would move a battalion as a whole?

4612. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

4613. SIR W. MEYER.—General Aylmer spoke about the leave rules of native troops; they are very liberal? A. 2816.

4614. SIR E. BARROW.—Quite liberal.

4615. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think they could be reduced?

4616. SIR E. BARROW.—No, it would be difficult.

4617. SIR W. MEYER.—He said he would cut down furlough.

4618. SIR E. BARROW.—I think it would cause great dissatisfaction.

4619. PRESIDENT.—How has the policy of posting regiments to provinces distant from their recruiting areas answered?

4620. SIR E. BARROW.—As a general policy I hesitate to give an opinion but in particular cases it is advantageous; take, for example, the moves of the 10th Jats to Hyderabad, or of a Sikh regiment to Quetta, or a Pathan regiment to Calcutta—cases where a corps was supposed to be disaffected. To place up-country regiments at Secunderabad and Bangalore is not a satisfactory arrangement. They are too far from their homes and it adds to the expense of leave and furlough, for every man travels at the public expense in these cases.

4621. SIR W. MEYER.—Apart from moves considered desirable for special reasons, would you be against sending regiments too far from their centres?

4622. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, as a general rule they ought to be within reasonable distance. But, for special reasons, I should like a Carnatic battalion, for instance, at Dera Ismail Khan, to get experience in frontier work; or a battalion might be on foreign service at colonial stations, or in Burma or at Aden.

4623. PRESIDENT.—Sir Charles Egerton's view was that it would be a good thing to divide India into certain areas so as to prevent regiments being stationed too far away from their homes. His scheme was based on motives of economy, and with a view to the convenience and comfort of the troops. Secondly, it was considered that it would tend to split up the Indian army into areas, and thus restore the localization of the army to a certain extent. Do you agree in that view?

4624. SIR E. BARROW.—To a certain degree; I prefer a system with large groups or regiments. One battalion on the frontier, one in its own area and the other at a reasonable distance.

4625. PRESIDENT.—The necessary corollary to your theory would be that you must recruit the army more evenly from diverse areas?

4626. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

4627. PRESIDENT.—From what you have seen of the work of divisional Generals, do you consider that they make adequate use of the financial and other powers conferred upon them? Do you think that any further measures of decentralization might be tried?

4628. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, I consider that they do exercise their powers, but I doubt if they have much real financial power. There can be no financial power without the actual control over money. I see no necessity for further decentralization.

4629. SIR W. MEYER.—My experience of some years ago was that very often a divisional General would send up a thing which, even under these restricted powers, would be within his own competence.

4630. SIR E. BARROW.—I do not think there is much of that now. You see he now has an Accounts officer at his elbow. That system will grow I think. Generals will consult these officers more, and the latter will help more.

4631. PRESIDENT.—Do you approve of the system under which the Generals commanding the Northern and Southern Armies are not utilized in any way for administrative work? Do you think that these high officers might be given more definite work to do and thus relieve Army Headquarters?

4632. SIR E. BARROW.—I certainly do not approve. The system not only adds to the congestion of business at Army Headquarters, but fails to make use of the experience and local knowledge of the officers concerned who are not 'Commanders' but really 'Inspectors of Training.' They might well be Inspectors of cantonments as well as of troops. Also, their opinions should be sought on questions of distribution and internal defence.

4633. PRESIDENT.—Are the Army Commanders over-worked in the summer?

4634. SIR E. BARROW.—My experience has been that, after the annual reports are in, I have barely two hours' work a day.

4635. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you give them any financial powers?

4636. SIR E. BARROW.—It is not so much financial powers as decentralization of ordinary business that is required, I think. They could save Army Headquarters a great deal of work now thrown upon them. Take cantonments for instance, there are many cases in which, owing to their local knowledge and experience, they could act more efficiently than some junior officer at Army Headquarters.

4637. SIR W. MEYER.—Might an officer of your position have increased powers as regards promotions?

4638. SIR E. BARROW.—I would not go further than second-in-command; I am entirely satisfied with the present system, because I find that the Commander-in-Chief usually accepts my recommendations.

4639. SIR W. MEYER.—You have got a Deputy Adjutant-General?

4640. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, a Brigadier-General of the General Staff.

4641. SIR W. MEYER.—Is an Army Commander consulted as to whether an officer is fit for the command of a regiment?

4642. SIR E. BARROW.—Certainly, he recommends the officer in the first instance.

4643. SIR W. MEYER.—And if there is a brigade vacant?

4644. SIR E. BARROW.—I have no voice in that, except perhaps unofficially.

4645. SIR W. MEYER.—What staff would you require if you did more administrative work?

4646. SIR E. BARROW.—My present staff is not overworked.

4647. SIR W. MEYER.—You could undertake a larger measure of administration without any additional staff?

4648. SIR E. BARROW.—Certainly.

4649. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you a large clerical staff?

4650. SIR E. BARROW.—Five clerks.

4651. SIR W. MEYER.—And divisional Generals; do you think that their clerical staffs might be reduced?

4652. SIR E. BARROW.—They are possibly overstaffed, but not to a large extent.

4653. SIR P. LAKE.—I am not sure; I have had to go into my office in Meerut and order the men away. They rarely got a holiday and had to work very hard.

4654. SIR W. MEYER.—Under a system of avoiding duplication of work you might go further in the way of reduction?

4655. SIR E. BARROW.—I do not think you could go very far.

4656. SIR W. MEYER.—Well, looking at the matter from outside, and with your experience inside, should you say establishments at Army Headquarters might be reduced?

4657. SIR E. BARROW.—I should say that there might be some reduction of officers in the General Staff Branch.

4658. PRESIDENT.—Take the case of the Intelligence Branch; in many cases no fresh compilation is needed, but simply periodical revision; the work must therefore be less than it was at the inception of the Intelligence Branch?

4659. SIR E. BARROW.—That is so, but the greater the number of officers you have, the better the work is done. I think we were understaffed in the old days.

4660. PRESIDENT.—Regard must be had to the reasonable possibility of operations in the country concerned. Thus, for example, it would be of no particular advantage to collect a lot of information about, say, Badakshan. We have collected possibly as much as we want and there is no possibility of our going there now?

4661. SIR E. BARROW.—Quite so.

4662. SIR W. MEYER.—If you had a larger staff of officers than is really required, do they not tend to create work?

4663. SIR E. BARROW.—No doubt, that might be the case, but there is a mean.

4664. PRESIDENT.—Sir Malcolm Grover told us lately that in regard to the important future needs of the army, he would classify these in the following order of urgency:—

A. 770.

- (i) Armament, equipment and other modern needs;
- (ii) Improvements in distribution and organization;
- (iii) Improvements in communication;
- (iv) Improvements in training.

Do you concur generally in these? What in your opinion are the most important specific needs of the army at present?

4665. SIR E. BARROW.—I do not agree. Every case must be judged on its merits. Sometimes one and sometimes the other is the more pressing need. Any hard and fast programme or classification is inexpedient and in my view unwise. As regards my opinion as to the most specific needs of the army, I attach a list of what I believe to be its most important requirements. (*Vide* Annexure I.)

With reference to that list, item (6), my view is that we eat up capital by always breeding mules. The donkey is a slow animal, but can be trained to go at a fair rate.

Then take (11); I have dealt rather with the political necessity for this; this is the class the agitator works through.

As regards (22); why I say it might be completed to that point is that so much work has already been done that we may as well finish it. That is to say, if you complete the work to mile 300, or whatever it is, in the case of operations beyond Landi Kotal all return convoys can easily come down to mile 300 and there be railed in. That relieves the congestion on the actual Khyber line.

4666. PRESIDENT.—In the event of our having trouble with China on the North-East Frontier, do you consider that the Chinese troops need be reckoned as formidable from a military point of view ?

4667. SIR E. BARROW.—I do not think so at present. The Chinese troops have no trained or trusted leaders, no real knowledge of modern warfare, while the whole organization of the army is probably steeped in corruption. I have twice seen so-called European trained Chinese troops in action against a greatly inferior enemy (at Peitsang and Yangtsun) and on both occasions they quickly melted away before a resolute advance. Led by Europeans or Japanese they might become really formidable, as the Chinaman is no coward and shows an extraordinary aptitude for drill. His natural intelligence, industry and patience are valuable qualities if rightly developed.

4668. SIR P. LAKE.—If unrest in China continued, do you think it would be advisable to have more troops on the Burma frontier ?

4669. SIR E. BARROW.—I would not reduce the present Burma garrison at all. At all events, I would not reduce it below six native infantry battalions. But I would delocalize these completely, so that they might be available for service outside of Burma if required.

4670. PRESIDENT.—The late Sir John Jenkins noted in 1911 :—

“There are many stations and many districts which, in the absence of immediate military aid, would be at the mercy of comparatively small bodies of resolute men, however badly armed.”

* * * * *

“I do not think that it is established that the strength of the army in India is in excess of existing requirements, * * * * *. If there are regiments which are bad or inefficient, they ought certainly to be remodelled, but I would make no reduction in numbers without affecting at least an equivalent improvement in efficiency, which may be gained by armament and mobility.”

“On the question of what regiments might be reduced, it is important to note that regiments which may be regarded as most efficient for external war are not always those which would be most trustworthy in case of internal disturbance.”

Do you concur in all or any of the opinions expressed in the above extract ? If so, what action do you consider to be necessary :—

(a) To perfect arrangements for internal defence.

(b) To re-model regiments of doubtful value ?

4671. SIR E. BARROW.—I concur entirely in the opinions expressed by Sir John Jenkins. As regards remedies, I think internal defence can best be provided for by first, the registration of all able-bodied Europeans and Eurasians in a territorial reserve; secondly, by an enactment enabling the Government to enforce service if necessary; thirdly, by the allotment, in advance, of such territorials to specific duties, either with the existing units of Volunteers or otherwise; and fourthly, by the maintenance of reserves of arms and ammunition at suitable British centres for such organizations.

4672. PRESIDENT.—Would your territorial reservists receive pay ?

4673. SIR E. BARROW.—If they were called out, not otherwise.

4674. PRESIDENT.—What value do you consider can be placed, generally speaking, on the Volunteers, in such circumstances as may necessitate their employment for a prolonged period ?

4675. SIR E. BARROW.—I consider that, even if inefficient now, their military efficiency and value would rapidly improve under the pressure of disturbance or danger, and that for purely sedentary duties, obligatory garrisons etc., they would be invaluable. Excepting mounted corps, they would be of little use for mobile columns, though special men might be of the utmost value for supply or intelligence duties.

4676. PRESIDENT.—It has been said that, when riots took place at Tuticorin, the Indian infantry regiment at Trichinopoly was so weak as to find difficulty in sending 100 rifles to the former place on the requisition of the civil authorities. Now that railways facilitate movements in the southern districts of the Madras Presidency, do you think it advisable that the Indian infantry regiments at Trichinopoly and Cannanore should be quartered together in one cantonment? If so, where would you place them?

4677. SIR E. BARROW.—There should have been no difficulty in sending the troops. I am not aware that railway facilities are much greater now, nor do I think it advisable to withdraw either regiment with a view to concentration.

4678. PRESIDENT.—Now that the railway is open to Mangalore, is it necessary to retain detachments of British infantry at Calicut and Cannanore and one Indian infantry regiment at the latter place?

4679. SIR E. BARROW.—Subject to the retention of the Indian infantry at Cannanore and of the British detachment at Mallapuram, I think the British infantry might be withdrawn from Calicut and Cannanore. I do not see how the extension of the railway to Mangalore affects the question.

4680. SIR W. MEYER.—At Calicut there is a guard of native troops?

4681. SIR E. BARROW.—I am not aware of it.

4682. SIR W. MEYER.—In 1902 there was one I think. It was for the Collector, because at one time a Collector was cut to pieces by Moplahs.

4683. PRESIDENT.—There are two British infantry battalions in the Southern Brigade both of which are split up into detachments. Do you consider this to be a satisfactory arrangement, or can you suggest means by which one of these two battalions can be kept intact without putting the State to great expense?

4684. SIR E. BARROW.—This is a most unsatisfactory arrangement. If Calicut and Cannanore are reduced as I have suggested above, I would distribute the two regiments thus:—

" A " Battalion		8 Companies	...	Wellington.
" B " "	{	4 "	...	Fort St. George.
		1 Company	...	The Mount.
		1 "	...	Mallapuram.
		2 Companies	...	Bellary.

No extra barracks would be required for " A " battalion, except a larger mess house at Wellington, and perhaps additions to the regimental institutes.

4685. PRESIDENT.—Would not that distribution be very distasteful to the battalion?

4686. SIR E. BARROW.—Not more than the present one.

4687. PRESIDENT.—It has been suggested that the Frontier Militia in the North-West Frontier Province, the Zhob Levy in Baluchistan, and the Military Police in Bengal, Assam and Burma, should be placed under the Commander-in-Chief. What is your opinion?

4688. SIR E. BARROW.—I entirely disagree. It would be more expensive, as there would be a constant levelling up demanded. Military considerations would always be placed before civil needs, and in case of any regrettable incident the loss of prestige would be far greater. I may quote the events in the Khyber in 1897 as an illustration; if there had been a regular detachment at Landi Kotal at the time and it had been annihilated, the political effect would have been far greater than it was when the Khyber Rifles were the victims.

4689. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider that the system which now obtains or the selection and appointment of officers to the Frontier Militia, including the Zhob Levy, and the Military Police in Bengal, Assam and Burma, is

satisfactory? If you consider that the system should be changed, what do you recommend, and why?

4690. SIR E. BARROW.—No, it is most unsatisfactory. Young officers in debt or with influence seem to enjoy the preference in obtaining these appointments. The conditions have entirely changed since the annexation of Burma, and we now require officers of more experience in command. I wrote on this subject to the Commander-in-Chief. At the time of the annexation of Burma the Military Police were largely formed from existing regular battalions. They at that time were better paid than the army and got the pick of the Punjab. They were very efficient, constantly employed on field service of sorts, and the best officers were keen to go to them. Now the police battalions are very inferior to what they used to be; the men get worse pay than men in the Indian army; and the consequence is that the police get the leavings of the army from the Punjab. Officers have not been selected for good service, but for private reasons. To my mind these battalions, being isolated with no supervision, require officers of greater experience than these young subalterns; and the men themselves fail to look up to these young boys. I think that the military police service generally would be much improved by having officers of greater experience attached to them.

4691. SIR W. MEYER.—Are you or the divisional General consulted when officers are required?

4692. SIR E. BARROW.—I am not quite sure that I am in the case of the military police. Perhaps I am unofficially. I sometimes recommend officers.

4693. SIR W. MEYER.—For how long do the officers serve with the military police?

4694. SIR E. BARROW.—For four years, with a possible extension to seven.

4695. SIR W. MEYER.—A disadvantage of putting in senior officers would be that they could not adapt themselves so well to the work?

4696. SIR E. BARROW.—I think if you select a good officer he can adapt himself to any conditions.

4697. SIR W. MEYER.—Some years ago, when the Burma Government was asked about a possible reduction of the military police they urged among other reasons against such a measure, that it was better to have them organized in battalions.

4698. SIR E. BARROW.—But they are not really organized in battalions. I remember when visiting Burma, going to a police officer with a view to seeing his men, he said he could not collect twenty. Except in a few cases the so called battalions are split up into minute detachments.

4699. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think the Burma Military Police could be reduced?

4700. SIR E. BARROW.—I do not know enough about it; I am inclined to think that the present Lieutenant Governor looks on this large body of military police scattered about the country as a danger.

4701. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider it necessary that the Zhob Levy posts on the Baluchistan-Afghan frontier, west of Domandi, should be maintained?

4702. SIR E. BARROW.—I am not in a position to advise. The officers of the Baluchistan Agency alone can usefully do so.

4703. PRESIDENT.—If these posts are withdrawn, could a sufficient number of the Zhob Levy Corps be concentrated at Fort Sandeman to allow of the regular Indian infantry regiment being taken away from that place?

4704. SIR E. BARROW.—I should like to see the Zhob Levy so increased as to dispense altogether with the regular regiment at Sandeman, and in that case I would send another regiment to Chaman. I see no more reason for keeping a regular regiment at Fort Sandeman than I do for keeping a regiment at Landi Kotal.

4705. SIR W. MEYER.—Troops serving in Baluchistan are expensive ; do you see any way to reducing this expenditure. Your idea was to reduce expense in Burma by delocalization ?

4706. SIR E. BARROW.—No, my idea of delocalizing the troops was more on the ground of efficiency. I have not considered the matter of expenses in Baluchistan.

4707. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think Aden is properly garrisoned ?

4708. SIR E. BARROW.—No, I think Aden requires another battalion of Indian infantry.

4709. SIR P. LAKE.—Would you say the present British battalion ought to be completed to full strength ?

4710. SIR E. BARROW.—No, I do not see any particular advantage in doing so. It is not a good place for British infantry in peace time.

4711. PRESIDENT.—What, in your opinion, is the minimum establishment at which a regiment can be kept having regard to its training in peace and employment in war ?

4712. SIR E. BARROW.—I should say 800 men. If depôt or skeleton battalions are necessary on financial and political grounds then two such battalions might be kept together, each 450 strong. That is very much the suggestion I made as regards the raising of the establishment of the Carnatic regiments. If you must have weak regiments I am rather in favour of putting two depôt battalions together, so as to give sufficient men for training and garrison purposes.

4713. PRESIDENT.—Under that system the two depôts would have to be localized, but that is opposed to our entire system of periodical reliefs ?

4714. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes.

4715. PRESIDENT.—What do you consider should be the establishment of reservists for a regiment of the strength you have just suggested ?

4716. SIR E. BARROW.—The minimum would be 300 reservists per battalion. But in my view the ideal system would be regiments of four battalions each, namely, two service battalions of 800 each, and two depôt battalions of 400 or 450 each located together, with a reserve of 1,000 men for the whole regiment. On mobilization the depôt battalions would be expanded to 800 strength and act as feeders to the others. The reason I think it would be an ideal system is that in war it would give us more units, and in my opinion we have got far too few units in the Indian army.

4717. SIR W. MEYER.—It would reduce the places where you could locate troops ?

4718. SIR E. BARROW.—No, we should have more battalions, but half of them would be weak cadres.

4719. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that the war strength of an Indian infantry regiment is adequate ? Is it not wasteful to have full complements of officers for the present number of men ? Would not a thousand men per battalion be better ?

4720. SIR E. BARROW.—The stronger the regiment takes the field the better, but taking one thing with another I am content with the present strength of 750.

4721. PRESIDENT.—Do you recommend any changes in the terms of service, pay and allowances, rewards, pensions and gratuities of the native ranks of the Indian army ?

4722. SIR E. BARROW.—I think the present terms are quite good enough for some years to come, except as regards the native officers. Their position requires improvement, as they have received least benefit from recent changes, and they are precisely the class it is important to keep contented and loyal. I would increase both their pay and pension—pay Rs. 60 for Jemadars, and

Rs. 120 for Subadars of 28 years' service; pensions of Jemadars Rs. 20 and 25, instead of Rs. 16 and Rs. 20. The present pensions of Jemadars are ridiculously inadequate for people of their position. I wish to emphasize very strongly that so long as the native officers are loyal and contented, we may rely on the men. I am afraid there was much disappointment that no concessions of any particular value were made to them at Delhi.

4723. PRESIDENT.—The pay of the lower native ranks of Indian regiments has been materially increased; the pay of native officers has not increased?

4724. SIR E. BARROW.—No; the only difference, made the other day, was that, whereas formerly we had two classes of Jemadar and Subadar, and one got more pay than the other, there is now only one class of each on the higher rate of pay. I think it would be better to pay a Jemadar more after a certain number of years' service.

4725. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider it possible to effect any economies in the maintenance of the army. If so, what do you suggest?

4726. SIR E. BARROW.—I do not consider reduction of expenditure on the army feasible, as although I can suggest economies, they would be counter-balanced by increased expenditure. For example, I would reduce the number of expensive units like British cavalry regiments and Royal Horse Artillery batteries, but only on the condition that an increase were made in British mountain artillery and that more howitzer batteries were provided. One regiment of British cavalry and two batteries of Royal Horse Artillery cost about thirteen-and-a-half lakhs per annum. Four British mountain batteries and three howitzer batteries would cost approximately fourteen lakhs, but would give us thirty additional guns. [I am using figures given by Colonel Miley as Accountant General a dozen years ago.]

Another economy would be the substitution of donkeys for mules for compact loads like ammunition, but this would involve initial expenditure under donkey breeding. Then, as suggested elsewhere, the squadrons of the Deoli and Erinpura regiments might easily be reduced, but on the other hand, the savings thus produced should be utilized in bringing the infantry of the three local regiments up to strength; also another squadron should be added to the Guides.

The Nepal Escort might justly be removed from the Military Budget. It is a purely political service.

Then there are small reductions that might be made in the General Staff at Army Headquarters, but that might have to be balanced by an increase of the Staffs of Army Commanders.

I have always held that it is a great mistake having British cavalry in the 1st and 4th Cavalry Brigades. I would prefer to see three regiments of native cavalry unhampered by Horse Artillery, because they will be with the leading échelons, and you want units who can live on the country. In going to Kandahar, for instance, it would be a great advantage to a commander to be able to launch his cavalry forward as quickly as possible. I prefer seeing British cavalry employed in internal defence. This would produce an economy in that all arrangements for these two brigades would be on a more economical scale.

4727. SIR W. MEYER.—Could you not produce considerable economy by reducing peace establishments and increasing reserves?

4728. SIR E. BARROW.—Yes, but I am not advocating reduction, I should like to see the present peace establishment maintained.

4729. SIR W. MEYER.—Then again, if you reduce the number of officers of the Indian army you get economy?

4730. SIR E. BARROW.—I have already proposed something on those lines.

4731. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you considered the Rifle Factory?

4732. SIR E. BARROW.—I have no figures to refer to, but I understand that military factories were established because it was said that India ought to be self-supporting.

4733. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think India ever could be self-supporting in the matter of rifles?

4734. SIR E. BARROW.—Well, I rather thought that at the time I noted against the proposal about rifles. But I am entirely in agreement with the absolute necessity for a cordite factory in India.

4735. SIR W. MEYER.—Assuming that it takes a greater amount of money to produce rifles in India, and that you have got an adequate reserve, is there anything to be gained by manufacturing them in the country?

4736. SIR E. BARROW.—Personally I do not think there is. I am in favour of the gun carriage factory, because we must be able to produce wheels and component parts for our carriages.

4737. SIR P. LAKE.—Would not that apply to rifles?

4738. SIR E. BARROW.—I think it is certainly an advantage, but on financial grounds I cannot say it is absolutely necessary. There is less economy in producing component parts of rifles than there is in producing wheels, etc., and such small articles are more easily imported.

(The witness then withdrew.)

ANNEXURE I

(See answer 4665.)

List of the most important needs of the army at the present time.

REMARKS.

(1) Increase of British mountain artillery by 4 batteries.

The 6th, 8th and 9th Divisions are now without mountain artillery, but as we can at the best only mobilize 8 divisions, 4 mountain batteries will suffice for the present. The cost may be met by reduction of British cavalry and Royal Horse artillery, I would put the 6th Division's mountain artillery at Deolali and that of the 9th Division at or near Wellington.

(2) An additional brigade of howitzers.

We require this for the second line of operations. The cost can be met as above or by reducing a Field Artillery Brigade. I would not add a 3rd brigade of howitzers, as advocated by the General Staff, as I deprecate using a 3rd line of operations.

(3) Improvement in the pay and pensions of native officers.

I put this high in the list, because of the political importance I attach to the subject.

(4) Increase in the establishment of the Army Bearer Corps, and improvement in the conditions of service.

There are at present only 11 companies, which is quite inadequate. The total establishment is only 1,610 men, and the General Staff calculate that allowing for sick and one year's wastage, we are deficient of 13,613 men so that it would seem we have now barely sufficient for 1 division. I would call attention to the report of the Ambulance Transport Committee, 1898. We recommended an establishment of 35 companies with 200 men each and 10 cadres with 100 men each—total 8,000 men. On this, the Government of India sanctioned an establishment of, I think, 3,000 men, but a few years later, under Lord Kitchener's orders, even this establishment was halved. I protested at the time with reference to the requirements of the 1st Division, but with no avail. The experience of the Mohmand expedition proved that I was right.

(5) Increase in transport and improvement in pay and status of transport followers.

On this subject see the reply to question regarding dependence of troops on their 2nd line transport.

(6) The initiation of a donkey breeding scheme with a view to the substitution of donkeys for mules for the transport of compact loads such as ammunition.

After the Tirah campaign, I made proposals in the Military Department in this direction. The Commander-in-Chief, Sir W. Lockhart, concurred, and I believe he intended to take up the question.

I would not form donkey transport corps, but allot donkeys to units for maintenance and training.

(7) Completion of the Kacha Garhi Base Scheme.

Under my Presidency a Committee sat at Peshawar in 1907 to consider requirements. I understand our proceedings were approved in principle, but that little or nothing has been done. Unless action is taken, the difficulties of an advance on the Khyber line will be much aggravated.

(8) Completion of 2' 6" line from Thal to Parachinar.

To facilitate an advance by the Peiwar Kotal in summer, and the maintenance of troops in Kurram in the event of a defensive campaign.

(9) Addition of 1 squadron to the Guides Cavalry.

At present the cavalry regiment, 1st Division, takes the field with 3 squadrons instead of 4.

List of the most important needs of the army at the present time—contd.

REMARKS.

(10) Increase in the establishment of Indian Army Reserves, and division into two classes.

If we reduce the establishment of units, reserves will become all the more necessary.

(11) Improvement in the pay and status of sub-assistant surgeons.

This class has not been generously treated, is very discontented, and may become a political danger as a vehicle of sedition. It would be both just and expedient to improve their position. The question is on all fours with that of (3) above.

(12) More Signal Companies.

We have only sufficient for 4 divisions. We ought to have 1 company per division.

(13) Field troops of sappers for use with cavalry brigades.

As the countries in which Indian troops usually operate are devoid of railways and bridges, I think it will suffice if we have 3 such troops, one for each corps of Sappers and Miners.

(14) Introduction of the Station Hospital system for native troops and improvement in hospital equipment, etc.

I think this will tend to both economy and efficiency, although I am aware there are valid objections to it.

(15) Addition of 8 battalions to the Indian army, *viz.* :—

The army is deficient by at least this number.

- 1 Brahman battalion.
- 1 Jat "
- 1 Rajput "
- 1 Bengal Pioneer "
- 1 Baluchistan "
- 1 Carnatic "
- 1 Second Battalion to Guides.
- 1 " " to Hazara Pioneers.

To complete links of 3 battalions.

The 9th Bhopal Regiment to be reconstituted as a Rajput regiment and linked to the 13th Rajputs and the suggested new battalion. The cost of this measure might be met by the reduction of the establishment of all battalions to an average of 13 British officers and 800 native ranks. The present establishment of the infantry is 138 battalions—2133 British officers and 121,520 native ranks. The proposed establishment would be 146 battalions—1898 officers and 116,800 native ranks or, if all two battalion regiments and Pioneer battalions were left at 900 strength, 120,600 native ranks. So that even in the latter case financial equilibrium should be preserved.

(16) Further extension of principle of class regiments.

Desirable on political grounds.

(17) De-localization of Burma regiments.

Desirable as tending to efficiency and economy.

(18) Provision of travelling field kitchens, of the Russian or other improved pattern, to British regiments, and of travelling boilers to native regiments.

This would add greatly to the comfort and efficiency of regiments operating in countries where carriage roads exist.

(19) Formation of a small Aviation Corps.

Might be quite a small organization, as ordinarily our opponents would not be so provided, as there would be no battles in the blue.

(20) Provision of mounted sections (25 men) for all British infantry battalions delegated to internal defence.

These would be quite invaluable to moveable columns without cavalry, and for reconnaissance duties.

(21) Improvement of lines of native troops.

Much yet remains to be done, and this measure tends to improve both the health and comfort of the troops.

(22) Extension of Khyber railway from Warsak to Mile 300.

This will enable us to utilize the Kam-Shilman and Mullagori road for return convoys in summer.

(23) Improvement of pay and status of Silladar syces.

Might facilitate transport arrangements, if regulated to that end the extra cost being borne by Government.

ANNEXURE II.

(See answer 4286).

Note by General Sir Edmund Barrow on Class Regiments as compared with Class Company regiments:

A most desirable change in policy, in my opinion, is the formation of more class regiments. I am well aware that the majority of officers are opposed to this on the ground that in a class regiment they never know what is going on in the lines. I have myself commanded a class regiment of Musalmans and do not accept this argument, but, even admitting it as a strong objection to class regiments, I maintain that the advantages of the system completely outweigh that objection. With class regiments we can always segregate classes of doubtful loyalty, or neutralize them by placing them with other corps of classes which have no sympathy with them, *e.g.*, 10th Jats to Hyderabad, 14th Sikhs to Quetta, while in the case of class company regiments, not only is it impossible to segregate any particular class, but we run the risk of contamination and of fraternisation between classes, *e.g.*, the Mutiny, when whole regiments turned against us though composed of such diverse elements as Oudh Hindus, Sikhs, and Musalmans. The experience of the Mutiny demonstrates the absolute futility of relying on diversity of class within a regiment. Daily intercourse, and common regimental interests and life, form ordinarily a cement far too strong for class prejudice to withstand. Moreover, the system enables us always to employ classes we can fully trust, *e.g.*, in Tirah we employed Sikh and Gurkha regiments against Pathans. Similarly if we had to fight Nepal, we should prefer to employ Musalmans and Marathas. Finally, I think no one will dispute the fact that class regiments are generally much happier ones, and on the whole more efficient because (i) there is naturally greater *esprit de corps*, (ii) they attract the pick of their class in the recruiting market, (iii) there is less difficulty in regulating promotion, and (iv) a simpler interior economy.

The practicability of this change may be disputed, but I maintain there is little or no difficulty, and we could effect the change without much dislocation or discontent. The system of class companies within regiments facilitates a rapid and easy transformation. For instance, an increase in the number of Musalman regiments seems particularly desirable. This might be done by eliminating Musalmans from certain regiments and concentrating them in others. Thus for example in the 20 Maratha, Hyderabad and Carnatic regiments there are 62 Musalman companies, more than sufficient, if desired, to form 2 Musalman regiments of 3 battalions each. Similarly in the 12 old Punjab regiments there are ample Musalmans to form 2 regiments of 3 battalions, *viz.*—1 regiment of Pathans (20th, 21st and 40th) and 1 regiment of Punjabis (22nd, 33rd and 46th); but to accomplish this it would also be necessary to form a new Sikh group (19th, 24th and 26th) to which the Sikhs of the above mentioned Punjabi regiments could be transferred.

Similarly from the 15 new Punjab and Burma battalions (old Madras regiments) we could form 1 Sikh regiment, 1 Punjabi regiment each of 3 battalions, still leaving 3 mixed regiments. Without some such measure as this we perpetuate what I conceive to be a growing danger, the fusion of religions and classes which are still a counterpoise to one another. In a mercenary army we cannot afford to disregard the old Roman maxim of "*Divide et impera.*"

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

22nd Meeting—Friday, the 19th July 1912.

The Hon. Lieutenant-Colonel Sir George Roos-KeppeL, K.C.I.E., Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General, North-West Frontier Province, attended as a witness and was examined.

EVIDENCE OF SIR GEORGE ROOS-KEPPEL.

4739. PRESIDENT.—You are Agent to the Governor-General and Chief Commissioner in the North-West Frontier Province and have had great experience of the tribesmen in the Kurram Valley, the Khyber, and along the frontier?

4740. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes, sir, I have been there for twenty years.

4741. PRESIDENT.—It has been stated that during a period of over thirty years little has been done to improve our communications through the Khyber. What, in general terms, is the state of the roads from Peshawar to Kabul and from Quetta to Kandahar, as compared with what it was in 1878-80?

4742. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—During the last ten years much has been done to improve communications through the Khyber from Peshawar to the Afghan frontier at Torkham. The main road from Jamrud to Landi Kotal has been widened and well metalled, and is now in first class order. A second road has been made, of which all the difficult parts have been finished and metalled; it could be completed at short notice. A third road has been made through the Mullagori country to Landi Kotal which would be valuable for return transport. From Torkham to Kabul the road has been improved and between Jalalabad and Kabul it has been lightly metalled. The Amir visits Jalalabad yearly and shortly before his journey the road is repaired sufficiently to make it practicable for motors. It is possible to take motors to Jalalabad through the Khyber, but this can only be done with difficulty and with a very light load. The metalling of the road between Jalalabad and Kabul is said to be very light, and it would probably not stand the strain of heavy traffic for more than a few days. I know nothing of the roads between Quetta and Kandahar.

4743. SIR W. MEYER.—Are the Amir's motors heavy?

4744. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—He has all kinds, but they are mostly fairly light.

4745. SIR W. MEYER.—Could we use light lorries for transport in Afghanistan?

4746. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—No, I think they would cut the roads to pieces in a very short time.

4747. SIR W. MEYER.—You are speaking of the roads on the Amir's side? On our side constant traffic must cut up the roads, but they would stand as much as the roads in India, I presume?

4748. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes.

4749. PRESIDENT.—We have been told of a report to the effect that the Amir was going to start a motor service between Landi Kotal and Kabul for parcels and passengers; have you heard of it?

4750. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I have heard of it, but I think the project is probably being pushed by Europeans who want to sell the Amir motor cars. I do not think it will come to anything.

4751. PRESIDENT.—A lorry carrying stores and so on would weigh four tons at least; that would constitute a heavy load for the road?

4752. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Well, ten years ago, after the South African War, before we improved the Khyber road, some traction engines were sent up that road, and one of them went through the metalling and sank four feet into the ground.

A. 1940. 4753. SIR W. MEYER.—I think a former witness suggested doubling the road through the Khyber ?

4754. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—It has been done ; that is to say, the road has been doubled everywhere except in those places where the work would entail cutting into fields ; this, of course, we cannot do in peace time. A Pioneer battalion could complete the doubling in a few days. We have completed all the difficult parts as far as Landi Khana.

4755. PRESIDENT.—How does the present system of maintaining order along the North-West Frontier compare with that which was in force in 1895 ?

4756. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The present system of maintaining order along the frontier compares favourably with that in force in 1895. The four militia corps, namely the Khyber Rifles, Kurram Militia, North Waziristan Militia, and South Waziristan Militia, are well trained, organized and disciplined, and our main dependence is upon them supported by the regular garrisons.

4757. PRESIDENT.—Are these forces satisfactory in every way ?

4758. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes, but recruiting for them is somewhat difficult.

4759. PRESIDENT.—If the pay were raised, would there still be this difficulty ?

4760. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—No. The officers are very good indeed ; they are taken from the regular army and seconded. I choose them all, and I do not take anybody I do not know personally.

4761. PRESIDENT.—Of what rank are the commandants ?

4762. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Majors.

4763. PRESIDENT.—And you have captains and subalterns in addition ?

4764. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes.

4765. SIR W. MEYER.—You have had experience of the time when the Punjab Frontier Force guarded the frontier ?

4766. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes.

4767. SIR W. MEYER.—How would you compare that period with the present state of things ?

4768. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—It is very hard to compare them, because in those days we kept entirely behind the administrative border ; we had nothing forward of it at all. I do not quite understand to what particular time in the history of the Punjab Frontier Force you are referring.

4769. SIR W. MEYER.—I was thinking of the time when we pushed on to Wano and the Tochi.

4770. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The Punjab Frontier Force was then practically what the militia corps are now.

4771. PRESIDENT.—It was a highly efficient force, was it not ?

4772. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—It was very efficient for its particular work.

4773. PRESIDENT.—At the time of the Afghan war we had a considerable number of regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force, some of which highly distinguished themselves. As we gradually pushed on our frontier, would it be disadvantageous to convert the militia regiments into regular regiments, provided irregular corps of men possessing the fine fighting qualities of these tribesmen were organized and pushed on in front ?

4774. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—It would not be disadvantageous, assuming as a preliminary that in the advance everything would be absorbed behind.

When you go forward, you get fighting and non-fighting races, but it depends on how far forward you get. The Ghilzais, for example, would not take service.

4775. PRESIDENT.—What is the general character of the tribes on the frontier? How far are our present relations with them friendly or otherwise? What are their relations with each other?

4776. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Love of independence, pride, and avarice are the only characteristics which the tribes on the frontier can be said to have in common; in all others they vary widely. To take them in order from the north, the people of the Black Mountain and of Buner have shewn themselves fanatical in the past, but they have been quiet for many years; they are poorly armed, and it is doubtful whether they would ever give any serious trouble unless their independence were threatened. The Swatis of Upper and Lower Swat are intensely fanatical and priest-ridden. They are, in my opinion, not to be trusted, and might rise at any time without cause and without warning. The people of Dir and Bajaur are less fanatical than the Swatis, but they are not free from fanaticism and would probably join the latter in any big rising. The Chitralis are hostile to the Pathan tribes surrounding them and would be unlikely to join them. The Mohmands have fanatical tendencies and would probably give trouble, but their country is accessible and comparatively easy, and they are not a serious menace. The Mullagoris are very friendly to us and are on bad terms with their neighbours, the Mohmands and Afridis. They can be depended upon and would assist us to guard the Mullagori road. The Shinwaris feel that their interests are ours and could be entirely depended upon. They could be made use of in time of war to guard the Khyber road within their limits. The Afridis are the most important tribe upon the frontier and no rising could be general without them, as, so long as they remain quiet, they form a complete barrier between the tribes to the north and those to the south; they are singularly free from fanaticism and look solely to their own interests. They are the best armed tribe on the frontier. The Orakzai and Zaimusht would probably watch the attitude of the Afridis and follow their lead; they resemble the Afridis but are not such good fighters, nor are they as well armed. The Turis of Kurram are *Shias*, and are completely surrounded by a hostile *Sunni* population, which would have conquered and exterminated them but for our intervention; in a frontier rising they could be entirely depended upon. The Wazirs and Mahsuds are undoubtedly hostile to us and are subject to accesses of individual fanaticism; they are well-armed and are steadily increasing their armament. They are much under the influence of Kabul. The lesser tribes—Bhittanis, Mianis, and Shiranis—are negligible. The Bhittanis would probably go with the Mahsuds and Wazirs.

Our relations with all except the most remote tribes have steadily improved since 1895 and are on the whole friendly. Their relations with each other have been drawn closer, and, whereas in 1895 they were indifferent to each other's fate, to-day a war against one tribe would arouse the sympathy of the others.

4777. SIR W. MEYER.—You say they were indifferent to each other in 1895, but was not the trouble in 1897 caused by the tribes collectively becoming uneasy?

4778. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Each tribe had its own causes for uneasiness. There was a general belief that we had started on a policy of swallowing up the whole belt of independent territory. There was no lateral communication between the tribes then, now there is a chain linking them up.

4779. SIR W. MEYER.—I understand that in 1895 they were concerned about each other's fate. A thought that if B was swallowed up, his turn would come next?

4780. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Each was mainly concerned about his own fate.

4781. SIR W. MEYER.—You say there are communications between Kabul and the tribes?

4782. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The Amir keeps up regular pro-Afghan agencies amongst the tribes and subsidizes them. Anybody who is notoriously anti-British receives an allowance.

4783. SIR W. MEYER.—Is not that a contravention of the Durand Agreement ?

4784. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes.

4785. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you ever represented this to the Foreign Office ?

4786. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I have reported it in every Administration Report. The British Agent in Kabul reports how the tribes are given large sums of money and ammunition.

4787. SIR W. MEYER.—Are the Kabul presents to the tribes as large as our subsidies ?

4788. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—No; nor are they given to the same people.

4789. SIR W. MEYER.—We subsidize the tribesmen, and I presume the Amir subsidizes the *mullahs* ?

4790. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Our allowances are allotted by tribes, and each section receives its share. Individuals who distinguish themselves by raiding British territory, or by their general hostility towards us, know they will be given an allowance from Kabul.

4791. SIR W. MEYER.—But if we find that a certain number of individuals in a tribe are misbehaving, we stop our allowance to the tribe, do we not ?

4792. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—These cases are usually settled with the tribe by making them pay compensation for the misdemeanour committed.

4793. SIR W. MEYER.—Has this system of allowances worked well ?

4794. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—On the whole it has; I do not think we could possibly do without it.

4795. SIR W. MEYER.—Is it really blackmail ?

4796. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—In some cases, not in others. For instance before we took over the Khyber, the Afridis took all tolls from caravans. We now collect the tolls, and the allowance to the tribe is based on the value of the tolls.

4797. SIR W. MEYER.—Take the Mahsuds; do they render us services proportionate to what we pay them ?

4798. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—No, they do not.

4799. SIR W. MEYER.—You spoke of the Wazirs being hostile. What is the reason of their hostility ?

4800. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—All the tribes on the frontier are more or less hostile at heart.

4801. SIR W. MEYER.—You said that the Swatis are fanatical, but the Afridis are not. How is that ?

4802. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The Swatis are very religious and priest-ridden, the Afridis are not. Most of the tribes are very poor, consequently they are always hungry. This leads to raids which bring them into collision with us; thus the raw is always kept open between us.

4803. SIR W. MEYER.—This is the essence of the problem—the increase of the tribes and the absence of an outlet for their energies ?

4804. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I do not think they want an outlet. I should think that the blood-feud system keeps the population down to reasonable limits.

4805. SIR W. MEYER.—I understand they used to form colonies in India. Take the Rohillas for instance?

4806. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Those were not frontier tribesmen who came to India in those days. There is no instance of frontier tribes having settled in India. The settlers you refer to were the Afghan followers of the Afghan conquerors of India. The frontier tribes were as hostile to the kings of Afghanistan as they are to us. They love their independence. I infer that, if considerable numbers of the tribesmen had joined the Mughals, they would have risen in the world by virtue of their fighting qualities but there is no evidence of this.

4807. SIR W. MEYER.—You say the Swatis are fanatical; have they been softened at all?

4808. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The punishment we inflicted on them in 1897 softened them.

4809. SIR W. MEYER.—Did not an Akhund of Swat who died in the early sixties say that, in the event of a war with Russia and Britain, the Swatis ought to side with England?

4810. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I have never heard of it.

4811. SIR W. MEYER.—The saying is, I thought, supposed to exercise considerable influence on the frontier?

4812. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Rumours have been generally spread among the tribesmen that the Russians behave very badly to Muhammadan women. I do not think the tribes want to change masters in the least.

4813. PRESIDENT.—In the Swat valleys the tribesmen have benefited enormously in the way of cultivation, trade, and so on, have they not?

4814. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—An enormous trade has grown up, but cultivation has not increased as the irrigable land is limited. They count their revenue in water—so many canals. We have not touched Upper Swat at all.

4815. PRESIDENT.—Still, the trade has increased enormously?

4816. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes. They have discovered now that there is a great demand for various commodities. The trade over the Malakand in rice, wheat, hides, and wool, has grown greatly.

4817. PRESIDENT.—What did they do previously with the stuff they now export?

4818. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—When they had no outlet for trade, they were very wasteful. They were prolific and bred heavily. The population has been steadily growing up. Our occupation has not affected the amount of cultivation in the least. One effect which their increased prosperity will undoubtedly have will be to soften them, and consequently they will become of less value as fighting men. They will also become less inclined to fight because they will have more to lose.

4819. SIR W. MEYER.—In the event of a war with Russia, with Afghanistan as an ally, what would be the feeling of the frontier tribes?

4820. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—It depends on the officers in charge of the Agencies and on the *mullahs*. The tribesmen are extremely selfish and they would look to the side on which their interests lay.

4821. SIR W. MEYER.—Would they prefer Great Britain to Russia?

4822. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes, I think so.

4823. SIR W. MEYER.—Would their preference run to the extent of their being actively friendly and fighting for us?

4824. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—If they thought we were going to win, they would fight for us, but some would nevertheless raid our convoys. The tribes would wait to see which side was going to win. In the case of serious

disturbances in India they would get uneasy. They regard Russia as a big factor because they think that we were formerly afraid of her ; but to most of the tribes Russia is merely a name.

4825. SIR W. MEYER.—What was the effect of the Russo-Japanese War ?

4826. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—They do not know what the Japanese are. There was not a newspaper sold in Peshawar until last year. When I say they did not take any interest in the struggle between Russia and Japan, I speak of the tribesmen. In great cities like Peshawar, however, general politics are discussed. Nineteen Russian deserters came down to Peshawar last winter, and people came from far and wide to see them ; the Amir, thinking they were probably spies, turned them over to us.

4827. SIR W. MEYER.—Were they Europeans or Asiatics ?

4828. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Europeans.

4829. PRESIDENT.—What became of them ?

4830. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I got them moved to Cawnpore in the hope of their being able to find work there, but the scheme was not a success. They were finally sent to Australia. When asked if they would like to return to Russia, they declined to go back.

4831. PRESIDENT.—What are the steps taken to find out what is going on in the tribal areas, and to get information as to their armaments, etc. ? Can the statistics compiled in this respect be really relied upon ?

4832. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—In the tribal areas Political Agents obtain their information regarding the tribes through tribal elders, spies, and the men of the frontier militias. The elders are generally jealous of one another, and by comparing their information it is usually possible to know what is going on. As regards armament, the statistics compiled can be relied upon as a minimum. Though they cannot be said to be accurate, they are probably more accurate than similar statistics in British districts, as in independent territory no one attempts to conceal his arms. I once succeeded in getting a census of the arms amongst the Afridis which was fairly accurate.

4833. PRESIDENT.—You take the figures in your report as the minimum, I suppose ?

4834. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes, but I would like to mention that in this report nothing at all is said about any arms except arms of European manufacture. It may be accepted that every one of the 350,000 men on the frontier has a weapon of some sort.

4835. SIR W. MEYER.—How do you calculate the number of fighting men ?

4836. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The tribal allowances, which are worked out by sections, sub-sections, and minor sub-sections are handed to the head men for distribution, and by cross-questioning the latter it is possible usually to arrive at a very fair knowledge of the fighting strength of the tribe.

4837. SIR W. MEYER.—Is every able-bodied male counted as a fighting man ?

4838. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—‘ Everything from a quail to a camel,’ as they say.

4839. SIR W. MEYER.—Practically every boy who has been circumcised at the age of thirteen, I presume ?

4840. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Sometimes circumcision takes place at the age of seven. I think it may be assumed that everybody from the age of 15 to 55 is counted a fighting man.

4841. SIR W. MEYER.—These figures are based on guesswork more or less ?

4842. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—If you look at the latest report you will see that the entire estimate is worked out by sub-sections. The figures are not given in round numbers and it is quite possible they may not be accurate within 10,000 or 5,000 either way.

4843. SIR W. MEYER.—You yourself described reports prior to 1910 as inaccurate, did you not?

4844. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes. I do not think so much trouble was taken with them formerly as now.

4845. SIR W. MEYER.—Sir Henry McMahon told us he could give us accurate statements for certain areas, but further back, the estimates were more doubtful.

A. 3495.

4846. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I impress on all our Political Agents to take the minimum figures. I have been asked by the Foreign Office to write a note showing which of the tribes are the most accurately calculated. When you come to distant tribes who inhabit districts where no Europeans have been since the last expedition, and where we only see the people occasionally, the figures are much vaguer than they are in areas like Waziristan, for instance, where you have the Political Agent and his staff.

4847. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you any statistics relating to the ammunition in the possession of the tribes?

4848. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The ammunition varies enormously. At the beginning of the Tirah Expedition I should say the ammunition supply of Afridis was comparatively small. At the end it was fairly large. The Persian Gulf trade in ammunition was enormous. The tribes have always obtained ammunition from Kabul, and they also buy it from the Afghan troops on the frontier of the tribal areas. At one time the Gulf arms trade brought in such enormous quantities that the price dropped down to one-fifth of what it formerly was.

4849. SIR W. MEYER.—The table prepared by the General Staff shows a total of about 62,500 rifles and carbines of various descriptions as being in the possession of the tribesmen; should you say they had an adequate supply of ammunition for these?

4850. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes, for their own purposes, but not sufficient (according to our ideas) for war. I should say the average man possesses about twenty to forty rounds of ammunition for his rifle.

4851. SIR W. MEYER.—If Afghanistan were neutral and hostilities against us lasted some time, would their supply of ammunition give out?

4852. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—It certainly would, but they have the advantage over us that they never waste a round, and they know their country.

4853. PRESIDENT.—You say that the Afghan troops on the frontier of these tribal areas sell their ammunition to the tribesmen. How do they explain that to the superior authorities? Do they say that the ammunition is expended on rifle practice?

4854. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I do not think so. When they were supposed to be fighting the Mangals, the Afghan soldiers were selling their ammunition all the time. It is even said that they started a sort of bazar for this purpose. The reason why the Patan fort was captured by the Mangals was because all the powder in the fort had been taken and sold.

4855. SIR W. MEYER.—In the event of a war with Afghanistan and the tribes, would there be enough ammunition to supply all the men who would be in arms against us?

4856. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The Amir has gigantic stores of ammunition in Kabul which he has obtained from England, the Gulf and from his factories.

4857. PRESIDENT.—If there is no turnover of the ammunition, it must deteriorate?

4858. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—It does not deteriorate much. The bulk of it is Martini ammunition.

4859. PRESIDENT.—We consider the life of our ammunition to be about ten years.

4860. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I have used ammunition twenty-five years old. We have great experience of old ammunition in the Frontier Militia. As you know, the fighting in which they are generally engaged is not usually at very long ranges.

4861. SIR P. LAKE.—There is a good deal of variety in the rifles ; is that taken into account in estimating the amount of ammunition that would be available ?

4862. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—No rifle has very great value on the frontier which does not take Government ammunition. Ammunition goes with the rifle on purchase. All the rifles that are made in the tribal area are made to take Government ammunition—others are not popular.

4863. SIR P. LAKE.—If we changed our rifles, would the result handicap them for a time ?

4864. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—We have done that ; look at the Snider. Now there is no demand at all for the Snider rifles, and I think that, if we were completely to abolish Martini ammunition in India, the fate of the Martini rifle would be settled.

4865. SIR R. SCALLON.—Do they manufacture their own rifles ?

4866. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes, rifles are made in the Kohat Pass and elsewhere.

4867. PRESIDENT.—Do they make them well ?

4868. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—They are very roughly finished, but they shoot well up to 800 yards or so.

4869. PRESIDENT.—Have they imported machinery for rifle making purposes ?

4870. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—They have a little machinery. In 1897 we found a complete set of re-sizing machinery from the Rawalpindi arsenal. In many villages they make the rifles entirely by hand.

4871. PRESIDENT.—Where do they get the metal from ?

4872. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The barrels are Public Works jumpers. They bore them out by a process of their own, retemper the barrels, and the result is quite good.

4873. SIR R. SCALLON.—Could we not stop the manufacture of rifles in the Kohat Pass ?

4874. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The effect would be to drive the trade further inland. It is annoying, however, to see arms being bought and sold on the roadside.

4875. PRESIDENT.—It must be a very laborious process to make these rifles by hand ?

4876. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes it is, but it is very interesting. They have two muzzle-loading cannon at Jamrud, but they suffer from shortage of ammunition.

4877. PRESIDENT.—What has been the effect of our operations in the Persian Gulf on the arms supply of the tribes ? How can these tribesmen raise the relatively large sums of money required to purchase modern rifles ?

4878. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The effect of our operations in the Persian Gulf has been to reduce largely the supply of arms and ammunition. The possession of a rifle is becoming such an absolute necessity that every man is willing to make almost any sacrifice to obtain one, either by mortgaging his property, by selling his daughter, or by postponing his marriage or that of his

sons and using the dowries thus saved to purchase arms. There is practically nothing they will stop at to get a rifle.

4879. SIR W. MEYER.—What is the price of a rifle ?

4880. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The longest price I know of paid was Rs. 1,300 for a British Lee-Enfield. Formerly the average price for a Martini was Rs. 500 or Rs. 600 ; now you can get a Lee-Metford for Rs. 700 and a Martini for Rs. 300, whilst Sniders are a drug in the market.

4881. PRESIDENT.—Do they sell their daughters like cattle ?

4882. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—When a marriage is arranged between two families, the father of the bride receives compensation for the expense he has incurred in bringing up his daughter. Probably without this system they would strangle their female children.

4883. PRESIDENT.—Do the tribesmen obtain arms and ammunition to any appreciable extent from Kabul ?

4884. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The tribesmen visit Kabul and Jalalabad in considerable numbers each year, and bring back a few rifles and large quantities of ammunition. Professional arms dealers bring ammunition from Kabul for sale.

4885. SIR P. LAKE.—Does the Amir sell ammunition openly in Kabul ?

4886. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—No.

4887. SIR W. MEYER.—Did the weapons that came from the Gulf pass through Kabul ?

4888. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—All in my part of the world did. The headquarters of the trade is in Kabul. The biggest rifle dealer is a man called Nuraki, who buys his stock in Kabul and brings the rifles down to Jalalabad.

4889. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think that the operations of the last few years in the Gulf against the arms traffic have been so useful that they should be continued ?

4890. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I think they should be continued until the trade is exterminated. I think the treaty with the Sultan of Muscat will do a great deal to forward that end, because there is no place in the Gulf equal to Muscat for the purposes of the arms traffic.

4891. SIR R. SCALLON.—Who finances these big rifle dealers ?

4892. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The profits are gigantic. The chief man, Nuraki Kuchi, is a rich man and a camel owner ; it is rumoured that Nasrulla Khan put money into the concern. The profits of a successful *coup* are so great that they compare very favourably with those of the slave trade. In Birmingham a Martini rifle costs 18 shillings, in the Persian Gulf its value is £2-10-0 and on the frontier £30. On the frontier at one time, Martini ammunition cost 8 annas a round, it now costs about 10 annas a packet.

4893. SIR W. MEYER.—A witness told us that the Amir is empowered to import arms and ammunition duty free through British India. Might he not bring in arms and ammunition and sell them to the tribesmen ?

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4894. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Not openly. Some time ago he bought 10,000,000 rounds of sporting Lee-Metford cartridges, but Lord Curzon ordered 2,000,000 to be destroyed because, he said, it had not been contemplated that the Amir would bring in ammunition on such a gigantic scale.

4895. SIR W. MEYER.—Have we the right to stop arms and ammunition consigned to the Amir when we think they are not meant for legitimate purposes ?

4896. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I do not know the exact wording of the treaty, but we certainly have the power.

4897. SIR W. MEYER.—Then unless we are very vigilant there is a danger from these imports ?

4898. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—We take the Amir entirely on trust. Anything might be imported, but as regards ammunition the Amir certainly does not allow the ammunition from his arsenal to be sold.

4899. PRESIDENT.—We must then assume a certain amount of allegiance to our treaty on the part of the Amir?

4900. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes. At one time a large number of rifle barrels from the Ferozepore arsenal were stolen and sold and there is probably leakage at Kabul. We have heard that the Amir has sold off useless stuff to his subjects, and certainly a proportion of this would find its way to the tribes.

4901. SIR R. SCALLON.—Are his own subjects well armed?

4902. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—No.

4903. SIR W. MEYER.—I thought he was supposed to have enough rifles in stock to arm everybody?

4904. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The idea was that on the outbreak of war all the infantry should become artillery, and the general population infantry. He has enormous stores of ammunition at Kabul, but I do not think anybody could make an estimate of what he has.

4905. PRESIDENT.—I suppose he has collected all sorts of stores, but has neglected the personnel to utilize them?

4906. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes.

4907. PRESIDENT.—What is the likelihood of any large or general tribal combination against us? How far would the tribes be subject to incitement to a *jihad* preached from Kabul, or independently by their own *mullahs*?

4908. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I can see no present likelihood of any large or general tribal combination against us; but, were any important tribe to rise, and were prolonged operations against it necessary, the fire would doubtless spread, and it would depend upon the Political Agents supported by a show of force how far it would extend. The tribes have no intention of pulling the chestnuts out of the fire for the Amir, and no incitement to *jihad* preached from Kabul would induce them to rise unless the Afghans showed the way. Should, however, the tribes have serious grievances, and should their discontent tempt them to rise, their inclination would doubtless be intensified by preachings and by promises of support from Kabul. The exhortations of their own *mullahs* would in like circumstances probably have a similar effect.

4909. SIR W. MEYER.—Would the tribes consider the stoppage of arms a grievance?

4910. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I told them some years ago that the trade might be stopped.

4911. SIR W. MEYER.—You do not agree that the stoppage of this traffic would bring some of the tribes on us?

4912. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Not in the least. The actual losers talked a lot of nonsense on one occasion and tried to bluff the Government of India into giving them compensation, and Government began to discuss the idea; but it was explained that all the other tribes would want to be compensated, and the matter was dropped.

4913. SIR W. MEYER.—What are the grievances you have in your mind?

4914. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Any gradual encroachment on their independence, or anything they would look upon as a real injustice.

4915. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider that there is a great difference between the tribes of Baluchistan and those on the northern part of the frontier?

4916. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I think the difference is so great that no comparison is possible. Baluchistan is a desert three times as large as the

Frontier Province, and the population is less than that of the Peshawar District; it amounts only to eighteen men to the square mile, whereas in the Frontier Province the population is 242 to the square mile. Nobody could call the tribes in Baluchistan as good fighting men as the frontier tribesmen.

4917. SIR W. MEYER.—You said a little time ago that the tribes have now lateral communication with each other? A. 4778.

4918. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The malcontents and their *mullahs* are constantly coming to Kabul, and the solidarity of Islam is preached to them day in and day out. Nasrulla Khan always points out to them that as long as they are divided they cannot stand against us, and begs them always to keep in communication with each other. The *mullahs* go backwards and forwards from one tribe to another in the spring.

4919. SIR W. MEYER.—I gather, however, that the tribesmen look to their own interests first?

4920. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—They are very democratic; everything must be settled by the tribal *jirga*, and *jirgas* of different tribes cannot meet.

4921. SIR W. MEYER.—Are there blood feuds between the tribes?

4922. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—They are not exactly blood feuds. The factions that spread down the frontier might be compared to the Tories and Radicals. When one clan in Tirah, for instance, tries to oppress a weaker clan, all the clans of the same faction arise in sympathy.

4923. SIR W. MEYER.—Is there fellow-feeling between the Afridis and the Mahsuds?

4924. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The Afridis consider themselves the premier tribe and have a certain amount of dislike and contempt for the others, but common instincts and a common fighting religion count for something.

4925. PRESIDENT.—The Malikdins do not like the Zakkas, do they?

4926. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—No, but they would fight against us if they thought that we were trying to take Zakka Khel country. The national feeling is too strong to permit us to entertain the idea of getting any of the clans on our side in such a case.

4927. PRESIDENT.—For a general war with the tribes on the North-West Frontier, the General Staff, in 1911, estimated a force of six-and-a-third divisions as necessary, *plus* several separate units of infantry, cavalry, and Pioneers. Do you agree with this estimate? Do you consider that, if Government took prompt measures at the outset, there could be any simultaneous and concerted action of the tribes against us?

4928. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I have not the data to check this estimate. Speaking generally, I consider it ample if not excessive. The three important tribes to be considered are the Swatis, Afridis, and the Wazirs (including the Mahsuds). Provided that we were not at war with Afghanistan, I cannot conceive a simultaneous and concerted rising of these tribes. Assuming that one of the three rose, the probability of the others remaining quiet would be in direct proportion to the rapidity with which Government took action against the original offenders. The massing of troops on a large scale on the borders of tribes which had not risen might be misunderstood, and might force them to rise, as they firmly believe that we are but waiting for an opportunity to crush them and to annex their country. I mean by this that if a rising took place in Swat, and a couple of divisions were immediately brought up and encamped at Bara, it would make an Afridi rising much more likely than if the troops were kept at Rawalpindi.

4929. PRESIDENT.—With what tribes do you think it most likely that we may have hostilities in the near future?

4930. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I have already mentioned that we need only consider the Swatis, Afridis, and Wazirs (including the Mahsuds). By this I mean that their smaller neighbours would look to them for guidance

and would follow their example. The most obviously hostile tribe at present is certainly the Mahsuds, with whom we have been engaged in a sort of guerilla warfare for many years; but, although they have given and will continue to give sufficient provocation for war, should we wish to take up the challenge, it is not probable that they will force us into an expedition against our will. I look upon the Swatis as the gravest danger. They are quiet at present, but they are fanatical, priest-ridden, and extraordinarily inflammable. At any time, out of a blue sky and with little or no warning, we might hear of an attack upon Chakdara, the Malakand, or the Chitral Reliefs. The Afridis are shrewd, sensible and intensely selfish; their priests have very little power, and I think that nothing but some very real grievance, or the fear of invasion, would induce them to rise independently of others.

4931. SIR P. LAKE.—Do you consider that the tribes have increased in fighting power since 1897?

4932. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Certainly. Their armament is very much better.

4933. SIR W. MEYER.—But our armament is better also?

4934. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes.

4935. SIR P. LAKE.—We now have a better rifle, but they have far more rifles of a decent description than formerly?

4936. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I think we are in a better position to hit at them than we were.

4937. SIR W. MEYER.—Owing to the improvements in internal communications, etc.?

4938. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes.

4939. SIR W. MEYER.—The Mahsuds are the people with whom Lord Curzon tried so-called peaceful measures; would not a real expedition have been better?

4940. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—It was an expedition in a desultory way—a blockade.

4941. SIR W. MEYER.—But speaking generally, if you have to strike you must strike hard?

4942. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—You could ruin the Mahsuds by entering their country in the spring and destroying their harvest then and in the following autumn. They would then practically starve.

I do not think the Mohmands are formidable.

4943. PRESIDENT.—What would be the probable attitude of the tribes if we were at war with Afghanistan, or of Afghanistan, if we were fighting some of the tribes?

4944. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—A war with Afghanistan would certainly unsettle the tribes and they would need careful watching, but it would not necessarily make them rise in sympathy. In such a war the most important tribe would be the Afridis, as they command the Khyber throughout its length, and the road from Landi Kotal to Jalalabad. I think it should be possible to hold them at the beginning of a war, but this would depend almost entirely upon the personality of the Political Agent in charge. An early and decisive victory at Jalalabad or Gandamak would probably bring them to our side, though doubtless very large numbers of individual Afridi *ghazis* would join the Sangu Khel Shinwaris in attacks on our line of communications. The other tribes from their situation could take little part in the war, but, were it prolonged they would probably become much excited and go in for extensive raiding.

Were we engaged in a tribal war, the attitude of Afghanistan would, I think, be officially correct, that is to say, the Afghan Government would disclaim any sympathy with the rebels, but would give covert assistance in the

shape of food and ammunition, and would wink at large numbers of Afghan subjects joining the tribesmen.

4945. PRESIDENT.—Do you think the tribes would be troublesome in the event of our being involved in hostilities with Turkey?

4946. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—A war with Turkey would not directly concern the tribes, but it would seriously affect feeling in Afghanistan and among the Muhammadans of India. There is in existence a widespread belief in a conspiracy of the European nations to crush Islam, and excitement in India and Afghanistan would re-act upon the tribes and make them uneasy, restless and inclined to war.

4947. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think the tribes are following events outside India—in Turkey for example?

4948. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The tribesmen themselves are not doing so, but in Peshawar, Bannu and elsewhere, the people are undoubtedly following events in Turkey, Tripoli and Persia very closely, and the tribesmen hear about them when they come down. But, with the exception of the Swatis, it may be said that the most reliable trait in the tribes is selfishness.

4949. SIR W. MEYER.—It is said that the rising in 1897 was to a certain extent brought about by the Turkish victories over the Greeks. What is your opinion?

4950. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I had to work out once what I thought were the causes of this rising, and I put down the feeling aroused by the Turco-Greek War as one very small contributory factor.

4951. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you say the same would be the case now; that events in another part of the Muhammadan world would only affect the tribes in a minor degree?

4952. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I would say that it would only effect them in a minor degree directly.

4953. SIR W. MEYER.—But indirectly, would not every effort be made to stir them up?

4954. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The feeling in India and Afghanistan would re-act upon the tribes. There is no barrier between the tribes and the people of the frontier districts, and many of the tribes have lived partly on one side of the line and partly on the other. Down in the Bannu District, the Wazirs stretch right across the line, and it is practically the same everywhere. The demarcation of the boundary between the tribes and the people of our own districts is quite an artificial one.

4955. SIR W. MEYER.—Apart from their own interests, the tribes are friendly to us, I gather? Have they any objection to us as individuals?

4956. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The religious question does not trouble them very much. In 1897 the Afridis had already divided up Peshawar among the different sections of the tribe, yet many of the men who fought on our side believed in the scheme.

4957. SIR W. MEYER.—Did the Afridis make an offer to come and help us in South Africa?

4958. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—No, but the Khyber Rifles would fight against anybody.

4959. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing we had a revolt on the part of the Sikhs and Hindus, could you count on the frontier tribes if we wanted them to come down?

4960. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—They would come in their thousands and bring their own arms. They would not require commissariat or transport, and they would pay themselves.

4961. SIR R. SCALLON.—Have any Afghans gone to Tripoli from Egypt ?

4962. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I have heard of a few having gone from the Perso-Afghan border, but there were very few indeed who went.

4963. PRESIDENT.—Do they regard the Sultan of Turkey as the head of the Muhammadan religion, or do they have any regard for the Amir in that capacity ?

4964. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The only possible Caliph is the Sultan of Turkey. The late Amir and the present Amir have never dared to take the name of Caliph, but have taken various fancy designations of a religious significance. The tribesmen do not regard the Amir as a great religious leader, but no *jihad* is lawful unless declared by a Muhammadan king and the Amir is a Muhammadan king.

4965. PRESIDENT.—What should be the policy in the event of our having to march into the tribal area ? Should we simply withdraw as previously, or if circumstances seemed favourable, establish posts there ?

4966. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I think that anything in the nature of annexing the territory up to the Durand Line would be a mistake. The only part of the frontier where we have a conterminous boundary with Afghanistan is in Kurram and the Tochi, where our territory marches with the Khost Province, and here the Afghans have shown themselves much worse neighbours than the tribesmen. We should, however, in my opinion, take advantage of future expeditions for necessary rectifications of our frontier with the tribes ; thus, I would take over the Adam Khel Jawaki spur, which separates the Peshawar and Kohat Districts ; the Kabul Khel country below the Thal-Idak line, which separates the Kohat and Bannu Districts ; and the spur ending at Pezu, which separates the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan Districts. Also, it might be desirable to make roads through some parts of independent territory, and to keep them open by posts, without annexing or taking over the administration of the country.

4967. SIR W. MEYER.—Sir Harold Deane held the view that, if you went into a tribal area and established a garrison there, you would have to disarm the tribes or the people in the near vicinity. What is your opinion ?

4968. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I think you would have to do so, unless you took the fight out of them for a generation or two. The Afridis could be disarmed in three years by fairly severe methods, but the tribes generally would take time.

4969. SIR W. MEYER.—Sir Harold Deane also drew a distinction between the occupation by force of a tribal area, and the voluntary acquiescence by the tribesmen in the quartering of an armed force in their country. Do you agree ?

4970. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The only part of the frontier where the latter method has been found successful is the Kurram, where the conditions are absolutely so unlike anything else in the whole of India that you could hardly use it for purposes of comparison. The *Shias* in the Kurram have a hostile population all round them.

4971. SIR W. MEYER.—Suppose a tribe asked us to come in to protect them, would you comply ?

4972. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I should take each case on its merits. I should not evince any enthusiastic desire to save them from immediate danger, because they would afterwards probably be more hostile to us than ever after the danger was past.

4973. SIR W. MEYER.—I gather that, if we had war with any tribe or tribes, you would not endeavour to garrison their country ?

4974. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I think the opening up of communications is the best means for keeping a tribe in check. If, for instance, we had

a prolonged war with the Afridis, we could make roads up the Bara Valley and in the Kohat direction and keep them open by means of posts. But I deprecate anything in the way of administrative measures. I think they would accept the situation that would be brought about by the improvement in communications, and after a little time they would not dislike it at all; their position would be weakened and they would be unlikely to give us trouble again. The whole question is one of roads and railways.

4975. PRESIDENT.—You have just told us that the line between the independent tribes and our own people in the trans-Indus territory is now artificial; I presume that the reason why we have been able peacefully to administer the settled frontier districts is that these tracts are level and not hilly?

4976. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes.

4977. PRESIDENT.—You have probably read a memorandum by the former Commander-in-Chief, Lord Kitchener, in which he strongly advocated the occupation of any tribal area if we marched an expedition into the territory. As an example, in the Tirah business, he would have occupied the Afridi territory?

4978. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I think I read it a good many years ago.

4979. PRESIDENT.—But your policy would not be a regular occupation; you would prefer the construction of roads, and posts sufficient to protect these roads, utilizing the tribesmen for the purpose as far as possible?

4980. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes.

4981. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing we followed out that policy, would it be likely to bring other tribes down on us on the ground that it was the beginning of the end? Let us suppose a war with the Afridis in which we get the best of it and run roads through the surrounding country; would the other tribes think we were beginning to sap their independence?

4982. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—A war with the Afridis would not be a short business; the other tribes would have declared their attitude before it ended, and we could only make the roads after we had brought the Afridis to their knees.

4983. PRESIDENT.—Are the Afridis fond of us?

4984. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Well, they get on better with us than any other of the tribes. They have a great natural taste for soldiering.

4985. SIR W. MEYER.—You mentioned just now that in 1897 they formed a plan for dividing up Peshawar. Why?

4986. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—There was a general idea all over India that our time had come. There were a lot of contributory causes for the general rising, one being our very active frontier policy. There were many stories of risings in India, and the frontier tribes were full of confidence.

4987. SIR W. MEYER.—In 1907 there was a certain amount of sedition in the air. Did that affect them?

4988. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—No. In 1907 no one thing would have made them break out, as they were then on good terms with us. India can only fan an existing flame. The talk up in the border hills was that the Sikhs were going to rise, and we could have had 10,000 to 20,000 fighting men to come down and help us.

4989. SIR W. MEYER.—You have spoken about the zeal with which they would attack the Sikhs. Has any scheme been thought out with regard to utilizing them in the event of a Hindu rising?

4990. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Not so far as I know, but if the tribesmen did come down to the Sikh country it would be to do what they themselves have always wanted to do—not so much to help us, though incidentally they would do so.

4991. PRESIDENT.—About the time of the Mutiny, owing to the absence of railways and telegraphs, officers on the frontier had much more local influence and power than they have now, I believe ?

4992. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes, and it was an advantage.

4993. SIR W. MEYER.—You have a scheme for an Islamia college in Peshawar ?

4994. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes. Its pupils would be the sons of rich men probably. The college is bound to come, whether we like it or not, so that we had better see that we have a controlling influence over its inception.

4995. PRESIDENT.—How far could 'peaceful penetration' on the Sandeman system be tried on the North-West Frontier ?

A. 4196.

4996. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Peaceful penetration on the Sandeman system can only be effected in a sparsely inhabited country where the people have not the power to resist. Conditions in the North-West Frontier Province differ so widely from those prevailing in Baluchistan that no comparison is possible. The area of the Frontier Province including tribal country is 16,466 square miles with a population of close on four millions. Baluchistan, including its tribal country, has an area of 45,804 square miles and a population of about 800,000. Thus the population of Baluchistan is, as I have already mentioned, about 18 per square mile, while that of the Frontier Province is about 242 per square mile. The tribes of the North-West are compact, heavily armed, and animated by a very strong love of independence. No penetration into their territory could, in my opinion, be peaceful. It is true that occasionally small and weak sections of tribes who are oppressed by their neighbours ask us to take them over ; but were we to accede to their request, we should alarm and offend the greater tribes, while those taken over would ere long repent and would intrigue to regain their independence.

4997. SIR W. MEYER.—Sir Mortimer Durand in giving evidence before a committee at home said that, although he started with the belief that the Sandeman system would not do at all on the North-West Frontier, he finally came round to the belief that it would.

4998. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I think there is a good deal that is mythical about the Sandeman system. Of course it is very easy to penetrate an uninhabited country.

4999. SIR W. MEYER.—One argument, often adduced, is that the tribes on the Baluchistan side are organized on an aristocratic system of government and, being controlled by the chiefs and head men, are thus more easily dealt with. Such is not the case with your tribes ?

5000. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I think if the tribes of Baluchistan had been strong there would have been no attempt at peaceful penetration. As it was, there was no resistance, their subjugation was "a walk over."

5001. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider it desirable to proceed with the Loi-Shilman and Parachinar railways ? If so, which would you take up first ? The Foreign Department desired to run the former line along the Kabul river ; Lord Kitchener suggested an alternative line ; which do you prefer ?

5002. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—From the point of view of the provincial administration alone, there is no necessity to proceed with either the Loi-Shilman or the Parachinar line ; but for the purposes of an Afghan war the construction of the former would almost double our strength, while that of the latter would be of great assistance. I would advocate the reconstruction on the broad gauge of the Kurram railway certainly as far as Thal, if not to Parachinar itself. With regard to the Loi-Shilman railway, I am, and always have been, strongly in favour of Lord Kitchener's alignment through the Loi-Shilman valley as that line is easy to guard, while to protect the river alignment I am convinced that it would be necessary to occupy the left of the bank of the Kabul River, and thus we should bring ourselves into unnecessary collision with the Mohmands and possibly with the Amir who claims the Bohai Dag.

You have the disadvantage in Lord Kitchener's scheme that you would run your line through a hilly country with one very expensive tunnel. The engineers at the time assured Lord Kitchener, however, that the cost of the two lines would be about the same.

5003. SIR W. MEYER.—I have heard that Lord Kitchener finally came to the conclusion that he would try the Bazar Valley?

5004. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I should say that would be an absolute impossibility. The Bazar Valley drops almost sheer quite suddenly. When Lord Kitchener came up to see the ground he was strongly in favour of taking the line through the Khyber and, failing that, by the river route; but I took him all round the country and showed him everything. He finally said that the Khyber route was quite impossible, and that the difficulties of protecting the railway by the river route would be so great that the only line we could make would be through the Loi-Shilman Valley. Under existing conditions, if the river route were to be adopted, you would have to have garrisons right along the banks of the Kabul river.

5005. SIR P. LAKE.—In order to prevent the tribesmen from pulling up the line?

5006. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes. You must realize the extreme narrowness of the gorge through which the river flows; there is no part of it that you could not throw a stone across. A man with a revolver would be sufficient to prevent work on the line, and in time of trouble you would have forty miles of railway to protect. The Mohmands, say, could come across the river and breach the line, and six men on the other bank could make it impossible to mend it again. I do not think the railway should be taken by this route, at any rate to start with.

5007. PRESIDENT.—I understand that there are high cliffs on the Mohmand bank of this gorge of the Kabul river?

5008. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes. You would have to have a series of block-houses right along the Mohmand bank.

5009. SIR W. MEYER.—When it was decided to give up the construction of these lines, was it sound policy to take up the rails that had been laid down?

5010. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—No, I think it was a ridiculous petty economy. It is a pity the bridges were taken up again.

5011. SIR W. MEYER.—So that practically all the money that has been spent has been wasted?

5012. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes. The tunnels remain of course. The money spent was about eighty lakhs.

5013. PRESIDENT.—This project was initiated in the original memorandum on the defence of the North-West Frontier about the year 1884. In that memorandum great stress was laid on railway communication along the Kabul river up to our boundary?

5014. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—It was advocated very strongly.

5015. SIR W. MEYER.—Can you say whether the pulling up of the lines and bridges was due to a mandate from Home?

5016. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I cannot say. The railway was unpopular from the first both here and at Home and, but for Lord Kitchener's strong advocacy of it, it would not have been sanctioned.

5017. PRESIDENT.—Have you any personal knowledge of the character and efficiency of the Afghan army? In particular, (a) do you concur with the view which has been expressed that the military power of Afghanistan is steadily increasing, especially for purposes of defence? (b) Do you think that the Afghan army is really formidable *per se*; and that any large part of it could be

concentrated against us? (c) Do you think that the recent incidents at Khost afford a high idea of the efficiency and concentrating power of the Afghan troops?

5018. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I have little personal knowledge of the character and efficiency of the Afghan troops stationed in Kabul, though I believe neither to be high; but in the course of the last twenty years I have seen a good deal of the Afghan troops in the provinces, and I consider them to be beneath contempt. Their officers are in many cases old and worn out and in all cases untrained, the men are discontented and underpaid and do not know how to use their weapons; they are not fit to face tribesmen and far less to fight our troops.

(a) The Afghans have certainly amassed very large supplies of munitions of war, but I think that the Afghan army, including regulars and levies, is now less formidable than it was at the time of either of the past Afghan wars.

(b) I do not think that the Afghan army is really formidable, but I think that, were we to advance upon Kabul, a great effort would be made to concentrate a sufficient force to fight a battle some few marches on this side of Kabul.

(c) Recent incidents in Khost have merely confirmed my unfavourable opinion regarding the mobility and efficiency of the Afghan forces.

5019. PRESIDENT.—I suppose, in your opinion, we should have to fight somewhere about the Haft Kotal?

5020. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—They would probably risk one battle somewhere between Kabul and Jalalabad.

5021. PRESIDENT.—Mainly for the sake of *izzat*?

5022. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes.

5023. SIR W. MEYER.—The idea has been put forward that, if we were at war with Afghanistan, a formidable factor would be the guerilla warfare with the Afghan tribes.

5024. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I think that was the case in previous Afghan wars, but I think that the Amir's policy of killing all the leading men has left the Afghan tribesmen largely without leaders. In former days the big nobleman would come out with his followers and fight. Abdur Rahman was jealous, and practically removed every big tribal chief in Afghanistan, or kept him a prisoner at Kabul. I do not think the Afghans would be as formidable now as in previous wars.

5025. SIR W. MEYER.—In case of a war with Afghanistan, how would the Ghilzais, say, be affected?

5026. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I do not think it would be safe to count on them. I think if we were to make a distinct offer of the throne to the Ghilzais, they would come over to our side; barring that, I think their fighting and religious instincts would make them all fight us.

5027. SIR W. MEYER.—A statement in regard to the equipment of the Field Army counts on our being able to raise eighteen Ghilzai camel corps. Do you think they could be relied upon?

5028. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Of course it depends on the time of the year. If a war breaks out in winter the Ghilzai camels are down in the districts of the Derajat, and we could seize them and prevent their going back. I would not use Ghilzai drivers in Afghanistan, however, as they would be unreliable.

5029. SIR W. MEYER.—If the war broke out at a season when we could seize the Ghilzai camels, you would not use the Ghilzai drivers?

5030. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I do not think I would send them up to the front. I would use the Ghilzai camels in India.

5031. SIR P. LAKE.—A previous witness said he thought they were more keen about making money than anything else. A. 3132.

5032. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—No, I think the national and religious feeling would come out.

5033. PRESIDENT.—In the second Afghan War we had considerable trouble with the Ghilzais. They are considered the most important fighting section among the Afghans ?

5034. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—They are much the largest section.

5035. SIR W. MEYER.—Would the Hazaras assist us ?

5036. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—In Afghanistan they have had the unpleasant experience of seeing us evacuate the country and leave them to their fate after accepting assistance from them. If we announced that we were going to stay in the country, they probably would not believe us now.

5037. PRESIDENT.—During the Afghan War we utilized Hazaras for road-making; after the war the Amir invaded the Hazara country and depopulated it ?

5038. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I do not think that we can count on any help in Afghanistan.

5039. PRESIDENT.—Then the general conclusion is that no reliance could be placed on the Ghilzais, in the event of such a war willingly to place their camels, etc., at our disposal, but that we could probably seize their camels if in our territory and utilize them ?

5040. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes.

5041. PRESIDENT.—In the event of a war with Afghanistan, Russia being friendly or neutral, the General Staff, in 1911, estimated that we should require a Field Army of eight-and-a-quarter divisions and four cavalry brigades, with some other units and a cavalry brigade as an immediate reserve. An additional three-quarters of a division and three cavalry brigades to be sent up later from internal defence forces, if possible. This was assuming that the frontier tribes gave little trouble, and the scheme contemplated sending four divisions and two cavalry brigades to Kabul. Do you consider that so large a force would be required to cope with Afghanistan ?

5042. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I do not consider it safe to base any calculations regarding the number of troops required for an Afghan war upon the assumption that the frontier tribes would give little trouble. I have not the data which would enable me to offer any criticism upon the numbers stated in your question, but speaking generally, I consider that our line of communications to Kabul should be very strong, as it would bear the brunt of the fighting, while a much smaller force than that suggested could deal with Kabul, if I may assume that the Afghan army would only fight one pitched battle somewhere between Kabul and Jalalabad.

5043. PRESIDENT.—In the event of war with Afghanistan, do you consider that our main advance should be directed on Kandahar or on Kabul ?

5044. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—As the ultimate objective of an Afghan war, Kabul stands alone. Kabul is the heart of Afghanistan, and the Amir is almost invariably referred to as the Amir of Kabul and not as Amir of Afghanistan. In the eyes of Afghanistan and of the world, Kabul is Afghanistan, and the capture of Kandahar by itself could never end an Afghan war and would in fact have little influence on the course of the war. There are, however, arguments in favour of a main advance on Kabul *via* Kandahar, though I think that the balance of advantage rests with the Khyber road, while the Kurram route could be utilized as an auxiliary line of advance in the summer and autumn.

5045. PRESIDENT.—Some of the evidence we have heard has been to the effect that it would suffice to march on Kandahar and leave Kabul by A. 4008.

itself. I do not know on what grounds that is said, if, as you observe, the occupation of Kandahar would exercise no influence on the hostilities. Is there not an Afghan saying that "the ruler of Kabul is the master of Afghanistan"?

5046. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes. They talk of a "Kabul" War. To take a country town like Kandahar would have no effect at all.

5047. SIR W. MEYER.—The views of the Kandahar school are that the occupation of the Kandahar Province would be such a blow to the Amir that it would probably arouse such great discontent as to lead to his overthrow. If it did not, we could march on Kabul?

5048. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I do not think the loss of Kandahar would have this effect, since in the old days the Amirs of Kandahar and Kabul were separate.

5049. PRESIDENT.—Have you considered the idea of marching to Kandahar, and thence to Kabul *via* Ghazni?

5050. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I have heard it advocated, but I do not know anything about it.

5051. SIR W. MEYER.—The plan advocated by the Kandahar school is that we should first get into Kandahar, await a revolution in Kabul, and then, if there was no revolution, move on Kabul from both sides.

5052. PRESIDENT.—When we have minor troubles with the Amir, can we bring him to reason by closing the Khyber?

5053. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—We have never yet failed to bring the Amir to reason in minor matters by closing the Khyber, and by threatening to close other passes and arrest Afghans in India. I have a firm belief in the efficacy of this measure, though I would not make use of it too lightly or too frequently. The closing of passes, and especially of the Khyber in the winter, threatens the Ghilzais with ruin, and no Amir could stand against their protests.

5054. SIR W. MEYER.—I understand we have had many minor troubles with the Amir regarding the frontier and other matters?

5055. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Constantly.

5056. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you consider that we are taking the right line in dealing with them?

5057. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—We know the disadvantages of the present *régime* in Kabul, but we do not know that the disadvantages of any alternative one might not be greater. Let sleeping dogs lie. Whenever the Amir forces us to put the screw on, I say stop the Khyber, and it always brings an answer from Kabul and immediate action.

5058. PRESIDENT.—What are your views as to the possibility or desirability of reducing the strength of the North-West Frontier militias, or of merging them in the regular Indian army? Assuming them to be kept up as separate bodies, would you place them in any way under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, and would you do the same with respect to military police?

5059. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I have the highest possible opinion of the value and utility of the frontier militias, and so far from reducing them would like to increase them. I should be very glad to see the four militia corps merged in the regular army after the manner of the "Punjab Irregular Frontier Force" in its early days when it was directly under the Punjab Government. Any attempt, however, to regularize the militias to the standard of technical efficiency of the Indian army would, I fear, deprive them of their elasticity and impair their efficiency. To place the militias or military police under the control of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in time of peace would, I think, be impossible at present, as to do so would be to transfer the most essential arm of the administration from my hand, and from the hands of my

Political Agents to those of the Generals Commanding frontier brigades, who can have but a slight knowledge of the independent country and of tribal conditions.

5060. PRESIDENT.—Does the same apply to the military police ?

5061. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The old Border Military Police have practically ceased to exist. The reorganized Border Police should be almost as good as the militias.

5062. PRESIDENT.—You are going to improve the Border Police are you not ?

5063. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—We have been trying to do so for the last ten years.

5064. SIR W. MEYER.—General Aylmer said he was very strongly in favour of merging these frontier corps with the regular army. He suggested that the Generals in command of the frontier brigades should have political powers and political agents under them. Is that feasible ? A. 2650.

5065. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The only possible way would be if I were given command of the whole of the troops on the frontier which would be absurd. Everybody has to be trained to his own work and should stick to his job.

5066. PRESIDENT.—You, on the other hand, would be in favour of keeping these militia corps and giving them perhaps a somewhat larger proportion of British military officers ? Would you convert these corps to regulars as was done in the case of the Punjab Frontier Force ?

5067. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I am not sure that a larger number of British officers is an advantage, but a command of 1,700 men should carry the same advantages as, say, the command of a Carnatic battalion. As it is, the officers of the frontier militia are being constantly changed. If the men were transferred to the regular army, they would get better pay and better conditions of service than they do now.

5068. SIR W. MEYER.—Who chooses these officers now ?

5069. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I select them. I write in and apply for the loan of the services of a certain officer for a certain number of years, and my request is generally granted.

5070. SIR W. MEYER.—Do they get more pay than with their regiments ?

5071. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes.

5072. SIR W. MEYER.—It has been suggested that this leads to the appointment of officers who are in debt ?

5073. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I find that officers who are in debt are anxious to get to the militia, but I make very careful inquiries, and I do not take them on that account. I have a list, and I take those officers I know to be good.

5074. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you prefer this system to one under which you would have to take such men as the Commander-in-Chief designated ?

5075. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The present system cannot last for ever. I take a very great interest in the militias and know the work ; but if I were succeeded by a civilian, it would probably change. The local administration on the frontier has always required an arm which can be used without outside help. If the militias were made part of the regular army, I should immediately have to start raising another force ahead of them. If the old Frontier Force had remained as it was, there would have been no necessity for militias ; but as matters are I cannot conceive it possible for me to dispense with the power of being able to send men wherever they are wanted. The men sent away on prolonged duty from say, Kohat or Bannu, would, if they were

regulars, want to go back again to their homes for various reasons, but my men do not argue the point; they stay at a place six months if necessary. You must have something the Political Agent can use himself.

5076. PRESIDENT.—You wish to establish an analogy between the Punjab Frontier Force, as originally constituted, and the present militias?

5077. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes, except that the Punjab Frontier Force had all the advantages of the regular army, but the militias have not. I think they should be given those advantages now.

5078. SIR W. MEYER.—You have commandants, but have you any superior military officer who co-ordinates the work under you?

5079. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—There is an official called the Inspecting Officer of Frontier Corps. In practice he is to me what the Military Secretary was to the Punjab Government. Under a civilian he would have much larger powers, as a civilian would not have much knowledge of the subject, and would consequently leave the work entirely to the Inspecting Officer.

5080. SIR W. MEYER.—Does not the same thing apply to the military officers of the Political Department?

5081. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I class them as in the Civil Service. I have commanded militia for sixteen years. The Inspecting Officer is a full colonel.

5082. PRESIDENT.—Why not call him Military Secretary to the Commissioner?

5083. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I do not think the name matters.

5084. PRESIDENT.—Was the strength of the Khyber Rifles considerably increased in connection with the now abandoned Loi-Shilman railway? If so, would you reduce it now?

5085. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—An addition of about 430 men was made to the Khyber Rifles for the guarding of the Loi-Shilman railway. In the interval which has since elapsed, the scope of the duties of the corps has increased so widely, and the armament of the Afridis has improved so greatly, that the work of the corps is now heavier than it was before. I consider that any reduction would be impossible.

5086. SIR W. MEYER.—How does the pay of the Khyber Rifles and other frontier corps compare with that of the regular army?

5087. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Very badly. A Commandant of militia is however better paid than he would be as a commander of a double-company of a regiment. A Commandant receives about Rs. 500 staff, and in addition to this he gets travelling allowances and Pushtu allowance.

5088. SIR W. MEYER.—Then the rank and file are the worst paid?

5089. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes, and it affects their recruitment. They are not so well housed either as the regular army, but they do not require the luxuries of regulars.

5090. SIR W. MEYER.—I gather that you are trying for an increase to their pay? Do you consider it necessary to level it up to the pay of the sepoy?

5091. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—There is no hope of it. We shall have to go on with the present rate of pay, but this will not be the end; we shall have to go on increasing.

5092. SIR W. MEYER.—I understand that the Pathans furnish a very considerable number of men for the army?

5093. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Not in proportion to the number of Sikhs enlisted.

5094. SIR W. MEYER.—You have a total of 11,500 Pathans as against 32,000 Sikhs.

5095. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Considering their numbers and fighting qualities, I am of opinion that Pathans are very much under-enlisted.

5096. PRESIDENT.—What is your opinion of the Border Military Police in the Frontier Province? Do you still adhere to the recommendations made with reference to these police by a Committee, presided over by Sir Harcourt Butler in 1911, of which you were a member?

5097. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—An efficient force of Border Police is absolutely essential, if we are to guard the border villages against raids. The present Border Police are inefficient; they are badly paid, overworked, without hope, and they have lost all *esprit de corps*. I adhere to the recommendations of last year's Border Police Committee, but I would remark that these recommendations were in the nature of a compromise.

5098. SIR W. MEYER.—Sir Henry McMahon told us that the Government of India had largely modified the proposals of the Butler Committee, but that they intended to make an improvement in the pay and organization of the Border Military Police with some reduction of their numbers.

A. 3475.

5099. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I have not heard of these orders. In 1909 I submitted proposals for the formation of a sufficient force of Border Military Police to guard the frontier, but I was told that my suggestions were so expensive that they could not be considered at all.

5100. SIR W. MEYER.—Have we not regular troops on the Samana at present?

5101. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes. The Samana is on, not across, the frontier.

5102. PRESIDENT.—What is the strength of the civil police in your Province? How far are they armed, and with what weapons? Are any bodies of them concentrated at particular centres whence they could be readily despatched to places at which there might be special need of them? Do you think that, in the event of serious internal disturbance, you could reckon on material assistance from the police in the maintenance of order?

5103. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The strength of the civil police in the Frontier Province is 4,087 men, of whom twelve gazetted officers and three upper subordinates are Europeans. About fifty per cent. of the force is recruited from the Punjab, less than ten per cent. being Hindus, the remainder Muhammadans. Their armament consists of 576 Martini rifles, 133 Enfield pistols and 2,665 smooth-bore breech-loading muskets and carbines. About 900 men are concentrated in Peshawar, and from 250 to 350 at the headquarters of the other four districts; the remainder are distributed among the 74 police stations of the Province, the strengths of which vary between a minimum of thirteen and a maximum of forty. Scattered as the police necessarily are, they would not be of any great material assistance in maintaining order, especially as they are very badly armed, but they would be of use in collecting information and in repressing minor disorders. The police are of good quality and, were they armed with Martini-Henry rifles and trained to their use, they could be of very great value if concentrated at important points in time of serious disturbance.

5104. SIR W. MEYER.—You have these bodies at district headquarters and at Peshawar; would they not be of some use for local riots?

5105. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—At Peshawar they would be barely sufficient to deal with the city.

5106. SIR W. MEYER.—Are all your police armed?

5107. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—No, they are not all armed, because you cannot call the smooth-bore breech-loading musket a serious arm nowadays. There are 3,300 weapons of sorts for 4,087 men, of whom a large number would be 'employed' men, so there are enough arms to provide every man with something. I would train the police in the use of better arms.

5108. SIR P. LAKE.—You do train them to the use of arms?

5109. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes, but we only train them to use buck-shot, etc. I would train them to use rifles; but I would not issue the rifles till required.

5110. PRESIDENT.—What is the strength of the Volunteers in your Province? Are you satisfied that they are efficient? What duties would you assign to them in the event of serious internal disturbance?

5111. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The strength of the Volunteers in the Frontier Province is one company; 1st Punjab Volunteer Rifles—enrolled strength 115, reservists 4; and one half-troop Punjab Light Horse—enrolled strength 19, reservists 4,—total (including reservists) 142.

I do not think that the Volunteers can be said to be efficient. They are never, as far as I know, inspected and have no opportunities of training in anything except musketry. They are all, or nearly all, Government servants who would have their own duties to perform in time of disturbance, and I think that they are a negligible quantity.

5112. PRESIDENT.—Do you think the internal situation in the Frontier Province is materially worse or better now than it was (a) in 1904 and (b) in 1907-08?

5113. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I consider that the internal situation in the Frontier Province is materially better, and morally worse, than it was ten years ago. It is difficult to compare the present situation with that of any particular date subsequent to 1897. The situation is materially better owing to the stricter enforcement of the Arms Act, to the improvement of communications, and to the increase of the military garrisons and improvements in their organization. It is morally worse owing to the steadily increasing connexion of the people of the Frontier Province with malcontents and political agitators in India and especially in the Punjab; also to the growth in circulation of a reptile vernacular press.

5114. SIR W. MEYER.—There was a certain amount of agitation and trouble in the Punjab in 1907-08. Did it affect the Frontier Province?

5115. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—As far as the agitators could manage it, it did. Peshawar was flooded with missionaries of sedition. They were assisted in every way by a clique in Lahore, but they have had very little effect.

5116. SIR W. MEYER.—Are you aware of any attempts in your Province to tamper with the loyalty of the troops?

5117. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I have heard occasionally of *fakirs* preaching.

5118. SIR W. MEYER.—You spoke of a "reptile press." Is the Press Act being consistently worked?

5119. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—It is unworkable. One paper lived entirely by blackmail and my *locum tenens* demanded security from it. It crossed the Indus and established itself on the left bank, under the Punjab Government, and from there it has been continuing its nefarious traffic. It had one perfectly scandalous article, and I tried the Press Act in this case and forbade the importation of the paper into the Province. We found we could only forbid the entry of the particular number in which this article appeared, and that happened two or three months after its publication.

5120. PRESIDENT.—The same rule that enabled you to take security would apply to the Punjab Government, would it not?

5121. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The paper in question has since rendered itself repeatedly liable to have its security taken away, but the Punjab Government decline to take action. I contrive to keep the one paper at Peshawar in order.

5122. SIR W. MEYER.—Does the Arms Act apply to the Peshawar District and the Province?

5123. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The Peshawar District and the Province were exempted until Lord Curzon ordered their disarmament; the Act now applies. Most of the big Khans are title holders and are exempted.

5124. PRESIDENT.—Formerly everybody ploughed his field with a gun strapped on his back.

5125. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—They are now deprived of their guns. During the last two years the Arms Act has been worked more strictly.

5126. SIR W. MEYER.—In what way has the Arms Act been more strictly enforced?

5127. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The habitual carrying of arms has been stopped. Five years ago nobody was without a dagger or something.

5128. PRESIDENT.—How do they defend themselves against thieves at night?

5129. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—They cannot. By disarming them the obligation of defending them against raiders is thrown on us, and we find we cannot fulfil it. Sir Frederic Cunningham said that it would only mean rearming them sooner or later, and we have been rearming them ever since.

5130. PRESIDENT.—Has the prestige of the British Government on the frontier increased or diminished during the last twenty years?

5131. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—On the whole I think that the prestige of the Government on the frontier has increased in the last twenty years. On the one hand, we have had considerable increases in the garrisons, and improvements in their organization, efficiency, and mobility. The prompt action of Government in 1908, and the remarkably rapid and complete success against the Zakka Khel and the Mohmands, had a great effect; and the growth of the militias, which have always been able to hold their own against greater numbers of tribesmen, have convinced them that our organization is formidable and that in war with us they must be the losers in the end. Against this we must put the breaking up of the Punjab Frontier Force, which guarded the frontier more efficiently than is possible to-day, also the constant intrigues with the tribes from Kabul, and with the people of the districts from India; last and not least, the weakening of personal rule due to the breaking down of the isolation of the Trans-Indus country.

5132. PRESIDENT.—The Punjab Frontier Force was a localized force and the regiments in it were fairly well accustomed to the country, and so on; would you imply that, as we now get regiments from all parts of India, you consider them less efficient for the frontier than the Punjab Frontier Force?

5133. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—After ten years they would be all right, but as they are constantly being changed they are not so efficient.

5134. SIR W. MEYER.—Did you take part in the Zakka Khel Expedition?

5135. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I did.

5136. PRESIDENT.—We heard from a witness that in the Zakka Khel business there were hardly any casualties on our side?

5137. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I forget how many there were. There were no cases of followers being cut up or anything like that. One or two British officers were killed, but the casualties were small. The arrangements were excellent.

5138. PRESIDENT.—Of course the force taking part in the operations was very lightly equipped. The whole thing only lasted about a month, but if it had been a long business it could not have been carried out on that scale?

5109. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—No.

5140. PRESIDENT.—Have there been periods during your tenure of the Chief Commissionership in which the attitude of the tribes, or other circumstances, gave you cause for serious anxiety?

5141. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—It is impossible to calculate how far local unrest, however insignificant in itself, may spread. Thus, every sign of trouble must give cause for anxiety. In 1908 an expedition against the Mahsuds appeared inevitable, and, in view of the then state of Afghanistan, a rising might have had very serious and wide-spread consequences. An expedition was fortunately averted. Again, in the spring of this year a Mahsud rising appeared to be imminent, but it was again staved off. In 1910 the attitude of the Adam Khel Afridis gave reason for apprehending war. This difficulty, however, was again settled. The isolated position of the weak Chitral garrison and the annual passage of its reliefs are to me a constant source of anxiety.

5142. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you any suggestion to make as regards improvement in this last respect?

5143. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I think, if we are going to keep an isolated garrison in Chitral, it must be increased to two battalions.

5144. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you keep up a regular garrison at Chitral, or would you leave it to the Kashmir Imperial Service Troops?

5145. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I do not think it would be advisable to employ the Kashmir Imperial Service Troops for this purpose, because it would be practically handing over Chitral to the suzerainty of Kashmir. Presumably their reliefs would come from Gilgit, but the distance would be enormous.

5146. SIR W. MEYER.—Can you not have a localized corps at Chitral?

5147. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—They have that already—the Chitrali Scouts.

5148. SIR W. MEYER.—Would it be possible to apply the tribal militia system to Chitral and have a local corps?

5149. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The local corps would have to be of Chitralis, who are not reliable. The hatred between Chitralis and Pathans is very strong, and I do not think it would be possible to have a Pathan militia: such a force would probably work satisfactorily, but owing to this hatred, which it is to our advantage to foster, it is inadvisable to bring Chitralis and Pathans together.

5150. SIR W. MEYER.—I gather then that, with all its disadvantages, the present system is the best?

5151. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes, but it is too weak. I would have a force in Chitral sufficiently strong to be able to go out and quell any trouble. It is only strong enough at present to sit behind walls and await reinforcements.

5152. SIR P. LAKE.—Would the present garrison there have to be strengthened in case of serious disturbance?

5153. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I look upon Chitral as a *damdosa hæreditas*, but there would be chaos if we were to withdraw. Although as long as their supplies held out, the garrison could stay behind walls, the advance of a relief expedition would be looked upon by the Swatis as a declaration of war. The reliefs are liable to be annihilated every time they go up.

5154. SIR W. MEYER.—But there has been no disturbance for years past?

5155. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—It will come. I feel the responsibility of it very much indeed. The garrison should be strong enough to send a force out if necessary. I suggested in conversation with the Commander-in-Chief that, as the cost of the reliefs is so enormous, there would be a saving if the garrisons were increased and the reliefs carried out every two years instead of every year.

5156. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you pressed the Government of India for a modification of the present arrangements ?

5157. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—No, because I think the question is a military one on which I could hardly voluntarily offer an opinion.

5158. SIR W. MEYER.—Could you not have written up to the Government of India stating that the situation is unsatisfactory ?

5159. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I always thought it was a question for the military authorities.

5160. SIR R. SCALLON.—Has not the garrison been decreased by men going on furlough ?

5161. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes, now that they are there for two years.

5162. PRESIDENT.—In a "Strategical* Study" on the subject of the internal defence of India, prepared by the General Staff in 1911, the following remarks occur in regard to the Frontier Province :— * Not reproduced.

"The first thing that will strike the reader as being abnormal in this Province is the very small proportion of British troops quartered in it. Of the armed forces therein, less than one-tenth are British troops, while in addition, spread along the frontier, are some 300,000 independent tribesmen armed with 70,000 breech-loading and 50,000 muzzle-loading rifles. This brings up the population, if armed men alone are counted, to 40 Indian to one British rifle within the zone itself. It shews clearly how much we depend on the loyalty of our native troops, and of the want of power among the tribesmen to combine against us : it demonstrates how, in the case of serious trouble arising in the Province reliance must be placed on assistance from the Cis-Indus side of Hindustan."

Do you consider the situation thus outlined satisfactory ? If not, do you consider it desirable to increase the proportion of British troops in the Province ?

5163. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I consider the improvement of railway communication to be more important for the safety of the Province than any increase of garrisons. The main line of the North-Western Railway passes through Nowshera and Peshawar to Jamrud, with a narrow gauge branch from Nowshera to the foot of the Malakand passing through Risalpur and Mardan. A broad gauge railway runs from Rawalpindi to Kohat, with a narrow gauge extension (which in my opinion should be converted to broad gauge) to Thal. We hope to complete the narrow gauge railway from Kalabagh to Bannu this year, and we are pressing for a branch of it from Lakki to Tank. This narrow gauge railway is connected by a ferry with the North Western Railway system in the Punjab. I hope eventually to obtain sanction for a narrow gauge line connecting Bannu with Kohat, either direct or *via* Thal, also a line connecting Peshawar with Kohat. I see no great advantage in increasing the proportion of British troops in the Province. The strength in Nowshera and Peshawar is enough to enable them to hold their own under any circumstances. I presume that the question refers more to the desirability of locating British troops in the independent brigades of Kohat, Bannu, and Derajat. If the Indian troops in these brigades are trustworthy, and I have no reason to suppose that they are not, the brigades are strong enough as they are. If they are not trustworthy, isolated British regiments would be sacrificed.

If it were desired to increase the proportion of British troops in the Province, I would suggest the addition of a British cavalry regiment at Risalpur and a battalion at Nowshera.

I may add that our latest return gives 347,430 fighting men, with 89,709 breech-loading and 49,372 muzzle-loading rifles, in the tribal area.

5164. SIR W. MEYER.—More British troops are to be brought into Risalpur when the necessary barracks are ready ?

5165. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The barracks are ready now, but I think the British cavalry regiments themselves are strongly averse to going there. The place is a desert.

5166. PRESIDENT.—I suppose the ground there is quite flat ?

5167. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Quite.

5168. PRESIDENT.—You are aware that the main object for which the scheme for the Field Army has been prepared is for trans-frontier operations ? The trans-frontier is a mountainous country, is it not ?

5169. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes.

5170. PRESIDENT.—The country in the vicinity of Risalpur is flat ; therefore what advantage do you obtain from concentrating large bodies of cavalry at Risalpur, when in time of war they would have to operate in hilly country ?

5171. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—They could only be used in plains such as the Jalalabad valley, where they would be useful in case of a general disturbance. On active service in the hills they are more responsibility and trouble than they are worth. In 1897 the cavalry regiments of the Field Force were used as infantry.

5172. PRESIDENT.—In the scheme a very large cavalry force is supposed to be necessary to operate in northern Afghanistan—where could they be employed ?

5173. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—In the Mazar-i-Sharif the country is flat, but in south-eastern Afghanistan with the one exception of the Jalalabad valley, they would be no use at all. They might be valuable as a containing force ; the Shinwaris have a horror of cavalry.

I agree with the contention that the Derajat Brigade should be located at Tank, and now that Tank is being connected with Bannu by railway, the argument is stronger. Dera Ismail Khan is fifty miles from the nearest frontier and for defensive purposes a brigade there is useless. The heat is terrific. We are going to have a railway to Tank and we have a very fine site in a position to support Wano and cover the Gomal. At present it would take the troops at least a week to get to Wano.

5174. PRESIDENT.—Have they transport ready ?

5175. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—They have not sufficient ready, but they could improvise it. The Punjab Frontier Force had its own transport and was able to move rapidly.

5176. PRESIDENT.—That system has been discontinued ?

5177. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes, but it was an excellent one.

5178. SIR W. MEYER.—The Derajat Brigade consists of one Indian cavalry regiment, one Indian mountain battery, and three battalions of Indian infantry. You suggest that it should be maintained at Tank instead ?

5179. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes. They have an expensive fort at Dera Ismail Khan, and it might be an advantage to leave half a battalion there, but even that is hardly necessary.

5180. SIR W. MEYER.—It would entail great expense to move a brigade *en bloc* to Tank, would it not ?

5181. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Not very great. The Indus is setting so much towards the right bank that Dera Ismail Khan is being washed away.

5182. PRESIDENT.—Your opinion then is that the Derajat Brigade should be moved to Tank ?

5183. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes.

5184. PRESIDENT.—It has been recently proposed to increase the peace garrison of Peshawar by a battalion of native infantry. Do you consider this advisable ?

5185. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—If the proposed increase is to be merely for the garrison of Peshawar, I see neither any particular advantage in it nor objection to it. If, however, this increase would enable the garrison to hold the important outposts of Abazai and Shabkadar, and possibly Bara, I should strongly advocate it. Under the Defence Scheme I understand that the garrisons of Abazai and Shabkadar will be withdrawn, but I am convinced that this could not be done with safety.

5186. PRESIDENT.—Would you be in favour of the arrangement proposed, provided one of the regiments in the Peshawar garrison were allotted to the outposts?

5187. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes. As a matter of fact, the outposts are garrisoned, but the military authorities always say that they are only so held temporarily. I cannot conceive of any circumstances under which I could agree to the troops being withdrawn. I think it should be recognized that they are permanent. We have to keep up the outposts at present, but I think that in the event of barracks being built, these should be kept up by the Public Works Services.

5188. SIR W. MEYER.—What is the approximate strength of the detachments at Jamrud, Abazai, and Shabkadar?

5189. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—They vary a great deal, but I think there are about two companies at Shabkadar, two at Abazai, and one at Jamrud.

5190. PRESIDENT.—You are of opinion that garrisons are required at these stations?

5191. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—War garrisons are absolutely necessary.

5192. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that our Pathan troops and the Frontier Militia could be relied on in the event of hostilities (a) with their fellow-tribesmen, (b) with Afghanistan, (c) with Turkey?

5193. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—A very long experience of Pathans has convinced me that the answer to this question depends almost entirely upon the personal influence of officers. In 1908 a force of about 800 men of the Khyber Rifles, including three companies of Zakka Khel, entered the Bazar Valley and took part in operations against the Zakka Khel, the remainder of the corps being scattered over a long line of outposts with every opportunity of deserting with impunity. The men of the Khyber Rifles fought cheerfully against their fellow-tribesmen and relations, and burnt their villages and in many cases their own. Throughout the operations not a single man deserted and not a single rifle was lost. Where Pathans are in a very small minority in a regiment, and are commanded by officers who have not specialized with Pathans, they are less trustworthy.

5194. PRESIDENT.—Then you consider that with your officers they are to be relied on in every case?

5195. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes.

5196. SIR W. MEYER.—Are you satisfied with your officers in the frontier militia?

5197. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Absolutely.

5198. PRESIDENT.—What do you think would be the attitude of Punjabi Muhammadan troops in like circumstances?

5199. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I have little personal knowledge of Punjabi Muhammadan troops, but I have a high opinion of them, as I have never known them to fail to do well on the frontier. I have no knowledge of how far political seditionist movements have got among Punjabi Muhammadans.

5200. SIR W. MEYER.—Is there not a strong feeling between Hindus and Muhammadans in your Province?

5201. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—In the whole of the north of India, with the growth of political agitation, the feeling between Muhammadans and Hindus has become steadily more bitter each year.

5202. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think a combination of Hindus and Muhammadans probable?

5203. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—No combination is possible that you could not break with the greatest ease.

5204. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that we have too many Pathans in the Indian army, or do you think their numbers might be increased if circumstances suggested a redistribution of races therein?

5205. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I think that we have too few Pathans in the Indian army, and I would strongly advocate an increase of their numbers. There are, I believe, only 2,800 Afridis now serving and it would be easy to treble this number. Orakzais also make good soldiers, and Mahsuds have given excellent results when serving at a distance from their homes. The Cis-Border Pathans, such as Yusafzais, Khattaks and Mohmands, are over-recruited and are gradually losing their fighting qualities. To obtain the most satisfactory results from Pathans, I consider that regiments in which they are enlisted should contain not less than two double-companies of them and that these should be homogeneous.

The existence of large numbers of pensioners and especially of pensioned Indian officers in the tribes should give us, if properly used, a great hold over them. In view of the great rise in the cost of living I consider that the rates of pensions should be increased so as to enable the recipients, and especially native officers, to keep up their positions.

In 1897 we did not take advantage of the great hold we had over our Indian officers at all. At the beginning of the war we should have called all of them in to report themselves at Peshawar, or in default, lose their pensions. I think we could break the back of an Afridi rising by withdrawing these pensions. I think, however, that the present pensions given to Indian officers are too small.

5206. SIR W. MEYER.—Did the pensioners who fought against us in 1897-1898 get their pensions all the same?

5207. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I think so.

A. 482
and 2802.

5208. SIR W. MEYER.—One of the economies suggested for the Indian army is a lower peace footing and larger reserves. Would the Pathan reservists give us much trouble beyond the frontier?

5209. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—In operations against the tribes they would probably join with their fellow tribesmen if at home at the time.

5210. SIR W. MEYER.—Would they in the event of a war with Kabul?

5211. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—It would be a matter of individual judgment.

5212. SIR P. LAKE.—On the other hand, if they thought we would withdraw their pensions, they would come over to us?

5213. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The pensions are small, so I do not think that would influence them.

5214. PRESIDENT.—Are you satisfied with the proportion of Sikhs in the army?

5215. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I consider the very large number of Sikhs in the Indian army, and their organization in class regiments, to be a serious danger. Regiments where Sikhs and Muhammadans are mixed are all right because you know what is going on, but in class regiments the officers do not know what is going on.

5216. PRESIDENT.—The Sikh is an intriguing person, is he not?

5217. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes, with great grievances with regard to Canada at the present moment.

5218. SIR W. MEYER.—Sir Edmund Barrow is in favour of class regiments as having this advantage, that if the regiment is tainted you can easily move it *en masse* to a less dangerous place. In 1897, for instance, a regiment had only one company of Afridis but the whole regiment had to be moved away.

A. 6.428.

5219. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I take the opposite view. The remedy is actually in mixed regiments. In a class Dogra regiment the opinion was volunteered to me that the Commanding Officer had not the faintest idea of what was going on.

5220. SIR W. MEYER.—In the Afridi instance you would have made your other companies disarm the Afridis, I presume?

5221. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes. While Pathans are in a minority in regiments, there is very much more likelihood of their giving trouble or being suspected of giving trouble; but if you have half a regiment of Sikhs and half a regiment of Pathans you will be perfectly safe anywhere.

5222. PRESIDENT.—You should have at least two double-companies of Pathans, I take it?

5223. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes.

5224. PRESIDENT.—Lord Kitchener's scheme of 1903 contemplated the possibilities of the raising of several yeomanry corps by loyal gentry in time of trouble. Would this be possible in your Province?

5225. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I am confident that the gentlemen of the Frontier Province, who have a vivid memory of the exploits of their fathers in 1857 and of the liberal rewards gained, would gladly raise contingents of horse and foot in time of trouble. These would be best utilized in keeping order on the borders of independent territory, and this plan, besides relieving our troops and police of a harassing duty, would have the advantage of keeping a number of hot-blooded men out of mischief. In 1909, when we had serious trouble with the Afghans on the Kurram Border, the Nawab of Teri, on hearing that I had gone there, sent spontaneously his eldest son with about thirty sowars and a hundred and twenty footmen to my assistance. This reinforcement was not of great material assistance, but its political effect was very marked. I think it would be a mistake to organize these levies into corps of yeomanry as the jealousies excited would be great. I would prefer to give each Khan a section of the border to guard with his own levies appointing two or three officers familiar with the country to tour along the line and be in general charge of the levies. It would be necessary to store rifles for the levies either at Peshawar or Rawalpindi. I think you could trust them thoroughly.

5226. PRESIDENT.—Lord Kitchener's original proposals for the redistribution of the army included the establishment of a large cantonment at Torsappar. Do you think this would have been desirable?

5227. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—From my recollection of conversations with Lord Kitchener, I believe that the main, if not the sole, object of a cantonment at Torsappar was to guard the head of the Loi-Shilman railway. Now that this railway has been abandoned, there is no advantage in having the cantonment.

5228. SIR W. MEYER.—Apart from the Loi-Shilman railway, is Torsappar a place well suited for a brigade?

5229. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes, but there is no particular advantage in having it there.

5230. SIR P. LAKE.—General Barrow said he thought there would be a very suitable place on the Maira?

A. 3972.

5231. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—It is near the Kabul river, but it does not lead to anywhere in particular. The railway passes near Shagai. I think you could get a good training ground above Cherat.

5232. PRESIDENT.—Are you satisfied with the arrangements for internal defence, in the event of a frontier war and serious internal disturbance, recently suggested to you by the Government of India in the Army Department?

5233. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I adhere to the opinions I expressed in answer to that letter.

5234. PRESIDENT.—The existing scheme places stress on organized brigades being earmarked for the Field Army, while internal defence troops would be drawn largely from various and possibly distant sources. Thus it has been proposed that one of the battalions required for the internal defence in the Peshawar divisional area, should be located in time of peace at Dinapore. Do you think this a satisfactory arrangement? Might it be preferable to allot internal defence to troops already stationed in or near the places to be principally guarded, and to make the moves from other places in connection with the mobilization of the Field Army?

5235. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—From a purely provincial point of view it would doubtless be desirable to allot the internal defence of the Province to troops already stationed in it and familiar with the country, but I venture to think that the general advantages of utilizing, in an Afghan war, the organized brigades now garrisoned on the frontier, which have been trained in a *terrain* similar to that in which they would have to operate in war, should outweigh local and selfish considerations. As regards the battalion referred to as now stationed at Dinapore, I think it is more a question of its quality than of its location, provided that the railway authorities can guarantee that there will be no delay in sending it to its allotted station.

5236. SIR W. MEYER.—You think that where a brigade has not been specially trained under frontier conditions, it might, if necessary, be equally well employed in internal defence.

5237. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—Yes, apart from the general considerations I have mentioned, it would meet the needs of the Province better to keep it where it is.

5238. PRESIDENT.—Do you think the local conditions at Nowshera are particularly conducive to training for mountain warfare?

5239. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—The hills are not far off. They have had a lot of manœuvres there. Nowshera has many advantages; it is on the main line of rail.

5240. PRESIDENT.—There are no hills, for example, in the immediate vicinity of Peshawar?

5241. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—That is so, and the Peshawar valley is so highly cultivated that you cannot train troops in it. You must go to Fundoo. There are no hills within ten miles of Peshawar. At Rawalpindi there is broken ground.

5242. PRESIDENT.—You lay stress, I gather, on the retention of Bannu. Is it very desirable that the peace garrison should remain there as obligatory troops?

5243. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—From a purely selfish point of view they should stop there, but from a broader point of view they would be much more valuable in war than a brigade from down country.

5244. SIR W. MEYER.—Are you aware that the military authorities, having trained the Kohat troops in time of peace as a brigade, propose to break up the brigade in war?

5245. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—No, I am not. From the narrow point of view I would keep it at Kohat, but I would sacrifice this for the greater good.

5246. SIR W. MEYER.—A brigade trained together in time of peace should be kept together in time of war?

5247. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I should presume so, but it is not possible to adhere to principles in every case.

5248. PRESIDENT.—Might the defects of the Peshawar divisional area as a self-contained entity in regard to the provision of a division for the Field Army, and for local internal defence, be partly remedied by making it include the now independent brigades at Kohat, Bannu, and the Derajat?

5249. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—I do not quite understand this question. If it means that the independent brigades at Kohat, Bannu, and in the Derajat would be able to afford assistance to the Peshawar Division in the event of serious internal disturbance, I fear that this is not the case, as it would not be possible to weaken them.

5250. SIR W. MEYER.—Is there any advantage in making these Brigade Commanders independent instead of placing them under the divisional General at Peshawar?

5251. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—There is one office less to have to go through.

5252. SIR P. LAKE.—If you had any difficulty in the Derajat, you could go at once to the Derajat Commander?

5253. SIR G. ROOS-KEPPEL.—This has happened, and I have dealt directly with Major-General Younghusband without incurring any delay at all.

(The witness then withdrew.)

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

25th Meeting—Tuesday, the 30th July 1912.

Lieutenant-General Sir James Willcocks, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., Commanding Northern Army, appeared as a witness, and was examined.

EVIDENCE OF SIR JAMES WILLCOCKS.

5254. PRESIDENT.—Sir James Willcocks, you command the Northern Army, and have previously commanded the Peshawar Division; you have had considerable experience on the staff in various parts of India?

5255. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, sir.

5256. PRESIDENT.—The Kitchener scheme proposed to make every divisional area self-contained, both as regards its contribution to the Field Army and the internal defence troops. As a matter of fact it appears that practically every one of the present nine divisional areas in India proper would require to obtain a portion of its war or internal defence troops, or both, from outside; and that the full working out of the Kitchener scheme in this respect would involve large expenditure. Do you consider that this expenditure need be incurred or that the full working out of the scheme might be abandoned?

5257. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—If money were not the chief consideration I would certainly carry out the Kitchener scheme in full. For purposes of war training nothing in my opinion can be more important. Considering, however, its cost and the many needs of the army in India which must be met, I do not think it possible to work the scheme out in its entirety. There are, however, some details which should in any case be completed, for instance, the completion of the 1st Division area communications up the Kurram and Khyber, etc.

5258. SIR W. MEYER.—How would you complete the 1st Division area?

5259. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—By bringing in those units which are not there now.

5260. SIR W. MEYER.—You would bring the 3rd Brigade together?

5261. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I would bring in the battalion that is deficient to complete it.

5262. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you have it concentrated as the other two brigades are?

5263. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, I would bring the fourth battalion into Peshawar, the divisional Pioneer battalion to Nowshera, and the cavalry and artillery to Risalpur; I would also bring up the sapper company. If it is considered that there is not room for all these units, the question of the extension of the Peshawar area must be taken up.

5264. PRESIDENT.—The real point is to make the divisional area self-contained?

5265. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes.

5266. PRESIDENT.—You would also have to bring in units for the obligatory garrisons when the division is moved out?

5267. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—That is so, but it is a very small area; and I may say that notwithstanding its smallness it possesses more training ground than many other larger areas.

5268. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you make a corresponding reduction in the Kohat Brigade?

5269. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I could not answer that straight off, but I would affirm that the division that goes into the field should be completed, and the troops required for this purpose should be near at hand in case they were required.

5270. SIR R. SCALLON.—Perhaps the Abbottabad Brigade might be transferred to the Peshawar Division ?

5271. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, that is a question which has been put up by me.

5272. SIR R. SCALLON.—That would complete the war division and internal defence troops ?

5273. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, but then you have got to consider the 2nd Division.

5274. PRESIDENT.—What would be the result of bringing in the Abbottabad Brigade ?

5275. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—It would mean war training for it in the division. It is one solution of the problem of how to complete the Peshawar Division, though I do not say it is the best.

5276. PRESIDENT.—Lord Kitchener was able to provide nine divisions for the field as opposed to four (finally raised to six) contemplated in previous arrangements, (a) by reducing the proportion of British troops formerly held necessary for the Field Army, and, (b) by reducing the strength of what were formerly considered to be necessary for obligatory garrisons, etc.

(i) As regards (b) do you consider that Lord Kitchener's scheme adequately provided for the necessities of internal security and defence ?

(ii) Might a larger Field Army have been provided without the complete recasting of previous arrangements ?

5277. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—(i) Lord Kitchener's scheme provided for the necessities of internal defence as they existed at the time. Things have changed a good deal since. I do not think sufficient obligatory garrisons were detailed in the scheme, but in my opinion, whatever may be laid down in peace, in India internal defence will have to be met according to circumstances. So long as the Field Army is efficient and victorious, so long will internal defence be comparatively easy. If the Field Army fails in its task, then internal defence comes to the fore.

(ii) For five years preceding the introduction of Lord Kitchener's scheme I was away in West Africa, and before I left India in 1897 my work on the staff, as Assistant-Adjutant-General, was chiefly routine so my answer to this question would not be of much value.

5278. SIR W. MEYER.—You say the great thing is the Field Army; that internal defence must be left to shift for itself; and that the situation in the interior will only become serious if there is a disaster in the field. In the event of such a calamity you will find yourself handicapped internally ?

5279. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I should say the rising would be very small if the army in front is victorious; if not, a larger force will be required from Home or elsewhere to meet the situation.

5280. SIR W. MEYER.—But it would be possible to provide more fully for internal defence, and have a less ambitious Field Army which might stand on the defensive until reinforcements arrived ?

5281. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I would prefer to keep the Field Army as it stands and let internal defence take the risks; but, at the same time, I do not believe that the risks in India itself could be so great as to demolish us before reinforcements arrived.

5282. PRESIDENT.—Even if troops were fully concentrated as under the Kitchener scheme, would they be able to move without their second-line transport, and would that be promptly available ?

5283. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I do not think the second-line transport (or all the other animals needed) would be promptly available. In fact, I am quite sure they would not be; but on the other hand, Lord Kitchener must have had before him the project of the early advance of our frontier railways. I myself firmly believed six years ago that the Loi-Shilman and Parachinar railways would be completed soon. Had this been done, the saving of expense and time on mobilization would have been great and the saving in transport animals still greater. Why, even the completion of Kacha Garhi as a base would save endless delay. To-day the base godowns at Peshawar are about as badly placed as they can be. The great desideratum in a frontier war (especially against Afghanistan) is to start from a point as near to the objective as possible. It is the congestion at bases such as Peshawar and Kohat and the wear and tear of the transport before it reaches the frontier that will do much harm when war breaks out.

5284. SIR P. LAKE.—Have you worked out the question?

5285. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I have in part; I do not think the transport would be immediately available for a large portion of the army. From my experience in the Zakka Khel and Mohmand expeditions I know the difficulties. We have risks also as regards camel transport.

5286. SIR W. MEYER.—Eighteen Ghilzai corps are counted on for mobilization. Do you think that it is safe to rely on these?

5287. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I think they would turn up in ordinary times, but that in the case of a war with Afghanistan it would be doubtful if they would put in an appearance.

5288. SIR W. MEYER.—What about the Army Bearer Corps?

5289. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I consider that to-day the army is absolutely without ambulance transport. In both the Mohmand and Zakka Khel expeditions I had no proper ambulance transport; sepoys and British soldiers were carrying wounded—and made a fuss about it. I have represented this matter and said that, notwithstanding the excellence of the army, the ambulance transport had been entirely left out. I would rather do without a brigade than do without my ambulance transport.

5290. PRESIDENT.—Even in the case of these operations where you were lightly equipped, there was difficulty in getting up second-line transport?

5291. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—There was delay; there is the delay in bringing them up. We used to keep camels up about Peshawar at one time, but owing to fear of raids they were moved down to Campbellpore. The only units that may be said to be equipped with transport are the Malakand and one or two other moveable columns.

5292. PRESIDENT.—As regards the Army Bearer Corps we understand that for the Mohmand affair you had to denude every other division in India of their few bearers?

5293. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, and we did not get them even then.

5294. SIR W. MEYER.—I understand that, in the event of the Field Army being mobilized, internal defence troops would be left without any transport. Do you think that is satisfactory?

5295. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Well, there is one thing, transport is available in the country, and we should, of course, not ask for it but take it.

5296. SIR W. MEYER.—What about horses, for replacing casualties in batteries?

5297. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I too should like to know what will happen there.

5298. SIR W. MEYER.—The state of affairs is not satisfactory?

5299. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Not at all.

5300. SIR W. MEYER.—You would like a larger reserve of artillery horses ?

5301. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes.

5302. PRESIDENT.—Is the proposition that troops ought to be trained and commanded in peace by those who will lead them into the field in time of war possible to carry out fully in practice, having regard to the limited tenure of commands, the possible unfitness of particular officers for field service, and the periodical reliefs of units ?

5303. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—The training of troops for war by those who will lead them in the field is essential and eventually economical. My own experience has convinced me that a brigade being commanded on service by the same General who trained it in peace increases its fighting value immensely. This is true economy both in lives and money. It helps to end a campaign much sooner than it could be done otherwise. If due foresight is exercised, commanders, staffs, and troops should change as little as possible, and, as to the particular officers who may be found unfit for service, this must occur occasionally under any conditions. They should not be there to start with. Reliefs should be gradual, one corps leaving a brigade at a time.

5304. PRESIDENT.—Do you find any considerable difference between the capacities for command of the various brigade commanders ?

5305. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—A great deal.

5306. PRESIDENT.—When you find them unfit for leading troops in time of war, are they got rid of ?

5307. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I report them to the Commander-in-Chief.

5308. PRESIDENT.—As a matter of practice what is done ?

5309. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Well, if I had any difficulty I should object to take such a man, but action is taken on my reports at Army Headquarters.

5310. SIR W. MEYER.—If you had to take the Northern Army into the field, would you take all the present Generals ?

5311. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—No, not all, if I was asked ; but you cannot help that. That might occur under any system.

5312. SIR W. MEYER.—There ought perhaps to be more rigorous sifting than is likely to obtain ?

5313. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—That would be the best thing, but it would never be done.

5314. PRESIDENT.—Having regard to the above considerations, was it desirable to put a large expenditure on redistribution in the forefront of the reform programme ? Might it have been better to confine redistribution, at the outset, to cases in which it was desirable to concentrate small isolated detachments, and to postpone larger moves until after arrangements had been made to render the proposed Field Army and internal defence troops thoroughly efficient by remedying defects in their armament, equipment, transport appliances, etc. ?

5315. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I was officiating in command of the Secunderabad Division when the Kitchener scheme was first started ; I then commanded the Nowshera Brigade when it was in full swing, and lastly the Peshawar Division when the scheme was put to the test in the field in 1908. I am convinced, notwithstanding the heavy expenditure involved in redistribution and notwithstanding the other very necessary requirements of the army enumerated in the question under reply, that the redistribution was the best thing that could have been done. It brought into being actual war units ; it stimulated war training, it gave life to troops, who at last understood what they were meant for, and it was hailed by those whose hearts were in their work ; moreover, it caused emulation—division *versus* division and brigade *versus* brigade ; it allowed Generals

to exercise bodies of troops which they would lead in the field, and the extraordinary interest it aroused was a thing not to be forgotten by those who, like myself, were in actual command, or who belonged to the actual war units in any capacity. In my opinion, whatever its drawbacks or whatever might have taken precedence, the redistribution was a right good move; especially as at the same time defects in equipment, transport appliances, etc., (at least in the area in which I was serving) were not forgotten; thus, 18-pr. guns were brought into Nowshera, the Attock bridge of boats was also brought there, the Khyber route was doubled, the Loi-Shilman railway started, the Mallagori route begun and many other projects undertaken.

5316. PRESIDENT.—In our experience of trans-frontier warfare—in the Afghan war—was it the case that units of various brigades were being continually altered so as to suit the varying contingencies of the time?

5317. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I believe so.

5318. PRESIDENT.—The exigencies of mountain warfare in Afghanistan lead frequently to the breaking up of particular organizations?

5319. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—It has done in the past.

5320. PRESIDENT.—Then is it proved that, though it may be of high importance for warfare of the normal type in civilized countries, to have homogeneous infantry and cavalry brigades trained for war, the training of mixed brigades is less important for the army in India than the training of the homogeneous infantry and cavalry brigades which have been organized under the existing system?

5321. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—In the Mohmand affair, every time I undertook an operation it was with whole brigades. I did not send out a battalion here or a battalion-and-a-half there; I took a brigade and it worked as a brigade. The country is quite suitable for it. The enemy were sometimes led by some of our deserters. I do not know whether the tribesmen suffered bigger losses or offered less resistance, but the General Commanding and the officers under him knew each other and in that way I think that even in an Afghan war brigades will work together. After all, there are two forms of training, one for war against a European enemy and the other against an Asiatic enemy.

5322. PRESIDENT.—Then you think that we should attach more importance to training for meeting Russia in Afghanistan, than for dealing with Afghanistan and the frontier tribesmen?

5323. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—No, but I think if you train troops to meet Russia you can include in that training preparation for work on the frontier?

5324. SIR W. MEYER.—You would not consider it just as good training for both troops and Brigade Commander to have, say, three battalions of infantry and a regiment of cavalry, etc., brigaded together, as to have four battalions of infantry?

5325. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—But the Brigade Commander under present conditions does both; he trains his brigade, but he does his combined training as well. Take the case of the infantry brigade at Nowshera; there is also the cavalry brigade there.

5326. PRESIDENT.—The infantry Brigadier does not train the cavalry?

5327. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—No, but he trains his mixed units. It is only in a few stations where there does not happen to be any cavalry that he does not do so.

5328. PRESIDENT.—Surely the cavalry is not under his command?

5329. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Although it is not under his command, he can call for it for training purposes, and the divisional General also sees to this.

5330. SIR W. MEYER.—Each of your war brigades consists entirely of infantry or cavalry, and the artillery is either with the divisional or army troops. Would it not be better to follow the practice of, say, the Roman

legion, and, instead of having infantry or cavalry brigades, let each brigade have a certain proportion of each arm ?

5331. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I do not agree with that, I prefer it as it is.

5332. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you never have a cavalry officer in command of an infantry brigade ?

5333. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—No, but he might command a combined force.

5334. SIR W. MEYER.—Then you speak about the advantages of the Redistribution Scheme, but you say how the army has suffered as regards the Army Bearer Corps ; might it not have been better to have completed this service in preference to other measures ?

5335. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Undoubtedly ; but as far as I know, the Redistribution Scheme did not include any reduction.

5336. PRESIDENT.—One of Lord Kitchener's original proposals was to establish a large cantonment at Torsappar ; apart from political objections, do you think this would have been desirable ?

5337. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I visited the proposed site at Torsappar whilst the question of establishing a cantonment there was under consideration. Strategically, I think it was a very good site, but as a spot for a cantonment it was impossible. The water was very limited and life at Torsappar would have been dull in the extreme, whilst the training ground (except for infantry and mountain artillery) was quite unsuitable. There is not a tree or anything of interest in the place. Had Torsappar been a good site for cantonments, I can think of no better place for quartering a brigade whence it could look over the Kabul river and the plains of Jalalabad.

5338. PRESIDENT.—General Barrow mentioned an alternative site to the right of the railway leading to Jamrud, near Chagai. A. 3972.

5339. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—That is quite a good place for a cantonment.

5340. PRESIDENT.—But it would be a dull place ; we have to have some regard to the amenities of life as our army is raised by voluntary enlistment ?

5341. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes.

5342. PRESIDENT.—In the event of war with Russia, do you think that the Russians would content themselves, at the outset with occupying Afghan-Turkistan and consolidating their position there, or that they would make so rapidly for Kabul that we should have to throw troops into that place very quickly ? Bearing on this, have you any special knowledge of the difficulties of communication in Afghanistan ?

5343. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Russia would of course occupy Afghan-Turkistan early. Unless the Afghans themselves desired it, she could not reach Kabul for many months ; in any case, whether Russia had Afghanistan with her or not, in my opinion, we must occupy Kabul as soon as possible. Putting aside strategical considerations, to leave Kabul alone, whilst the Russians consolidated their position in Afghan-Turkistan and made preparations for crossing the Hindu Kush, etc., would mean that the Afghans might or might not go over to Russia, but would in any case go dead against us. Action of some sort always inspires respect amongst Afghans ; hesitation, if they were for us, would lose us their support, or if they were against us, would increase their resistance.

I know a good deal of the state of communications during the last Kabul campaign of 1878-80 ; since those days roads and bridges have made vast strides. I have many times talked to traders and others about the present roads from Dakka to Kabul and from Kabul in various directions ; the one thing I always gather is that, though the alignments are fairly good and bridges

average, the foundations have no soleing and rest on small stones, earth, and even sand. In other words, they are good surface roads but would never stand heavy wheeled traffic. This is important.

5344. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you seen Lord Kitchener's scheme of 1903-04 as expounded by General Duff before the Mowatt Committee? I think it contained some formidable calculations regarding the rate at which it was assumed the Russians could advance, and it practically came to this, that we should have to race them hard to get into Kabul first?

5345. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I do not agree with that; we could easily get there first.

5346. SIR W. MEYER.—Therefore we should have time for preparation and could occupy Kabul with greater leisure than Lord Kitchener anticipated?

5347. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Well, if you have the means to mobilize, I should say, do so at once.

5348. SIR W. MEYER.—But we should not have to rush for Kabul breathlessly?

5349. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—No, I cannot conceive of any situation under which we could not be in Kabul first.

5350. SIR W. MEYER.—Various witnesses have told us that we should not move on Kabul until the Amir asked us to go, and we knew that the Afghans would not oppose us?

5351. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I should not wait for that.

5352. SIR W. MEYER.—There would be the risk of having to face both the Afghans and Russians?

5353. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, but we must face that.

5354. PRESIDENT.—Are you aware that in the last Afghan war great difficulty was experienced in feeding the troops?

5355. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I was there, but do not know of any difficulty that could not be overcome. There was an immense lot of local food where we were, but we were not allowed to touch it. Had we been allowed to take it, we could have fed our line of communications. I was surprised at the large amounts of food that were available in certain parts.

5356. SIR W. MEYER.—If, as you say, it is desirable to hold Kabul at any cost against Russia, why not go further and try and secure this side of the Hindu Kush passes?

5357. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—During war, do you mean?

5358. SIR W. MEYER.—Russia declares war; you say we should occupy Kabul; would you go further and try and secure the mouths of the Hindu Kush passes?

5359. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—That would depend on Afghanistan; if they were friendly, we might try and hold them, not otherwise.

5360. PRESIDENT.—In the event of war with Russia, with Afghanistan more or less friendly, do you think that we should endeavour to occupy the Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar line and Hindu Kush passes at once, or confine ourselves to an advance on Kandahar and Jalalabad, until reinforcements arrived from England?

5361. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—What does the friendship of Afghanistan mean? Very little. A nation so treacherous and barbarous keeps no agreements and only acknowledges superior force. But supposing she were more or less friendly, I would trust her, but be on my guard. If Russia did her some really bad turn, she might remain friendly to us for a time and until she had had her revenge. In this case, I would send some troops to assist her on the Hindu Kush and also occupy the Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar line. The principles of strategy cannot be applied in their entirety to such cases. The Afghan

army, compared with European armies, is a rabble ; stiffened by the presence of British troops it might, I believe, offer a good defence in the difficult passes and mountains north of Kabul, etc. Without such a stiffening it would be swept away by Russia. Moreover, the time that must elapse between an outbreak of war with Russia and her actual occupation of anything more than Afghan-Turkistan, would afford time for the arrival of reinforcements from England, provided we had command of the sea.

5362. PRESIDENT.—In the event of war with Afghanistan, Russia being friendly or neutral, the General Staff, in 1911, estimated that we should require a Field Army of eight-and-a-quarter divisions and four cavalry brigades, with some other units and a cavalry brigade as a reserve. An additional three-quarters of a division and three cavalry brigades to be sent up later from internal defence forces, if possible. This was assuming that the frontier tribes gave little trouble, and the scheme contemplated sending four divisions and two cavalry brigades to Kabul.

- (i) Do you consider that so large a force would be required to cope with Afghanistan, and that it would be possible to feed the four divisions, etc., proposed for Kabul ?
- (ii) Has the development of railway communication put us in a much better position for dealing with Afghanistan than in 1878-80 ?
- (iii) Do you think that the Afghan army is really formidable, *per se*, and that any large part of it could be concentrated against us ?
- (iv) In the event of war with Afghanistan, with Russia friendly, might it be the best course to occupy Kandahar first and allow the Russians to take Afghan-Turkistan ?

5363. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—If Russia were friendly or neutral, a war with Afghanistan could present but few difficulties. In my opinion, in both cases Russia will certainly help herself to a large tract of Afghan territory ; Afghan-Turkistan for sure and the country about Herat. To imagine her remaining strictly neutral is to my mind impossible ; her friendship or neutrality can only be gained by giving her a big share in the spoils.

- (i) I do not consider eight-and-a-quarter divisions under the above conditions necessary, that is, provided we are prepared to accept the fact that Russia must have her share. To give a calculation of the strength required would take more time than I have at present ; but I should say that we could do with much less and ensure victory. You could not feed four divisions and two cavalry brigades in Kabul from local supplies for long, but I see no difficulty in doing so once our lines of communication are open, and we have light railways to assist us in the task. A good deal depends on the attitude of the frontier tribesmen, but I take it we must reckon with these also. Even so, we have so improved in our methods of warfare that I consider the General Staff's estimate is high. Prompt action and a vigorous offensive will be better than slow moving divisions.
- (ii) The development of railway communication has placed us in a much better position for dealing with Afghanistan than was the case in 1878-80. The further extension of our railways would make our task far lighter.
- (iii) In my opinion the Afghan army is anything but formidable. On the contrary, a rapid mobilization and advance would cause panic in it. Its transport is very defective, its training and leading are merely nominal, and it could not concentrate in large numbers against us.
- (iv) Russia, whether she be friendly or unfriendly to us, will take Afghan-Turkistan in any circumstances.

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5364. SIR W. MEYER.—Others have told us that it is not the Afghan regular army that would be formidable, but the guerillas armed from the Amir's arsenals.

5365. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, they would be the people who would give us trouble.

5366. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think they would give us as much trouble as the tribesmen on the frontier?

5367. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—No, I do not think so.

5368. SIR W. MEYER.—The more the Amir organizes his army, the better?

5369. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Quite so; it will be the easier to mop them up.

5370. SIR R. SCALLON.—We should want more troops to hold the country than we should to take it?

5371. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, the holding on is the difficult part.

5372. PRESIDENT.—For a general war with the tribes on the North-West Frontier, the General Staff, in 1911, estimated a force of six-and-a-third divisions as necessary, *plus* several separate units of infantry, cavalry and Pioneers. Do you agree with this estimate? Do you consider that if the Government took prompt measures at the outset, there could be any simultaneous and concerted action of the tribes against us?

5373. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—If our Government takes prompt measures at the outset of a war with the tribes on our North-West Frontier, I can see no possibility of so large a force as six-and-a-third divisions being necessary. A simultaneous rising will be impossible if we strike at once against the first tribes. Delay and diplomatic dealings may cause a general rising; but the suspension of political rule and a free hand to the commander of the troops will be the best and only way to prevent a prolonged campaign, and to nip a general rising in the bud. The immediate advance of, say, one division, will do more than the concentration of large force, at a later period.

5374. SIR W. MEYER.—General Duff on one occasion, before a Committee at Home, estimated that in the event of war with Afghanistan and the tribes combined, we should require 120,000 men. What would be your view?

5375. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I cannot conceive of such an army being required for any enemy except Russia.

5376. SIR W. MEYER.—You said just now that one of the results of war with Afghanistan would be that the Russians would establish themselves in Afghan-Turkistan; would you regard that with apprehension?

5377. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I take it that the Hindu Kush is absolutely bound to be the boundary in future years. I do not look upon it with apprehension because I know it is coming.

5378. SIR W. MEYER.—We could not defend Afghan-Turkistan?

5379. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—No, what is the use of saying we could defend it—a place to which we cannot get our troops?

5380. PRESIDENT.—Is there not an agreement between England and Russia to the effect that Russia will not occupy Afghan-Turkistan?

5381. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I believe so.

5382. PRESIDENT.—And are there not many instances of territory being safeguarded by virtue of International agreement?

5383. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—There are.

5384. PRESIDENT.—Then why do you assume that a friendly Power would act in such a manner?

585. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Well, I consider that where Asia is concerned you cannot avoid it. I look upon it as an absolute necessity.

5386. PRESIDENT.—A memorandum prepared by the General Staff in this connection estimated the total strength of the tribes as about 300,000 fighting men, with about 62,000 breech-loading rifles or carbines and about 40,000 muzzle-loaders. Do you think these large figures are to be relied on? How do you account for the alleged large purchases of expensive rifles by poor tribesmen?

5387. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I do not believe that 300,000 fighting men (that is, men who will fight) actually exist. As for breech-loaders, I feel sure the number (62,000) is immensely exaggerated. Judging from my own experience in 1908, I do not think the tribesmen possessed one half the numbers they were credited with. Of course the numbers have increased since then, but I do not believe the people as a whole can afford to buy *good* rifles, and cheap ones are not up to much.

5388. SIR W. MEYER.—Your experience is that they are trying to ape our methods?

5389. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, they did it three times in the Mohmand affair and they got terribly punished.

5390. SIR W. MEYER.—As time goes on then, the tribesmen will become less formidable?

5391. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—The more they pursue this system, the less formidable they will become.

5392. PRESIDENT.—In the event of war with the tribes, are you in favour of continuing the previous policy of withdrawal after a punitive expedition, or would you endeavour to settle permanent garrisons in their territory?

5393. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Withdrawal after punitive expeditions cannot in my opinion be laid down as a principle. There are many trans-border tracts in which it would be folly to remain permanently. On the other hand, strategical considerations should never be neglected on the frontier, and there are distinct cases in which territory should be held and from which no withdrawal should be made, thus, for example (i) the Mohmand country is useless to us. (ii) the Bazar Valley would be most valuable. A look at the map will convince anyone of that. In 1908 the Afridi tribes wanted us to take the valley, and thus not only should we have dominated the Zakka Khel, but possessed a strong advanced flank against Tirah and a secondary line of advance into Afghanistan. It was a great pity we did not occupy the Bazar Valley; they begged us to stay. Strategically, it would have been a good place for troops.

5394. SIR W. MEYER.—This is Sir G. Roos-Keppel's answer to a similar question "I think that anything in the nature of annexing the territory up to the Durand Line would be a mistake. The only part of the frontier where we have a conterminous boundary with Afghanistan is in Kurram and the Tochi, where our territory marches with the Khost Province, and here the Afghans have shewn themselves much worse neighbours than the tribesmen. We should, however, in my opinion, take advantage of future expeditions for necessary rectifications of our frontier with the tribes; thus, I would take over the Adam Khel Jowaki spur, which separates the Peshawar and the Kohat Districts; the Kabul Khel country below the Thal-Idak line, which separates the Kohat and Bannu Districts; and the spur ending at Pezu, which separates the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan Districts. Also, it might be desirable to make roads through some parts of independent territory and to keep them open by posts, without annexing or taking over the administration of the country."

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5395. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I think that is very sound.

5396. SIR W. MEYER.—But in the case of making the roads and keeping them open, supposing you did that with one tribe, might it bring other tribes upon us?

5397. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I do not think so. If one tribe thought the other was gaining anything by it, they would ask for it too. Gain goes a long way with them nowadays.

5398. SIR W. MEYER.—Then you do not think that any policy of road making and the like would provoke a large conflagration?

5399. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—No.

5400. SIR W. MEYER.—Which do you think are the tribes we have got most to fear from, in the immediate future?

5401. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I should say the Mahsud Wazirs. They are the only ones I should say; they must get a beating.

5402. PRESIDENT.—Assuming that friendly relations with Russia continue, what strength do you consider necessary for the Field Army of India?

5403. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—This is a question I can only answer according to my own convictions. I do not consider it possible that our relations with Russia can continue on so friendly a footing as to make it safe for us to base the strength of the Field Army of India on this fact alone. If we could assume Russia to be non-existent and that we had no fear from that quarter, it would be possible to reduce the Field Army by two war divisions. But armies take years to create, train and discipline, and cannot be mobilized by a magician's wand. To reduce the army with the certainty (and this amounts with me to a conviction) that sooner or later we must be prepared to resist a Russian occupation of Afghanistan, not to say later on an advance towards India, would be the worst possible policy. What I would advocate, if a small reduction is going to be made, is the reduction of such troops as are not fit to fight at the front. I am aware that even such troops may be useful on the lines of communication or at advanced bases, but I am arguing in case the word goes forth to reduce under any circumstances, always provided, however, that not a British soldier or gun less than the present numbers, be maintained. In my opinion any other reduction of the army in India would be fatal.

5404. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider it desirable to proceed with the Loi-Shilman and Parachinar railways: if so, which would you take up first? The Foreign Department desired to run the former line along the Kabul river; Lord Kitchener suggested an alternative alignment of which you are doubtless aware; which do you prefer?

5405. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—In my opinion the Loi-Shilman and Parachinar railways are absolutely necessary lines. Ordinarily speaking, I should have taken the Loi-Shilman line first, as it is on our main northern line of advance and must one day be constructed (unless of course, some better alignment can be found). As it is, this expensive railway is now being removed and broken up. This being the case, I would certainly advance the Kohat-Thal line to Parachinar.

Lord Kitchener's alignment of the Loi-Shilman line beyond Warsak was doubtless a most difficult one; it may or may not have been the best from an engineering point of view, but it did not appear to me to be the best. I should have preferred the route along the Kabul river, but I am not aware of the reasons which led to the choice of the tunnel route.

5406. PRESIDENT.—Do you think there is much to be gained, having regard to the expense involved—estimated at Rs. 3,18,19,400 in 1907—by establishing direct railway communication between Bombay and Karachi?

5407. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I do not consider that under present circumstances so large an expenditure on direct railway communication between Bombay and Karachi is justifiable. With two such excellent ports as Bombay and Karachi there are many more urgent needs to be met first.

5408. PRESIDENT.—So far as you have studied the internal situation in India, do you think it materially worse or better now than it was (a) in 1904, and (b) in 1907?

5409. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—In my opinion, the internal situation in India to-day is, from a military point of view, better than it was in 1904 and 1907, because we all realize that sedition and unrest exist and will remain, and knowledge is power. On the other hand, whereas in 1904 things were discussed by the natives of India in secret, now it is common to have them spoken of as facts to be faced. After a very long experience of India and an intimate knowledge of its people and languages, I feel sure the trouble lies, as far as the army is concerned, in the class regiments.

The youngest in the land are having the seed of hatred to the white man sown amongst them. It is not the cultivators and dwellers in remote villages who want to be rid of us; it is the children who are receiving, willy-nilly, an unwholesome education, and are learning the meaning of hatred. Talking of this, the country is full of children who hate us; it is these children who resent the presence of the white man near their villages.

5410. SIR W. MEYER.—In 1907 there was considerable uneasiness in regard to certain native regiments. Do you think there is any reason for uneasiness now?

5411. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I think there is; they know we know, and they are more careful to conceal their feelings. This applies particularly to class regiments. I mean regiments not of one religion, *e.g.*, Hindu or Muhammadans but of one sect, *e.g.*, Sikhs.

5412. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you apply it to all class regiments or only to certain sections?

5413. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I would apply it to Jats first of all. I spent two weeks last year in their country and was surprised by the feeling of dislike of the white man I experienced there. Next to them I should put the Sikhs.

5414. SIR W. MEYER.—Pathans?

5415. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—There are, I think, no class regiments of Pathans left, but they are much better than other classes; it is more the Hindus who require watching. The Jats, Sikhs and Oudh Rajputs; these, as far as I personally am concerned, I would, if I had them in a brigade, keep as far behind as I could.

5416. SIR W. MEYER.—Your objection to class regiments is that whatever section they are drawn from, they might get disaffected at some future time?

5417. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes. I refer to regiments of one class entirely.

5418. PRESIDENT.—But you much prefer, in that respect, the Muhammadan to the Hindu?

5419. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I do.

5420. SIR W. MEYER.—General Barrow is in favour of the class regiments because you can move it away as a body if necessary, whereas if you have class companies affected you have to move the whole battalion.

A. 4286.

5421. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Well, of course local circumstances might necessitate that, but personally I should have no hesitation about disbanding a disloyal element.

5422. SIR W. MEYER.—You would simply disband the disaffected company?

5423. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes.

5424. SIR W. MEYER.—When you move white troops nowadays, you do so generally by rail. It is a good thing, is it not, to move them by road occasionally and thus show them to the people?

5425. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, it is a very good thing. One remarkable thing about the move of the Gordon Highlanders through Bengal some time ago, was the favour they met with among the country folk.

5426. PRESIDENT.—Speaking generally, do you concur in the arrangements for increasing the internal defence forces suggested by the Government of India to local Governments and Administrations in January—March 1912? In particular, what is your opinion in regard to the following points:—

(a) The withdrawal of two battalions of Indian infantry from the Kohat Brigade?

(b) Do you think that the scheme of numerous and relatively weak moveable columns is desirable? Take, for instance, the columns for Delhi and Meerut (contiguous places). Might it be better here, and in some other instances, to have fewer columns of a stronger character?

5427. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I agree with the arrangements for increasing the internal defence forces.

(a) Under the conditions stated, I see no harm in reducing the Kohat area by one battery and two battalions of infantry.

(b) Certainly the strength of some of the moveable columns is very small indeed, for example:—

<i>Delhi.</i> —1 squadron cavalry	} No guns and a very small force; this might well be increased.
4 companies British infantry	
2 companies Indian infantry	

Meerut has two guns in addition but is again very small.

However, as I said before, the strength of such columns may be laid down as a guide, but local conditions will surely render them all liable to change on the mobilization of the Field Army.

5428. PRESIDENT.—The existing scheme lays stress on organized brigades being ear-marked for the Field Army, while internal defence troops would have to be drawn largely from various and possibly distant sources. Thus we are informed that the mobile brigade with base at Delhi, proposed under the new internal defence scheme, might perhaps be drawn from the 9th Division. Again, while Secunderabad is a large military centre, most of the troops stationed there would be ear-marked for the Field Army, while the troops for the defence of the Hyderabad area—which are more than the equivalent of a brigade—would be drawn from a variety of places. Do you consider those arrangements sound? Might it be preferable to allot internal defence to troops already stationed in or near the place to be principally guarded and to make the moves from other places in connection with the mobilization of the Field Army?

5429. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I do not consider that the present arrangements for internal defence are the best that can be made, but, as I said before, all arrangements may, and probably will, have to be modified when the Field Army is mobilized, as so much must depend on the local internal situation at the time. An area which we have considered as dangerous may temporarily be the reverse, and *vice versa*. All we can do is to arrange for local defence and then hold mobile columns ready to move. That is the great desideratum. The knowledge that a mobile column is ready to move at once will have more effect than anything else. Keep a certain number of obligatory British soldiers in places of importance, such as arsenals and factories, etc, and then depend on the offensive.

I cannot say I have worked out the present scheme as a whole, but my contention is that the first necessity is the Field Army complete and ready. Nothing should be allowed to interfere with that. Internal defence must take a back seat in comparison; for it is what the army does in the field which will more or less regulate what is done behind it in India. If you can arrange to

use the troops in internal defence areas who are at the time quartered in such areas, so much the better: if you cannot do this, take them from the nearest areas, but have an elastic and not too rigid a scheme, for, as I said before the best laid plans may need alteration at the last moment.

The real solution would be the completion of the Kitchener scheme so as to make all divisions self-contained, but as that cannot be done we must make the next best arrangements. I maintain that we have in the Indian army to-day many corps unfit to take their places in the Field Army. If we are going to keep these up as at present, they should be used for internal defence. I think some of them would like it. If sent on mobilization to stations away from their homes they would be unlikely to become disaffected. In fact they might become a kind of first class military police. I would prefer to do without them altogether.

5430. PRESIDENT.—What are they?

5431. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Some regiments of the Madras army—the Carnatic regiments, and a few others.

5432. PRESIDENT.—You are of opinion that they are not worth maintaining?

5433. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—No, they are not worth maintaining.

5434. PRESIDENT.—Have you had experience of them?

5435. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I saw something of them in Afghanistan and I saw them in Burma. I commanded the Secunderabad Brigade, where I had long field days and made them take their share with other troops, and judging from what I saw, I am sure that they have not the stamina. I have just been inspecting two Madras regiments and was absolutely surprised at their want of physique.

5436. PRESIDENT.—Do you think the Moplahs would make good soldiers?

5437. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—No, I do not think they would. I saw them at manœuvres and I do not think I ever saw so many men fall out from any unit.

5438. SIR W. MEYER.—But, being as we are in an alien country and depending on alien troops, do you not think there is a danger of putting too many eggs in one basket?

5439. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, there is undoubtedly.

5440. PRESIDENT.—But you would prefer to have good eggs rather than bad ones?

5441. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes.

5442. SIR W. MEYER.—Assuming that it is necessary to have a full mobile brigade with base at Delhi, would it not be desirable to take one of the brigades that had been trained together in peace?

5443. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I do not think it is so necessary there; you want it at the front.

5444. SIR W. MEYER.—As a main feature of internal defence, is it desirable to scatter European troops in too small bodies? General Aylmer said that if you have got one company of British troops against two or three companies of natives, the latter might gain the upper hand; whereas, if you had a British brigade with guns they could account for three or four times their number.

A. 2700.

5445. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Well, there might be something in that.

5446. PRESIDENT.—Are you consulted by Army Headquarters or the Army Department in such matters as have been dealt with in the above questions?

5447. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—No, I may say I am practically not consulted on the above matters by Army Headquarters or the Army Department. I do not know why. I should be glad to be asked to give my opinion

for what it is worth, and it might occasionally be of some use. I saw all these General Staff memoranda for the first time when the Committee sent them to me. I do not know why I was not permitted to see them.

5448. SIR P. LAKE.—The Government of India ordered them not to be circulated.

5449. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I never saw these schemes addressed to local Governments in connection with local defence until I got them from the Committee, and I should have liked to have seen them. The General Staff do not let me see plans of campaign, yet these might be put into my hands at the crucial moment.

5450. PRESIDENT.—Supposing that the Field Army were reduced to seven or eight divisions, would you make a similar reduction in the number of divisional areas and thus render it more easy to have each divisional area self-contained? In particular, might the defects of the Peshawar Division be remedied, in a measure at least, by making it include the now independent brigades of Kohat, Bannu, and Derajat?

5451. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—If the Field Army were reduced to seven or eight divisions, it would be necessary to redistribute the divisional areas so as to render it easier to have each divisional area self-contained. In any case, the redistribution of divisions or the filling up of divisional areas is very necessary even as it is, as in the case of the 1st Division. I do not, however, see how the inclusion of the independent brigades at Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan would make the 1st Division more self-contained. The Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu Brigades are too far away and have specific duties to perform. The case of Kohat is somewhat different; this Brigade will now cease to exist on mobilization.

5452. SIR W. MEYER.—The maintenance of the Kohat Brigade as a separate unit is in contravention of what the General Staff propose, since it will cease to exist in time of war?

5453. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes.

5454. SIR W. MEYER.—What would you do with the Kohat troops?

5455. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I agree with the scheme put forward by the General Staff.

5456. SIR W. MEYER.—Is it necessary to keep up a Brigade Commander at Kohat?

5457. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—It is for minor things, for there might be local trouble sufficient to require the presence of one brigade.

5458. SIR W. MEYER.—You would keep the independent frontier brigades separate then?

5459. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes.

A. 5179.

5460. SIR W. MEYER.—Sir George Roos-Keppel told us that he would move the Derajat Brigade bodily from Dera Ismail Khan to Tank.

5461. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I would like to see it moved.

5462. SIR W. MEYER.—He said Dera Ismail Khan would have to be abandoned in time. So that is a move you would like to see made?

5463. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, Tank is a much better place for troops than Dera Ismail Khan.

5464. PRESIDENT.—From what you have seen of the Imperial Service Troops in your command, do you consider them efficient corps, and comparable with regular Indian battalions, etc., of like character?

5465. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I have not seen much of Imperial Service Troops, except those of the Nizam and a few others at field manœuvres. They are efficient, but in no way comparable with similar corps of our Indian army. I hope this winter to see a large number of them from many States at our

inter-divisional manœuvres. The value of these troops must depend largely on their officers, who are a doubtful quantity.

5466. SIR W. MEYER.—Did you have any of them under your command on expeditions ?

5467. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—No, never.

5468. PRESIDENT.—What is your opinion in regard to the efficiency of the local armies of the Phulkian States, etc. ?

5469. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—The local armies of all Native States I have seen (excluding Imperial Service Troops) are very inferior.

5470. PRESIDENT.—What is your opinion of the tribal militia on the North-West Frontier ; do you think that they can be trusted to fight against their co-tribesmen in case of serious trouble on the border, or would you, in such an event, try and move them elsewhere ?

5471. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—The tribal militia on the North-West Frontier which I know best, are the Khyber Rifles and Kurram Militia. Both these corps are good fighting units, and I would take them with me on any frontier expedition. I believe they would be staunch and fight against their own people. They certainly did in 1908 in the Zakka Khel country, when I saw over and over again Zakkas taking their full share in the operations. The great thing is to give them the offer of fighting or leaving before operations commence, and secondly, to give them officers whom they know and understand and will follow. It would be a mistake to move them away from the frontier on the outbreak of hostilities. Back them up and trust them fully, and I believe they will do well.

5472. PRESIDENT.—Generally speaking, how far do you consider that the Volunteers are an efficient force, to be relied on for valuable assistance in internal disturbance ; do you consider that their efficiency has increased of late years ?

5473. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—The Volunteers have, in my opinion, improved in their ordinary duties of late years. They vary so much in quality that I am unable to say what their efficiency, as a whole, may be now. In 1903-04 I saw a great deal of them ; such corps as the Bengal-Nagpur and the Great Indian Peninsula Railway Volunteers, the Bombay Baroda and Central India Railway Volunteers, the Bombay Artillery Volunteers and others. Some of these were really quite good enough for any work they might have been called on to do. Since then I have not come much in contact with them, though corps I have seen, like the Assam Valley Light Horse, would be invaluable in time of trouble.

5474. SIR W. MEYER.—Lord Kitchener's scheme took credit for considerable bodies of Volunteers scouring the country and operating with regular troops. Do you think they could do much more than hold places in which they lived ?

5475. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—No, generally speaking, I should say not, but some of the mounted corps might be very useful.

5476. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you had much experience of natives as Volunteers ?

5477. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I know one or two Parsis.

5478. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you be in favour of a larger recruitment of natives whom we could trust ?

5479. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—No, I would not ; I do not think they would be of any use.

5480. SIR W. MEYER.—Where are the arms of Volunteers stored ?

5481. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—The arms of railway Volunteers are stored at railway stations ; they have got regular armouries and at some big places

they have central armouries. I believe some few Volunteers keep their own rifles.

5482. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think the rifles are adequately guarded ?

5483. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—As a rule they are.

5484. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you know anything of the Cossipore Artillery Volunteers ?

5485. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I have seen them.

5486. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you know where their ammunition is stored ?

5487. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—No, I do not. It is not in my beat.

5488. PRESIDENT.—Do you think it would be desirable to recruit one or two Eurasian battalions, or to employ Eurasians with inland defence artillery ?

5489. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I do not think Eurasian infantry or cavalry would be of much use, and they would not serve under ordinary conditions. They might be tried as a signalling company, and would, I think, do that work very well. None but specially selected and approved men should be enlisted. I am inclined to think they would do well in coast defence batteries, if you get the very best men to enlist. It is in the field that I do not place much reliance on their steadiness or physique.

I have a suggestion to offer which I think is sound. If anyone will be really loyal in times of internal trouble, it is the Eurasian. Why not try him for internal defence ? I have no plan to offer, but it can be done. I think it half solves the internal defence question. The Eurasians are everywhere ; tell them they are an asset of the Empire, form them into units or whatever may be decided ; but in any case you have men more loyal, if possible, than ourselves, for it is the Eurasian's best wish to be considered as one of ourselves, and under these conditions he will fight. His local knowledge of people and language will be most useful, and he can serve in his own defence area instead of being an onlooker whom we would in any case be bound to protect. Call him an Anglo-Indian reservist or some other soldierly name. It will go a long way with him.

5490. SIR W. MEYER.—You have got a certain number of Eurasians in the Volunteers already ; would you increase that number ?

5491. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I would make reserve corps. Take the Trimulgherry Intrenchment at Secunderabad ; hundreds of Eurasians will make a rush for Trimulgherry ; now if they had arms they would be most useful.

A. 4231.

5492. SIR W. MEYER.—General Barrow put before us a scheme for Eurasian artillery militia ; he said they could be embodied for a month yearly and given a retaining fee.

5493. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I agree with that.

5494. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider that the former theory which reckoned one British soldier as equivalent for purposes of internal security, etc., to two-and-a-half Indians, is still valid ?

5495. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Certainly, I believe one British soldier for purposes of internal security, is worth two-and-a-half and more native soldiers.

5496. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider it desirable that a large proportion of the British troops in India should be in the hills for considerable periods during the hot weather ?

5497. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—From a health point of view it is desirable that a large proportion of British soldiers should be in the hills during the hot weather. This has, however, been overdone of late years. The period of absence from plains stations has been prolonged over and over again, until now some corps are practically never in one station for years. Take, for example, the

British infantry battalion at Nowshera, which lives in hut barracks in winter and is away all the hot months in tents. The men and women dislike the system; training suffers a great deal, and great expense in tentage is caused to the State annually. The absence of the battalion at such a distance as Ghora Dakka from Nowshera might mean a good deal, possibly, if trouble suddenly arose and, taken all round, the time of absence might be considerably curtailed and in some cases, reduced to a minimum. The trouble is that there are no proper summer barracks now in Nowshera for infantry. I would prefer to see an entire regiment given a turn every few years in a hill station where they were comfortably housed instead of being sent up every year, as they now are, to uncomfortable tents which are very trying in the rainy season.

5498. PRESIDENT.—What has become of the infantry barracks at Nowshera?

5499. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—They were converted for a field artillery brigade, and the infantry battalion was given huts which cannot be used in the summer.

5500. SIR W. MEYER.—Speaking generally, for how long do the troops go up to the hills?

5501. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—The period is getting longer and longer. They used to go up for six months; now, some go up in April and do not come down till November.

5502. SIR W. MEYER.—It is extremely dangerous from the point of view of internal security?

5503. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, in cases where the distances are great. I think, however, it is a fine thing for the troops to be in the hills for a certain period.

5504. SIR W. MEYER.—Might it not be better to limit the stay to two months?

5505. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I do not think that is enough. I think five months.

5506. SIR W. MEYER.—Practically our military policy is being dictated by the doctors?

5507. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—As regards moves to the hills, certainly.

5508. PRESIDENT.—In the case of the British infantry at Nowshera it has become unavoidable; they must move away?

5509. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—They could not live in the huts during the hot weather.

5510. PRESIDENT.—Do you think it desirable that an important place like Jhelum should be left without any British troops?

5511. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I think that a place like Jhelum should never be without a British regiment. There are obvious reasons, and in any case the railway bridge should be secured against destruction.

5512. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider that due precautions are taken to guard the arsenals and military factories in your command by British troops?

5513. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, I think the present arrangements to guard arsenals and military factories are sufficient as a rule, but, as I said before, the obligatory garrisons are inadequate and would have to be increased as soon as trouble began. For instance, take the case of Ferozepore where two companies of British infantry have been detailed as the obligatory garrison; the perimeter is such that two companies would be totally inadequate.

5514. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think adequate precautions are always taken in time of peace?

5515. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I think every care is taken.

5516. SIR W. MEYER.—Take the case of the 10th Jats; I understand that Lord Minto, when out on one occasion for a morning ride in the outskirts

of Calcutta discovered that a magazine containing considerable quantities of cordite was under a guard of that regiment which was then under suspicion. He brought it to the notice of the General Officer Commanding who thereupon had the cordite moved to another magazine.

5517. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—That was very bad indeed, but I can only speak of what I know. All places I have visited have been adequately guarded.

5518. SIR W. MEYER.—Then I was looking at a statement supplied by Army Headquarters; I found that Attock Fort in the hot weather was guarded at one gate by native troops and another by British troops. Is that safe?

5519. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I think the British sentry is at a safe place. The native guard could not do much without being observed.

5520. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you know anything of the guarding of the ordnance factories round Calcutta?

5521. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—My work is chiefly concerned with training. All these things come under divisional Generals.

5522. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that there is risk in the policy, adopted of late years, of recruiting the native army mainly from a few sources such as Gurkhas, Pathans, Sikhs, and Punjabi Muhammadans?

5523. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, there is risk in recruiting mainly from Gurkhas, Pathans, etc., but such risk would be reduced to a minimum if class regiments were abolished and regiments were recruited, like the old Punjab Frontier Force, from several classes. I have never found trouble in mixed corps, always in class units. In my opinion, regiments composed entirely of Sikhs, Jats, Rajputs, and even Punjabi Musalmans, will one day give trouble. Give them mixed double-companies and any trouble that may be brewing will be given away to the British officers by one or other class.

5524. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that the Gurkhas can be implicitly relied on?

5525. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I exclude Gurkhas from my reply to the question above. As far as I can judge, I do not think we have another lot of soldiers in our native army as loyal as Gurkhas. Even when mixed with other races they do well, as for instance, in the Guides Infantry. Of course, Nepal may one day go against us, but in India we must take such risks. We cannot be strong everywhere.

A. 5205. 5526. SIR W. MEYER.—Sir George Roos-Keppel told us that if you have Pathans in a regiment you ought to have at least two double-companies.

5527. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I would not object to that, but I would rather see one double-company of Pathans. If they did want to leave, it would be a big lot to lose if there were four companies of them.

5528. SIR W. MEYER.—Speaking generally, when disaffection is found to exist in a regiment; if, for instance, certain native officers of it have expressed themselves willing to lead troops against the Raj; would you hush it up, or act promptly?

5529. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I would act promptly.

5530. SIR W. MEYER.—Did you know of any cases in 1907-08?

5531. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—It is hard to say; I believe there was a certain amount of it in class regiments.

5532. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that the recruitment of Sikhs has been overdone and will be difficult to continue, having regard to the present conditions in the Punjab? If so, and supposing the army to be maintained at its present strength, how would you fill the deficiencies?

5533. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—There are too many Sikhs in the army; they have lost their heads and think they are the salt of the earth. There are some classes still untried that I know of:

(i) Jharwas from the Garo Hills, a fine sturdy lot of fellows like Gurkhas.

(ii) Nagas—one of the finest class of hill men. I know them well; why not try a few as an experiment?

(iii) The eastern Nepalese who live towards Sikkim.

(iv) Various classes of Punjabi Muhammadans which have recently begun to be enlisted.

(v) Inhabitants of Rajputana.

5534. PRESIDENT.—Is it not the case that it is difficult to get Rajputs to enlist?

5535. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes. Personally, I like a man who lives in the desert. They are fine martial races who have never gone against us in times of peace.

5536. SIR W. MEYER.—Were there not some Rajput regiments the authorities were a little doubtful about in 1907?

5537. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Well, there are two kinds of Rajputs, the Rajputs of Oudh and the Rajputs of Rajputana.

5538. PRESIDENT.—Do they not enlist some southwards of Delhi?

5539. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, but I prefer the Rajput of Rajputana to the Rajput of Oudh.

5540. SIR W. MEYER.—Assuming that we have got too many Sikhs, I gather your policy would be to bring in men of other classes?

5541. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes.

5542. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that the Pathan and Punjabi Muhammadan troops could be relied on in the event of war with Afghanistan or the tribes, with a *jihad* preached from Kabul?

5543. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—With a *jihad* preached from Kabul, of course the Pathans would be excited. I do not believe the Punjabi Muhammadans would go against us, if we had sufficient British and other troops ready and took action at once. Immediate action has been in the past, and will be in the future our safest and only course. The Punjabi Muhammadan does not love the Pathan.

5544. PRESIDENT.—Was a *jihad* preached at Kabul at the beginning of the Afghan war?

5545. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I do not think it was; at any rate, it is not recorded.

5546. PRESIDENT.—There is much talk about these *jihads*, but so far as I know, they never occur. We only hear of some small *jihad* preached by some insignificant *mullah*.

5547. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I think we might get it with Nasrulla.

5548. PRESIDENT.—Would anybody pay the faintest attention to it?

5549. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Perhaps not outside his own place.

5550. SIR W. MEYER.—Sir George Roos-Keppel said he did not think the Afridis would move in the event of a fanatical outbreak, unless there were other circumstances as well. A. 4930.

5551. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I agree with that entirely.

5552. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that there is any risk, at present, of an anti-British combination of Muhammadans and Hindus?

5553. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—No, I do not. I am a close student of native feeling and I am sure that, at any rate on the North-West Frontier and in the Punjab generally, the Muhammadan and Hindu hate one another. Even if they both hate us in places, their hatred of one another is greater, and a combination of Hindu and Muhammadan, is, to my mind, but a temporary makeshift which we can nip in the bud by judicious handling.

- A. 5409. 5554. SIR W. MEYER.—You spoke a little time ago about children shewing anti-British sentiments; do you include Muhammadan children?
5555. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—They were generally Hindus, including Sikhs.
5556. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you found, so far as your knowledge goes, that the tribesmen, and the Muhammadans of the Punjab, look much to the Sultan of Turkey?
5557. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Only the highly educated ones.
5558. SIR W. MEYER.—You do think then that, if relations were strained with Turkey, it might be serious?
5559. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—No, I do not. Of course the Press would get a hold of the matter and do harm, but the ordinary villager, until it is thrust down his throat, knows little about the Sultan.
5560. SIR W. MEYER.—Have they heard anything about the Japanese?
5561. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, they have heard and are hearing more.
5562. PRESIDENT.—Are you aware of seditious agencies whose object it is to tamper with the allegiance of the native troops, or induce men not to enlist? If so, do you consider that these are active at present?
5563. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, I am aware of seditious agencies. I have seen the effects of the Arya Samaj once or twice when I was a divisional commander. I consider that a good deal goes on which aims at causing disaffection in the native army, but it is the class regiments it chiefly affects.
- *G. S. memo. of 1911. 5564. PRESIDENT.—It has been alleged* that, in order to mobilize the British artillery units of the Field Army, it would be necessary to deplete the units allotted for internal defence by a third of their strength, thus rendering them inefficient for active purposes. Do you concur in this view, and, if so, do you consider this a satisfactory state of things, in view of the fact that we rely so much on artillery as against a possible revolt of native troops?
5565. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I do not know who made the statement although I accept it. Our Field Army is already very low in artillery power, and it should not be depleted for any cause. It means therefore that, if this cannot be remedied, the internal defence artillery must be deficient; still I prefer its remaining so to depleting the Field Army. We could do with a much smaller proportion of artillery, comparatively speaking, in putting down rebellion, than we could in the field.
5566. PRESIDENT.—You are aware that in Afghanistan, for example, we found great difficulty in having much artillery in the field; and in northern Afghanistan there are very few places where you could bring artillery, other than mountain artillery, into action. Therefore, do you consider the proportion of artillery allotted to the Field Army in any way deficient?
5567. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Well, we have only got a third of what we have got at Home and you cannot get much lower than that.
5568. SIR W. MEYER.—Our great strength in India as against the native is artillery?
5569. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, they have got no guns; but you want your guns more to use against an enemy's guns. I think improvised batteries with two guns would be strong enough as units in proportion to the enemy we should meet in internal defence.
5570. PRESIDENT.—If you consider the present arrangements unsatisfactory, do you think that the difficulty could be met by reducing the number by artillery units assigned to the Field Army?
5571. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—No, I do not.

5572. PRESIDENT.—Do you concur in the proposal that has been made to reduce three companies of Royal Garrison Artillery and to add an equivalent strength of gunners and drivers to horse and field artillery units?

5573. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I think that, if reductions have to be made, some of the now obsolete heavy batteries might be reduced. Heavy guns are not required by us on ordinary campaigns across the frontier, and the retention of the heavy battery at Peshawar is unnecessary. Garrison companies will be wanted to man the better class of guns we may mount in forts, etc.

5574. PRESIDENT.—Do you know the reasons for having these heavy batteries for trans-frontier operations. What is the good of them?

5575. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—We might want a few guns if we were going to besiege a big place, but very few would be enough.

5576. PRESIDENT.—Have you any knowledge of the character and efficiency of the armed police? Would you supply them with better weapons than those they now have—mostly bored-out Martinis?

5577. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I have seen a good deal in various ways of the armed police. They are generally fitted for police duty, but I am against giving them any better weapons if those they have at present are fit for use at short ranges.

5578. PRESIDENT.—They produce a good effect at a short range?

5579. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes.

5580. PRESIDENT.—In present circumstances, would you be in favour of reducing the peace strength of the army by maintaining the existing cadres on a lower peace strength with adequate reserves? Could we work down to a peace establishment of say, 712 per infantry battalion (the figures in force before 1882), which should give an effective strength on mobilization, without reserve, of nearly 600. Then have a 1st class reserve (the younger men) of 200 per battalion, at Rs. 4 per month, with 2 months' training every other year, and a 2nd class reserve of 300, at Rs. 2 per month, and one month's training biennially, it being understood that the 1st class reserve would ordinarily be called up whenever the battalion was required for field service?

5581. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I am against making up numbers on mobilization by having larger reserves. I have seen practically the whole of the reservists of the Northern Army.

(i) Reduction of the peace establishments of battalions is a mistake, for you do not then get proper war training.

(ii) Reservists, do what you will, rapidly deteriorate.

(iii) You will get a number of men to enlist merely because they wish to go as soon as possible to the reserve. This does not tend to efficiency or keenness; a fixed salary in his own home is the native's ideal.

5582. PRESIDENT.—It is a system that every civilized Power in Europe has adopted?

5583. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, but there is a danger in India.

5584. PRESIDENT.—What danger is there from unarmed men?

5585. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—But there are arms in the country, and, in the event of unrest, the reservist will not come when you call him up; it would be altogether doubtful.

5586. SIR W. MEYER.—You could call him up and send him to the front?

5587. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—If he came. If you have him with his regiment, he is on the spot.

5588. PRESIDENT.—Take the present system, you have got a certain number of reservists?

5589. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, and I think that is the limit. I would not go over 50,000.

5590. PRESIDENT.—If the men on furlough come back, why should not the reservists come back?

5591. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—They do in peace, but at a time of trouble they could not be relied on.

5592. SIR R. SCALLON.—You say you have seen a great number of reservists; do you think that when they come up for training, after having been for some time away at their homes, they are physically fit for active service?

5593. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—No, I have recommended getting rid of an enormous number of reservists. Those who are good are very good, but there are others who are absolutely useless.

5594. SIR W. MEYER.—Might we not alter that feature of the system which allows men to remain in the reserve till they have completed twenty-five years' service?

5595. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, you might, but you will not get such big reserves. I would keep no reservist over 20 years.

5596. SIR W. MEYER.—Let us suppose we have trouble with the Sikhs, then only the Sikh reservist might not turn up? Would not others be prepared to come and take up arms against the Sikhs?

5597. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, I believe they would.

5598. SIR P. LAKE.—If you had a large reserve, would it not be better to train the men with their own units?

5599. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, it would be best, but with a great reserve you could not do it probably.

A. 4380. 5600. SIR W. MEYER.—General Barrow was rather in favour of a real system of linked battalions with one battalion stronger than another. What would be your view?

5601. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I would reduce no battalion below what it could train with for war.

5602. SIR W. MEYER.—His plan was to have a certain number of weak battalions, to be expanded by reserves.

5603. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I would not agree with that.

A. 4098. 5604. SIR W. MEYER.—Then he also told us that in his opinion, in case of war with Russia, although the people of India might not like us, they would relish domination by Russia so little that we should have little trouble.

5605. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—That might be so.

5606. PRESIDENT.—In some cases, however, for example, in the event of sudden trouble in the Khyber, it might be necessary to send battalions into the field without waiting for the reserves; in that case would you send a battalion as it stood, or would you meet the contingency by keeping certain regiments on the frontier at larger peace establishments?

5607. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Does this mean maintaining a kind of permanent frontier force again, or is it only intended that the regiments for the time being on the frontier should be kept up to a field service strength, being again reduced when they left the frontier? My own idea is that the frontier regiments were unequalled for the work they then had to do. As units they have not been surpassed since; their drawback was that they were not given combined war training; given this they would have been the most efficient in the native army. As I said before, no regiment should be at too low a peace strength, and if it comes to a matter of sending a battalion suddenly, say, into the Khyber, etc., whatever the system adopted, it should go at full war strength.

5608. PRESIDENT.—You are speaking of regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force ?

5609. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, the old Punjab Frontier Force. Of course there are a good many of them on the frontier still, and they retain many of their old traditions.

5610. PRESIDENT.—Do you anticipate serious difficulties in regard to such a reserve scheme in the case of Gurkhas and Pathans ?

5611. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—With Gurkhas time would be the chief difficulty. In the case of Pathans, I believe a certain number of reservists would not turn up.

5612. SIR W. MEYER.—I could understand Pathans not turning up in case of a war with their own tribesmen, but supposing it was a case of war with the Russians ?

5613. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I think time alone can prove that; they may turn up, at any rate a good many of them. It is a very difficult question to answer.

5614. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that there would be difficulties in the calling up of reservists by reason of battalions serving far away from their recruiting grounds ?

5615. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I think delay would be the only difficulty.

5616. SIR R. SCALLON.—I suppose the season of the year would make a difference ?

5617. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, with Pathans especially, if cultivation is going on in the valleys.

5618. SIR W. MEYER.—Then I gather that you would rather let a reservist join his own battalion than join a linked battalion which might happen to be nearer to his home ?

5619. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Certainly.

5620. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think there is any real advantage in the linked battalion system we have at present ?

5621. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—It gives a great deal of trouble in the matter of promotions of British officers. I see no advantage in it.

5622. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that it is feasible to reduce the peace establishment of Indian cavalry regiments, or the Indian artillery units, and have a larger reserve ?

5623. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—It is decidedly inadvisable to reduce the peace establishment of native cavalry and artillery.

(i) You must keep up a war establishment of horses, and how are you going to do this ?

(ii) The horses of silladar cavalry are actually maintained by the men ; therefore the Government must maintain the men.

(iii) Artillerymen need constant practice to be efficient, natives very soon get rusty, and even forget their work which is very technical—badly trained gunners are of little value.

(iv) Very large reserves are a danger, especially of cavalry.

5624. PRESIDENT.—Could the nineteen service companies of Sappers and Miners have their peace establishment reduced from 151 sappers to 121, with a 1st class reserve of 30 and a 2nd class reserve of 45 ?

5625. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—They could of course be so reduced. But it will mean less efficient companies, for reservists will always deteriorate in India. I consider the Sappers and Miners are, in their own degree, the most useful units we possess in frontier warfare.

5626 PRESIDENT.—Do you consider that in the event of war there would be difficulty in getting recruits ?

5627. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—In my opinion recruits will always be forthcoming for ordinary campaigns, and so long as we are victorious. If serious reverses come, recruits will not come forward. This is of course, assuming that no internal trouble is taking place at the time. If internal trouble has to be grappled with, recruits will fall off to a lesser or greater degree according to the quarters from which trouble comes. Pay the army a good wage ; it is well laid out money. If anything can ensure a kind of loyalty, it is the certainty of good pay and pension.

5628. PRESIDENT.—You think the pay of the native soldier is now sufficient ?

5629. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I think so, but I do not think the native officer is well pensioned. He cannot keep up *izzat* on nothing.

5630. SIR W. MEYER.—The soldier's pay was raised in 1908 ?

5631. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—At the beginning of 1909.

A. 2771. 5632. SIR W. MEYER.—One witness thought that step was undesirable at the time, as it gave the impression that it was the result of fear.

5633. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—It gave the idea that we were giving in to them.

A. 2808. 5634. SIR W. MEYER.—Some witnesses have told us that we should have difficulty in getting recruits for Afghanistan, and laid stress on the fact that that was the case in 1878-80.

5635. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I think we would get recruits.

5636. SIR W. MEYER.—Lord Kitchener's scheme took into consideration the possibility, in times of internal trouble, of getting corps of yeomanry raised by loyal gentlemen.

5637. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I think that would be very good. I know some who would be very useful.

A. 4422. 5638. SIR W. MEYER.—General Barrow gave us an experience of his where it was not successful.

5639. PRESIDENT.—I think that was for a regiment for service in China.

5640. SIR W. MEYER.—For service in India it might be a different thing ?

5641. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, I think so.

5642. PRESIDENT.—Lord Kitchener's scheme ultimately provided for twelve British officers for each native cavalry regiment and infantry battalion taking the field, and ten for internal defence units ; and, allowing for other requirements, this apparently necessitated a peace establishment of fourteen per unit. Do you agree with the opinion expressed by the General Staff in 1911 that this allowance was too high, and calculated to stifle the responsibilities of the native officers ? If so, would you accept the proposals of the General Staff, which allow ten officers per unit in the Field Army, ten for some and seven for others of the remaining units, with some for depôts of units on field service, leading up in all (after providing an allowance of seven per cent. for sick and an addition for first casualties) to a peace complement of twelve officers for most units and a total reduction of 312 officers ? Or would you go further in the way of reduction ?

5643. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I think the increase of British officers with regiments has told against the initiative and willingness to take responsibility of the native officers. I agree with the proposals of the General Staff to reduce the numbers of British officers. If we are going to trust our native army we must give native officers more responsibility. At present, the native

officers look to the British officers for everything; in some corps the native officers are very heavy and slow thinkers, and this we cannot alter, but must I fear accept as a fact. At the same time, the broad principle should be to give them responsibility, and initiative will follow. Later on a further reduction might still be made in the number of British officers. I know many dull native officers, but there are also many brilliant exceptions who must hate being fathered by subalterns. Give them a chance and I believe they will rise to it.

5644. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you go further in the way of reduction than the General Staff suggest?

5645. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—The strengths might be revised as time goes on.

5646. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think that we have an excessive number of native officers?

5647. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—No, I do not think we have.

5648. SIR W. MEYER.—There are at present one subadar and one jemadar to each company, one of these company subadars being the subadar-major of the regiment. In Indian cavalry regiments there is besides, a native adjutant?

5649. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes.

5650. PRESIDENT.—The General Staff war complement of ten British officers provided for a quartermaster and a transport officer. Might one officer discharge both duties with the aid of a native officer?

5651. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, he could.

5652. PRESIDENT.—The General Staff scheme proposes a reserve of 900 officers to be utilized in the event of a serious war. Do you consider this number necessary?

5653. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I have not gone into this, but the General Staff memorandum appears to be sound in the matter. My doubt is, what will be the quality of the reserve officers who come from the merchant and other classes? There should be no doubt on this point; let it be understood that if they draw the pay they must learn the work.

5654. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you induce a certain number of officers to join the reserve from the regular army with the obligation to rejoin in time of war?

5655. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, if they were still young enough to be called upon.

5656. SIR W. MEYER.—Would not the objection in the case of the native soldier also apply to the officer *i.e.*, that he would be rusty?

5657. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Certainly it would.

5658. PRESIDENT.—Is it a fact that owing to the increased number of British officers with Indian regiments, officers are granted leave most liberally, that the rules would admit for instance, of an officer spending eight months of every year on leave (two months on full pay and six months on furlough pay), as against four months of regimental duty. Do you consider such a method desirable or economical?

5659. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—It is most undesirable. Much harm has been done by the amount of leave now given to British officers of the native army. I hope it will be cut down very considerably. It is bad for discipline; it takes officers out of the country too much. It makes them slack and often lazy, and runs them into debt. It makes the native troops think their officers only care to get away, and when service suddenly comes large numbers of officers are away, including Commanding Officers, who hurry back but are sometimes too late. The system is indefensible.

5660. SIR W. MEYER.—Were divisional Generals consulted when these leave rules were formulated?

5661. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I do not remember.

5662. SIR W. MEYER.—What were the rules in the old days?

5663. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Officers took furlough, but I forget the exact rules.

5664. SIR W. MEYER.—In the civil service a man earns so much leave by so much effective service, but this leave cannot be claimed as a matter of right: for instance, it is withheld if there would be too many men away, but if a man has firstly, the qualifying service and secondly if he can be spared, the leave is granted. Do you think this system should apply to the regular army?

5665. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, I do generally speaking, but I would be liberal with leave.

5666. SIR W. MEYER.—You say that Commanding Officers have too much leave; do you include Brigadier Generals?

5667. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, they have too much leave.

5668. PRESIDENT.—Might it be possible to obtain some of the war reserves required for Indian regiments by the grant of commissions to British non-commissioned officers; one way of doing this being to promote a non-commissioned officer in his British regiment and to detach a British officer therefrom with some knowledge of Hindustani to native troops?

5669. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, I think this should work well to a limited extent. Lists of British officers for transfer to Indian regiments on mobilization should be kept and such officers informed. It would also tend to officers learning Hindustani.

5670. SIR P. LAKE.—Would you make it voluntary for these officers, or could you order them to join these Indian regiments?

5671. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—You could order them in time of war.

5672. PRESIDENT.—I fancy you could order any officer to do duty with regular troops, and Indian army troops are regulars.

5673. SIR P. LAKE.—But it is possible that these officers would not understand native ways and the native system of accounts etc.?

5674. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—If you gave them sufficient inducements they would surely try their best to overcome these difficulties.

5675. PRESIDENT.—There is a marked readiness on the part of subalterns to join the Indian army, so that I would anticipate no difficulties. Many of the men who got command of Indian regiments at the end of the Mutiny were chosen from British regiments.

5676. PRESIDENT.—Might such services as Supply and Transport, Ordnance and Army Clothing, be made largely civil in character?

5677. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I think Ordnance and Army Clothing should be largely civil in character, but the Supply and Transport Corps should only be so in a very limited degree. This service should be maintained for work in the field across the frontier; its personnel should therefore be chiefly military.

5678. PRESIDENT.—Would you consider it possible to substitute civil for military subordinates in the Military Works Services?

5679. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, in a large measure. I presume this means economy; if not, I should leave things as they are.

5680. PRESIDENT.—Formerly under the Public Works Department there were a number of native subordinates, whose duty frequently obliged

them to visit barracks in which British troops were quartered. The British troops sometimes treated them in such a manner that disciplinary difficulties arose. This was one of the arguments put forward for making the Military Works Services military in character.

5681. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Quite so.

5682. PRESIDENT.—Could pensioners be substituted for effective soldiers in the Barrack Department?

5683. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I should certainly give this a trial. I do not see any reason why they should not.

5684. PRESIDENT.—Do you think that expenditure on reliefs might be curtailed by keeping units for longer periods at the same stations, or by other means?

5685. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—For British troops I see no reason why corps should not be kept in healthy stations for longer periods than they are now. From relaxing stations reliefs must be more frequent. For native troops you must consider the various classes and other necessities. You can reduce expenditure by making shorter distance moves. The regiment in Chitral might always remain there for two years. Service is very popular there. In the localized corps (for instance the Guides), you never lack recruits because the local men get to their homes so easily, and the others have a permanent home in Mardan, yet I know no more serviceable corps in the field. It is an interesting question. Lord Kitchener said that localized corps got rusty and would not have them, but I consider them the best in reality.

5686. PRESIDENT.—The Punjab Frontier Force was localized in a comparatively small area, but it contained some of the best troops in the Indian army.

5687. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes. We had also the Hyderabad Contingent which was very good, though not equal to the Punjab Frontier Force and the Central India Horse. It is an extraordinary thing that the localized troops were so good.

5688. PRESIDENT.—It has always been feared that localized regiments would be influenced by local feeling and might be a danger on that account. Then again, if they are too much localized, their relations prey on them, do they not?

5689. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes.

5690. SIR W. MEYER.—As regards British troops, you said this morning that a great many go to the hills in the hot weather; this being so, is it necessary to trouble much about changing regiments from station to station. Do not the moves to the hills suffice?

5691. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—From many stations there are no moves to the hills—from Calcutta for instance. It is only more or less the men from the Punjab stations that move.

5692. SIR W. MEYER.—How is it the doctors think it necessary to send men from the Punjab to the hills, and not men from Calcutta?

5693. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—In the latter case there are few hill stations to which to send them. They take their turn in the Punjab for hill stations.

5694. SIR W. MEYER.—Then as regards native troops, I gather you think they might be kept longer at their stations than they now are?

5695. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I do not see any objection to it.

5696. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think that the present leave rules for the native rank and file are too liberal?

5697. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—They are liberal, but not too liberal.

5698. SIR W. MEYER.—As they get good leave they should not object to being kept in the same place for many years?

5699. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, I think they would like it.

5700. PRESIDENT.—From what you have seen of the work of divisional Generals, do you consider that they make adequate use of the financial and other powers conferred upon them? Do you think that any further measures of decentralization might be tried?

5701. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—As a divisional General I used all the financial and other powers vested in me to the utmost extent. As Army Commander, my work is training and discipline, and I am not aware of what General Officers Commanding divisions do in these respects. In my opinion Army Headquarters would be spared much office work if divisional Generals were left more power in disciplinary matters, for instance in the matter of rows between British soldiers and natives. Frequently the most trivial cases lead to correspondence with the Adjutant-General, and I could go into many further details by reference to office papers. I can certainly say that the conferring of these extra powers would have made my work as divisional commander much more interesting and easy, and saved a lot of writing.

5702. PRESIDENT.—Could you with advantage have exercised greater financial powers as divisional General?

5703. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, I could have utilized them with great advantage up to about Rs. 20,000. The bigger financial powers you give commanders the more efficient they become.

5704. SIR W. MEYER.—The divisional General has a definite Budget I presume?

5705. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—He has now.

5706. SIR W. MEYER.—A divisional General has a Deputy Controller of Accounts as his financial adviser; does the system work well?

5707. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—When I commanded the 1st Division the Controller was not in Peshawar, but at Rawalpindi. This caused a good deal of writing because every other anna was objected to. A Deputy Controller is now in Peshawar, which must facilitate matters, but I have had no experience of the system. Judging by the staff and buildings, there would appear to be many Controllers instead of one. The Peshawar officer has a very large establishment. The numbers they sent me to house frightened me. However, the conferring of financial powers on certain officers was certainly one of the best things that occurred in my time. Personally, it gave me more power and interest in my division. A Brigadier General can now sanction up to Rs. 500; formerly he could not sanction much.

5708. SIR W. MEYER.—If you extend the present financial powers of divisional Generals, would you extend those of the Brigadier Generals?

5709. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I do not see why you should not.

5710. PRESIDENT.—How has the policy of posting regiments to provinces distant from their recruiting areas answered?

5711. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I know of no ill effects from such postings. In some cases the native ranks like it. So long as such postings only come occasionally I do not think a regiment minds it. The question of economy is another matter. Politically it is a good thing. I would occasionally let corps go and see new parts of India, and let those parts of India see other classes of our army.

5712. PRESIDENT.—Do you approve of the system under which the Generals of the Northern and Southern Armies are not utilized in any way for administrative work? Do you think that these high officers might be given more definite work to do and thus relieve Army Headquarters?

5713. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—As General Officer commanding an Army, I have as much to do as I can manage. For seven months I am continually travelling, directing staff tours in divisions, inter-divisional manœuvres, watching brigade manœuvres, and seeing new corps, in order to report on their

senior officers, whose confidential reports all come through me. I am also responsible for the review reports of all corps and Volunteers, the higher question of discipline of corps, officers' courts-martial and courts of inquiry; civil cases transferred, and many other matters of training and discipline are also in my hands. I find that from October till the end of April it is all I can do to get through my touring work. May and June are spent in writing the confidential and training reports of the Army. From July till the end of September, with my General Staff officers, I prepare the next winter's manœuvres and staff tour schemes, and we study the art of war in all its branches, issue and check essays; and before all these are done, the next regular training season comes round. If an Army Commander does all these things thoroughly, in my opinion he has no time for further administrative work than he already has to do.

5714. SIR P. LAKE.—You have promotions as well?

5715. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, we have to deal with all recommendations for promotions, besides transfers and all acting appointments such as squadron and double-company commanders. I have only a small staff to cope with this work, but I do not want more staff nor do I want administration.

5716. PRESIDENT.—You are, I presume, entirely responsible for preparing programmes of training for the troops?

5717. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I send them to the Chief of the General Staff. He looks over the special and general idea, and between us we embody them in schemes. After that I am responsible for the supervision of the manœuvres.

5718. SIR W. MEYER.—General Barrow told us that in the course of his duties he necessarily passed through cantonments, and he thought the General Officers Commanding the Northern and Southern Armies might deal with cantonment matters as well as with the discipline and training of troops? A. 4636.

5719. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I could not do it. I always write demi-officially to the Adjutant-General or Quartermaster-General if I notice anything worth writing about.

5720. SIR W. MEYER.—Then supposing cantonment questions were included in your sphere, it would not give you any more work than at present?

5721. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Indeed it would. If under present conditions I see something wrong with, say, a hospital, I write to the Quartermaster-General and tell him that I have noticed this or that, and the next time he goes to that particular place he looks into the matter. Besides, the divisional General can look after his cantonments, etc., and again there is the Brigadier General. If I dealt with cantonment matters it would be making useless work for which I have no time.

5722. SIR W. MEYER.—General Barrow's experience has been that after he has finished the annual reports, he has barely two hours' work a day.

5723. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I have within 12 months spent a hundred and sixty-three nights in a train, and nine days out of ten I was on a horse, etc. Of course, there is a time (July, August and September) during which I do not spend more than two hours in the office, but I am studying the art of war during this period with my staff officers. The greater part of the work of Army Commanders then is to study and supervise, for which I have only three months in the year. I cannot do the work of training the army and administrative work as well and I never waste time.

5724. SIR W. MEYER.—Does your work tend to dwarf the responsibilities of the divisional Generals?

5725. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Not at all. During inter-divisional manœuvres, the divisional Generals are of course commanding their own divisions, and it is for me to report on them and to see whether the two divisions have been trained on similar lines and I report anything I see wrong.

5726. SIR P. LAKE.—You also compile the inspection schemes ?

5727. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes. I make a record of my daily work in a book. In this book are written the names and the qualifications, as far as I can judge, of all the field officers in the Northern Army. Therefore when I report on officers to the Commander-in-Chief it cannot be said that I am reporting on officers I do not know. That in itself is an important duty. If you go to parades and manœuvres and do not take notes, it is not the right way. Then as regards the art of war. I am sure Lord Nicholson will agree with me that you can study it to the end of your life and still be none too good at it. I have been Army Commander for two years and I have not had any leave, so that, as things are, I can honestly say that I can do no more work than is given me at present.

5728. SIR W. MEYER.—As regards the art of war, in its wider aspect is not that the specific duty of the General Staff ?

5729. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, but I command in the field. I learn a great deal from the General Staff, but there are one or two things I would like to be consulted on. Between us, I take it, we are doing very good service to the State. I am commanding an army, and we are each discharging a duty. I would be responsible if war broke out, for the command of an army. When the Commander-in-Chief comes to manœuvres he supervises me ; thus it runs down the scale. It all works down to one end—the proper standard of what the army should do. I think the present system adopted by the Chief of the General Staff up here, of letting us submit our reports and combining them, is a very excellent one. The day has come when officers see that study of the art of war is the most serious part of their profession. I spend three months on it but I wish I could spend more.

Staff tours are exceedingly difficult things. You have to know your work to be able to do it, and when you give your opinion regarding the movement of brigades and divisions you must know a good deal about the subject.

5730. PRESIDENT.—Sir Malcolm Grover told us recently that in regard to the important future needs of the army, he would classify these in the following order of urgency :—

- (i) Armament, equipment, and other modern needs.
- (ii) Improvements in distribution and organization.
- (iii) Improvements in communications.
- (iv) Improvements in training.

Do you concur generally in these ? What, in your opinion, are the most important specific needs of the army at present ?

5731. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—All four points noted by Sir Malcolm Grover are very important.

The following also are urgent requirements, in order of urgency, as money becomes available :—

- (i) Better prospects and pensions for native officers.
- (ii) Formation of proper army bearer corps for service across the frontier. At present they are non-existent.
- (iii) Completing the Peshawar Division so as to have it ready for instant work across the frontier.
- (iv) The provision of a Manœuvre Act in the vicinity of cantonments and reservation of land for training troops.
- (v) Improving the accommodation of the Indian army.
- (vi) Formation of the base sidings, etc., at Kacha Garhi.
- (vii) Rearmament of artillery and completion of the arming of all infantry with latest model rifles.

(viii) Improving the communications (railways preferably) to Parachinar and through the Khyber.

(ix) Better provision for syces of silladar cavalry.

(x) Last but by no means least, the completion, as far as possible, of war divisions in their own areas. This may have to wait for years but if money was available I would put it high on the scale.

5732. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you know anything of a recent case where rifles were found to be defective ?

5733. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I know cases where rifles are not up to the mark.

5734. SIR W. MEYER.—An enormous number of rifles have been reported on unfavourably by the Ordnance Department ?

5735. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I have heard of it.

5736. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think the examination of rifles by the Ordnance Department is unduly stringent ?

5737. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I think the examination is probably very fair. Some regiments are armed with poor rifles. I do not know whether the inspections of recent years were lax, or whether it was that no money was forthcoming.

5738. PRESIDENT.—Sir Beauchamp Duff, giving evidence before the Mowatt Committee at the India Office, drew a vivid picture of the chaos that would arise from the non-fulfilment of the self-contained divisional area scheme, and the consequent transfer of mobilization arrangements from the divisional Generals to Army Headquarters. Do you concur in this, and had you any experience of such a condition of things in a frontier expedition ?

5739. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I agree generally with Sir Beauchamp Duff. My own experience in 1908 during the Zakka Khel and Mohmand expeditions was limited to the 1st Division, and to the reserve brigades from the 2nd Division. Although only one war division was concerned, the absence of some of its units caused much work that could have been avoided had the whole Division been in the area. With several divisions mobilizing at the same time, I cannot but believe that much confusion, delay and needless work would ensue.

5740. PRESIDENT.—But did you not have a very small and lightly equipped force for these expeditions ?

5741. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes.

5742. PRESIDENT.—Previous expeditions were on a larger scale. For action across the frontier the first requirement is the collection of transport, without which you cannot move. If there were five or six divisions entailed, I presume there would be very considerable delay before the transport could be got together ?

5743. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes.

5744. PRESIDENT.—Can you not concentrate your troops sooner than you can collect your transport ?

5745. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—It depends upon what area you are in; if you have railways in your area you can collect them much more quickly.

5746. PRESIDENT.—I take it that in the Peshawar and Kohat direction the transport would take six weeks to collect, and you could concentrate the troops there in, say, a fortnight ?

5747. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—You could collect your transport in less than a month now for operations.

5748. PRESIDENT.—Therefore although the self-contained area idea might be an improvement, you would not say that chaos reigned before its

inception, because as a matter of fact the troops were collectable within ten days, but the transport took months. Would that be the case at present?

5749. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—No, because we now have the grantee camel corps and other improvements, which facilitate the transport question.

5750. PRESIDENT.—But even with better transport arrangements, the collection of the second-line transport takes a long time?

5751. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Of course it may be necessary to wait for the transport, but I cannot imagine a situation in which you could not move forward a certain number of troops. The second-line of camels is that on which I lay stress. The advance of a couple of brigades moving toward the Tirah might be the salvation of an expedition, if they reached the Bazar Valley quickly, which they could do.

5752. SIR W. MEYER.—There are always a certain number of troops on the frontier are there not?

5753. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes.

5754. SIR W. MEYER.—It has always been possible to move a couple of brigades, has it not?

5755. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, but you can move a division now much quicker.

5756. PRESIDENT.—Was it not the case that the Guides, for example, could move with their transport at a moment's notice?

5757. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, but then, on the other hand, each of the frontier brigades has mobile transport for a moveable column. They can furnish transport very readily on that frontier for small columns.

5758. PRESIDENT.—I understand that mobilization arrangements are made at Army Headquarters at present?

5759. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, but the concentration is effected by divisional Generals. General orders for concentration are issued from Army Headquarters.

5760. SIR P. LAKE.—Is it not the case that the mobilization of troops is entirely done by divisional commanders?

5761. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Certainly. Mobilization is ordered, and concentration takes place as the natural result.

5762. PRESIDENT.—Taking Meerut as an example, has the divisional General at Meerut the means of providing all the units in his command with the essentials for taking the field as regards transport animals?

5763. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Part of them would come from other divisions under instructions from Army Headquarters.

5764. PRESIDENT.—But that is a mobilization arrangement, is it not?

5765. SIR W. MEYER.—It is laid down in Mobilization Regulations, India that "mobilization is the process by which an armed force passes from a peace to a war footing." The mobilization therefore of a unit means its completion for war in personnel, animals and matériel.

5766. PRESIDENT.—In case of a serious matter arising, demanding rapidity, then all the divisions in the rear would be depleted of their transport units on mobilization being ordered. I only wish to bring out the fact that the chaos referred to was a chaos which depended on the supposition that an immediate advance across the frontier in great strength was not only feasible, but likely to occur. In view of the difficulty of collecting the second-line transport, the idea is not feasible. We could not move with the same rapidity as France and Germany on their conterminous frontier.

Is it always possible or expedient in a minor expedition to provide the troops required entirely from the nearest division?

5767. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—The nearest division should furnish the troops for a minor expedition. It is the nearest and most handy. The General Officer Commanding and his Staff know the requirements and nature of the country. The troops have been trained by the commanders in peace who will lead them in war. The troops expect their turn of service, should luck come their way during their tour of service in the area. It may occasionally be necessary for some special reason to change a corps at the last moment, but this would be a trifle compared with having brigades made up of troops unaccustomed to work together. It is the brigade or division trained together in peace that is worth far more than anything else in war.

5768. PRESIDENT.—Hitherto it has not been the custom to follow out that principle in expeditions of an arduous nature?

5769. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—No, not till 1908.

5770. PRESIDENT.—Was not the Abor Expedition also an exception?

5771. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Its work was peculiar, but I would not have sent any troops out of the divisional area to it.

5772. PRESIDENT.—Are you satisfied with the arrangements contemplated for the command of internal defence troops, when the whole or a large part of the Field Army is mobilized for service on the frontiers?

5773. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I am not satisfied, but in my opinion, whatever we do, we must first think of the Field Army. Success in the field means success in India, that is, far less trouble behind the Field Army. Good officers should be detailed for the command of internal defence areas, but such officers must be given a free hand as to how to act. Lay down guiding principles, (*e.g.*, civil requirements, political considerations, etc.) and then let them have a free hand. If you do not give it to them, the good man will take it when the time comes, notwithstanding all the schemes and orders you may draw up in peace time.

5774. SIR W. MEYER.—The fact remains that, if you mobilize the whole of the nine divisions, there is hardly a General officer left in India. How are you going to find commanders for these areas?

5775. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—You do not want General officers; younger officers would be much better.

5776. SIR W. MEYER.—Take the very important Meerut area. Would you trust the command of that divisional area to a comparatively young officer? It is surely as important as, say, a brigade in the Field Army?

5777. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—It is just as important, but the man in charge does not want the same training, because he is not going to fight battles like the Brigadiers. You want a man of common sense; give the command to a colonel whom you know to be a good man.

5778. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you advocate a sort of confidential roster in which the names of colonels and their commands would be entered?

5779. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—It might answer, but the Chief of the General Staff would know the man to appoint.

5780. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think, speaking generally, that our Generals are too old?

5781. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Sometimes they are too old; on the other hand, the native army is getting its Commanding Officers younger than it used to. The block of promotion in the cavalry, however, is killing all interest.

5782. SIR W. MEYER.—I understand the rule is that a lieutenant colonel has to go when he reaches the age of fifty-two. General Barrow was in favour of making it fifty for the cavalry. What is your opinion?

A. 4478.

5783. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I think it would be a very good thing.

5784. SIR W. MEYER.—General Barrow also proposed that a second-in-command should retire at the age of forty-eight in cavalry regiments and fifty in infantry regiments. Would you agree?

5785. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I would. I am in favour of giving a specially good man command of a regiment within a reasonable time, but General Barrow said he would not give an officer the command of a regiment unless he had twenty-five years' service. I think it is the rule now.

5786. SIR W. MEYER.—The difficulty is that in the native army a man gets his rank by length of service, does he not?

5787. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, because in the old days we could not get officers unless we offered them the inducement of automatic promotion. In the British army it is not so. At the same time, I think if a man is not good, that is, if his services are not up to the mark, he should go; it is, however, a difficult thing to carry out.

5788. SIR W. MEYER.—Still, you would not hesitate to put in a junior lieutenant colonel over the head of a senior, I presume?

5789. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—No, it would make for efficiency in the end.

5790. SIR W. MEYER.—Under present conditions an officer becomes full colonel, and after discharging his duties at Army Headquarters in some capacity or other may be sent back to his regiment. Is that a good plan?

5791. PRESIDENT.—There have been cases of an officer being promoted to the rank of substantive colonel, and after being employed in a staff appointment at Army Headquarters or elsewhere returning on its termination to his regiment as second-in-command or commandant, to the great disadvantage of everybody else?

5792. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Quite so.

5793. PRESIDENT.—What is your opinion of the Border Military Police in the Frontier Province? A Committee on this force, presided over by the Hon. Sir Harcourt Butler, proposed in 1911:—

(i) The withdrawal of two squadrons from the Indian cavalry regiment at Kohat.

(ii) The stationing on the Samana of a battalion of Indian infantry (now there), half a squadron, Indian cavalry, and a detachment of Indian garrison artillery.

(iii) The posting at Thal of a battalion of Indian infantry and the two squadrons of Indian cavalry withdrawn from Kohat.

(iv) The posting at Tank of one battalion of Indian infantry and a regiment of Indian cavalry.

(v) A withdrawal from Wano and the Upper Tochi.

(vi) The reorganization on lower strength of the Border Military Police to be styled 'Frontier Constabulary' who would have a larger strength of European police officers.

What is your opinion?

5794. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—The Border Military Police in the North-West Frontier Province, as it stands at present, is useless; I believe it is to be reorganized; as to—

(iii) I am in favour of posting a battalion of infantry at Thal. I know nothing of the move of two squadrons of cavalry.

(iv) I think the whole garrison of Dera Ismail Khan would be better placed at Tank; in any case one battalion of infantry and one cavalry regiment should go there.

(v) I am against any withdrawal from Wano and the Upper Tochi.

5795. PRESIDENT.—It has been suggested that the frontier militia in the North-West Frontier Province, the Zhob Levy in Baluchistan, and the Military Police in Bengal, Assam and Burma, should be placed under the Commander-in-Chief. What is your opinion?

5796. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I know the frontier militia and the Assam military police. I consider these should remain as they are, and not be placed under the Commander-in-Chief. I have seen a good deal of the working of these troops. My relations with the civil authorities were always cordial, we worked in entire harmony; but the duties performed by these special corps are of so different a nature in peace time from those of regular troops, that I prefer leaving them as they are. When war breaks out they fall into their place, under command of the General Officer Commanding the forces, perfectly naturally. I am against a change for its own sake. In this case I say leave well alone.

5797. PRESIDENT.—Under its original constitution the old Punjab Frontier Force was under the Government of the Punjab, was it not?

5798. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes.

5799. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider that the system which now obtains for the selection and appointment of officers to the frontier militia, including the Zhob Levy, and the military police in Bengal, Assam, and Burma, is satisfactory? If you consider the system should be changed, what do you recommend, and why?

5800. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—My experience has been chiefly with the Khyber Rifles, Kurram Militia, and Burma Military Police. I would not change the system of officering them. I can guarantee that their officers are very good indeed. The civil authorities are pleased because they get the men they ask for, and the officers are contented and zealous. Best of all, they are young—that invaluable asset on the frontier. If they were posted direct from Army Headquarters, with due respect, I think rank and age would come into play. Let us keep out of that. Leave the system as it is.

5801. PRESIDENT.—Could you not get reasonably active lieutenant colonels to command militia regiments which are about 1,200 strong?

5802. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I would rather have a major because he has something to look forward to.

5803. SIR W. MEYER.—I take it that this is one case in which you can temper the rule of automatic promotion?

5804. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—You mean by sending anybody we choose?

5805. SIR W. MEYER.—Yes. Although his rank remains the same, the officer selected practically gets the advantages of higher rank?

5806. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, it gives him good practice as a Commanding Officer which is another argument in favour of having a major.

5807. PRESIDENT.—In the event of a serious war on the frontier, accompanied by actual or potential serious disturbance in the interior of India, would your policy be to move to the front all Indian regiments of whose fidelity you were somewhat doubtful?

5808. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I would disband any corps which showed united or open discontent. In very special cases other doubtful corps might be sent to the base of operations, and if they did well be given the honour of joining the Field Army. In some cases corps who were only slightly suspected might go to the Field Army, where their discontent might turn into loyalty amid their surroundings. Corps might also be sent into other areas where men of their own class or religion were few. Whatever is done, the main object should be borne in mind, namely not to dislocate if possible brigades which have been trained together in peace.

5809. SIR W. MEYER.—Let us suppose that the authorities were apprehensive that in the event of a big war on the frontier there might be trouble with the Sikhs, and came to the conclusion that the best way to secure the Sikhs would be to send every Sikh regiment off to the Field Army; would not a consideration like that outweigh the theoretical considerations in favour of your homogeneous brigades?

5810. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I can imagine such a situation, but I should prefer to take my own brigades into the field. The question hinges on the situation you suggest. I would not move all of them forward because they might find it profitable to show disaffection in order to get to the front. Of course, if the feeling were known, you might have to turn a regiment out of the Field Army, but I think the main principle to bear in mind is, if possible, not to change anything which belongs to the Field Army. I advocate sending the doubtful regiments to the base and making it conditional on their behaviour whether they go to the front or not.

5811. PRESIDENT.—It has been stated that owing to the increased duties at Peshawar, it is desirable to place another Indian infantry battalion there. Can you say in what manner the duties have so increased of late years as to render this step necessary?

5812. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—When I commanded the Peshawar Division the civil authorities constantly called for military aid. This went to such an extent as to reduce the number of nights in bed below the minimum. The troops were getting tired of this, and fever and other ailments took their toll. Ordinary duty in Peshawar was also very heavy, and leave and furlough had to be considered. I asked for an extra battalion, which would also have furnished a unit for the 3rd Brigade, which now draws it from Kohat. I consider Peshawar should have another battalion, and if one cannot be sent, one of the Nowshera regiments should be moved up there and the Pioneer battalion of the 1st Division sent to Nowshera.

5813. PRESIDENT.—How would you accommodate this regiment?

5814. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—We should have to build lines.

5815. PRESIDENT.—Is there room to do so?

5816. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—We could turn the heavy battery out of Peshawar where it is perfectly useless,—Army Headquarters would select another station for it. Our heavy batteries as at present constituted, are, as I have said, perfectly useless.

5817. SIR W. MEYER.—This is one of the economies you might be able to suggest?

5818. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I have suggested it before.

A. 5185. 5819. SIR W. MEYER.—Sir George Roos-Keppel said it was absolutely necessary to have strong detachments at Shabkadr, Jamrud and Abazai, for which he wanted troops, more especially in time of war. Do you concur?

5820. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—There certainly should be troops there in time of war. These stations might be taken over by the Khyber Rifles. I think we have always had a garrison at Shabkadr.

5821. SIR W. MEYER.—Do they find all these detachments from the Peshawar garrison?

5822. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, except I think that at Abazai. In my opinion there ought to be another battalion at Peshawar.

A. 5153. 5823. SIR W. MEYER.—Sir George Roos-Keppel told us that he was very apprehensive of the present system of holding Chitral, and that the reliefs filled him with concern because he expects that some day they will be cut up.

5824. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I do not agree with him. They are a match for all the Khans that could come against them.

5825. SIR W. MEYER.—Sir George Roos-Keppel also said that, if A. 5143. Chitral is to be held, there ought to be two battalions there instead of one.

5826. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I see no necessity for it. The local people cannot do anything to the troops there. In case of war the Kashmir troops could come to their relief. I cannot see any danger in holding Chitral as at present.

5827. PRESIDENT.—His idea was that if you had a stronger garrison you could hold the fort and also attack the enemy.

5828. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, but who is the enemy?

5829. SIR W. MEYER.—It is so far the principle that the points beyond our administration should be held by tribal levies, is it not?

5830. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—But the tribal levies there are not good enough.

5831. SIR W. MEYER.—Would it be possible to have localized corps there and avoid the constant expense of these reliefs?

5832. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—In my opinion, you must have the force you have there now.

5833. SIR W. MEYER.—But could we not localize the corps as in Baluchistan, and thus avoid the expense of these constant reliefs?

5834. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Corps of tribesmen?

5835. SIR W. MEYER.—Not necessarily.

5836. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—At present you have a very good asset in these Chitral reliefs because all the troops like it.

5837. SIR P. LAKE.—Regarding the Peshawar garrison, are all the guards, detachments, etc., furnished from it, necessary?

5838. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes.

5839. PRESIDENT.—Forty years ago I was stationed at Peshawar, and the people then were just as turbulent as they are now. The garrison was no bigger then than at present, but there was no difficulty about nights in bed and so on.

5840. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—But the Border Military Police has gone to pieces and the troops are doing their work to a large extent. For instance, take the incident of the capture of the outlaw Multan which I myself witnessed; if it had not been for the regular troops we should never have captured him. I quote this as one instance.

5841. SIR W. MEYER.—I understand that the Border Military Police is being put on a better footing?

5842. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—They will never be good enough for the work by themselves.

5843. PRESIDENT.—It has been stated that the greatest danger to British rule would be discontent in the native army. Do you think there is any discontent in the native army at the present time? If so, to what causes is it due, and what steps would you propose to remove the feeling?

5844. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—There is discontent in the native army. It has been growing gradually. Seditious pamphlets, preaching a vague idea of the Asiatic being as good or better than a white man, the religious fervour in Afghanistan, the absence nowadays of field service which has been a great incentive to recruiting in the past, rise in civil wages (*e.g.*, labour in the North-West Frontier Province, especially Malakand Canals, etc.) the loss of *izzat* to soldiers, the comparatively obscure status of native officers on retirement from the service, plague rise in prices, and the much harder work demanded of all ranks have all contributed towards the feeling of discontent and unrest. To remove such causes is very difficult. I maintain that we should pay and pension the native

army well. This is the greatest incentive to loyalty. Keep up the *izzat* of the soldier both in the service, and when he leaves it on pension. The native civilian subordinate has gradually been pushed up the ladder of *izzat*, whilst the native officer and soldier have been pushed down in comparison. I may say that is one of the gravest causes of complaint amongst native officers whom I know very well. Occasionally I collect all the native officers I can find and talk to them and the one complaint is that in the villages the native officer is not looked up to as he should be. At Lahore the Lieutenant-Governor collected a number of native officers together at a certain function, but I, as commander of the Northern Army, was not even told by the civil authorities that this gathering was to take place. Some of the native officers said "Sahib you did not take part in this Darbar then?" As I say I myself had not been told and I believe many Commanding Officers did not know of the Darbar although all these native officers had been collected and taken up. This is an example of loss of *izzat*.

At gatherings I have seen native officers who should have been in a high place put in a lower one. The native officer feels this very much. He always tells you he is not given sufficient pension to keep up his position, consequently he cannot maintain it. A subadar-major gets fifty rupees or so, and a jemadar gets only eighteen rupees. How can a man keep up his position on eighteen rupees?

5845. SIR R. SCALLON.—He cannot maintain his family.

5846. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—No. It is one of the first things that should be righted.

5847. SIR W. MEYER.—Should a table of precedence be drawn up?

5848. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—It is drawn up by all civil authorities, I believe.

5849. SIR W. MEYER.—There is none for India as a whole. I think it usually varies with the ideas of the Commissioner. Would you like a definite ruling as regards the position of the subadar in relation to the tahsildar?

5850. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, I should.

5851. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you read a book written some 50 years ago called *From Sepoy to Subadar*? Do you remember the same complaint there as to the treatment of retired officers?

5852. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes, I have read it.

5853. SIR W. MEYER.—Then it is not a new complaint?

5854. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—It is new in one way; it is known and commented upon in the papers. Even the villagers know it now.

5855. PRESIDENT.—Did not a poet write something on the subject?

5856. SIR P. LAKE.—When danger threaten, and a war is nigh,
 "God and the soldier" is the people's cry!
 When war is over, and the nation righted,
 God is forgotten and the soldier slighted.

5857. PRESIDENT.—A suggestion has been made to post a General Officer in charge of administration to each division with a view to giving divisional Generals more time to devote to the training of their troops. Do you concur in the suggestion, and if so, why?

5858. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I think a General Officer commanding a division who does his duty thoroughly is nowadays a very hard-worked man, but I should have been sorry myself to hand over any part of the work to an administrative Brigadier General. It is absolutely essential to a General of a division to be well acquainted with the administrative duties of his command, and there is not so much training to be done in a division as to make it necessary to have yet another General. It has been argued that this administrative General might command the internal defence area on mobilization, but I think

a colonel would be sufficient, so long as he is well chosen. A divisional General has got his administrative officers and he need never be worried with detail if they do, or if he makes them do, their work. I do not concur in the proposal.

5859. SIR W. MEYER.—Speaking of Brigadier Generals, do you think it was necessary to create six Brigadier Generals of artillery? I have always understood that a lieutenant colonel commanding a brigade of artillery is not overworked?

5860. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I did not think it was absolutely necessary to create these appointments, but of course we would want them for war. We could have done without them, but it all tends to better training. At the same time, the multiplication of Generals may be overdone. After all that has been laid down by the Commander-in-Chief and the Staff we might have done without these artillery brigadiers, but it is well to have an expert of this arm.

5861. PRESIDENT.—Have the old Colonels on the Staff, Royal Artillery, been done away with?

5862. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Mine has been taken away, but I have been given a Brigadier General for certain divisions. I go round to all the divisions, but it is very awkward having no one of that arm with me now.

5863. PRESIDENT.—What are the relations of the General Staff with yourself as a General Officer commanding an army, and with divisional and brigade commanders in the matter of training?

5864. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—My relations as General Officer commanding a division, and now as Army Commander, with the General Staff, are most cordial. We work I believe, in harmony; I am consulted on all questions of training and given a free hand under certain conditions as to how I carry on my duties. As far as training goes, I have no suggestions to offer; I would, however, say that the General Staff might well consult me in matters of organization and preparations for war. It would help me and it might help them sometimes. Thus, as Army Commander I am not consulted in:—

- (i) Proposed changes in the defence of areas.
- (ii) Alterations in strengths of moveable columns.
- (iii) Plans of operations across the border, and many other matters which have distinctly to do with the training and discipline of the Northern Army, for which I am in part held responsible by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

5865. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think that in the last few years there has been a tendency on the part of the General Staff to take to themselves functions which were previously exercised by the divisional Generals?

5866. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—No.

5867. SIR W. MEYER.—The General Staff is now a comparatively large body; we wanted your opinion as to whether there was too much centralization, thus causing the General Staff to concern themselves with matters which were previously left to the divisional Generals?

5868. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—No, I think the General Staff do the duties belonging to them which divisional Generals could not do.

5869. SIR W. MEYER.—Does this also apply to the Quartermaster-General's and Adjutant-General's Branches?

5870. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I hardly deal with these. All my work is with the General Staff, except that I deal with the Adjutant-General in questions of discipline. I think that the Adjutant-General's Branch does not give me enough freedom.

5871. SIR R. SCALLON.—About assault cases?

5872. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Disciplinary cases all round. They always want to know this, that, or the other.

5873. SIR W. MEYER.—Is your decision final in disciplinary cases?

5874. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—It is final. But quite recently, and at my special request, the Commander-in-Chief relieved Army Commanders of their powers as regards courts-martial. Practically all I had to do with them was to annul, on the Deputy Judge Advocate General's advice, proceedings in which legal flaws had been found. In cases where I disagreed with him, the proceedings were further reviewed by the Judge Advocate General in Simla, and my decision was probably set aside for technical reasons. I had no powers to commute or mitigate sentences, as I was not a confirming authority.

5875. SIR W. MEYER.—Suppose it is a case of reducing a jemadar; who deals with that?

5876. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I am sorry to say that under the revised Indian Army Act that power has been taken away from me. It has done a great deal of harm. Formerly a jemadar knew that I had the power to remove him, now he knows I have not.

5877. SIR W. MEYER.—Might it not be better to give this power to a divisional General?

5878. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—He had it up to six months ago.

5879. SIR W. MEYER.—In the old days the divisional General had the power, but now it is concentrated at Army Headquarters?

5880. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—Yes.

5881. SIR R. SCALLON.—A divisional General cannot even order a native officer to take his pension.

A. 4726. General Barrow was in favour of reducing the horse artillery and also, if necessary, a British cavalry regiment in order to increase the British mountain artillery. Would you concur?

5882. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—If you wish to increase the British artillery, I would advocate converting some of the heavy batteries, which are almost obsolete and cost large sums of money, and are doing nothing. I have reported this to Army Headquarters.

5883. SIR P. LAKE.—Do you attach importance to that part of the training of British troops which will enable them to fight side by side with their comrades at Home when they leave India?

5884. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—You mean with reference to the general question of training?

5885. SIR P. LAKE.—Yes.

5886. SIR J. WILLCOCKS.—I attach the greatest importance to it. This is one of the reasons why I should not like to see British cavalry reduced, because it conduces to combined training which ought to be the same in India as at Home.

(The witness then withdrew.)

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

26th Meeting—Friday, the 2nd August 1912.

The Hon. Mr. J.B. Brunyate, C.I.E., Joint Secretary in the Finance Department (M.F.B.), attended as a witness and was examined.

EVIDENCE OF MR. J. B. BRUNYATE.

5887. PRESIDENT.—Mr. Brunyate, you have had long experience in the Finance Department of the Government of India and are at present Joint Secretary for Finance?

5888. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes. My exact designation at present is Secretary to the Government of India in the Army Department (Finance), and Joint Secretary to the Government of India in the Finance Department (Military Finance Branch).

5889. PRESIDENT.—With reference to paragraph 23 of your* memorandum on the course of military expenditure from 1898 to 1912-13, how, roughly speaking, was the sum of £8,000,000 (£6½rd million initial and £1½rd millions recurring) which the Government of India undertook to meet in 1904, in consequence of Lord Kitchener's representations, arrived at?

5890. MR. BRUNYATE.—The Committee will be able to follow the figures more clearly if I give them in crores of rupees.

Lord Kitchener submitted his Redistribution Scheme at the end of 1903; the figures showing the cost were described as rough approximate estimates and totalled two-and-a-half crores non-recurring. His Reorganization Memorandum followed shortly afterwards, and at the end of that memorandum were tabulated the measures which he regarded as "immediately essential." The total of these came to four crores initial and one crore recurring.

Finally, one crore was proposed for the expansion of reserves and the enlargement of the capacity of Ordnance factories with a view to providing a greater reserve of manufacturing power.

These three groups make a total of Rs. 7½ crores initial and Rs. 1 crore recurring expenditure. These were the original main figures giving the estimated cost of reorganization and redistribution. They were forwarded to the Secretary of State, before examination, with simply a covering despatch, and were the figures which the latter adopted as the original statement of cost.

The Reorganization Memorandum, however, referred also to other measures which, though less urgent, were considered necessary, namely—

The addition of three battalions of British infantry.

An additional regiment of Indian cavalry.

Six additional Indian mountain batteries.

These items were roughly estimated at the time to cost, including accommodation, half a crore initial and half a crore recurring. As far as we can gather they were taken into account in the Government of India's figures (Rs. 10 crores initial and Rs. 2 crores recurring). They must therefore be added to the totals of Rs. 7½ crores initial and Rs. 1 crore recurring quoted above, making Rs. 8 crores and Rs. 1½ crores.

Thus what I am asked to explain is, how did these latter sums develop into Rs. 10 crores and Rs. 2 crores.

The Rs. 10 crores initial and Rs. 2 crores recurring, as far as the Military Finance Branch can gather (I speak without personal knowledge of what occurred), did not represent an aggregate of detailed estimates of individual schemes arrived at after each had been subjected to departmental examination. They were simply rough forecasts in lump of the possible ultimate total cost of the schemes as a whole, put forward before any regular departmental examination had taken place. Sir Edmond Elles examined the redistribution proposals soon after their receipt—on general lines—and pointed out that the figures in

the scheme as put forward would be largely exceeded—possibly by Rs. 50 lakhs. It was shown in fact at a later stage that there were a good many omissions; departmental percentages had not been taken into account; standard figures for cost of building had been used without any allowance for the extra cost of building in small out of the way places; and so forth. But at the outset the position seems to have been simply this: it was seen that the cost was probably underestimated in the schemes as first sent to the Government of India, and therefore, as a working hypothesis, pending examination, arbitrary lump totals were taken, Rs. 10 crores initial instead of Rs. 8 crores, and Rs. 2 crores recurring instead of Rs. 1½ crores. The special reason which led to rough total figures being put forward in this way, before examination, was that the Military Department wanted to take up the question with the Finance Department whether it would be financially possible to provide the sums required to carry out the two groups of measures in 5 years; and for this special purpose Rs. 10 crores and Rs. 2 crores were postulated. It is repeatedly stated in the notes that these figures were merely a rough approximation; that they were not estimates; and, as Sir Edmond Elles declared, were not even “forecasts.”

Similarly in July 1904 it was stated by the Military Member that Council was not being asked to accept the Commander-in-Chief's scheme in full and including all details, but simply to say *whether it would be possible to finance it*, and it was added that the process of estimating the cost of the scheme was in hand.

5891. SIR W. MEYER.—Are we to understand that the cost of all these schemes was not carefully worked out?

5892. MR. BRUNYATE.—In the light of subsequent experience, some of the estimates are now seen to have been seriously erroneous; as I have just pointed out Sir Edmond Elles said at the time that the figures given in the schemes could not be regarded as “estimates,” and I do not imagine that Lord Kitchener himself when forwarding the schemes to the Government of India meant in any way to imply that they had been fully worked out.

5893. SIR W. MEYER.—Then again, take the reorganization proposals, these were to a certain extent hurried and rough?

5894. MR. BRUNYATE.—They were clearly rough estimates; I do not know what degree of previous preparation there was.

5895. PRESIDENT.—There cannot have been much, because Lord Kitchener did not take up the command in India until November 1902.

5896. SIR W. MEYER.—I have always understood that the scheme was throughout treated as highly confidential, and that the estimates did not undergo the scrutiny which ordinary estimates of expenditure receive?

5897. MR. BRUNYATE.—As regards the checking of the figures, it may be explained that the stages through which a comprehensive scheme, including a number of separate measures, would ordinarily pass before work could be begun, would have been as follows (under the administrative arrangements existing in 1904-05):—

- (a) Army Headquarters would prepare the general scheme, giving such information regarding its financial aspects as it was possible for them to provide.
- (b) The scheme would then be examined generally in the Military and Finance Departments, and eventually be referred to the Secretary of State for *general acceptance*.
- (c) Each individual scheme would then in due course be formulated in detail as regards both its scope and its cost, examined from the general Government and financial point of view, and also submitted to the Secretary of State for specific sanction unless the expenditure involved was within the Government of India's own powers.

The Army Headquarters organization at that time included no expert advisory establishment in matters of finance and estimating, nor did it include the Headquarters Staff for Military Works, Ordnance, and Supply and Transport.

We should never think to-day of regarding figures advanced by the General Staff, unassisted by the Ordnance and Military Works authorities and by ourselves, as possessing any permanent significance, or think of sending them to the Secretary of State at all without examination. The necessities of the case were the same in 1904-05, but the system was different, in that before the Commander-in-Chief of the time could obtain the expert assistance now available in the Military Finance Department he had to submit his scheme, whether officially or unofficially, to another Member of Government. Under the present system, he can obtain the entire assistance available at the headquarters of Government before he has personally committed himself in relation to the Viceroy or his other colleagues or the Secretary of State, and I may perhaps remark in passing that it is well known that this change of system is due to Lord Kitchener himself.

The real question, as I take it, is, would time have admitted of an adequate check being applied by the Military Department and Army Headquarters acting in concert, and what degree of check would in the circumstances have been adequate?

As regards the latter point, I would reply to this, firstly, that, without very great delay, no such check could have been carried out as occurs in stage (c) of the procedure outlined above. Secondly, I would say that great delay would also have been involved in the examination of the question whether individual measures as originally put forward were capable of reduction in scope and so forth. In actual practice, discussions of the latter kind take a very long time indeed to mature. As far as I can gather, the attempt to do this was the main reason which did delay the submission of revised figures for each individual scheme in 1904-05.

Thirdly, I would say that there was a very necessary check of an intermediate character which could have been applied within two or three months of the time when the schemes were first received by the Government of India. This check would have taken up each scheme on somewhat general lines, but individually, and a rough forecast figure would have been worked out for each and substituted for the preliminary Army Headquarters figures received with the original schemes. Something of the sort was in fact done with the redistribution measure, though the scheme was treated as a whole instead of each constituent part being separately examined. I am quite sure that if a Military Works officer, such as Major Liddell then or Colonel Dallas now (if I may mention names to make my meaning quite clear) and an expert in military estimating (and such experts were available) had been put on a short period of special duty, and consultation had been facilitated by informal meetings of representatives of the branches and departments concerned as would now be the practice, the estimating might soon have been put on a really sound basis, though not an absolutely final one.

5898. SIR W. MEYER.—Then taking page 9 of your Memorandum; and perhaps you will allow me to say that I appreciate very highly the trouble that this memorandum must have cost and the great use it will be hereafter.

[The President associated himself with this remark on behalf of the Committee.]

5899. MR. BRUNYATE.—Thank you. As you have spoken of it, I should like to say how deeply indebted I am to Mr. Ashmore, without whose assistance I really could not have got the material for it together.

5900. SIR W. MEYER.—Well, the cost of Lord Kitchener's schemes which were forwarded to the Secretary of State was put at £6½rds millions initial and £1½rd millions recurring?

5901. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes; what the Government of India said was that they would undertake to keep their expenditure within that sum.

5902. SIR W. MEYER.—In your Memorandum you have shewn expenditure already incurred and expenditure still to be incurred under a reduced programme, and have added a rough estimate of the cost of the deferred items; you get a total of practically £5 millions initial and £853,000 recurring. You say in paragraph 23 that the Finance Department have been trying to

ascertain the difference between these totals and those given in 1904. Is that investigation still proceeding?

5903. MR. BRUNYATE.—We have looked into that; the main point I had in my mind there was the investigation of what the amounts originally mentioned (Rs. 10 crores initial and Rs. 2 crores recurring) really meant, and that is the point I have answered. I shall have something to say about these figures later.

5904. PRESIDENT.—How far, speaking generally, had the estimate on which these figures were based to be modified under the test of subsequent examination?

5905. MR. BRUNYATE.—As the Rs. 10 crores and Rs. 2 crores represented a purely lump estimate, we cannot explain measure by measure how the actuals subsequently differed from the estimates. I can say something generally about the Redistribution Scheme, however. The cost of the Redistribution Scheme, as originally estimated in Lord Kitchener's first memorandum, was put at Rs. 2½ crores. The Military Member, Sir Edmond Elles, examining it before there had been a full departmental examination, said that an addition of at least Rs. 50 lakhs would be necessary which would raise the estimate to Rs. 3 crores. Later on, there was a rough departmental examination of the Redistribution Scheme by the Military Works Assistant Secretary; he put the cost at once at as much as Rs. 3½ crores, so perhaps we may regard that figure as representing roughly the redistribution portion of the Rs. 10 crores. We now estimate the cost of the complete Redistribution Scheme at £2,900,000. So we get:—

					£
Original figure	1,667,000
Sir E. Elles' figure	2,000,000
Rough departmental figure	2,500,000
Our present figure	2,900,000

Some of the increase shown by the last figure (say £133,000) is due to changes in type of buildings adopted since 1904-05.

I cannot say that the scheme which we now estimate to cost £2,900,000 is identical with the scheme originally put forward, because there have been constant modifications from the beginning, and this fact was impressed upon the Secretary of State in a despatch of the 30th August 1906.

As regards the Reorganization Scheme there is a good deal of difficulty in making comparisons. A certain item may now be found to cost more than the same item was estimated at in 1904, *i.e.*, the estimating as such may have been faulty; or, again, measures originally put forward may have since been considerably altered in scope. For example, it was originally proposed to form 23 mule corps and cadres; the scheme ultimately adopted included only 13 corps and cadres. There are many alterations of that kind, some ordered by the Government and some initiated by Lord Kitchener himself. The original figure at which it was proposed to maintain the reserve of rifles was 175,000; later on it was considered sufficient to have 111,000; this year it has been proposed (for a time) to have none at all. Another case is that of the small arms ammunition columns: a number of these were to have been brought into being with personnel and animals complete; eventually it was decided only to lay in the equipment for them. That change saved £127,000 initial and £166,000 recurring.

5906. PRESIDENT.—But the columns do not exist?

5907. MR. BRUNYATE.—Of course I do not wish to quote these cases as real savings, but as avoidance of expenditure. I am merely showing how the original estimates have come in certain cases to be inapplicable.

Then, again, some measures which were included in the original programme were afterwards removed and treated as ordinary (*i.e.*, non-reorganization) measures, such for example as the augmentation of the existing Royal Horse and Field Artillery batteries and ammunition columns which was

estimated to cost £114,000 initial and £114,000 recurring. These sums were originally included in the lump sum estimate of Rs. 10 crores initial and Rs. 2 crores recurring, so that the latter estimate has now been relieved to that extent. Reasons of that kind make it impossible to institute an exact comparison between the figures on page 9 of my Memorandum and the Rs. 10 crores and Rs. 2 crores estimate.

5908. SIR W. MEYER.—The reason I put my previous question was that generally in the case of big schemes the original estimates are exceeded. Here we get a case where schemes were estimated at more than was actually required. This is now explained.

Now taking the figures under Military Works in the statement on page 9 of your Memorandum, we find that they correspond practically to the redistribution outlay.

5909. MR. BRUNYATE.—Practically they do.

5910. SIR W. MEYER.—And there were no other measures outside redistribution which appear under Military Works?

5911. MR. BRUNYATE.—The army expenditure includes certain redistribution expenditure on land and lines for Indian troops built by units (£149,000); while the Military Works expenditure includes practically counterbalancing reorganization expenditure, the chief item being additional buildings for Ordnance factories to increase their capacity of outturn (£115,000).

5912. SIR P. LAKE.—Should not the scheme receive credit for barracks that would either have to be abandoned or rebuilt in any case?

5913. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes; this has been done, *i.e.*, our present estimate of £2,900,000 allows all credits which Lord Kitchener claimed in his original calculation of cost, except one item of £1,400 which the Secretary of State ordered the Government of India to debit to redistribution.

5914. PRESIDENT.—You have got a grant for ordinary Military Works; was that grant materially reduced on account of the extra expenditure incurred in the Redistribution Scheme, or did it remain at the normal figure?

5915. MR. BRUNYATE.—It remained at the normal figure, but it has not increased since except for certain charges which have been transferred to Military Works from the Army head since 1904-05.

5916. PRESIDENT.—But its normal rate provided for the normal reconstruction of barracks, which should therefore have gone on as before. Therefore, if the normal grant was not reduced, it follows that no credit should have been taken on this account.

5917. SIR W. MEYER.—The President has spoken of the Military Works grant; as a matter of fact very soon after Lord Kitchener's scheme was accepted was not the grant fixed at the very liberal figure of a crore and a quarter?

5918. MR. BRUNYATE.—The Military Works now has a grant to cover non-Schedule items only, and it is with regard to the ordinary Military Works expenditure that I was led to explain that there has been no subsequent increase. Apart from this grant and in addition to the money provided for the financing of Lord Kitchener's scheme, 25 lakhs a year were provided in the Schedule for financing non-redistribution military works costing more than Rs. 50,000.

5919. SIR W. MEYER.—Then, did not redistribution in some cases involve permanent recurring expenditure?

5920. MR. BRUNYATE.—It must inevitably do so in the end. The more buildings you place in charge of the Military Works the more they must spend on repairs. But as a matter of financial convenience it has not been the practice to treat the cost of repairs as "Schedule."

5921. SIR W. MEYER.—But if we are trying to determine the actual cost of redistribution, we should add a certain amount as recurring expenditure?

5922. MR. BRUNYATE.—One per cent. at least of the capital cost of the new buildings—except in so far as these buildings replace buildings in other places.

5923. SIR W. MEYER.—Apart from buildings, the scheme also involved a certain amount of concentration of troops at Quetta. Baluchistan is an expensive place, because troops receive concessions there which they do not get elsewhere. To that extent also the Redistribution Scheme, if fully carried out, would have added considerably to the permanent military burden?

5924. MR. BRUNYATE.—That is so, there would have been at any rate some addition on this account.

5925. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you agree that there was nothing sacrosanct in the original scheme; that it was a good scheme, but that Lord Kitchener himself modified it in certain important respects?

5926. MR. BRUNYATE.—That is true; I would subscribe to that.

5927. SIR W. MEYER.—Are you aware of any instances in which the pushing on with items of the original scheme in a hurry led to considerable waste of money?

5928. MR. BRUNYATE.—No, I do not recall any such cases.

5929. SIR W. MEYER.—I have a statement here which says that over 900 horses were purchased in 1906 for Royal Horse and Royal Field Artillery ammunition columns, whereas the reorganization of the columns did not take place till 1908. The total expenditure on horses before they were wanted is put down at Rs. 5 lakhs.

5930. MR. BRUNYATE.—I do not remember the case. I am not disputing your facts, but merely do not recall them. If you would like them verified, the Finance Department will do so at once.

5931. SIR W. MEYER.—I have it here that Rs. 10½ lakhs were spent on field hospitals, whereas a Committee presided over by Surgeon-General Sloggett has said that there was an unnecessary expenditure of some Rs. 6 lakhs?

5932. MR. BRUNYATE.—One can hardly speak so categorically, I think, of “unnecessary expenditure” in such a case. Assuming the soundness of the administrative view now put forward as compared with the previous view which favoured a higher expenditure on field hospitals, I should put the later change of opinion on the same footing as some of Lord Kitchener’s economies where he saved money by discontinuing a number of measures which had been introduced by his predecessors in the five or six years preceding 1904-5.

5933. SIR W. MEYER.—My point is that, had certain items been more cautiously proceeded with, there might have been economy in the end?

5934. MR. BRUNYATE.—I think it was a great mistake to provide funds before the process of examination had been well advanced, and, though I do not personally recall the two cases you mention, there can be little doubt that money would have been saved to some extent had this been done.

5935. SIR W. MEYER.—Then Lord Kitchener in his scheme mentioned certain strategic railways he desired to be undertaken—the Bombay-Sind connexion, the Loi-Shilman and the Thal-Parachinar extension. The cost of these would not have come under the military estimates at all; therefore, if Lord Kitchener’s schemes had been carried out in their entirety, you would have had to add the cost of these strategic railways?

5936. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes, of course. The estimates I have quoted in my earlier answers did not purport to include railways at all. Lest the Committee should misunderstand me, I may say that in connection with the Rs. 10 and Rs. 2 crores I only mentioned the schemes which were

believed to have been allowed for generally in arriving at the lump totals. There were also a few other proposals in the Reorganization Memorandum as submitted by Lord Kitchener on which no definite orders were asked for. They were all dropped, except that dealing with the provision of equipment for the small arms ammunition columns. The cost of these proposals is not included in the figures I have already mentioned.

5937. SIR W. MEYER.—There were certain other measures which required the Secretary of State's sanction, and were either not sent up at all as in the case of the proposed cantonment at Torsappar, or were actually negatived by him as in the case of the proposed cantonment at Baleli; so that to that extent the original programme was a bit sanguine in anticipating the sanction of the Secretary of State, which was not forthcoming?

5938. MR. BRUNYATE.—That seems to be correct, but it might happen with any programme that some parts of it would in the end be rejected by the Secretary of State.

5939. PRESIDENT.—Was it possible, in the most favourable circumstances, to carry out this programme in the course of five years?

5940. MR. BRUNYATE.—Of course I can only give an opinion on the point,—an opinion, moreover, which is necessarily influenced by what has happened since. I take “the most favourable circumstances”; firstly, ample provision of funds throughout; and, secondly, continued belief in the policy, but not an unusual exemption from criticism. Looking at the trying cumbrousness of official procedure, the inter-dependence of the schemes, and also the delay which occurs in military works when building is undertaken on a considerable scale in the same place and especially a new place, it does not seem to me now to have been probable that the schemes could have been fully carried out in five years. But I think we should bear in mind that there were many independent causes of delay, for which the Commander-in-Chief and the Government of India were not responsible. I refer here to certain very strict orders about the sanctioning of redistribution expenditure; reduction of the scale on which funds were provided; and so forth. I may also mention as an instance of the cumbrousness of official procedure, that it took three years to submit a scheme for the reorganization of artillery to the Secretary of State, and to get it through the War Office, to revise it, resubmit it and so forth, *i.e.*, three years elapsed before orders were finally passed.

5941. PRESIDENT.—In paragraph 3 of the Memorandum above mentioned, you spoke of a revision of his original programme by Lord Kitchener in 1908-09, and of his having indicated a number of measures as suitable for postponement; what were the most important of those?

5942. MR. BRUNYATE.—The important items postponed were:—

- (i) Addition of 3 battalions of British infantry.
- (ii) Addition of 1½ regiments Indian cavalry.
- (iii) Addition of 4 batteries of Indian mountain artillery.
- (iv) Addition of 4 railway companies.
- (v) Conversion of 6 companies Royal Garrison Artillery into heavy batteries.
- (vi) Provision of important Ordnance stores to meet a year's operations. This has only been carried out to the extent of 6 months' requirements.
- (vii) Provision of local Ordnance stores for field parks.
- (viii) Increase of reserves of food supplies.
- (ix) Formation of 4 pony cart trains (cadres).
- (x) Formation in peace of 6 heavy artillery ammunition columns.

- (xi) Building expenditure chiefly in Khyber and near Quetta. Some of the above items, however, had been rejected by the Secretary of State.

5913. SIR W. MEYER.—Speaking generally, do you think Lord Kitchener meant to take them up as soon as opportunity offered, or that some were postponed to the Greek Kalends?

5944. MR. BRUNYATE.—I cannot go beyond what he himself said and did; he put forward these in a list of “deferred items.”

5945. SIR W. MEYER.—Can you tell us the principal objects of the expenditure (initial and recurring) included in the total columns against (b) on page 35 of your Memorandum?

5946. MR. BRUNYATE.—Out of the sum of £2,968,135 initial, £1,250,000 represents redistribution. Of the balance, the following were the main items:—Increase of reserves of small arms ammunition, £159,000; increase of reserves of artillery ammunition, £445,000; additional transport corps, £253,000; increase of reserve of rifles, £191,000; additional field hospitals, etc., with stores, £86,000; additional ammunition columns, £70,000; and so on. The recurring expenditure, £443,000, was mainly due to the addition of 350 officers to the Indian army, £141,000; additional transport corps, £127,000; eight additional ammunition columns, £95,000; and some smaller items.

5947. SIR W. MEYER.—Apart from the 350 officers of whom you speak, 451 officers were previously added, making altogether an increase of about 800 officers in the Indian army?

5948. MR. BRUNYATE.—I understand that to be so.

5949. SIR W. MEYER.—I should like to take you on certain general figures which I have deduced from your Memorandum.

Taking 1898-99 as the starting point and following your calculations, the Budget of 1912-13 is a bit below the normal; adjusting it to normal we get the following, food charges for 1898-99, £1.26 million, and for 1912-13 £1.45 million. You consider that this increase is adequately explained by the rise in prices, and that we cannot look for any material economies in this direction?

5950. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes. It is understood of course that that is not the whole food charge for the army?

5951. SIR W. MEYER.—Yes. Then we come to expenditure on the improvement of the army, that is to say on new measures: 1898-99, £211,000, and 1912-13, £2,760,000. There is a great increase there.

5952. MR. BRUNYATE.—May I mention that when you say so much more is now being spent on the improvement of the army, it does not mean that we are spending £2½ millions more each year on new measures than it was the practice to incur in the past. You are including also the permanent recurring expenditure entailed by measures undertaken between 1898-99 and 1912-13. Up to 1904, over £300,000, were added; since then the addition has amounted to roughly £1,500,000. Our *new* expenditure in 1912-13 is of course much less—namely £520,000.

5953. SIR W. MEYER.—There has been a growth of non-effective charges; savings over exchange must be taken into consideration; and there was the transfer of the Hyderabad Contingent, and of cantonment magistrates, from Civil Estimates. These together account for a net increase of £270,000.

5954. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes.

5955. SIR W. MEYER.—Then you have messing allowance, kit allowance, etc., 1898-99, £130,000, and 1912-13, £1,030,000, an increase of £900,000; which is practically due to measures in connexion with British troops in which the Indian authorities had to follow the lead of the Home Government.

5956. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes.

5957. SIR W. MEYER.—As regards ordinary expenditure, apart from the special heads that have been mentioned, it has remained practically constant, being £13·83 millions in 1898-99, and £13·89 millions in 1912-13. Then, allowing for war savings, and, since 1901-02, the payment by the Home Government on the report of the Welby Commission, we get a total (omitting special services) of £15·47 millions in 1898-99 and £19·36 millions (normal) in 1912-13, that is, an increase of £3·89 millions.

5958. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes.

5959. SIR W. MEYER.—Then in paragraph 28 (b) of your Memorandum you estimate that hereafter, by the automatic expansion of recurring charges already in operation, there will be a further increase of expenditure by about £300,000 a year?

5960. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes. The estimate is a rough one and I do not lay stress on the exact figure. A difficult actuarial calculation is involved.

5961. PRESIDENT.—In paragraph 28 (a) of the same Memorandum, you say that between 1904-05 and 1912-13, the aggregate new expenditure for military purposes has been about £8·3 millions, against a total provision of £11·4 millions. What was the reason for those large lapses, in spite of the liberal powers of reappropriation which it is understood were possessed by the Army Department in conjunction with the Military Finance Branch?

5962. MR. BRUNYATE.—Before I go further I wish to say that these powers of reappropriation do not really apply to Home provision. Lapses in that part of the Budget are practically in the hands of the Secretary of State; though we can ask his permission to use out here funds allocated for expenditure at Home, it is, of course, difficult either to know what is available or to further the spending of the money at Home. Furthermore, when very large lapses are involved it is difficult to find means of expending them at short notice. By hypothesis you have failed to spend your money on some large scheme you thought you *could* spend it on. You are not likely (late in the year) to be able to spend it on some other large scheme which you had not been expecting to take up at all that year.

There is another point: money is sometimes put into the Budget, as in the case of the artillery rearmament, though the Finance Department does not consider it likely that it will be possible to spend it. It is put there because Council consider that the matter is so urgent that if there is any chance of spending the money at all it must be provided, and possibly a year's delay avoided. Money provided under such conditions is practically put there in trust, we cannot begin diverting the money (by reappropriation) to other purposes until we know for certain that it cannot be used on the object for which it is given, by that time it is too late. Then again there may be special reasons for money not being spent. For example there was a lapse at Home in 1905-06 of over a million owing to failure to supply Q. F. guns. Or again the lapses may be due to an intentional curtailment of expenditure as in 1908-9. Food prices were rising; there were also very heavy charges for which Budget provision had not been made, *e.g.*, the award of the Romer Committee, which saddled us with £300,000, and the expeditions of that year. Generally, in fact, the financial situation which developed, after the 1908-09 Budget was framed, was very unsatisfactory, and every effort was made to spend as little of the Budget provision as possible.

These, and such like factors, must therefore be borne in mind, but we are still left with large lapses which were simply due to funds being provided before the schemes for which they were granted had been fully worked out. I have here a statement year by year describing the causes of lapses, but I do not think the Committee want me to describe them in detail?

5963. SIR W. MEYER.—Perhaps Mr. Brunyate's explanation will suffice. It comes to this, that the Government provided, at Lord Kitchener's request, more money than could be spent in those years to any advantage.

5964. MR. BRUNYATE.—I would rather put it this way: the Government in pursuance of their own policy of carrying out Lord Kitchener's schemes in five years—a decision formulated before they had worked out those schemes—provided from year to year more money than could be spent.

5965. SIR W. MEYER.—But the policy was initiated by Lord Kitchener?

5966. MR. BRUNYATE.—I do not think it is for me to apportion responsibility in that matter. The whole question as to how long the programme would take to carry out was very fully discussed both in the Military and Finance Departments, and it was taken up in Council. Almost from the first the Government laid down the five years' standard, and I think the Government of India as a whole were very closely associated with that decision. I should like to add a word about another circumstance making for lapses which I have not made quite clear. There came a time when, though Government continued to provide funds on the original scale or something like it, the attitude of the Secretary of State towards the schemes had really altered. He was disposed to slow down, it took longer to get schemes through, and so forth; and lapses occurred because the schemes were still being liberally financed, though there was no longer the same disposition to push them through.

5967. PRESIDENT.—The change in the political situation caused by the Anglo-Russian Convention also had something to do with it?

5968. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes. Later, when the Anglo-Russian Convention was announced, our interpretation of what had been going on previously was that the Secretary of State had known that it was coming on, and had been trying for some time beforehand to retard further progress with the Reorganization and Redistribution Schemes as much as he could, until he was in a position to place the new situation before the Government of India and ask them to consider what it involved.

5969. PRESIDENT.—Lord Kitchener, speaking in the Budget debate of 1909-10, justified the policy of a fixed special grant for fresh military expenditure, as having imbued his officers with a sense of economy, and diminished friction between the Army and Finance Departments. Do you consider that, having regard to these conditions, the abolition of the Special Grant was a good measure?

5970. MR. BRUNYATE.—I am not opposed to the idea of some form of special grant or contract for the Schedule, but before I deal with that I should like just to make one or two other remarks. I do not think that as an actual fact any loss of economy or increased friction in everyday work has resulted from the abolition of the Special Grant. There may have been friction since then in fixing the Schedule grant each year. But once it has been fixed there has been full co-operation in spending it between the administrative and financial authorities concerned. Then there were special reasons for abolishing the Special Grant. The term was introduced in connection with the Reorganization and Redistribution Schemes, *i.e.*, as part of a programme of very heavy expenditure. It was also associated to a very large extent with a position which may be supposed to have changed. In 1904-05 the Russian menace was, I understand, supposed to be imminent; when it was abolished we had the Anglo-Russian Convention. It was also associated with a method of shewing cumulative recurring expenditure which greatly inflated the apparent outlay, as I have shown in Appendix I of my Memorandum. For these reasons I think it was a good thing to get rid of the term Special Grant, considered as a technical term carrying certain definite associations.

As regards the second part of the question, I do not think it is sound to have a fixed grant for Schedule covering the whole of the Schedule items, because the sums involved fluctuate so enormously. Next year, for instance, we shall not import rifles at all. Three or four years hence we may be providing very large sums of money every year for that object. As regards these very big items of expenditure what is wanted is not so much a rigid contract as a clear facing of the issues involved. Take the hypothetical case of the introduction of the new rifle. Let us say that three years hence a new

rifle will have been issued to the British troops at Home, so that the manufacturers are then free to begin supplying us. We will assume that the measure will cost two million pounds. The question of giving the new rifle to the army in India will come before Council, and it will be incumbent on Council to say how long they consider it desirable to keep the army without the rifle. Let us assume that they say that the measure must extend over five years; that will mean that the Council of the Government of India are of opinion that, in the interests of efficiency, an average of £400,000 a year for five years must be provided for that measure; that it is not safe to hang the business up for a longer time; and so forth. If they hold these convictions then the rate at which funds must be provided is thereby settled, subject of course to the possibility of extraordinary financial dislocation. A contract will not help you in these matters.

5971. SIR W. MEYER.—Did you have much to do with the old system which prevailed in the time of Sir Edwin Collen?

5972. MR. BRUNYATE.—I had not much to do with it personally.

5973. SIR W. MEYER.—I had, and owing to the absence of a contract system there was constant friction between the military authorities and the Finance Department, and there was an infinitude of time lost that might have been avoided.

5974. MR. BRUNYATE.—I am very largely in agreement. Although in actual fact we have been getting on without friction as to the disposal of funds, I do not say that there has not occasionally been a feeling of pressure; and I fully admit that the utter absence of any systematic method of fixing the Schedule might at any moment lead to acute trouble.

5975. SIR W. MEYER.—Then, when Sir Edmond Elles became Military Member, Council fixed the amount to be given for special expenditure; that modified friction very largely. Then you got the special system initiated for Lord Kitchener. You have explained the reason why you would not go back to that system, but your plan would be, I take it, a combination of the two—the Elles and the Kitchener plans; the total grants for big measures would be fixed by Council, and a contract allowance given for minor measures?

5976. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes; of course the total amount for the Schedule is still fixed by Council.

5977. SIR W. MEYER.—One objection to the system under which you have no contract is that the military people have not the same inducement to effect economies?

Originally there was no settlement for the provinces; they got what they could out of the Government of India. The system of contracts was adopted, and it has led to a large decrease of friction. Do you think the same would happen in the case of the army if you were to extend the contract system in some measure on the analogy of what has been done with local Governments?

5978. MR. BRUNYATE.—I have thought of the question a good deal. I think some more definite arrangements than those that exist at present are necessary. The suggestion has previously been put forward to the Government of India, and it has been necessary to consider it carefully. In my Memorandum I separated from other expenditure certain heads which I said were branches of expenditure in which financial or administrative pressure was most rigidly exercised, and to a large extent they are matters which vitally affect the efficiency of the army. First of all, there is this question of *minor Schedule measures* for which the contract system would be suitable. Then there is the whole question of ordinary *store requirements* of the army; it was largely with the object of looking into that that I wrote my Memorandum. The store expenditure is passed with an absence of check which is absurd when compared with the scrutiny exercised over other military expenditure. A Schedule measure is discussed by the Advisory Council, and probably has to go to the Secretary of State, and so forth. The store expenditure on the other hand is treated more as an ordinary question of estimating, in the same way as "pay".

charges; very large figures are put forward, and it is very difficult to know at the moment how far they are justified. I think there has been excessive expenditure under the store head in the past, and some waste of money. I think that store expenditure might well be included under any contract system, if only because it would direct everyone's attention to the sum that was being asked for.

Then there is the annual *provision for horses, mules, etc.* There has been rather a tendency lately to cast animals at an earlier age, and to raise the accepted standard of efficiency. What happens now is that the Budget is settled with some sort of agreement; then, soon after, there is generally a scare about animals brought forward and additional grants are asked for. I should like to have the provision under this head also brought under any contract system which may be proposed.

Then there are various *quasi contract grants*, reliefs, training and so forth. The military authorities frequently want more money for hutting, and the training grant is being raised every few years. These also might be included in contract grants.

Then there is the *ordinary military works grant*. That does seem to have been restricted very closely indeed, and the Military Works opinion is that financial pressure has been too strong, and also that other military claims have led to their being left in the lurch. While their total grant has been practically fixed, they have had to provide (within that total) for increased expenditure on repairs. On the other hand there is a tendency nowadays to improve the type of buildings, a tendency over which the Military Works authorities themselves have little control.

I believe that if you were to take these five items and put them on a contract system for 3, 4 or 5 years it would be financially sound, because I think there is danger of further pressure on us in all these directions in the near future. I am sure we shall have some reaction after the pressure of the last few years. I would like to add too that these items are really not as heterogeneous as they may seem at first sight. They interlace a good deal with Schedule transactions. Thus Schedule stores are not always genuinely distinguishable from ordinary stores. For instance we treat the purchase of extra mules as ordinary expenditure, but buy extra cavalry horses from the Schedule. A Military Works measure may be a Schedule measure if treated as a whole, or can be regarded as simply a group of ordinary measures if split up. And so on.

This is as far as I would go in the direction of a contract for the Army Budget.

5979. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you include the Ordnance factories?

5980. MR. BRUNYATE.—Well, of course I did not mean my list to be absolutely rigid; the Ordnance factories are to a large extent included by the fact of the store head being included; if it was thought desirable to include establishments as well I do not think there would be very great objection.

5981. SIR W. MEYER.—Then having got this contract system, would you follow the procedure adopted in the case of provincial Governments, and allow the military authorities to have the benefit of any lapses?

5982. MR. BRUNYATE.—Do you mean simply that they would get the money again the following year, or that they would have a continuous accumulating credit?

5983. SIR W. MEYER.—A continuous credit, just as in the case of local Governments.

5984. MR. BRUNYATE.—I utterly disbelieve in a system of accumulating money for military expenditure. It would rightly be regarded, I think, as open to political objections. I do not think the Finance Department would hold to the bargain for long, and I think it is opposed to the correct attitude towards military expenditure which is that you must not spend money unless you can justify the expenditure. That seems to me to be very much the attitude of the Secretary of State in the despatch which constituted this Committee. He treats

the presence or absence of money *i.e.*, the general financial position at any given moment, as a comparatively irrelevant factor. As a matter of fact, most of these grants are fully spent. We do not now have large lapses for *minor* Schedule measures. The provision for stores in India is usually very closely adhered to. There is no reason why there should be any lapses in the case of animals. The Military Works Branch has practically no lapses. My opinion is that on the whole the accumulation of lapses would not lead to economy, but to slackness.

5985. SIR W. MEYER.—There is this view, that a man says I have got money now and I may not get it again, so I am going to spend it before the year closes?

5986. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes.

5987. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you say the provincial system works satisfactorily?

5988. MR. BRUNYATE.—Well, the expenditure of the provinces is, I think, of a very different kind, because it requires no such special justification as military expenditure requires. Everybody recognizes that provincial expenditure must go on progressing.

5989. SIR P. LAKE.—Would you include recurring charges due to previous measures in the contract amount?

5990. MR. BRUNYATE.—No.

5991. PRESIDENT.—It is understood that at present the total expenditure to be allotted for military purposes for any year is fixed beforehand by the Finance and Army Departments in conjunction, and that what is now termed Schedule expenditure (for fresh outlay) is the balance remaining out of this after the obligatory requirements of the army on its existing basis have been met. Is this statement of the case correct? If so, what happens when there is a difference of opinion between the two Departments as to the amount to be allotted? How is the relative urgency of new schemes with reference to their inclusion in or omission from the Schedule arrived at?

5992. MR. BRUNYATE.—I find it difficult to reply to this question because there has really been no system in recent years. The question is correct in laying stress on the point that the recent tendency has been to fix the Budget as a whole in the first instance, so that the Schedule figure tends to become merely a derived or secondary figure. I do not mean to say, however, that the Schedule has been left absolutely out of account. If the Committee will allow me, I would like to take them through the steps of fixing the Budget of 1910-11. I would premise that to draw up a Schedule is a most laborious business which involves an enormous amount of office work.

- (i) On the 23rd August 1909 the Advisory Council drew up a preliminary Schedule for Rs. 91 lakhs.
- (ii) Between this date and October the Finance Department intimated that the budget of 1910-11 (as a whole) must not exceed that of 1909-10.
- (iii) Accordingly on the 4th October 1909 the Advisory Council drew up a Schedule of Rs. 41 lakhs; this was printed up in detail, and a draft despatch to the Secretary of State prepared.
- (iv) In November 1909 the Secretary of State's preliminary forecast for 1910-11 was received; it indicated that an additional Rs. 24 lakhs might be available. The Army and Finance Secretaries, in the absence of the Commander-in-Chief, drew up proposals and sent them off to the Commander-in-Chief.
- (v) In December the Commander-in-Chief, on being further informed of the wishes of the Finance Department, agreed to accept a Budget of Rs. 10 lakhs less than that of the previous year. A provisional Schedule was then drawn up for Rs. 62 lakhs, but not definitely accepted as the financial situation was to be discussed in Council.

On re-examination the figure came to Rs. 58 lakhs, and this preliminary Schedule was sent Home in January 1910.

(vi) Finally, the Budget was fixed at Rs. 2,956 lakhs for 1910-11; and the final Schedule was raised to Rs. 72 lakhs and sent Home in May 1910.

It was not possible therefore until the end of the financial year for the army to know what expenditure would probably be allowed on Schedule measures. The sanction of the Secretary of State still had to be obtained. I ought to mention perhaps that the year was one in which additional taxation was imposed, so that it was a year in which the financial situation was a matter of difficulty. It was such facts as these which led me to agree with the view that there ought to be some means of regulating the Schedule.

5993. SIR W. MEYER.—Then would you go back to the system that prevailed in the pre-Kitchener days by which there was no definite limit but practically every proposal for new expenditure had to go before the Government of India, and then the sum totals of the sanctioned proposals were put together and that amount was fixed for the next year?

5994. MR. BRUNYATE.—New expenditure is of various kinds; it may for instance be purely automatic and will be provided for in the ordinary course of estimating. Or it may arise from Schedule measures undertaken in the previous year, and if so it must be accepted. If you are allowed to spend, say half a million on the Schedule, you must put into the Schedule the measures you think most urgent. You cannot throw an urgent military measure out because it involves recurring expenditure, and include another less urgent one simply because the expenditure it involves is all initial. Then there are the increases of expenditure which arise from ordinary petty sanctions given day by day. These require watching. That is best done by maintaining lists of these sanctions, as we have been doing for the last two or three years. You cannot watch them as part of the preparation of the Budget, or restrict them by a contract covering the entire army expenditure. They get merged in the general figure, and obscured by the fluctuations of a fortuitous or temporary kind. What I have in view therefore is not the system postulated by the question, but:—

(a) Provision each year for the very large schemes on the basis of the periods in which Council have already determined to complete them (as explained above in the hypothetical case of the rifles).

(b) A contract for certain heads, namely minor Schedule measures, ordinary stores, animals, certain minor grants such as reliefs and hutting, and ordinary military works.

(c) All the rest (pay, supplies, conveyance and so forth) then becomes, in the main, a matter of expert estimating, supported generally by a statement of what new expenditure is being provided for as the result of petty sanctions given during the year. Recent experience shows that these can be kept within very moderate limits, and will be counterbalanced to some extent, at any rate, by minor economies.

5995. PRESIDENT.—It is understood that anticipated lapses under Schedule measures can be applied to other such measures; can a similar application be made of estimated lapses in ordinary (non-Schedule) expenditure?

5996. MR. BRUNYATE.—Lapses in ordinary expenditure cannot be applied to Schedule measures, except with the sanction of the Secretary of State.

5997. SIR W. MEYER. Do you think that advisable?

5998. MR. BRUNYATE.—I think it is often advisable that the sanction of the Secretary of State should be freely given, but I do not think there is anything wrong in saying to the army "you will have so much for Schedule measures next year and no more."

5999. SIR W. MEYER.—I can see your argument with reference to recurring expenditure, but might you not apply lapses in the case of initial expenditure?

6000. MR. BRUNYATE.—I think you might. We have got our estimating very much closer than it was formerly and restrict the Budget as closely as possible, and that being so I think personally that with the enormous mass of military demands always awaiting execution it is very desirable to spend every penny you take in your Budget.

6001. PRESIDENT.—But you would not utilize lapses to meet recurring expenditure?

6002. MR. BRUNYATE.—Well, I do not know that in actual practice I would make a distinction.

6003. SIR W. MEYER.—But it surely stands on a different footing?

6004. MR. BRUNYATE.—That is so. You cannot theoretically apply lapses to recurring expenditure?

6005. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing you had to send many Indian troops to China; that would lead to considerable military economy, but it would be very undesirable to mortgage that for recurring expenditure?

6006. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes, but I had not such large lapses in my mind. It would be necessary to go carefully in a case of that kind. I may mention that in the last two years we have done our best to get the Secretary of State's permission to using lapses in ordinary expenditure for further progress with Schedule measures. He refused to help us in 1910-11 unless we could show that the spending of lapses in that year would enable us to ask for a lower Budget in 1911-12. In 1911-12, however, he was disposed to meet us very fully, though except for some advance purchases of stores it proved impossible to do much in the end.

6007. PRESIDENT.—It has been alleged that the present system, under which all lapses in military expenditure outstanding on the 31st March of any year revert to the Treasury, is calculated to diminish the zeal of the military authorities for making outlay economical both as regards amount and time of expenditure. Do you concur in this view? If so, how would you remedy the defect?

6008. MR. BRUNYATE.—So far as lapses are concerned, I think I have covered all the ground in my previous replies.

6009. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you admit that the present system involves a certain amount of waste?

6010. MR. BRUNYATE.—I admit that it does so theoretically. There is a tendency to hurry expenditure towards the end of the financial year—consequently there is a tendency to waste in a minor degree, but I do not admit that it is a serious evil.

6011. SIR W. MEYER.—You know the methods sometimes adopted in the Public Works Department as regards the ante-dating of cheques for contractors, etc.?

6012. MR. BRUNYATE.—They have come within my experience as a district officer.

6013. SIR W. MEYER.—The same thing might occur in military departments?

6014. MR. BRUNYATE.—I admit it theoretically.

6015. SIR W. MEYER.—Does it occur in actual practice?

6016. MR. BRUNYATE.—I do not say it does not occur to some extent in practice.

6017. SIR W. MEYER.—Moreover, do not these lapses often give rise to inconvenience to the Government?

6018. MR. BRUNYATE.—You took me on the question of economy, I understood?

6019. SIR W. MEYER.—Yes, but I would now like to take you on another point. A large lapse sometimes places the Government in a position of embarrassment; it may affect the operations of the following year. There was a case of this in 1904-05. The Budget for the following year had already been made up, and it was very awkward to make good a sudden lapse of forty lakhs in that Budget.

6020. MR. BRUNYATE.—I want to say a word about that from the point of view of military efficiency. First of all there are the large schemes that I suggested should be dealt with separately by Council, and so on. Take the case of a new rifle. If the Government decide that it is unsafe to protract such a measure beyond five years, and if the money cannot be spent in the first year, then it is a matter of mere common sense, if they can find the money, to put it into the next or succeeding years; or else reconsider the decision on its merits and say that after all they do *not* consider it necessary to see the measure through in five years. Accordingly, in the case of a retarded rate of progress with a big measure, I think the question of the regrant of lapses is on a different footing; in that case there is greater justification for regranting lapses. Then again take the Stores question. There are constant lapses from time to time on Home stores. The army has to be provided with stores, and if for some reason or other the money is not spent in the year, it is no use Government saying they cannot give it again, if the army really needs the stores. In fact in actual practice the system of regranting lapses is already followed to a large extent. If the money is to be spent at Home the Secretary of State carries over the money, and if we hear of it in time we act accordingly; or if the money is to be spent out here if the authorities know in time they do likewise: they ask for and get a larger grant for the next year.

Where, however, the prevention of lapses is merely a matter of careful watching and administration, it is better not to encourage slackness by giving a free hand in the regrant of lapses. Finally in some cases, I take it, the Committee would not themselves suggest the regranting of lapses. The army for instance has no sort of claim to any regrant of funds which lapse owing to pure over-estimating, or to an improvement in food prices.

6021. PRESIDENT.—The non-regranting of lapses makes people more careful about estimating at Home, and also, I presume, in India. There is a tendency to estimate for a great deal more work than can be done.

6022. MR. BRUNYATE.—In matters which are within our own control, and where we have full powers, the lapses are very small indeed. The Military Works Services, for example, spend their money to the full; also the grant for stores in India is generally spent. The Heads of Departments can watch it, and they get the money spent. At Home the Secretary of State runs the thing himself, therefore we cannot control it.

6023. PRESIDENT.—Probably the lapses at Home are due to strikes and various troubles in the labour world. It is understood that lapses often occur by reason of the inability of the India Office to work up to the estimated Home charges; if this is so, what remedial measure would you suggest? Do the India Office authorities give adequate warning of their inability to work up to programme?

6024. MR. BRUNYATE.—Regarding Home expenditure, the main lapses take place under Schedule expenditure, and Government stores. Under other heads there is no persistent tendency to lapse. We get from the India Office a monthly statement of Schedule expenditure; from it we gather that a few pounds or shillings have been spent on this or that item, and probably a hundred or a thousand pounds on another, but that does not raise the slightest presumption that the Secretary of State is not going to pay more. We also get a telegram in October showing how expenditure under the various heads of account is expected to turn out, and thereafter a succession of telegrams till the end of the Budget season. We may hear that there is going to be a lapse

under, say, Ordnance. If we happen to have only one really large item of Ordnance expenditure in the Schedule, we can probably infer that the lapse will be due to that measure, but we are not informed directly in these telegrams of the expected lapse under each individual Schedule measure, and, generally speaking, we do not get adequate warning, that is, warning which is sufficient to enable us to spend the money. If we do ask to spend the money the Secretary of State may very probably ask us how our own Budget is getting on, which means that he is not satisfied with our 'six months' estimates, and he wants to have our first edition of the Budget; and of course if he hangs up everything till this is ready it is too late for action. This brings me to the point regarding remedial measures. I would first like to put in a qualification, namely, that we do not really know anything about the inner working at Home. I think it is only by personal discussion between the authorities here and at Home that there can be any hope of practical improvement in these matters. The following suggestions are therefore sketched on very general lines.

In the first place, if lapses are not to occur, the Schedule must not be too large. Secondly, judging from our experience during the last seven years, I think a more rigid attitude ought to be adopted regarding the provision of funds before schemes have been fully worked out. My third suggestion is that Heads of Departments should be more continuously in touch with the Director General of Stores on these subjects than they apparently are. They are allowed to have direct relations with him, but these relations ought to be more constant. They ought to hear regularly from the Director General of Stores of everything likely to affect compliance with their indents, as soon as the possibility is known at Home. There ought to be no need for special enquiries. Fourthly, I think there should be a complete understanding between the Secretary of State and the Government of India that every effort should be made to expend the money voted in the military Budget. There may be a lapse of a quarter of a million coming on; the money has already been taken from the taxpayer; and it is surely better to spend that money and relieve the future even if you cannot specifically show that you are going to relieve next year's Budget. I think there should be a more complete understanding on that point. Fifthly (I put forward this point tentatively because we do not know the exact arrangements at Home), it is understood that one difficulty in regard to payments at Home is that, even after an order has been complied with, the exact amount due from the India Office to (say) the War Office for the supply of armaments, cannot be settled until the exact value of that order has been worked out on the basis of the factory accounts of the year. I think that, whenever it is possible, the War Office should be paid quarterly subject to adjustment.

I would also offer a few remarks about stores. Most of the foregoing observations apply equally to ordinary i.e., (non-Schedule) stores, but a few points may be added which are special to that head. First, some of the lapses which have occurred at Home are partly due to irregular indenting out here, and the consequent cancelling of indents. This is one of the points in relation to the control of stores which calls for a remedy, and I think a partial remedy will be found in the proposal we now have before us to place financial advisers in the technical departments. Secondly, I think we should make the fullest use of advance purchases as a means of avoiding lapses. Referring also to my earlier replies on points in connexion with the Budget, I would add that I think the supplying departments should know earlier what funds they are likely to have. A contract system of some kind is perhaps the only way of meeting this requirement. These are my main suggestions about the avoidance of lapses.

6025. SIR W. MEYER.—Sir Malcolm Grover, when questioned on this point, suggested we might give orders direct to factories; that is, not to the India Office but to the producing agency at Home. Do you agree to this proposition?

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6026. MR. BRUNYATE.—No.

6027. SIR W. MEYER.—Regarding heavy lapses at Home, it has been suggested that the item might be written off in the Budget. The Secretary of State could then hold the money in deposit and pay it out when the goods were actually supplied. Is there any objection to that?

6028. MR. BRUNYATE.—If there has been no transaction at all, I should be inclined to say we should stick to our established practice and not treat sums as spent which have not been spent. I would follow the analogy of business procedure. If, as a private authority, I order £100,000 worth of material, the probability is that in the ordinary course of business I may have to put down £25,000 at an early stage before delivery. Anything like this which is fairly on an analogy with ordinary business should be done by the India Office. On the other hand, suppose we order a gun from Home and the type is not sealed and settled, we should not tell the public in our Budgets that we have paid £50,000 when the scheme has not come into being at all.

6029. SIR W. MEYER.—Regarding advance communications dealing with possible changes of projects by the India Office; in the ordinary Finance Department, as you know, you often receive demi-official letters from the Secretary in the India Office giving advance information, saying you will presently receive a despatch from the Secretary of State conveying such and such orders. Is there any similar action on the part of the India Office authorities in matters within your sphere?

6030. MR. BRUNYATE.—The army authorities often receive advance copies of despatches and so forth. But I do not, and I think the Army Secretary does not, in practice receive much advance information in regard to such matters as store purchases.

6031. SIR W. MEYER.—Is a similar advance warning given from the India Office as regards the changes in military expenditure, etc.?

6032. MR. BRUNYATE.—No, practically this is not done, within my experience.

6033. SIR W. MEYER.—Might it not be done?

6034. MR. BRUNYATE.—Well, I cannot state the fact categorically, but the impression left in my mind is that in practice it is very difficult to get earlier or fuller information from the Secretary of State, even informally, about Home Military expenditure. They are not disposed to go into the matter more fully than they do now.

6035. SIR W. MEYER.—Very often, judging from experience in the ordinary Finance Department, a considerable time elapses between the issue of a decision conveyed demi-officially and the receipt of the despatch out here?

6036. MR. BRUNYATE.—I will answer your question in this way. I have suggested that the supply departments here might be in fuller communication with the Director General of Stores. The Military Finance Secretary could also, perhaps, be in closer touch with the India Office. There is certainly nothing in the attitude of the India Office to prevent this.

6037. PRESIDENT.—Supposing that it were necessary to effect a material reduction in military charges, how would you proceed to do this?

6038. MR. BRUNYATE.—I doubt whether I can give much help to the Committee in this matter. In the ordinary way of business the Finance Department has been doing its best to keep down expenditure. It has also sometimes initiated proposals for economy. It has done so usually by informal suggestions to administrative authorities. The last and the present Commanders-in-Chief themselves have done a good deal towards cutting down expenditure. The position now reached is that economies are impossible in most cases except by administrative reorganizations. The question of economy seems to me therefore to have passed very largely into the hands of the administrative people themselves. All I can do is to offer the suggestion that in this or that instance there seems to be a *prima facie* case for consideration. I cannot express a strong personal opinion that economy will eventually be found to be possible, when this consideration has been given, and the administrative side also has been heard.

(i) I would first mention the Military Accounts Department, where, I think, a large economy is possible, but I may defer this till later. (ii) It seems to me as an outsider that, in view of the conditions under which economy is proposed to-day, a lower strength of Indian units with larger reserves would naturally be a measure to look into. (iii) I think that a strong *prima facie* case might be made out for the discontinuance of the rifle factory; and, similarly, I think the leather work for the army could eventually be placed to a large extent in private hands. I cannot say, however, what my final view would be after I had heard the case argued on the administrative side. (iv) I cannot see, personally, that a special officer is required for contracts in each division. This question was discussed at Sir Percy Lake's Committee of which I was a member, but I was not convinced by the arguments adduced in favour of these appointments. (v) The Finance Department has always held that the transport registration staff could be largely reduced, and at one time or another has put forward informal proposals to that effect. The idea of a reduction in this establishment has now been accepted in principle by the Commander-in-Chief, but no scheme has been worked out. (vi) A scheme was discussed before Sir Percy Lake's Committee for the reduction of the number of horses in British cavalry regiments in peace time. It is a purely administrative question, but the Committee may like to have their attention called to the matter. My opinion was that no real case had been made out against the suggested reduction. (vii) There is an officer at present in charge of the grass farms in every division. This was recommended by the Committee which dealt with military farms. I advised the acceptance of the Committee's recommendation, but, on reconsideration, I doubt whether this establishment is really necessary. We have reorganized the dairy farms on another principle. We have abolished divisional control and created two Circles, with a circle officer in each who supervises the various managers. It is a question whether a similar arrangement would not do for the grass farms, an extra inspecting officer or two being allowed if necessary. (viii) I would like to mention as my eighth point the possibility of reducing the number of officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps. One point for the consideration of the Committee in this connexion is the enormous improvement in the health of the British army in India of recent years. This should reduce medical work very greatly. The main argument against reducing the establishment is of course our war requirements. It is further urged that, if we reduce the strength of the medical officers, the preventive work against disease which has been so successful in recent years will be weakened, and we shall get back to the old state of things. This is plausible, but, personally, I think the argument is pressed too far. (ix) In all the reviewing and examining of military arrangements, which has gone on for the past six or seven years, I have never seen any special study of the Supply and Transport Corps arrangements with regard to contracts and food supplies. I think the question wants looking into. I suggested some time ago that it would be wise to have a statement drawn up explaining the present system and I hoped to see it before coming to the Committee, but I have not yet seen it. I think it will be ready by the time the responsible administrative authority appears before you. (x) I should like also to mention that there is reason to believe that under the new clothing allowance scheme for British troops introduced in 1909-10, by which a cash allowance has been substituted for certain issues of clothing in kind, the British soldier is getting much more money than he needs for his clothing and is putting a considerable sum into his pocket. This advantage to the soldier was a recognized part of the scheme, but it was never intended to be on so large a scale as it is now believed to be in actual practice. The rates of allowance are to be revised triennially. I think that, if the possibility is kept in view and the question is taken up at an early date, a considerable saving may be obtained when the time for revision comes round.

6039. SIR P. LAKE.—Do you think there is any room for economy by providing quarters at stations and charging rent for them, or by hutting troops at present under canvas?

6040. MR. BRUNYATE.—You mean that the rent would repay us for our capital outlay?

6041. SIR P. LAKE.—Yes. I see from the figures in your Memorandum that certain quarters built by the Military Works Services are remunerative; could this system be extended?

6042. MR. BRUNYATE.—The fact that rents are recovered, and that the amount of such rentals is increasing, does not necessarily mean that particular works are remunerative. The maximum assessed rentals are only calculated to cover maintenance, interest on capital, and so forth, so that there is no question of any surplus or profit being obtained, and often these maxima are not obtainable owing to the rule which limits the rent recoverable from officers of each rank. It is possibly true, however, that in the long run we are wasting money by not facing the question of building for troops in the hills. We are spending a good deal of money on tents, and if you spent twenty lakhs on buildings you would probably save money in the end, so far as that particular group of transactions is concerned. On the other hand, I am rather sceptical about the general policy of incurring heavier capital outlay now with a view to diminishing recurring charges in the future. You at once raise your general standard of expenditure by embarking on such a policy, and there is always a doubt as to whether you will succeed in getting it down again.

6043. SIR W. MEYER.—Speaking of quarters built by the Military Works Services have they been remunerative from the commercial point of view? Do the rents paid by officers cover the outlay on construction?

6044. MR. BRUNYATE.—The ordinary standard rent is, I think, $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, but it is frequently reduced by the operation of rank limits.

6045. SIR W. MEYER.—From a financial point of view would you be in favour of building more quarters for officers?

6046. MR. BRUNYATE.—Wherever it is possible to get quarters built by private enterprise I would prefer that agency. We charge a rent which is estimated to recoup us eventually, but, where the rank limit comes into operation, we obviously lose on it. On the hand we never get *more* than the amount required to recoup us.

6047. PRESIDENT.—Formerly native contractors built quarters for officers when they believed that cantonments were permanent, but the changes consequent on the Redistribution Scheme made them reluctant to build quarters in the new stations?

6048. MR. BRUNYATE.—I believe there are many cases in which we have no course but to build quarters ourselves—in new cantonments for instance.

6049. SIR W. MEYER.—Speaking generally as an outside observer, what is your opinion in regard to the question of reducing the number of officers in the Indian army?

6050. MR. BRUNYATE.—I feel some diffidence in answering this question, because there seems to be no point on which financial knowledge definitely comes in. My financial experience gives me no right to express an opinion.

6051. SIR W. MEYER.—Some years ago there were a number of Brigadier-Generals of artillery appointed, were there not?

6052. MR. BRUNYATE.—Last year.

6053. SIR W. MEYER.—I understand that the Finance Department accepted the scheme reluctantly. If you had to make a reduction in military charges, would you sacrifice these Brigadier-Generals?

6054. MR. BRUNYATE.—It is purely an administrative question whether they are needed or not. I am not prepared to say whether they are necessary or unnecessary.

6055. SIR W. MEYER.—If you were Finance Member, and there was a financial crisis, would you propose their reduction?

6056. MR. BRUNYATE.—I would tell the Commander-in-Chief how much reduction we wanted, and leave the election of items to him.

6057. **SIR W. MEYER.**—Is there needless expenditure incurred by sending British troops to the hills?

6058. **MR. BRUNYATE.**—There has been considerable economy lately in sending invalids to the hills instead of sending them to England. As regards sending men to the hills in ordinary course the only special way in which I have met the question is in regard to the claims of families to go to the hills. The sending of additional families entails accommodation questions, and it has always been a question to me as Military Finance Secretary as to whether these moves have not been carried out on too big a scale. I have seen letters from divisional Principal Medical Officers which seem to imply that European women and children cannot under any circumstances remain in the plains for the hot weather. Possibly there is scope for economy, *e.g.*, by sending them up in relays for half the summer only.

6059. **SIR W. MEYER.**—Regarding the Supply and Transport Corps; is it necessary to have a Director-General of Supply and Transport?

6060. **MR. BRUNYATE.**—My opinion about that is that his position is anomalous, and that there is hardly room for a Head of the Supply and Transport working under, and in daily contact with, the Quartermaster-General. On the other hand, it seems to me, first, that a very large organization like the Supply and Transport Corps may reasonably claim to have one General Officer's appointment, and secondly, that the difficulty is not in having a surplus man, but in not having adequate provision for inspection. I should have thought that if the present position of things is not satisfactory, the best course would be, not to get rid of the appointment altogether, but to convert it into an inspecting appointment?

6061. **PRESIDENT.**—How is the Quartermaster-General to direct such a technical Department when he is likely to know but little about its details? At Home there are Directors of Supplies and Transport who are Brigadier-Generals. At Home you also have an Inspector of the Army Service Corps under the Quartermaster-General. If you were to convert the Director here into an inspecting officer, who would be responsible for the administration of the Department?

6062. **MR. BRUNYATE.**—Well, I say again there are many of these semi-administrative questions I would prefer not to touch. I speak with great diffidence on these questions. My answer to that would be that as far as I understand it, the Quartermaster-General has not a great many other things to do. As far as I can judge the Supply and Transport work is his main work. He has also questions connected with railways, hutting, etc., but really it does not seem to me that this side of his office is a very voluminous one, or one which gives rise to many questions requiring his personal orders.

Then, as regards Supply and Transport, the Director is assisted by two very senior officers for supply and transport respectively, and to put another man between them and the Quartermaster-General does not seem right.

6063. **PRESIDENT.**—You are in favour of converting the present Director into an inspecting officer of supply and transport. In that case he would be a Major-General, because to abolish the one appointment of that rank available for the Supply and Transport Corps would be much resented?

6064. **MR. BRUNYATE.**—Yes, that is the suggestion I would put to the Committee.

6065. **PRESIDENT.**—Are you satisfied with the present organization of the Military Accounts Department? Have you considered measures for the reduction of expenditure there, combined with equal or greater efficiency?

6066. **MR. BRUNYATE.**—My answer to the first clause of the question is in the negative, and to the second that I have recently taken part in preparing a scheme for the modification and reorganization of the Department.

6067. SIR W. MEYER.—Perhaps you could provide some papers on this point, or sketch for the information of the Committee the main features of the scheme?

6068. MR. BRUNYATE.—I will forward to the Committee a copy of the notes showing the lines on which the reorganization has been discussed in the Finance Secretariat. The proposals have been provisionally and broadly accepted by the Finance Member, but will have to be referred to the Army Department, the Comptroller General, and others, and I must therefore not commit the Hon'ble Member in the matter.

What we propose to do is to abolish the three circle controllers and substitute inspecting officers, one for the Northern and one for the Southern Army. We propose to make accounts and audit administration in each division self-contained; thus there will be in each division an audit office in the charge of a superior officer of the Military Accounts Department, and a disbursing office in the charge of another such officer; over both, and co-ordinating the work of the two, there will be a deputy controller who will be the final audit authority for expenditure in that division. He will also be the financial adviser of the General officer commanding. It is hoped in connection with this scheme, or a short time after its promulgation, to effect a considerable reduction in the scope of the audit carried out by the Military Accounts Department. The figures which it is suggested by the Military Accountant General should be audited are fifty per cent., or six months, of the ordinary expenditure, and twenty-five per cent. of the store expenditure only. He calculated that this scheme would save Rs. 6½ lakhs. However, I put forward this figure with much reserve, because I think, when the scheme comes to be fully worked out, there will be some large deductions to be made from it. I mention it, however, in order that the Committee may know that there is really a prospect of very substantial savings in this department.

6069. SIR W. MEYER.—When you speak of only auditing a certain proportion of the accounts, do you mean that the remaining bills will be paid without any check whatever?

6070. MR. BRUNYATE.—In the case of British regiments the whole of the accounts are prepared by a trained expert office, and that in effect is really a preliminary audit. In this case it might prove safe only to audit a proportion of the accounts.

6071. SIR W. MEYER.—But in the case of other pay bills the disburser must check. They cannot be paid blindfold.

6072. MR. BRUNYATE.—That will have to be considered and worked out. In speaking of auditing only 50 per cent. of bills we were referring primarily to the pay of units.

6073. SIR W. MEYER.—There must be a certain amount of check for every bill which comes to the office for payment. You would not pay a private bill without looking through it?

6074. MR. BRUNYATE.—No.

6075. PRESIDENT.—Surely the system is on the following lines; the bills are passed by the responsible people concerned, but under the existing system there is an independent set of people who examine and check?

6076. SIR W. MEYER.—There must be, as an ordinary matter of business, some check on the details which comprise a bill.

6077. PRESIDENT.—I presume the accounting officer passes the bill, but the audit officer is an independent person.

6078. SIR W. MEYER.—In the case of a large establishment, I presume errors would be picked up, if not earlier then in the later accounts?

6079. MR. BRUNYATE.—It is presumed that they would be picked up in the first month in which the accounts were audited. But that might be some months later.

6080. SIR W. MEYER.—But if an officer overdraws money in good faith it is not usually recovered, is it, if the first challenge only takes place after a lapse of six months or more?

6081. PRESIDENT.—I think that Mr. Brunyate means that all the bills that go in are passed after scrutiny by some official and paid in due course?

6082. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes.

6083. SIR W. MEYER.—But you do not propose to do away with the checking of them? Take a civil case. In district treasuries men draw their pay on handing in their pay bills which are checked there and then before payment. The Accountant General also checks subsequently by post-audit. Under your system would there be that double examination?

6084. MR. BRUNYATE.—The examination which would be dispensed with is that in the office of the Accountant General. As regards the question as to whether there is any adequate checking on the part of the Accounts Department in the original preparation of the bill, I should say there is no strictly technical checking in the case of native troops at present. We were dealing with the case on general lines only in the scheme I have mentioned. I made some reservation myself in regard to store charges, and I contemplated that all that sort of thing would eventually be worked out and considered in detail.

6085. SIR W. MEYER.—As to your new general system, is it not rather a matter of evolution than revolution. At present you have a deputy controller for the division who has a pay and disbursing branch under him?

6086. MR. BRUNYATE.—No, these officers are independent. Under the present system, the deputy controller is simply the head of the divisional audit office. The disbursing officer is not under him but under the controller.

6087. SIR W. MEYER.—Anyhow, you propose practically to make the deputy controller into a local controller, and to convert two controllers into inspecting officers and abolish the third?

6088. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes. We regard the new scheme as simply a natural development of the reorganization introduced a few years ago.

6089. SIR W. MEYER.—The divisional disbursing system was introduced some years ago I understand?

6090. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes, and it is, I consider, working very satisfactorily.

6091. SIR W. MEYER.—The essence of the system is that it saves time by having the pay bills made up by a trained officer. Could the system be further extended?

6092. MR. BRUNYATE.—I think it quite capable of extension, but the point has not yet been taken up. We have, however, always had it in mind to consider whether it could not be extended to native units. I agree that the question of extending the functions of disbursing officers so as to include other expenditure, such as the pay of Indian units for example, is one which might well be taken up in connection with the scheme which I have outlined to the Committee.

6093. SIR W. MEYER.—In so far as it could be extended, would you say that it would lead to financial economies?

6094. MR. BRUNYATE.—I should assume so, but I have not had the question examined.

6095. SIR W. MEYER.—Is the present system, after development, one which lends itself fairly well to demands made during war?

6096. MR. BRUNYATE.—I think it would lend itself very well to operations in time of war. A large section of each office would go to the front, and be in connection as it were with that part of the field force to which it belonged.

6097. SIR W. MEYER.—Under the old system of four controllers, special accounts offices had to be improvised for an expedition?

6098. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes.

6099. SIR W. MEYER.—It also led to waste of money because the accounts people did not come up until much expenditure had been incurred?

6100. MR. BRUNYATE.—It is one of the advantages which we claim for the new scheme that it will fit in well with war requirements. The Military Accountant General has received definite instructions to proceed with the question of accounts and audit arrangements in time of war.

6101. SIR W. MEYER.—There is one point on which I would like to be quite clear, and that is what account arrangements would be made for internal defence troops when the divisions of the Field Army went off to the front?

6102. MR. BRUNYATE.—That is a question that has not yet been fully worked out, but it is to be taken up.

6103. SIR W. MEYER.—In this respect then, your accounts organization is defective, I take it, because it has not yet made provision for the accounts of the men left in India when a division goes to the field?

6104. MR. BRUNYATE.—It has not yet been indicated how this will be done. But we are looking into the question in connexion with the scheme.

6105. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think that stock inspection should be made more thorough than it is?

6106. MR. BRUNYATE.—Well, there is none at all on behalf of the Accounts Department at present. The Department was relieved of that duty some years ago. I would advocate the question being taken up again.

6107. SIR W. MEYER.—In paragraph 41 of your Memorandum I notice that there was heavy over-stocking in the Clothing Department some years ago?

6108. MR. BRUNYATE.—That was so.

6109. SIR W. MEYER.—That involved a waste of money, because stock accrued which could only be disposed of by sale to the public at a loss?

6110. MR. BRUNYATE.—These sales are still going on.

6111. SIR W. MEYER.—How did this mismanagement arise?

6112. MR. BRUNYATE.—The miscalculation partly arose from the change of system which I described in my Memorandum, namely the introduction of clothing allowance schemes for Indian troops and afterwards for British troops. It was also, I think, partly due to the decision arrived at in 1903-04 to provide units with considerable reserves of clothing. I think that led to larger stocks being laid in than were required. My own opinion is that there was also avoidable overestimating of requirements. I would just mention a case of this kind as an instance. It is a case where two hundred yards of expensive material were being used annually on an average, and you find the Clothing Department laying in thirteen years' stock.

6113. PRESIDENT.—Who was the Director?

6114. MR. BRUNYATE.—Colonel Palin.

6115. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think inspection would obviate this?

6116. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes, it would tend to prevent such occurrences.

6117. SIR W. MEYER.—Is there a waste of money in connexion with medical stores?

6118. MR. BRUNYATE.—I have no reason to think that there is any waste of money. Medical stores are largely purchased by the civil departments, and their demands are increasing. It is not my personal opinion that there is waste of money there.

6119. SIR W. MEYER.—When I was occupying the position you now hold there used to be questions every now and then about stock-taking in the Medical Stores which seemed to indicate an unbusinesslike system.

6120. MR. BRUNYATE.—I think the new system of accounts has effected a great improvement in that direction.

6121. SIR W. MEYER.—I would like to bring out this point; has your experience been that, whereas it is a good thing to diminish concentration in ordinary accounts and audit work, it has also been a good thing to centralize the technical accounts work relating to the Ordnance and other departments by putting them in the hands of a single office at Calcutta?

6122 MR. BRUNYATE.—I regard it as a vast improvement on the previous system.

6123. PRESIDENT.—It is often alleged that the Military Accounts is a "babu-ridden" Department; that much time and labour are spent therein in meticulous and often unreasonable objections, and that the officers of the Department might well take a broader view of their functions without abrogating the essence of the financial and audit control which it is their duty to apply. What is your view on these points? If the criticisms are in any way correct, do they point to the possibility of reducing the clerical establishments of the Department by the adoption of a less rigid system?

6124. MR. BRUNYATE.—The people who use the term "babu-ridden" adopt an attitude of hostility from which I should like to disassociate myself. They overlook the complexity of military pay systems and the comparative absence of discretionary powers on the part of the accounts officer. His business is to interpret regulations. I think perhaps it will answer the Committee's question if I say that, so far as my experience goes, the military accounts officers have a narrower view of their duties than civil accounts officers. As to any improvement in this respect leading to the reduction of clerks, of course nothing will help you to reduce your clerks until you have improved the quality and traditions of your personnel.

This can in part be done by putting the young men into more responsible positions, as we propose to do under the scheme which I have outlined to the Committee. Then, again, we have just introduced young civilian officials. I proposed, and the Hon. Member has agreed with me, that part of the preliminary training of these young officers should be in the civil accounts offices. We hope in this way to establish some feeling of identity between the two branches.

6125. SIR W. MEYER.—Have the older officers of the Department become so conservative that nothing much is to be expected from them, and does our chief hope of improvement lie in a new spirit among the younger officers?

6126. MR. BRUNYATE.—Substantially so.

6127. SIR W. MEYER.—There are rules now, are there not, under which an accounts officer may waive objections to small sums?

6128. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes, up to a rupee.

6129. SIR W. MEYER.—So far as your knowledge goes, do they exercise it?

6130. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes. But it is really meant for little discrepancies which come out in audit. The audit officer writes off the balance at once. Otherwise the rule does not have any material effect.

6131. SIR W. MEYER.—In these notes which will be communicated to the Committee there is a great deal about auditing; would you kindly explain for the information of the Committee the terms "pre-audit" and "post-audit"?

6132. MR. BRUNYATE.—Pre-audit is when a charge is examined and passed before payment. Post-audit is when payment takes place before final audit.

6133. SIR W. MEYER.—I am in possession of some notes by a high official in the Civil Accounts Department in which he speaks somewhat contumeliously of the work of the Military Accounts Department?

6134. MR. BRUNYATE.—I am glad of this opportunity of expressing my strong sense and appreciation of the industry and conscientiousness uniformly displayed by the military officers.

6135. SIR W. MEYER.—As your Military Accounts Department becomes more civil in character, is it proposed to interchange officers between the civil and military branches?

6136. MR. BRUNYATE.—Well, that is a long way ahead, I think, but it looks to me as if in the future we shall probably have both Departments under one Head, and possibly a degree of interchangeability, but I regard that at some considerable distance off. The present scheme is an attempt to make the best arrangements we can with a self-contained department in the natural line of development.

6137. PRESIDENT.—It has been alleged, on the other hand, that much time and labour is wasted by military officers failing to recognize that it is the duty of an accounts officer to enforce rules as they stand, and that when circumstances seem to warrant a departure from these, the proper course is not to enter into correspondence with the Accounts Department, but to apply to the requisite executive authority for the amendment of the rule or a special deviation from it. What is your opinion as to this?

6138. MR. BRUNYATE.—I think it is true that a great deal of unnecessary correspondence takes place owing to the idea which some officers have that by arguing with the Accounts Officer they will probably get him to withdraw his objection. We have often called attention to it up here. In the vast majority of cases an audit officer's decision is upheld, and if an applicant's appeal to the Government is conceded it is conceded because the Government have power to sanction that particular concession. Another point bearing on this question is that many officers do not know their way about in these matters, and one of the things we had hoped in constituting the audit officer to be the financial advisers of General Officers Commanding was that they would help them in these matters. For instance if the General Officer Commanding wants to press a case which he thinks a hard one, the audit officer, even though maintaining his objection, could often give the General a draft of the letter to Government, and so help him to get it stated at once in a way that was technically correct and complete.

Files have been shown to me in which there has been a woeful amount of discussion, which could have been avoided if the General Officer Commanding had known how to state his case to the Government of India and get it disposed of. There is a very marked difference in this connexion between different Generals. Sir James Wolfe-Murray, late of the 9th Division, was a General who paid a great deal of attention to the financial side of his work, and from a return he sent in we find that there were only ten appeals in three years from his Division. This I attribute to his knowledge of this kind of work and to effective co-operation between him and his accounts officer.

6139. SIR W. MEYER.—There used to be claims in former years due to the dilatoriness of the accounts office in dealing with claims against British regiments. Frequently they were put in after the regiment had left the country. Do they occur still?

6140. MR. BRUNYATE.—Cases do occur in which, for a variety of reasons, claims are not put in until the regiment has left India and may therefore have to be waived. We frequently find on examination that the delay is not due or not solely due to the accounts office.

6141. PRESIDENT.—How do the civil officers recruited of late years for the Military Accounts Department compare with their military *compagnons*?

6142. MR. BRUNYATE.—I find a difficulty in comparing senior military officers of long standing in the department with youngsters who have just come out to the country and whom I have only just met; but I say very readily that I am

favourably impressed with these new civilian officers; they are promising men and have a variety of useful personal qualifications. They have got through their preliminary training rapidly and thoroughly in spite of their ignorance of India and the army. When the change was first proposed I was against it: today I look forward to the effects of the change without any apprehension and indeed with satisfaction.

6143. SIR W. MEYER.—I understand that under the old system we could not get exactly the pick of the army for the Accounts Department?

6144. MR. BRUNYATE.—We got some very good men sometimes.

6145. SIR W. MEYER.—But you also had a considerable number of mediocre officers?

6146. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes.

6147. SIR W. MEYER.—Besides, apart from efficiency, these civil officers cost less than military men do they not? I have a statement here prepared by the Military Accountant General which bears on that point. I find that the average cost of the military officers is Rs. 1,132; and that of a civil officer Rs. 991 *per mensem*. This is the average pay taking the officer's career right through the Department.

6148. MR. BRUNYATE.—I do not recollect the figures, but I accept the accuracy of that statement.

6149. PRESIDENT.—Has the scheme for making the Deputy Controller of Military Accounts for each division also the financial adviser of the General Officer Commanding worked well in practice? Have you any amendment to suggest?

6150. MR. BRUNYATE.—I have dealt with this question in the notes on the reorganization of the Department which I will give you. It has been a decided improvement on the old relationships, but it has not, within the time that has elapsed since its inauguration, attained the success which we had hoped. There are some permanent difficulties which cannot be completely overcome. A divisional General is often away from his station a good deal, in summer in the hills and in winter with his troops. I think, moreover, that these financial advisers have found a difficulty in shaking off the traditions of audit officers. Also they have not had much leisure for doing work for the General Officer Commanding. They are subordinate to the Controller, therefore their advice is not final, and there is a good deal of uneasiness about giving advice at all. They have been under the impression that the Controller would think they were ignoring him. We have had these points in mind in framing the new scheme. Under that scheme the financial adviser to the General Officer Commanding will be independent, *i.e.*, any advice he gives as adviser he can sustain afterwards as audit officer. Secondly, in redistributing work under this scheme we have left the financial adviser with some leisure from the routine of account and audit duties, so that he can pay more attention to the requirements of the divisional General and his staff. I hope therefore that things will work better under the new system.

6151. SIR P. LAKE.—Do you contemplate bringing them in closer touch with the Generals?

6152. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes.

6153. SIR P. LAKE.—Will you kindly tell us what measures have been adopted to allow of General Officers Commanding divisions knowing how expenditure is going on?

6154. MR. BRUNYATE.—In the first place, the Budget system was altered in order to give each division a separate Budget. In the second place, the accounts were revised so that divisional Generals might, as far as possible, have a definite amount under a definite head. In the third place, statements were issued by which the General Officer Commanding could watch the course of expenditure month by month. These were the main points.

6155. SIR P. LAKE.—My experience was that these statements reached the General Officer Commanding too late to be of much practical value.

6156. SIR W. MEYER.—Do not divisional Generals get their Budgets a considerable time after the financial year has begun?

6157. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes, I do not know the exact time, but it is probably two or three months after.

6158. SIR W. MEYER.—Is not that rather a handicap?

6159. MR. BRUNYATE.—We cannot complete it under two or three months.

6160. SIR W. MEYER.—The army Budget is made up from all the Budget statements furnished by the divisions?

6161. MR. BRUNYATE.—But numerous alterations are made in them at headquarters, mostly in lump sums for all India, which have to be afterwards distributed in detail between the divisional Budgets?

6162. SIR W. MEYER.—Might not the Deputy Controller give the divisional General a provisional Budget, explaining that it was only provisional and that the final sanction of the Finance Department had to be awaited?

6163. MR. BRUNYATE.—I think there would be no harm in it at all. We would readily give any preliminary information of this kind.

6164. PRESIDENT.—So far as your experience goes, do divisional Generals make adequate use of the financial powers granted to them? Might these powers be increased?

6165. MR. BRUNYATE.—Judging from the cases which come up to me here, I cannot say that the instances are numerous in which one is able to say that the General Officer Commanding ought not to have sent a case up. I am sure, however, that there is a considerable variety of practice among General Officers Commanding. Where the General Officer Commanding and the accounts officer pay a good deal of attention to these things and work together, I feel sure that references are avoided, especially where you have an accounts officer who takes a less strict view of certain particular rules. I have in my mind General Sir James Wolfe-Murray and the few petitions which came from his division. I think there is a difference in practice, but probably the existing powers used broad-mindedly on the part of the accounts officer and the General would go a good deal further than they do.

I come now to that part of the question "Might these powers be increased"? For some purposes the powers of the General Officer Commanding are large, *e.g.*, he can sanction what are called "unauthorized but otherwise regular charges" up to Rs. 5,000 if he can find the money in his Budget allotment. The main limitations of his powers come under recurring charges. He can sanction no recurring expenditure whatever. Neither can he sanction anything in the way of a boon to a public servant. We will say an officer goes out for a couple of days to inspect camels and claims Rs. 5 detention allowance for each day he is away. The General cannot sanction it at all if the officer holds an appointment to which detention allowance has not been conceded by rule.

Then as regards the power about "unauthorised but otherwise regular charges;" this rule can always be defeated by undue interpretation, *e.g.*, by quoting the audit rule that financial powers cannot be utilized to effect a change of practice, or by quoting the rule laid down by the Secretary of State that charges of an "unusual" kind require his sanction. It depends on the type of man the audit officer is. We tried to get that rule to work more efficiently by suggesting that the General Officers Commanding should exercise their powers under that rule with reasonable freedom, and that the decisions if objected to should be sent up to the Government in a quarterly return where they would probably be passed *en bloc*, but this proposal was objected to by the Comptroller General.

In dealing with the question as to whether these powers could be enlarged, I should like to begin with a few *caveats*: I think there is a good deal of danger of the grant of power to sanction recurring expenditure leading to large additional expenditure in the long run. Cases in which sanction for recurring expenditure is required are not numerous. We addressed divisional Generals on this question a couple of years ago, and Sir James Wolfe-Murray sent in a very

complete reply showing a list of all the references he had made to the Government of India during the three years of his tenure; there were only 105 of these references altogether, and some of them really originated in questions raised by the Government themselves. Only about 70 references in the three years involved recurring expenditure, and Sir James Wolfe Murray's own conclusion was that the power of sanctioning recurring expenditure should *not* be given to divisional Generals.

Another point is that the delegation of powers is often objected to on administrative grounds. I think we struck out quite as many suggestions for delegation in Sir James Wolfe-Murray's statement for this reason as for financial reasons.

As regards "hard cases," there is a very decided tendency (possibly partly due to General Officers not having very wide powers and therefore feeling less responsibility) to deal with hard cases very liberally. In one case for example a detention allowance had been passed for 150 days running; it was really an increase of pay, or deputation allowance, and should have come to Government.

I should like to show a few ways in which these powers could be enlarged. We get up here a great many personal cases—trivial questions about detention allowance, pensions, etc., also questions about followers and menials. All these are small matters, and I think in these cases we ought, as a matter of commonsense administration, to leave the General Officers to deal with them. At present these petty personal questions overload us all at Army Headquarters.

Then I still think, with all deference to the Comptroller General's opinion about unauthorized but otherwise regular charges, that the rule should be made workable, and a statement should, I think, be issued showing what sort of things ought to be passed. Five thousand rupees, however, is too high a limit for this particular purpose; far above what used to be the corresponding limit for local Governments.

I think accounts officers might do more in the way of provisional objections. I know of a number of cases where payments which had been going on for years, *e.g.*, some follower's pension, have been suddenly discovered to be irregular and have been stopped outright, causing a good deal of justifiable complaint. The proper course would have been a reference to the Government of India by the accounts officer himself, the charge being provisionally continued till orders were received.

At present no reappropriation can be effected without the approval of the Controller. This is a remnant of the old system and requires correction. I am inclined to think too that, within limits, the question whether General Officers Commanding should not be allowed to reappropriate from grant to grant requires consideration.

Another irritating rule is that the General Officer Commanding must personally exercise his own financial powers, he is not permitted to delegate them, *i.e.*, he must actually sign orders sanctioning expenditure himself. That is the result of having a staff with no finance man on it. If we get better arrangements for military financial advice the Deputy Controller can take his full share in questions involving expenditure; only when he and the administrative staff officer disagreed would an ordinary routine question have to go to the General, and the rule about personally signing could then lapse.

My general opinion then would be as follows. Once we get better arrangements for financial advice, as in the scheme which I have outlined, we should ease off matters at once in the minor ways I have mentioned, and take up similar minor suggestions which may be put forward from time to time. Meanwhile the experiment should be watched—all possibilities in the way of wider delegation should be noted as they present themselves in the daily work of administration—and eventually we should consider, if the system of financial advice and co-operation is working satisfactorily, whether something on broader lines is not desirable. But at present we are not ready, I think, for anything very ambitious. And in any case it must be remembered that practically all the important new expenditure must remain centralized, for it originates almost

entirely in schemes affecting the army, or a class or department of the army, throughout India. It is never confined to a single division in the way that an important scheme of new civil expenditure is often limited to a single province.

I would add that as far as the Finance Department is concerned, we have always wished General Officers to exercise the powers they already have, and we have always withstood proposals to restrict those powers. We have preferred not to start nibbling at them.

6166. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you had cases of the abuse of this very vague power of General Officers Commanding to incur expenditure up to five thousand rupees?

6167. MR. BRUNYATE.—No, I cannot recollect any clear case of abuse.

6168. SIR W. MEYER.—It is a power whose vague wording lends itself to abuse. I understand that you propose to limit that power, but at the same time to make it more elastic.

On the civil side something has been done to diminish references by allowing such menials as sweepers and the like to be classed under the head of office contingencies. Is it so on the military side?

6169. MR. BRUNYATE.—I think not, but the point is well worthy of consideration. It might be taken up.

6170. PRESIDENT.—Do you think it would be advisable to give financial powers to the General Officers Commanding the Northern and Southern Armies?

6171. MR. BRUNYATE.—I think they should have normal powers to deal with their own establishment and so on, but I suppose that is not the point of the question?

6172. SIR W. MEYER.—We were considering whether Army Commanders might be administrative as well as executive officers.

6173. MR. BRUNYATE.—I am opposed to the suggestion that they should exercise administrative functions in matters of expenditure. We already have four Secretariats dealing with every proposal involving recurring expenditure. We have the divisional Generals, Army Headquarters, the Army Secretariat, and the Finance Department, all with a strong staff. To add a fifth will only mean extra establishments and expense, and no material relief to the Government of India. The key to the question of delegation is to be found in better arrangements for financial advice. Given them, I would just as soon delegate powers to a divisional commander at once as I would to an Army Commander.

6174. SIR W. MEYER.—There is also the objection that the divisional General has a financial officer and the Army Commander has not. Would the latter have to consult the nearest Deputy Controller?

6175. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes.

6176. PRESIDENT.—Might the bulk of Army Regulations be advantageously curtailed without diminishing effective financial control?

6177. MR. BRUNYATE.—I am only concerned with Volumes I, II and X. I think there is an inevitable complexity in military regulations partly owing to variety of system, and the tenacity with which every military officer clings to his old historical and prescriptive rights, and also to the system of pay of rank and staff pay. We proposed to modify the latter in 1907 but were not allowed to do so. The Secretary of State has now, however, ordered the matter to be taken up again. Then, again, one of the reasons why the regulations are so precise and minute is because of financial centralization at Army Headquarters. As I have explained above it may be possible, a few years hence, to take up the question of giving Generals larger powers and of simplifying the Regulations.

6178. SIR W. MEYER.—What struck me in times past was that whereas under the Civil Service Regulations every now and then cases would arise when a man would get a special concession, the Regulations were not altered for that. But when such cases occurred on the military side, an attempt was made to alter Army Regulations to fit them.

6179. MR. BRUNYATE.—There is undoubtedly this tendency.

6180. **SIR W. MEYER.**—Is there any trouble about travelling allowances, which in 1906 were made of a more contractual character?

6181. **MR. BRUNYATE.**—We have not had a great deal of trouble; it has worked well so far.

6182. **SIR W. MEYER.**—Is it possible to expand the system and thus diminish work?

6183. **MR. BRUNYATE.**—It is difficult to reply; Volume X certainly wants looking into with a view to simplification.

6184. **PRESIDENT.**—Do you consider that the present system of administration and co-ordination at Army Headquarters and in the Army and Finance Departments, affords adequate check on expenditure and due consideration of measures proposed from all necessary points of view, future as well as present?

6185. **MR. BRUNYATE.**—From the point of view of finance, I think the system puts us in a very strong position. It gives the financial adviser of the army the last word with the Commander-in-Chief and Army Member in everything which involves expenditure. The financial adviser is very rarely over-ruled by the Commander-in-Chief, and where he is he still has a right of reference to the Finance Department. From a broader point of view I should like to say, taking the system as a whole and apart from certain anomalies which are inevitable under an arrangement which combines the functions of Commander-in-Chief and War Minister in one authority, that in my opinion it has worked exceedingly well, and I should not myself propose anything which I should regard as an essential modification of its original lines. When I say it has worked well, I refer to the close and friendly co-operation between the Finance Department and the military authorities—not only the Commander-in-Chief himself but the Heads of Branches. I do not mean to say that we have not had times of strain with perhaps every Branch, but I think on the whole there has been very full co-operation, and Branches have given and do give all due weight to financial arguments. This is my general view. At the same time I think there are directions in which the present system is not satisfactory. I think that there are too many co-ordinate authorities separately advising the Commander-in-Chief, who are free to go to him and give their opinion at any stage of a case. We certainly want some regular co-ordinating authority, possibly a Chief of the Staff, or an Army Secretary with higher status, or an improved Advisory Council. Secondly, I think the army is weakened by there being practically no satisfactory machinery for focussing collective military opinion, and we also suffer from the want of discussion across the table. It is true that a machinery exists in the form of an Advisory Council but it rarely meets, and in my opinion it is too large for practical work. The tendency is for members to confine themselves to their own department too closely and not to join in general discussion. The fact that the Commander-in-Chief is present hampers discussion. I think too that procedure is becoming more cumbrous, as the result of the subdivision of Branches of Army Headquarters into numerous separate Directorates. There is also rather a tendency to substitute a pronouncement of expert opinion for a full reasoned statement. I think that the Finance Department, though allowed ample latitude in the scope of its criticism, has been hampered by not knowing what is going on in the technical departments. These are my general criticisms of the present system, and the general remedies I lean to are first, financial advice in the Branches—just as we already have the Finance Department with its representative in the army administration as a whole—and secondly, an improved and more efficient Advisory Council which will sit every week and deal not only with important schemes of new expenditure, but with cases which come up in the ordinary course of business and thus save references to the Commander-in-Chief, and prevent files being sent backwards and forwards to Branches, to the extent which obtains at present.

6186. **PRESIDENT.**—You say that a great many officers at Army Headquarters take the orders of the Commander-in-Chief in various matters, and that this leads to confusion. I have been reading a very interesting work,

the Compendium of Office Rules for the Army Department, and I find it laid down that no member of the Headquarters Staff can take the orders of the Commander-in-Chief except on such subjects as came formerly within the powers of the Commander-in-Chief. As nothing formerly came under the Commander-in-Chief's control which required reference to the Government of India or the Military Member, it follows from these rules that no member of the Headquarters Staff can submit any case requiring such reference to the Commander-in-Chief except through the Secretary in the Army Department. That is the rule anyhow.

6187. MR. BRUNYATE.—When I spoke of references to the Commander-in-Chief I did not do so by way of complaint. If what you have cited is the rule it is certainly not the practice. I do not think it would be a legitimate practice to keep the heads of the army from access to the Commander-in-Chief.

6188. PRESIDENT.—Another point is that the Chief of the General Staff is a Lieutenant-General. Under the rules of procedure all the members of the Headquarters Staff, including the Chief of the General Staff, are members of the Army Department. Is it not the case that as such they are necessarily subordinate to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Army Department?

6189. MR. BRUNYATE.—Not to my knowledge.

6190. PRESIDENT.—I merely quote this official Compendium authoritatively published in 1909.

6191. MR. BRUNYATE.—I am a member of the Army Department, but I am not subordinate to any authority in that Department.

6192. PRESIDENT.—But you are Finance Secretary in the Army Department. Are not the members of a Department of the Government of India subordinate to the Secretary?

6193. MR. BRUNYATE.—In recognized grades of subordination.

6194. PRESIDENT.—This book names the Chief of the General Staff, Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General, etc., specifically, and adds to this that they are departmental officers of the Army Department, though without any of the powers of a Secretary.

6195. MR. BRUNYATE.—The system is an anomalous one. In actual practice the principal staff officers can submit a case to the Commander-in-Chief even if it requires Government sanction, and constantly do submit it, and in my opinion should continue to do so.

6196. PRESIDENT.—It states in two places in this book that such cases will only be submitted to the Commander-in-Chief as Army Member by the Secretary in the Army Department.

6197. MR. BRUNYATE.—The book was about to be revised recently, but the revision was held over in view of certain pending questions.

6198. SIR W. MEYER.—You spoke of the Advisory Council as a convenient machine for getting questions discussed, and you stated that it met comparatively rarely. Was that the case in Lord Kitchener's time?

6199. MR. BRUNYATE.—No, because at that time there was a great deal of money, and consequently many new schemes to deal with. We have less money now.

6200. SIR W. MEYER.—My own experience was that the Advisory Council was exceedingly useful in avoiding friction.

6201. MR. BRUNYATE.—That is so still, but I think the Advisory Council should be reduced in numbers and meet oftener.

6202. SIR W. MEYER.—As Military Finance Secretary you get proposals from the various military Branches at Army Headquarters, with notes of course?

6203. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes.

6204. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you find that the notes state the case fully?

6205. MR. BRUNYATE.—In those cases which most closely concern finance, *e.g.*, in cases which come from the Adjutant-General's and Quartermaster-General's Branches, I think the cases are ordinarily very fully and clearly stated. In some of the other Branches we see less of the reasons which underlie the recommendations. We have less direct communication with the General Staff, but I may state as a simple fact that there seems to be less reasoning and more in the way of pronouncement in the General Staff notes as they come to the Secretariat than in those of other Branches.

6206. SIR W. MEYER.—Is there a tendency simply to give you a final note with no reference to possible differences of opinion?

6207. MR. BRUNYATE.—The established practice in that Branch is to give a single note only.

6208. SIR W. MEYER.—In most cases there is no absolute right or wrong, but simply a question of the balance of expediency?

6209. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes, I think so.

6210. SIR W. MEYER.—Is it not fair, when a proposal goes to the Finance Department, that they should be able to see whether different people have taken different views?

6211. MR. BRUNYATE.—The point is a difficult one. The Chief of the General Staff gives Government his final and responsible opinion, and I do not think we have the right to expect him to tell us the views of every subordinate who has differed from him. There are thirty-three officers in the General Staff. I do not therefore object to the single note system as such. But when there are serious considerations on the other side leading to doubt as to whether the policy recommended is the right policy, I think that should be touched on in the one note which the Branch sends out. While I state it as a fact that in the everyday work of the General Staff there is less of that kind of discussion than in some of the other Branches, I must also add that the procedure varies with the personnel. I do not mean to imply that the present Head of the General Staff would grudge us any information we asked for; I am sure he would not.

6212. PRESIDENT.—When official matter is submitted to you or circulated to you in the form of a note from the Chief of the General Staff, does the file come to you or is a separate note sent?

6213. MR. BRUNYATE.—The file comes to us with previous references and so forth, but not with all the notes which must have been written to arrive at the decision that has been come to. I hope I shall not create any misunderstanding; I have seen cases very fully argued indeed. I am merely saying that in the ordinary everyday routine there is less elaboration in the statement of the cases from one Branch than from others.

6214. PRESIDENT.—Formerly in the Military Department, which was a very well ordered office, there was a Central Registry. When the Army Department was instituted, I understand that the papers were divided up amongst the various Branches of Army Headquarters and the Central Registry was abolished. With a Central Registry you could see all the papers, but now, with these separate registries divided up, it is different. Is it not possible that the Head of a Branch or a Director who was very keen on a certain thing might omit to quote these previous papers, and put forward a proposal which had been rejected without bringing the fact to notice?

6215. MR. BRUNYATE.—My actual experience is that the tendency is to presume too little knowledge on the part of the financial authorities, and hunt up too many references and precedents, rather than too few.

6216. PRESIDENT.—Has it been an advantageous thing to abolish the Central Registry?

6217. MR. BRUNYATE.—I think the deliberate suppression of papers which would throw light on a case is not likely to occur. It is a possibility, but I do not think it is a point of practical significance. It only exists as a theoretical possibility.

6218. SIR W. MEYER.—Surely all orders issuing from the Army Department are recorded by the Army Department?

6219. MR. BRUNYATE.—They keep a register of such matters as they have themselves issued orders on.

6220. SIR W. MEYER.—All orders finally issue from the Army Department?

6221. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes, if they involve reference to the Government.

6222. SIR W. MEYER.—How then is it that there is the lack of such a general registry, such as the President refers to.

6223. PRESIDENT.—I think the Army Department send all their records to the various Branches of Army Headquarters concerned to keep for them. Is not that so?

6224. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes; that is so, I think.

6225. PRESIDENT.—Does the present system lead in any way to duplication of work?

6226. MR. BRUNYATE.—By the nature of the case there is of course some duplication in almost all Secretariats. In this instance I think the Army Department is necessarily doing again and very much from the same point of view, work which has already been done or should have been done by the Branch concerned. The Branch of Army Headquarters also deals with the financial side of the question as well as it can; and when the financial aspect of the question is dealt with again, that is by the Finance Department, it means some duplication of work again. As far as the Finance Department is concerned, it would be an improvement to have a financial adviser advising the Branches on cases from the inside at the outset, and with the same powers as our assistant secretaries now possess of disposing of cases there and then. This is an arrangement we hope to bring about.

6227. SIR P. LAKE.—Might you not say that if a Branch draws up its proposals for expenditure unskilfully, through not being able to get financial advice, there is duplication of work. Advisers in each Branch would be able to avoid that to a large extent?

6228. SIR W. MEYER.—Is not the Military Finance Secretariat open to advise every Branch which seeks advice?

6229. MR. BRUNYATE.—It is open, and gives the best advice it is capable of. I think I may say that I have sometimes gone a whole week at a time without being able to do my own regular Secretariat work, because I have been occupied in giving informal advice in the manner you speak of. I do not think, however, this is quite the same thing as having a man who is an integral part of the Branch?

6230. SIR W. MEYER.—Would these Branch advisers be members of the Finance Department?

6231. MR. BRUNYATE.—They would be subordinate to the principal financial adviser of the army whoever he was.

6232. SIR W. MEYER.—Would there not be instances of multiplicity of conclusions?

6233. MR. BRUNYATE.—There would be that risk certainly.

6234. PRESIDENT.—Surely that would correct itself in time?

6235. SIR W. MEYER.—What class of man would you give as advisers?

6233. MR. BRUNYATE.—Men of the assistant secretary class. In some cases I should advise the employment of a military accounts subordinate.

6237. SIR W. MEYER.—How many Branches will have advisers under this scheme?

6238. MR. BRUNYATE.—The Ordnance and Quartermaster-General's Branches; the relationship of the Military Works Branch with the Examiner would also be modified; there would also be a man for the Adjutant-General's Branch and various other Branches combined.

6239. SIR W. MEYER.—Will this involve a diminution of the general military finance staff, that is, the staff now ranged round yourself?

6240. MR. BRUNYATE.—It ought to.

6241. SIR W. MEYER.—If you did not take particular care that these Branch advisers were in constant touch with the principal adviser, you might get the Adjutant-General's Branch, for example, saying, "your man told us this was right, and you say it is wrong"?

6242. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes, those are points to be watched. I think if I were here, I should see these officers possibly every day and hear what was going on, and expect to see copies of any orders which it was proposed to issue, just as I see draft orders which the Army Department propose to issue.

6243. SIR W. MEYER.—The draft order is not issued till the scheme is worked out and approved?

6244. MR. BRUNYATE.—No.

6245. SIR W. MEYER.—Whereas in this case you want to be in touch while the scheme is being worked out. Should it not be possible for the Branch authorities to go straight to the financial Head?

6246. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes, and within proper limits it would continue, but apart from a financial man in a Branch having a provisional authority, there is a great deal he can do in the way of co-operation in the working out of details.

6247. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you notice in the files you get that "A" writes a note stating the whole case, and "B" then repeats the whole note without any useful additions?

6248. MR. BRUNYATE.—It is not specially a defect of the Army Department procedure. I should say it exists more in the Military Finance Branch than in any other. The Military Finance Branch Staff have the feeling that the case has come into a new Department which is dealing with it from a special point of view; there is a tendency to summarize a case again, and I have not perhaps discouraged it so much as might seem to be desirable because I value very highly the variety of opinion I obtain from my clerks and assistants. I do not want them to get a feeling of timidity in noting and making suggestions.

6249. SIR W. MEYER.—In order to get a variety of opinion, you are willing to pass over repetition?

6250. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes.

6251. SIR W. MEYER.—And for the same reason do you think that the military people's noting is not to be discouraged?

6252. MR. BRUNYATE.—I do not think there is much redundancy in their case. It is not within my experience that the various Branches are constantly restating the whole case.

6253. PRESIDENT.—Is any change proposed in the relations between the Finance Department and the military authorities in respect of the control of expenditure?

6254. MR. BRUNYATE.—Proposals were put forward last year by the Army Department which involved a modification of the present position of the

Military Finance Secretary and therefore of the relation of the Finance Department to the army authorities. They also raised the question of financial advice in Branches. Financial advice can of course be given in Branches under the existing system, or any other method of constituting a financial adviser to the army, and the Committee will not perhaps expect me to go into that matter again. As regards the main question of relations between the army authorities and their principal financial adviser, I would mention that the proposals put forward last year were not pursued to a conclusion at that time. The matter was postponed till this season, and a scheme was then put forward by the Finance Member for the abolition of the appointment of Military Financial Secretary as it now exists, and the creation of an appointment of principal financial adviser the designation proposed being "Military Accountant-General." It was contemplated that this officer would be wholly subordinate to the Finance Department. The proposals of the Finance Member were considered by the Commander-in-Chief, and the matter was discussed between him and the acting Finance Member, assisted by Sir Percy Lake, the Army Secretary, and myself. The Army and Finance Departments ultimately agreed to the proposal that the principal financial adviser to the army should be an officer appointed and removable by the Viceroy, on the recommendation of the Finance Department after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief. It was proposed to lay down that this officer should regard himself primarily as a financial officer responsible for enforcing financial rules and policy, but that the advice he gave should be that of an independent adviser forming an independent opinion. This advice was to be equally available to the Finance Department and the Army Department as required. This general conclusion, and the acceptance of the principle of having financial advisers in the Branches, is as far as the discussion has gone up to date.

6255. SIR W. MEYER.—Was it to be a permanent measure or a make-shift?

6256. MR. BRUNYATE.—As I understand it, the intention is to put forward these proposals as a permanent measure. They have not yet been put before the Secretary of State, and of course his sanction will be required.

6257. SIR W. MEYER.—Then, I understand you will be working for a time in anticipation of sanction? You will be succeeded by an officer who will work under the new designation?

6258. MR. BRUNYATE.—I presume that he will work as Military Finance Secretary until the revised arrangements have been approved.

6259. SIR W. MEYER.—Will the new officer in practice occupy very much the same position as you do now?

6260. MR. BRUNYATE.—That has not been worked out. I should perhaps explain that I was not consulted either regarding the original proposals last year, or those formulated this year. I was only brought in when the discussion of this year's proposals had begun. I am not therefore in a position to state the underlying intention regarding matters which have not yet been discussed and settled.

6261. SIR W. MEYER.—Regarding matters requiring the sanction of the Finance Department: under the present system you give the sanction of the Finance Department in minor cases where permissible? If you do not agree, or the case is beyond your responsibility, I understand you pass it on to the Hon. Finance Member?

6262. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes. The intention of the new system is that the financial adviser should have certain powers of conveying the authority of the Finance Department without actually sending all cases to that Department. He is also to have the right of demanding a reference to the Finance Department, subject to certain limitations, in any case which he thinks it desirable for that Department to see.

6263. SIR W. MEYER.—I think we may presume that cases which would require the sanction of the Finance Member will go to him as heretofore, but through the ordinary Finance Secretary?

6264. MR. BRUNYATE.—I think that is likely to be the case.

6265. PRESIDENT.—You do not propose any deviation from the rules of the Finance Department?

6266. MR. BRUNYATE.—No. The point today is that a proposal comes up and I may refer the case to the Finance Member if the orders proposed are outside the powers which used to be exercised by the old Military Department, but I exercise my discretion in this. The new scheme will not contemplate the financial adviser sending these cases direct to the Finance Member.

6267. SIR W. MEYER.—We are concerned under our terms of reference with economy. Will the new system give as full and economical control over military expenditure as of old?

6268. MR. BRUNYATE.—I think the existing system, as long as it works and does not break down, gives the maximum power of financial control.

6269. SIR W. MEYER.—May I interpolate that it affords a far greater amount of financial control than in the pre-Kitchener *régime*?

6270. MR. BRUNYATE.—That is most decidedly my opinion. The Military Finance Secretaries, so far, beginning with Sir William Meyer, have been officers with long experience of financial work, and the Commanders-in-Chief have found in practice that their advice was generally supported by the Finance Member. The Commander-in-Chief has thus known where he stood, and has appreciated the help so given. The relations established have been in consequence cordial and close. The existence of these relations has been of corresponding advantage to the Finance Department also, for it has received a deference to financial advice and opinion which no mere system of control as such would have secured. So long as the system works, it gives a maximum of control over military expenditure. The question is whether such a system, under which the Military Finance Secretary is in a degree subordinate to two Members of Council, can work indefinitely. Speaking for myself, I do not think the position is one which could be tolerable to the Military Finance Secretary himself for an indefinite time.

6271. SIR W. MEYER.—My question was: speaking generally, do you think the new system, if adequately worked, is likely to produce undesirable diminution of financial control?

6272. MR. BRUNYATE.—I do not think it is likely to be as strong as the existing system. If the financial adviser is wholly the subordinate of the Finance Member and is merely his agent, as the term subordination implies, I think he will be far less of a trusted adviser at Army Headquarters, and that the Finance Department will lose more in that way than they can gain by having a theoretically more complete control *i.e.*, control by an officer who is completely their subordinate.

6273. SIR W. MEYER.—And there will possibly be more friction?

6274. SIR P. LAKE.—In fact the Army Department wants thoroughly independent advice, not advice controlled by an outside Department.

6275. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you hold that the Army Member should have a financial adviser under him, and in no way connected with the Finance Department?

6276. MR. BRUNYATE.—No, you cannot get a really good financial adviser except from among men whose prospects and interests lie with the Finance Department. In no case would I have the principal financial adviser the staff officer of the Commander-in-Chief, because he would not be trusted by the Finance Department, and there would have to be all sorts of safeguards, resulting in great friction and delay.

6277. SIR W. MEYER.—The position in fact would be similar to what it was in the old days, when the Military Accountant-General was an independent financial adviser to the Military Department, and the Finance Department's time was largely occupied in demolishing his arguments?

6278. MR. BRUNYATE.—I would like to say that I am not putting forward the proposals as my ideal.

6279. PRESIDENT.—Might such services as the Supply and Transport Corps, the Ordnance, and Army Clothing, be made more civil in character?

6280. MR. BRUNYATE.—As regards the Supply and Transport Corps, in the case of transport, I take it, there is no question (there is none to my mind) of civilianizing—if I may use such a term—that part of the Corps. As regards supply, I certainly do not think that the superior establishments could be made civil. Then there is the question of the lower establishments. It requires to be appreciated that the subordinate establishments of the Supply and Transport Corps are already largely civil. Once you get away from the superior commissioned officers in general charge, and get down to store godowns, you have British military subordinates in charge of whole godowns or sections in the larger cantonments, and in smaller cantonments you have Indians working under civil conditions. The actual distribution of food to the troops is in the hands of the victualling agents who work under civil terms of service. The whole of the menial establishments, butchers, bakers, and so forth, are all Indians and civilians. The whole of the clerical establishments are civilians. Personally, I do not therefore see much scope for introducing more of the civil element into the Corps.

In the case of the Ordnance Department, the arsenal establishment, should, I think, be military as they are in direct contact with the troops. In the case of the factories there does seem to be some case for employing civilians, and I have talked about this matter with the Director General of Ordnance who authorized me to say that he was about to submit proposals to this effect which he believed would result in economy. That being so, perhaps the Committee will not ask me for any further expression of my personal opinion on that point.

Next, as regards the Army Clothing Department; I do not know that there would be much direct saving by appointing civilians. There are only five officers in the Department, and the saving per head would not be considerable. But the employment of civilians would perhaps result in economy in the general management of the Department; you would get men with a more intimate knowledge of the technicalities of the work if you employed civilians.

6281. SIR W. MEYER.—About the Supply and Transport Corps, a large part of the business of the higher officers is to deal with quasi-commercial matters, is it not?

6282. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes.

6283. SIR W. MEYER.—Why do you think that a civilian who has had many years of that sort of work would not be so suitable as the military man?

6284. MR. BRUNYATE.—The main reason is, I believe, connected with war conditions.

6285. SIR W. MEYER.—You mean that you want more officers in the field?

6286. MR. BRUNYATE.—No, I mean that you want your superior supply officer to be available for service in the field, and I do not think (it is of course an administrative matter) that civilians in the field would be anything like as satisfactory as soldiers. I believe there is a long history behind this question.

6287. PRESIDENT.—There is undoubtedly.

6288. SIR W. MEYER.—Anyhow, the whole Supply and Transport establishment will not go into the field?

6289. MR. BRUNYATE.—That is so, perhaps.

6290. SIR W. MEYER.—So far, therefore, the field argument does not apply. Now take another item—the registration of animals. Could not that be done by civilian agency?

6291. MR. BRUNYATE.—There I certainly think civilians could be employed, and I have never been able to understand why it could not be done by existing civilian establishments. It is years since I have had any experience of registration work as a district officer, and it may have become more thorough since, but certainly we could have done it through district officials and veterinary staffs, and could have done the work more satisfactorily than it was being done then.

6292. SIR W. MEYER.—Grass farms and dairies ?

6293. MR. BRUNYATE.—We are making dairies entirely civilian ; that was one of the changes effected as the result of the Fremantle Committee.

6294. SIR W. MEYER.—That is, you employ the civilian element until you reach the Director ?

6295. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes.

6296. SIR W. MEYER.—What about the grass farms ?

6297. MR. BRUNYATE.—The Fremantle Committee considered that the administration of grass farms should remain under the direct control of the General Officer Commanding, with the assistance of military grass farm officers. We accepted that opinion. I think the idea was that the connexion with the troops was too close for the civilian element to be used. I have no strong opinion on the subject myself at all.

6298. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think that if the handing over of the dairy farms to civilian agency proves satisfactory, a similar experiment might be made with the grass farms ?

6299. MR. BRUNYATE.—It is a matter for consideration I think. I might explain about the dairies that they will be largely manned by army men who will drop their military status.

6300. SIR W. MEYER.—What about the Remount Department ? That is largely concerned with the buying and training of horses ?

6301. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes, and mules. Of course horse-breeding was once entirely civil under the Revenue Department. It was transferred to the military on the recommendation of the Horse-breeding Commission. As regards horse and mule purchasing, a large part of the duty—and an important part—is the purchasing of animals in China, the Argentine and elsewhere ; going round to the fairs in this country, and arranging with shippers and so on. You have in the army a veterinary service, and an enormous number of officers who are living with horses and mules all their lives, and it therefore offers a wide field of choice of men who are acquainted with horses and mules. In the case of civilians you might get unsatisfactory men who would be difficult to get rid of, and be an embarrassment in so small a cadre, and I am inclined to think the balance of advantage is with the army man.

6302. SIR W. MEYER.—Then you think that horse-breeding runs might be made over to civil agency, but would not go further ?

6303. MR. BRUNYATE.—I would express no opinion in regard to horse-breeding runs. I simply say that they were under civilian agency once.

6304. SIR W. MEYER.—Is it a fact that officers of the Remount Department are still being sent off to foreign countries to purchase animals ?

6305. MR. BRUNYATE.—They are constantly going abroad to purchase. We have had men up in North China for a considerable period continuously now.

6306. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think that is an economical method ?

6307. MR. BRUNYATE.—I think it probably is ; it is more economical to make large purchases in one place where you can have officers staying for some considerable time, than it is to go to one country one year and another country another.

6308. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider that the rifle factory at Ishapore has justified its existence financially? Can it possibly make India self-supporting in the matter of rifles? Might it be better to drop rifle manufacture in this country?

6309. MR. BRUNYATE.—The answer to the first part of the question is in the negative. The answer to the second part, I take it, is familiar to the Committee, namely, that it is not the present policy to maintain the factory on such a scale as to make India self-supporting in the matter of rifles. As I understand it, the extent of the work the factory is intended to undertake is rather measured by what would be the normal annual replacements (supposing the so-called normal state would ever be reached).

As regards the third part I can give no categorical answer. The view of the Finance Department is expressed in a minute by the Finance Member, to the effect that there are some strong *prima facie* reasons why the present policy should be reconsidered. My personal opinion is that the question does want fairly threshing out, but we have not had an answer to the questions put in the Financial Member's minute, and pending such an answer in full I would not like to go further in the expression of an opinion than I have gone now.

6310. SIR. W. MEYER.—The notes referred to were written in 1911, more than a year ago; how is it that there has been no answer forthcoming?

6311. MR. BRUNYATE.—The Director General of Ordnance could reply more authoritatively to that question, but I may mention that the present Director-General had only just joined his post at that time and had a great many matters to take up almost simultaneously.

6312. SIR W. MEYER.—Is it a fact that expectations as regards output from this factory have been disappointing?

6313. MR. BRUNYATE.—They have been repeatedly disappointing.

6314. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think that, under the best conditions, the cost of turning out rifles in India is likely to be favourable compared with the Home price?

6315. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes, if you postulate sufficient time for the local manufacture of a new type to be got into full swing. Of course too the charges for freight and so on have to be considered in comparing the cost of imported rifles with that of the locally manufactured small arm.

6316. SIR W. MEYER.—Then would you say that under the most favourable circumstances the cost cannot approximate to the Home cost for some years, and that probably a few years after that a new rifle will be introduced and the difficulty again present itself?

6317. MR. BRUNYATE.—That is my general view. In course of time it should be possible to produce a rifle of any given type in India at a price somewhat approximating to the cost of the Home article, but meanwhile the whole initial stock of that type will have been laid in, mainly by purchase from Home, and, as a rifle is supposed to last some 10 or 12 years, you may well have another type introduced before any regular rate of replacement is established.

6318. SIR W. MEYER.—Under the most favourable conditions can it be as cheap to make rifles in India as to get them from Home?

6319. MR. BRUNYATE.—I think so.

6320. SIR. W. MEYER.—You think that in the course of time the cost of manufacturing the rifle in India may be reduced?

6321. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes.

6322. SIR W. MEYER.—With regard to the mere financial point of view, do you agree with me that the only method of comparison of the cost of the rifles in India and England respectively is to get the cost that is actually incurred in the purchase of the rifle here, and compare it with the cost you have to pay to the Home Government?

6323. MR. BRUNYATE.—I agree with you, subject to one modification which the Committee will no doubt accept, that is that, in considering whether it is advisable to abolish our factory here, you must compare the cost of the rifle as produced here *less* interest on capital to date, with the amount you pay for the Home article : for your capital to date is finally sunk anyhow, and you will not get it back.

6324. SIR W. MEYER.—General Mahon tried to make out that the Home manufacture was carried out under more favourable circumstances, and that this should be taken into account when comparing the cost of the Home rifle with that of the Indian rifle. What we are concerned with is the actual money that we have to pay for a rifle from Home ?

6325. MR. BRUNYATE.—Certainly. We can get a rifle from Home for, say, £1. How that £1 is made up is no concern of ours. All we are interested in is whether the manufacture of a rifle here does or does not cost more than £4.

6326. SIR W. MEYER.—I gather that you hold that as the rifle factory can never turn out anything like the number of rifles we want, and as it cannot turn them out more cheaply, it is best to look to England for the supply ?

6327. MR. BRUNYATE.—That is the *prima facie* case which we raise against the rifle factory.

6328. SIR W. MEYER.—What would you do in regard to repairs and so forth, supposing we got all our new rifles from Home ?

6329. MR. BRUNYATE.—That of course is the crux of the question. I suppose that the arsenals would carry out such petty repairs as were within their ordinary capacity. We should also of course have to maintain a proper reserve of rifles to replace such as could not be repaired in India, and if necessary send the latter Home to be put right.

6330. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you consider the Ishapore rifle equal to the Home rifle in all respects ?

6331. MR. BRUNYATE.—I could not say as to that.

6332. SIR W. MEYER.—Are you aware of the circumstances which led to a sudden demand for 73,000 rifles at the end of last financial year ?

6333. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes; the Committee will find the circumstances set out in a Government of India despatch and the connected notes.*

* No. 85 of 1912.
Not reproduced.

6334. SIR W. MEYER.—By whom is inspection carried out ?

6335. MR. BRUNYATE.—By the inspection staff recently constituted.

6336. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider that the profit and loss statements drawn up for the Ordnance factories are reliable ?

6337. MR. BRUNYATE.—I am not quite sure if any specific document is referred to ?

6338. SIR W. MEYER.—Take page 73 of the Military Accountant-General's first volume of statistics.

6339. MR. BRUNYATE.—I cannot see that any value at all attaches to this, considered as a means of measuring the advantages to be obtained by retaining the factory. Where you have articles of an identical kind produced here and at Home the only valuable test as to whether you can produce cheaper articles in India is a comparison with the Home price list.

6340. SIR W. MEYER.—How do the Indian factories arrive at their prices ?

6341. MR. BRUNYATE.—They must take cost of production.

6342. PRESIDENT.—I presume they fix their prices so as to shew if there has been a slight profit or loss. In so far as they cannot fix their prices by the Home vocabulary, I do not know how they do it ?

6343. MR. BRUNYATE.—As regards this form, I should say that looking at the operations of the factories as a whole, the total figure in column 6 throws no light on the question as to whether you are working at a profit or not. I think I am right in saying that neither the present Director General of Ordnance nor the present Accounts Officer for Ordnance products accepts the cost accounting as even approximately correct. A new system of accounts has been introduced under technical supervision which it is believed will give a far truer result.

6344. SIR W. MEYER.—Then the present calculations are not worth much ?

6345. MR. BRUNYATE.—No.

6346. PRESIDENT.—Has the gun carriage factory at Jubbulpore been a success financially ?

6347. MR. BRUNYATE.—I know very little about that question. The Director General of Ordnance tells me it is a question of some difficulty to answer. The concentration of the three factories at one place has, I take it, been undoubtedly economical.

6348. SIR W. MEYER.—Has not that been counteracted to a certain extent by moving a factory from Madras where wages were cheaper ?

6349. MR. BRUNYATE.—To a certain extent, yes : but I cannot say how far that is a material factor.

6350. PRESIDENT.—Might the harness and saddlery factory at Cawnpore be handed over to private agency ?

6351. MR. BRUNYATE.—I am not fully acquainted with the administrative aspects of the question. My own experience at Headquarters inclines me towards limiting Government manufactures (apart from the general economic question of the development of the country and so on). Manufacturing questions are very technical, procedure is cumbrous, and the operations of manufacturing departments are undoubtedly less supervised than those of ordinary administrative departments. The present case therefore is one where one would naturally be attracted to the idea of handing over work to civil agency. The practical difficulty is this, we have only one really reliable leather firm in India. That has been brought very forcibly before us in connexion with the boot contract recently. Practically speaking, we found that we had to put the whole work into the hands of Cooper Allen again, because no other competing firm could turn out a reliable army boot even as a sample.

The harness and saddlery factory, I understand, is one in which Government have undoubtedly made large profit by undertaking manufacture as compared with obtaining stuff from Home, and I think it is doubtful whether it would be wise to divest ourselves of that factory, and put ourselves entirely in the hands of even a firm so well disposed as Messrs. Cooper Allen. The Director General of Ordnance has, however, already given out some orders to them, and while I am attracted by the idea suggested by the Committee, I think the proper course would be to increase such orders and not close the factory until leather manufacture is more developed in India.

6352. SIR W. MEYER.—You mentioned boots ; has Cooper Allen's supply been generally satisfactory ?

6353. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes.

6354. SIR W. MEYER.—And there we pay less than we should if we had a Government boot factory ?

6355. MR. BRUNYATE.—Well, we do so well under the boot contract that I would rather not run the risk of making the boots ourselves.

6356. PRESIDENT.—Are there any other matters in regard to which you can suggest curtailment of local outlay and production in the Ordnance Department ?

6357. MR. BRUNYATE.—This question enters into the Hon. Finance Member's minute to which I have already referred, so that I have little to add. I will, however, mention two points; one of them was brought to my notice by the present Director General of Ordnance. There is a considerable amount of petty manufacture carried on by arsenals, I understand to the value of something like £100,000 a year—pawlins, bags of kinds, and all sorts of odds and ends. It is very questionable whether this kind of manufacture is advantageous to Government. There is no proper system of cost accounting, and we must not rely too much on the claim of the arsenals that they do the work very cheaply. By substituting purchase in the open market you encourage private manufacture, and these are things for which there will be enormous demand in war time; you would really provide for meeting these extraordinary demands by encouraging private manufacture whereas in arsenals no sudden expansion is possible. The Director General of Ordnance is therefore taking steps as far as he can to reduce arsenal manufacture and to go to the market.

There is another small matter in which the economy might not be great, but the administrative convenience of which would be substantial, and there might be economy in the long run. I think it might be worth while to contract with units for certain petty items like soap, grease, and so on, instead of supplying them from the Ordnance Department. For instance, I fancy about 6,000 yards of flannelette are issued to each regiment for cleaning rifles every year. That could probably be got by corps in the open market; it would save a considerable amount of bother and would probably be economical.

6358. SIR W. MEYER.—Sir Malcolm Grover said that he thought the Ordnance factories were handicapped in a way, as certain by-products were not taken by other departments because of the high paper price. Would you say that, as long as Government thought it expedient to keep up a factory, Government departments ought to take such by-products?

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6359. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes, certainly; I had that point in mind in speaking of the desirability of considering whether the contracting for army supplies of all kinds should not be centralized to a certain extent. There are these Ordnance products, and possibly with centralization there would be more economical disposal of such products, as well as more economical purchase in the open market when purchase is in fact necessary.

6360. SIR W. MEYER.—What is the chief work of the Director General of Ordnance? Is it supervision of the Ordnance factories?

6361. MR. BRUNYATE.—General administrative charge of the Department. The three main heads are Ordnance factories, stores, and inspection. There is a great deal of co-ordination between these wanted. He is also very much concerned with cases under discussion at Army Headquarters, cases in which his advice is of very great importance.

6362. SIR W. MEYER.—The position of Director of Ordnance Factories was created only a few years ago and it is held by a highly paid officer; do you think this a necessary post?

6363. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes, I think so; I think the inspection of these factories must be a very important thing. Your inspecting authority should have an intimate continuous acquaintance with their operations throughout; there is also a certain amount of centralized work in connection with factories—accounting and so forth.

6364. SIR W. MEYER.—And as regards the other two Directorships?

6365. MR. BRUNYATE.—Inspection is of course indispensable. Ordnance stores means the control of arsenals throughout the country which is an important matter.

6366. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think the Ordnance Department is too expensively manned at the top?

6367. MR. BRUNYATE.—No, I cannot say that. The whole question was recently gone into very fully at the time of the reorganization of the Department.

6368. PRESIDENT.—Are you satisfied that the work carried out by the Military Works Services is on economical lines ?

6369. MR. BRUNYATE.—I would like to give my reply in a few separate points.

(i) I think the figures I have given in my Memorandum point to a very considerable restriction of the growth of Military Works ordinary expenditure. When you consider the great mass of demands always ready to be taken up and always coming forward, I think it is a distinctly remarkable fact that there has not been a substantial growth. This keeping down of expenditure is undoubtedly partly due to the minor ordinary works expenditure being reduced and the repair expenditure increased. Nothing can keep down the growth of repair expenditure. But, on the whole, these figures create a strong presumption of reasonably effective control.

(ii) A dominant consideration in Military Works building has always been the provision of a structure which will not be too costly in repairs. We have felt in the Finance Department sometimes that this was carried rather too far, especially in regard to subsidiary buildings and so forth. Well, there has been a new departure of a very striking kind in that matter in the case of Indian troops' lines ; there we are spending large sums in providing buildings which are mainly *kutchra* work partly protected by brick. Of course these are much more expensive than what units used to build for themselves, but it is quite a new departure in Military Works construction and that I think is hopeful. I should like to see the system extended to subsidiary buildings where possible.

(iii) I suppose an outsider is always inclined to think that the Military and Public Works Departments spend too much money, but we ourselves have been very disagreeably reminded of the danger of cheap building by what has happened with these lines as built by regimental agency. They have come down in the most disheartening way, and two sets of lines built at Risalpur under the Redistribution Scheme only a few years ago have now to be re-erected completely.

On the whole, my responsible view would be that the tendency of Military Works administration is in the direction of economy and careful control. I would like to add one or two qualifying considerations.

(a) I have been much struck in the estimates which have come before me by the disparity between the views of local officers and those of the Military Works authorities at Army Headquarters, who are in close touch with the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, and financial opinion also. We have had very heavy estimates sent up which the Military Works people up here have found capable of considerable reduction, and that points strongly to the necessity for constant inspection so that the local people may know the policy of the Government of India ; it also shews the danger that a less economical policy may be resorted to at any moment should the strictness of headquarters control be in any way relaxed.

(b) The Military Works authorities, and we ourselves, are constantly under strong pressure to improve existing types. The Military Works people are merely agents to carry out building on lines which are dictated to them. A *post mortem* room, say, is to be built ; the medical people say that the approved type is insanitary ; dimensions must be increased ; a verandah must be added, and so on ; and so you get a new and more costly type for this class of building all over India.

(c) There has been at times a tendency, under the present system of army organization, for the full work of criticism to fall on the Finance Department. General Scallan will perhaps remember that we discussed this question together sometime ago, when he was Army Secretary. He gave us his very full support, and there was a decided improvement in that respect. There is no doubt at all that unless criticism in the Army Department proper is continuous and strict, there will be a falling back in regard to control over Military Works expenditure.

(d) You have got a fixed establishment of Royal Engineer officers for all India; every one of these, who is not employed in some other way goes into the Military Works Services. Not only that, but men tend to come to Military Works when it no longer suits them as regards pay to remain in any special appointments they may be holding. The Military Works gave us figures some time ago on this point; I will only quote one set. In 1909 or 1910 the proportion of lieutenants in the Corps of Royal Engineers as a whole throughout the Empire was 38 per cent. of its strength; in India the proportion was 29 per cent.; in the Military Works, 21 per cent. Obviously the Military Works Services were being loaded with an excessive proportion of senior officers, the apparent cost of building being thus inflated.

6370. SIR W. MEYER.—You spoke just now of a tendency on the part of other departments to prescribe higher types of building. Is that resisted by the Director General of Military Works?

6371. MR. BRUNYATE.—I do not say it is not resisted, but generally speaking the function of the Director General is regarded as being that of indicating how certain stated requirements can best be supplied from the constructional point of view; it is not regarded as strictly his business to say whether the requirements presented to him are intrinsically extravagant or not, and I think that, having regard to his very great knowledge of accommodation questions as such, it should be part of his duty to criticize fully anything of that sort. I am sure he would readily do it if it were definitely laid down as part of his constitutional functions; especially as he has a very limited Budget, and is much interested in making it go as far as possible.

6372. SIR W. MEYER.—You spoke of reductions in local estimates made at Headquarters; do you mean estimates prepared by Commanding Royal Engineers?

6373. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes.

6374. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you noticed much discrepancy between estimates as finally passed and actuals of expenditure?

6375. MR. BRUNYATE.—On the whole, I do not think this has been a very decided feature of military works estimating lately. Of course cases occur. What I do notice is that if we pass estimates submitted by *local authorities* without a thorough examination in the Military Works Branch, here we are generally let in. But my experience of that Branch is that the work has been very sound indeed when they have been taken thoroughly into confidence, and are working cordially with the Finance Department.

6376. SIR W. MEYER.—Have General Officers Commanding much power to sanction works expenditure without reference to Headquarters?

6377. MR. BRUNYATE.—Their powers are very small. They can only sanction authorized minor works up to a maximum of Rs. 2,500 in each case, and their Budget grants for minor works are very small. They cannot sanction unauthorized works at all.

6378. SIR W. MEYER.—It would not be desirable to decentralize in this matter?

6379. MR. BRUNYATE.—Most emphatically it would not be desirable to do so.

6380. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you say that there has been an improvement as regards efficiency and economy since the Military Works Services were removed from the Military Supply Department?

6381. MR. BRUNYATE.—Well, that is a thing that I cannot measure; I should say that there has been a decided improvement in the relations between the Finance and the Military Works Branch since the Military Supply Department disappeared, and I think that unless these improved relations existed there would be a danger of schemes being embarked upon which would ultimately prove unduly expensive.

6382. SIR W. MEYER.—It used to be alleged that the Military Works as a building agency was more expensive than the Public Works Department; what is your opinion on that?

6383. MR. BRUNYATE.—I have never gone into it statistically and thoroughly, but I have seen occasional references to the subject, and I should be much surprised to find that that was the case. I am inclined to hold the opinion that the Military Works are just as economical as the Public Works Department.

6384. PRESIDENT.—Has considerable fresh expenditure been incurred of late years on the hutting of native troops? Do you consider that this was necessary?

6385. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes. Five lakhs were given in 1909-10, and thirteen lakhs in each of the three succeeding years. This is becoming a stereotyped figure which is likely to be maintained, if financial conditions admit of it, for a good many years to come.

On the whole, I consider the expenditure necessary; it was represented by the military authorities that the question was developing a political aspect, Indian troops having begun to compare their accommodation unfavourably with that of British troops. Indian lines recently rebuilt were falling down, and in other places were reported to be in a wretched condition. I have already mentioned the Risalpur case. It was also found that grants given to units for reconstruction of their lines had constantly to be supplemented by additional grants, and even then there was no assurance that a sound set of lines had been provided. A very unsatisfactory position was thus created. Prices of labour and material have also increased of late years. Then, again, for political reasons the Indian soldier has been relieved of practically the entire building liability previously imposed upon him. The Finance Department for a time urged that it might be better to adhere to the old system of allowing regiments to build their own lines, and simply to give more funds than in the past. But the Government have provided a very large building agency of their own, and, if that agency cannot do the work as cheaply as it ought the right course is to reorganize it, and not to ignore it and fall back on amateur agency.

6386. SIR W. MEYER.—When was this policy initiated?

6387. MR. BRUNYATE.—About the end of 1909.

6388. SIR W. MEYER.—Contemporaneously with the arrival of the present Commander-in-Chief?

6389. MR. BRUNYATE.—It is specially associated with the present Commander-in-Chief.

6390. SIR W. MEYER.—It is a system which is bound to extend?

6391. MR. BRUNYATE.—It is bound to go on until practically all lines have been rebuilt.

6392. SIR W. MEYER.—So a time will come when the Military Works will be in practical charge of all Indian lines?

6393. MR. BRUNYATE.—That is what we are moving towards.

6394. SIR W. MEYER.—Are you satisfied that the Military Works will build with due economy, and not on a standard approximating to British lines?

6395. MR. BRUNYATE.—The standards are totally different.

6396. SIR W. MEYER.—Does the medical officer come in there too?

6397. MR. BRUNYATE.—Well, we have started by laying down types for these lines. These provide for better ventilation, but the main cause of increased cost is a better roof which was the great trouble in the old lines; also the plinth. The new type does not, I think, give very much in the way of more luxury and amenities except to a small extent in native officers' and married quarters.

6398. SIR W. MEYER.—It has been alleged by some witnesses that, in view of the general increase in the cost of living and the rise in wages, the recent increase in the sepoy's pay is not adequate, and that it will eventually have to be increased, and more particularly in the case of the native officer. Are you prepared to express any opinion on that point?

6399. MR. BRUNYATE.—I was not aware that the sepoy's pay was supposed to be inadequate. The native officer is on a different footing, and we might at any time be called upon to improve his pay and pension, more from a political than a strictly economic point of view. If I were asked for my view, I would say that there is nothing amounting at present to a pending liability as regards pay; but as regards pension I should say there is certainly a liability impending either in the case of officers only or of both officers and men. I have grounds for saying this in that a proposal was actually put forward last year, and, after consideration by Council, it was said not to be negatived but simply held over.

6400. PRESIDENT.—Are you satisfied that the present policy of supplying dairy produce and fodder departmentally by dairy and grass farms is economical? Similarly in regard to departmental horse-breeding and rearing?

6401. MR. BRUNYATE.—I am satisfied about dairy farms. You have got to take into account sanitary requirements, and in the case of milk and butter you must consider the decrease of typhoid. The administration was very well reported on by the Fremantle Committee. The question was raised by the Finance Department whether the practice of Government competition in this matter was right, and Council decided definitely that the military dairy farm principle was a sound one: and the Secretary of State is understood to be thoroughly in favour of it. I pointed out in my Memorandum that dairy farms are not involving an increasing annual charge on Government.

As regards grass farms there is no doubt that the system of producing grass by Government, and of employing expert agency to purchase, results in an enormous economy; I feel no doubt about that. As regards the detailed arrangements, I think it is a question whether you need a grass farm officer in every division; it is a question which requires consideration. There is also the question of civil agency in the event of its application to dairy farms proving a success.

As regards horse-breeding that was transferred from the civil. Every successive Commander-in-Chief takes up the question of reducing the expense, but the enquiry generally ends in finding that nothing is practicable.

6402. SIR W. MEYER.—I understand that while dairy farms are centralized under the Quartermaster-General, the grass farms are under General Officers Commanding?

6403. MR. BRUNYATE.—That is so.

6404. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think it would produce economy and efficiency if the dairy farm system were followed with regard to grass farms also?

6405. MR. BRUNYATE.—I could not say as regards efficiency, but if centralizing is compatible with efficiency, there could, I think, be little doubt it would be more economical.

6406. SIR W. MEYER.—There are a considerable number of regimental grass farms? I think the policy has been to substitute Government for regimental farms?

6407. MR. BRUNYATE.—The policy is to have Government grass farms for the supply of British cavalry and Government animals, such as mules; for silladar cavalry regiments the policy is to provide them, wherever possible, with enough land to produce an adequate supply of grass in normal years; and a recent development has been to enter into contracts with them for working expenses and so forth. This has put a stop to claims for compensation for dearth of fodder under the compensation head.

6408. SIR W. MEYER.—Are you satisfied with that system?

6409. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes, I would adhere to it.

6410. SIR W. MEYER.—And what happens with non-silladar regiments?

6411. MR. BRUNYATE.—I think I am correct in saying that they are provided from Government grass farms.

6412. PRESIDENT.—Are you satisfied that the present system of fixing compensation for the dearth of food and forage in the Indian army is satisfactory and economical? Was it so, say, six years ago?

6413. MR. BRUNYATE.—The system itself, as a system, may be compared with its possible alternatives, that is, with a system of local allowances or one of free rations. The system of local allowances would not, I think, satisfy the expectations of the Indian soldier. The free ration question was taken up and referred to the Secretary of State a few years ago, and was decisively negatived by him on the ground of religious difficulties and so forth.

I take it, however, the question refers more particularly to the way in which the compensation system is actually worked in its details. Well, the system was materially improved some years ago, before the period to which you refer, when various alterations in respect of the fixation of samples and rates were introduced. These used to be fixed by Commanding Officers and the rates were based on the rates in the regimental bazar itself, a plan which was obviously liable to the grossest abuse. Civil rates were then adopted as the test, and the system was thus in that respect decidedly improved. I think that after that the matter became very largely a matter of strictness of administration. I think the question put by the Committee is right in suggesting that some six or seven years ago the administration was not as strict as it should have been. Proposals were put forward at that time for laying down a procedure which would ensure a stricter and more continuous control and a better definition of responsibility. Formal effect was not given to these proposals. At the time there was some unrest in the Indian army; and considerable apprehension was felt as to the expediency of issuing a pronouncement which might be misconstrued into the suggestion that the Government was trying to take away the old-established privileges of the soldier. But I think that the objects which a circular then proposed had in view have nevertheless been very largely attained, and that control has been decidedly stricter in the last few years. The Quartermaster-General's Branch has instituted a close scrutiny of compensation rates at the principal stations month by month, and from the current year that scrutiny has been extended to actual prices, variations between neighbouring rates being pointed out and explanations being called for. I know this is being closely done now, and I hear that the Quartermaster-General's Branch are about to issue a circular on defects they have noticed. I understand that these are nothing like so serious as those of some years ago, and it is believed in the Quartermaster-General's Branch that there has been a decided improvement. I think also that the figures in my Memorandum will support what I have put to the Committee. Another administrative improvement has been the transfer of all this kind of work from the Adjutant-General's side (both here and in divisions) to the Supply and Transport side. Obviously the Supply and Transport people should know much more about such matters.

6414. SIR W. MEYER.—Well, the chief defects six years ago were that there was not enough co-ordination with the civil authorities, that prices were often passed on a better class of *atta* than the troops ordinarily ate, and, finally, that the Military Accounts Department were brought into a matter which, from an executive point of view, was not suited to them at all. You would say that these defects have been materially remedied?

6415. MR. BRUNYATE.—As far as I can judge, I think that is the case. The question was given extraordinary prominence about the time to which this question refers and that has had its effect.

6416. PRESIDENT.—Has a Committee presided over by Surgeon-General Sloggett pointed out great extravagances in the hitherto accepted equipment and organization of field hospitals, etc.? How far have these recommendations been accepted and what effect will the action taken thereon have financially?

6417. MR. BRUNYATE.—I explained to the Committee yesterday that the report of Surgeon-General Sloggett's Committee was only shewn to me informally by the Commander-in-Chief; it was only in draft at the time I saw it. It involved a reduction of field hospitals. So far as I could judge from that kind of perusal, I should imagine that the permanent recurring saving will be small, though no doubt there will be an avoidance of a considerable amount of non-recurring expenditure hitherto contemplated.

6418. SIR W. MEYER.—But will it not involve a reduction of establishments?

6419. MR. BRUNYATE.—It will involve some reduction *per se*; but I can only speak roughly; the recurring economies will be nothing like the apparent scope of the suggestions made which are rather far-reaching.

6420. PRESIDENT.—Can anything be done in the direction of curtailing the supply of free rations, etc., to the troops serving in Baluchistan and Burma?

6421. MR. BRUNYATE.—My personal opinion is that you should take every opportunity of withdrawing or modifying such concessions when you give an increase of pay and so forth, but that in practice you will not find it possible to withdraw concessions in the intervening periods. This case has been looked into recently by the present Commander-in-Chief, and it was decided to recommend no immediate withdrawal.

6422. SIR W. MEYER.—But how will general increase of pay improve it? Will not the troops say "we are only getting the same pay as others in cheaper stations"?

6423. MR. BRUNYATE.—Theoretically that would seem to be so, and indeed I may say that the Commander-in-Chief himself does not give much hope of ultimate withdrawal; but I think there have been precedents for such withdrawals in connexion with general increases of pay notwithstanding the arguments mentioned by Sir William Meyer.

6424. SIR W. MEYER.—It could be argued that civil officers also get pecuniary allowances in Burma; has that been altered?

6425. MR. BRUNYATE.—It has been up for consideration, but there has been no change in the orders.

6426. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider the present system of recruiting officers for the Indian army, with reference simply to the estimated requirements of each year, satisfactory? Does it tend sometimes to a congestion of promotion and at other times to a deficiency of senior officers? Would it be better to regulate recruitment by average requirements calculated on an actuarial basis?

6427. MR. BRUNYATE.—When you make a large addition of officers to the army, there is no doubt that the question of the effect on the age distribution of the establishment of officers is a very serious matter indeed, fairly deserving to be weighed against such administrative considerations as are likely

to be prominent in connexion with such an addition. I find it difficult to believe that it can ever be right to put this consideration wholly on one side. As regards ordinary recruitment, I myself am rather against refinement. I have been much impressed with the results of an attempt to introduce a better and more regular system of recruitment in the case of the Indian Medical Service. The discussion lasted for years. Eventually it was thought that a better system had been introduced. In actual practice, however, very few people understand the system, and we have had very expensive proposals put to us which were largely based on a misunderstanding of the new recruitment system. The Indian army officer, so long as he is protected by the time scale, and as long as there is no outrageous disproportion between the seniors and juniors and a man has a reasonable chance of rising to the command of a regiment, is not accustomed to expect anything very elaborate in the way of equalized rates of regimental promotion and I would not attempt such elaboration.

6428. SIR W. MEYER.—But if, with a time scale, you recruit a very large number of officers simultaneously, is not the result that in course of time you get more lieutenant-colonels than there are places for them to fill?

6429. MR. BRUNYATE.—That is so, but you have got a body of several thousand officers and a general average ought in *ordinary times* to establish itself in regard to casualties and so forth, and I would not try any particular refinement.

6430. PRESIDENT.—But would it not have been better if the large increases of recent years had been more gradual? Apparently no one had any regard to the result of it?

6431. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes: as I said before I think that consideration ought to have outweighed any administrative consideration.

6432. SIR W. MEYER.—You are aware of the system that prevails in the Indian Civil Service; they have a normal standard of recruitment, and that is not disturbed to a very great extent to provide for a temporary excess or deficiency. Do you think some similar system might be applied to the Indian army?

6433. MR. BRUNYATE.—I should be against applying it. There is one fundamental difference between the two. In the Indian Civil Service the number of juniors you may have is a matter which can be treated as one of comparative indifference, because shortage or excess of juniors is immediately made good by a corresponding movement in the provincial service. If in the army, when you had a shortage of officers, you were able to employ non-commissioned officers to do their work, you would have a system something like the Indian Civil Service.

6434. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think that for all these purposes of recruitment it would be desirable for the Government to have their own actuary?

6435. MR. BRUNYATE.—It is very possible that such an appointment would be worth the money, if civil and military requirements were both included.

6436. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider that there is any early likelihood of a block of promotion in the Indian army?

6437. MR. BRUNYATE.—That is a question which I could only answer satisfactorily after a personal statistical study of the subject. Perhaps the Committee will allow me to adopt the results which have been arrived at by a Committee which was appointed to examine proposals on this question which had previously been submitted by General Barrow's Committee. They seem to have gone into the question carefully, and they had competent mathematical advice. That Committee has come to the conclusion that there will be no serious block until the time comes when the officers appointed between 1900 and 1907 would ordinarily expect to get command of their regiments; there will then be a very large surplus indeed of seniors.

6438. PRESIDENT.—Would you alter the periods for promotion to Captain, Major, and Lieutenant Colonel, from time to time, in accordance with the average conditions prevailing in the British army?

6439. MR. BRUNYATE.—No. I am replying of course simply from the financial point of view.

6440. PRESIDENT.—One result of the South African War was that the periods of promotion in the British service were materially reduced. The Secretary of State then sanctioned a similar reduction in the case of the Indian army: now, however, the periods are getting longer and longer in the British army.

6441. MR. BRUNYATE.—I think I can hardly offer an opinion on that.

6442. SIR W. MEYER.—Anyhow, from your point of view, the conditions for promotion in the Indian army would necessarily on the whole be more favourable than those of the British army?

6443. MR. BRUNYATE.—You have got to adopt one method or the other. It may be that either should prevail; but I think you get the most economical pay rates if you give assured conditions.

6444. PRESIDENT.—Then it was quite unnecessary to shorten the periods of promotion in the Indian army with reference to the conditions existing in the British army?

6445. MR. BRUNYATE.—That would be so from my point of view.

6446. PRESIDENT.—Would you make any alterations in the pensionary conditions attaching to service by British officers of the Indian army?

6447. MR. BRUNYATE.—Is there any special point in view?

6448. SIR W. MEYER.—General Barrow's Committee recommended a reduction of pension for the future, under which any officer retiring as lieutenant colonel without having commanded a regiment should in future receive £550 a year instead of £700? Do you agree?

6449. MR. BRUNYATE.—My view would be this: if you want to manipulate the pension scale with special reference to a difficulty which has risen with regard to surplus officers, I should want to consider the scheme as a whole before expressing an opinion. Otherwise, though the maximum of £700 is high from some points of view undoubtedly, I do not think a long established rate ought to be touched merely as a matter of economy unless you are taking up the question of pensions in the Indian Services generally. It may be possible to get men on lower pension rates but there is no special reason for raising that question.

6450. PRESIDENT.—You speak of a long established rate, but did not Lord Kitchener get the pension rates modified to a certain extent?

6451. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes, but the main landmarks were still retained, I think.

6452. SIR W. MEYER.—Well, a Royal Commission has recently been appointed to consider *inter alia* civil pensions in India; would you await that report before tinkering with military pensions?

6453. MR. BRUNYATE.—I think that is a convenient suggestion.

6454. PRESIDENT.—Do you consider the present leave rules for British officers of the Indian army economical and advantageous?

6455. MR. BRUNYATE.—If the question of the number of absentees on leave entered in any way into the determination of the sanctioned establishment of officers, we should have to go into the rules absolutely *de novo*. In civil departments you definitely provide for a number on leave, and if you reduced that you could reduce the number of officers. I understand that is not the case in the army; that being so, I see no objection to the military leave rules as applied to regimental officers. In regard to privilege leave the rules are obviously

economical, since such leave must not involve extra expenditure to the State, and that principle is very strictly adhered to. The furlough and combined leave rules are liberal in theory, but in practice there are few men who can take the maximum amount of leave the rules allow them. That is experienced in the civil services also.

In the case of departments the application of the military rules is somewhat anomalous; in the case of the Military Accounts Department, for instance, we have found ourselves embarrassed by the rule allowing two months' privilege leave a year. But we have obtained the sanction of the Secretary of State to granting acting allowances to civilian officers officiating in privilege leave vacancies caused by the absence of military officers. The special leave rules applicable to General Officers, and British service officers in staff employ, which theoretically allows an officer to take four months' leave every year, are also needlessly liberal in theory from a financial point of view; in practice, however, no Staff officer is allowed to take advantage of the rule to that extent.

6456. **SIR W. MEYER.**—As regards privilege leave, in civil departments a man can only earn one month's leave a year; on the military side a man can take sixty days, but the man who comes in has to do the work without allowances. Then as regards furlough, on the civil side there are two main conditions, the first is that you must put in a certain amount of actual duty to earn the leave. On the military side that condition does not seem to exist. When taking the case of regimental officers, General Barrow informed us that there was nothing to prevent an officer spending eight months of every year on leave. Do you consider that a right system?

6457. **MR. BRUNYATE.**—I consider that it would be ridiculous if it were carried out, but, though the rules theoretically admit of it, it is the business of Commanding Officers to see that the rules are not abused in that way, and in any case I understand that the limits on the number of officers who can be absent from India simultaneously, as well as the increased demands on the army in respect of training, would go far to prevent any such abuse of the rule.

6458. **SIR W. MEYER.**—But on the civil side we have that condition too; you cannot take leave unless it is in the interests of the public service. On the military side only the latter condition applies. There is a maximum number of officers to be away at one time, but no provision that an officer must put in a certain amount of actual duty.

6459. **MR. BRUNYATE.**—I should ask myself, is administration suffering from this rule? So far as my experience goes it is not suffering, but of course my experience is very limited in such a matter. If that question is answered in the negative, I would say, why tamper with a rule which is probably one of the great attractions of the service, and therefore enables us to give low rates of pay, etc.

6460. **SIR W. MEYER.**—General Barrow told us he had known cases of officers who went home every year. Of course you could argue that the State saves on their pay, but going beyond that momentary saving, does the State get good officers if they go away for a large part of every year? From the financial point of view you must not only look at the saving in rupees, you must also look at the officer you are turning out.

6461. **PRESIDENT.**—What action has been taken with regard to the changes and economies in the Marine Department suggested by Admiral Slade's Committee?

6462. **MR. BRUNYATE.**—The case belongs to the Army Department, and I am not able to state what action has been taken; it has only been seen in the Finance Department on one or two occasions on minor points.

6463. **PRESIDENT.**—Are you satisfied of the necessity of the considerable increase in the number of officers employed at Army Headquarters which has taken place of recent years? Do you think that their number could be reduced by measures of decentralization or otherwise?

6464. MR. BRUNYATE.—I give the Committee a statement (Annexure I) showing the strength of the Headquarters Staff (excluding *attachés*), at various times from 1885 onwards.

If there is any question as to the correctness of the figures I would respectfully suggest that the Army Department might be requested to supply an authoritative statement after consultation with the Finance Department.

(i) *The General Staff*.—The General Staff Branch comes less in contact with the Finance Department than any other Branch of Army Headquarters, and we are less familiar with its internal work. The points which I would put to the Committee from the financial point of view are —

(a) The General Staff was formed at a time when new military expenditure was being undertaken on an exceptional scale, and when large schemes were under consideration. There would be a natural tendency at such a time to overestimate permanent requirements.

(b) Various branches of special work are undertaken by the General Staff from time to time which may prove temporary in nature. It is a question whether there should not be a re-examination of the duties transacted by the General Staff with a view to seeing whether some appointments cannot be abolished or resanctioned on a purely temporary basis.

(ii) *Adjutant-General's Branch*.—Generally speaking, I am under the impression, from daily contact with that Branch, that it is decidedly heavily worked. I think it has far too many petty personal cases to transact; I am speaking of cases involving pay and pension, which are often very intricate and involve a great hunt for precedents and so forth. I think that if powers for dealing with these minor cases could be delegated to General Officers Commanding the work of this Branch might be a good deal eased off. The question is also partly associated with the general arrangements for work up here, but as things stand at present I have nothing to say in regard to reduction except two points:—

(a) *Artillery work*.—The Finance Department understand that an Assistant-Adjutant-General and I think another officer are allowed for artillery work, also that the War Office manages with one officer only. This is put to the Committee subject to correction; if it is correct the number of officers might be found capable of reduction.

(b) *Judge-Advocate-General*.—If you are to keep one officer in each of the Army Commands and one up here, then I think you do need a fourth man as a reserve for leave vacancies and so on. The question was rather fully discussed a little time ago, and I think the Judge-Advocate-General's Department was right in urging that it must have a trained man available. The question is whether two officers at Headquarters would not suffice for all that kind of work throughout the army.

(iii) *Quartermaster-General's Branch*.—If you have a Director of Supply and Transport with two senior officers as Deputies, I cannot see the necessity for two Assistant Deputies.

As regards the Principal Veterinary Officer, he used to have a Deputy, but the Veterinary Department was recently reorganized and that Deputy, at the instance of the Finance Department, was replaced by an assistant. We wanted to get rid of him altogether, but it was represented that an officer was wanted to look after the chargers in Simla.

The question as to whether it was necessary to have a Director and also an Assistant for Remounts was also considered. There is a

large amount of inspection work which is said to necessitate an Assistant Director at Headquarters, and he has certainly been very useful to the Finance Department.

(vi)—*Medical Branch*—The question was referred to me about a week ago, and I said that I thought that one officer for the Royal Army Medical Corps, one for the Indian Medical Service, and one for sanitation, ought to suffice and give a proper organization, and I did not see the need for a Deputy Principal Medical Officer as well. The Commander-in-Chief has come to the conclusion that the Deputy is required, in view of the absence of the Principal Medical Officer from time to time on tour and for other reasons, but that the Sanitary Officer can be dispensed with.

(v)—*Military Works Branch*.—I think the Deputy Director-General of Military Works is very necessary, owing to the necessity for extensive touring by the Director-General. I cannot form any useful opinion as to how far the remaining five officers are necessary or not.

6465. SIR P. LAKE.—Reference has been made to *attachés*; does the concurrence of the Finance Department have to be obtained for entertaining these officers generally?

6466. MR. BRUNYATE.—No, I think not, since they do not receive extra pay.

6467. SIR W. MEYER.—Is the Judge-Advocate-General's Department very valuable from what you have seen of its work?

6468. MR. BRUNYATE.—As far as I can form an opinion, the work is well and carefully done. It is a Department which is at times rather an embarrassment to the Finance Department, as it is sometimes able to show that we cannot take action which we think proper on financial grounds.

6469. SIR W. MEYER.—As regards its legal opinions, are they very weighty, and comparable with what you could get from the Legislative Department?

6470. MR. BRUNYATE.—I think we should get next to nothing from the Legislative Department. They would refuse to do our work for us.

6471. SIR W. MEYER.—Well, looking at a publication like the List of Principal Officials at Simla, what strikes one is the enormous proportion of army people there. I have not counted them, but it looks as if the people at Army Headquarters were more numerous than all the civil secretariats taken together. Do you think that implies that there is a redundancy of officers at Army Headquarters as compared with the establishments allotted to civil branches?

6472. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes, I have a strong feeling myself that the work should be capable of being transacted with a smaller number of officers. If we get financial advisers in the Branches and an improved Advisory Council which will deal with work week by week, there should be a good deal less of sending cases backwards and forwards, and if advantage is taken of this a substantial reduction of clerks and to some extent of officers might be possible. But that is all rather hypothetical, and I preferred therefore to reply on the matter in some detail first before offering my merely general impression.

6473. PRESIDENT.—Can you suggest any measures of administrative decentralization which would reduce clerical establishments and which have not been covered by the preceding questions?

6474. MR. BRUNYATE.—No, sir.

6475. PRESIDENT.—Can you suggest any economies in respect of the Barrack Department?

6476. MR. BRUNYATE.—A proposal was made last year for the replacing of barrack military subordinates by pensioners, and His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief directed that it should be carried into effect gradually.

6477. SIR W. MEYER.—I was rather surprised to learn from General Dickie that he treated it as entirely an open question, and expressed his own personal disinclination to proceed with it except in one or two cases?

6478. MR. BRUNYATE.—He has presumably taken the further instructions of the Commander-in-Chief.

6479. PRESIDENT.—Can you give us a general statement of the establishments maintained for accounts purposes in the several divisions and at Headquarters?

6480. MR. BRUNYATE.—This statement (Annexure II) gives the information you require.

6481. SIR P. LAKE.—It has been suggested that in the Kitchener scheme it would have been better to confine redistribution at the outset to the concentration of small detachments, and to postpone larger moves until after the troops had been rendered thoroughly efficient by remedying defects in armament, equipment, etc. As a matter of fact, were these requirements put in the background and the bulk of the money spent on redistribution?

6482. MR. BRUNYATE.—Statement 6 (c) appended to my Memorandum shews that up to the end of 1912-13 it is estimated that redistribution measures will have absorbed one-and-a-quarter millions, while the total expenditure on reorganization and redistribution to the end of 1912-13 is shewn in the same statement at close on three millions initial and £443,000 recurring. I think that shews that redistribution measures have not secured any extraordinary degree of precedence.

I should like to add two remarks with reference to this question; one is a point which was taken at the instance of the late Military Department, namely that it would be desirable to begin with work which involved initial expenditure as much as possible, so as not to have recurring expenditure accumulating all the time the scheme was in progress. Secondly, I should also like to add, from my experience, that it would have been very inexpedient and risky from the practical point of view of the military administrator, to have first formulated the Redistribution Scheme and got it accepted, and then to have set it aside indefinitely until another very large scheme had been more or less fully carried out.

6483. SIR W. MEYER.—You are speaking of the redistribution expenditure actually incurred, and not of what might have been incurred had the Kitchener scheme been fully applied?

6484. MR. BRUNYATE.—Yes.

6485. SIR P. LAKE.—How does the average amount of Schedule expenditure under Lord Kitchener's *régime* compare in amount with the average of the three or four preceding years? Was there a very large increase?

6486. MR. BRUNYATE.—The actual expenditure in the preceding years you mention cannot be stated for reasons which have been explained at length in my Memorandum. All that is possible is to compare the Budget provision for new Schedule expenditure in the earlier years with that provided in the later years. This has been done in statement 6 (a) of the Memorandum. It will be seen that the large rise in provision began with 1900-01 when altogether £1,100,000 were provided. In the three years ending 1903-04 the annual provision was about £1,500,000 a year. Provision for Lord Kitchener's measures began on a much larger scale, as will be seen from the statement. But after 1906-07 provision on anything like so large a scale ceased, and after 1908-09 the period of exceptional provision came to an end altogether.

(The witness then withdrew.)

ANNEXURE I.

(See answer 6464.)

Number of permanent Staff Officers employed at Army Head Quarters, India, in various years.

	1885.	1890.	1895.	1900.	1905.	1908.	1912.
Commander-in-Chief and personal staff ...	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
General Staff	28	33
Adjutant-General's Branch (inclusive of Judge Advocate-General, etc)	13	14	14	13	16	15	11
Quartermaster-General's Branch (inclusive of Supply and Transport, Remount, and Veterinary).	11	11	17	18	27	18	14
Medical Branch	3	3	3	2	4	5	5
Ordnance Branch	3	3	2	3	4	3	3
Military Works Branch	4	3	3	3	3	6	7
Total ...	41	41	46	46	61	82	80

ANNEXURE II.
(See answer 6480.)

Statement showing the establishments (Superior Staff, subordinate Account Service, clerical and menial establishments) maintained for Account purposes in the Military Accounts Department and cost of the same.

	Superior Officers.	Subordinate Account Service.	Clerks.	Menials.	Present annual cost (in thou- sand of rupees).
Army Headquarters	3	14	24	19	1,85
Controller of Military Supply Accounts ...	7	54	291	72	5,17
Northern Circle Office	2	11	59	24	1,23
1st (Peshawar) Divisional Audit and Disbursing Offices.	2	13	77	23	1,26
2nd (Rawalpindi) Divisional Audit and Disbursing Offices.	3	17	109	20	1,63
3rd (Lahore) Divisional Audit and Disbursing Offices.	3	18	141	28	1,84
Western Circle Office	2	12	57	26	1,18
4th (Quetta) Divisional Audit and Disbursing Offices.	3	12	83	21	1,54
5th (Mhow) Divisional Audit and Disbursing Offices.	3	15	112	21	1,50
6th (Poona) Divisional Audit and Disbursing Offices.	2	19	108	21	1,51
Eastern Circle Office	2	13	70	25	1,42
7th (Meerut) Divisional Audit and Disbursing Offices.	3	16	125	31	1,58
8th (Lucknow) Divisional Audit and Disbursing Offices.	2	18	140	31	1,99
9th Secunderabad Division	4	25	157	42	2,29
Burma Division	3	17	98	27	1,97
Total	44	274	1651	400	27,96
Leave Reserve	11
Training „	3
	58

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

28th Meeting—Tuesday, the 6th August 1912.

The Hon. Mr. G. S. Curtis, C.S.I., I.C.S., 2nd Grade Commissioner, Bombay Government, and Mr. M. Kennedy, C.S.I., Inspector General of Police, Bombay, attended as witnesses and were examined.

EVIDENCE OF MESSRS. CURTIS AND KENNEDY.

6487. SIR P. LAKE.—Mr. Curtis, you are a Commissioner of the Indian Civil Service ?

6488. MR. CURTIS.—I am Commissioner of the Central Division, Poona.

6489. MR. KENNEDY.—I am Inspector General of Police, Bombay Presidency.

6490. SIR P. LAKE.—Can you give us the strength of (a) the total civil police in the Bombay Presidency, and, (b) the number of police trained to the use of firearms and the number of weapons provided for them ? What classes are enlisted and do they serve in the districts from which they are recruited ?

6491. MR. KENNEDY.—At present the entire strength of the police in the Presidency proper and Sind, including myself and all below me, is 27,623, but this number does not include the Kathiawar Agency police of and below the rank of inspector.

6492. SIR W. MEYER.—Are they maintained and paid for by the Native States ?

6493. MR. KENNEDY.—The Agency Police are, I believe, maintained for service in the territories of the non-jurisdictional Talukdars. There are something like 300 mounted and 600 foot police.

6494. MR. CURTIS.—The Committee will find them mentioned in the correspondence on Lord Kitchener's scheme.

6495. SIR W. MEYER.—I understand that the Bombay police are simply city and district police, and distinct from the Kathiawar police etc., who are maintained for the benefit of the native States ?

6496. MR. KENNEDY.—The strength of the Presidency police is 27,623, which excludes Kathiawar. These figures include the police of the Agencies of Palanpur, Mahi Kantha, and the Dangs, also the Sind police. The Bombay city police are also included in the 27,623. We are reorganizing the force and the proposals are now under submission to the Secretary of State. It is merely a question of a few months before the proposals will be sanctioned.

6497. SIR P. LAKE.—Do you contemplate an increase ?

6498. MR. KENNEDY.—Yes.

6499. SIR W. MEYER.—Have the Government of India agreed to the proposals ?

6500. MR. KENNEDY.—They have agreed to the proposals for increasing the police of the Presidency proper, but I know nothing about any other proposals.

6501. SIR W. MEYER.—Possibly we might ask for a copy of the despatch ?

6502. MR. KENNEDY.—I can give you the precise figures for the Presidency proper which excludes Sind, the three Agencies and Kathiawar.

Present strength 18,559.

Proposed ... 20,711 (not including the Bombay city police, only the Presidency police proper and the railway police).

6503. SIR W. MEYER.—“Presidency” is thus an ambiguous term.

6504. SIR P. LAKE.—Are all these police trained to the use of fire-arms?

6505. MR. KENNEDY.—Not all, sir.

6506. SIR P. LAKE.—What portion of them is trained?

6507. MR. KENNEDY.—Our police are divided into armed and unarmed. The armed police of the Presidency proper number 6,789. They are included in the total 27,623 I gave above.

6508. SIR P. LAKE.—What number of arms have you?

6509. MR. KENNEDY.—We have 6,789 and a reserve of 1,586.

6510. SIR W. MEYER.—Your system differs from that of other provinces in which all the police are trained in the use of firearms, but only a certain number are provided with them. You have two distinct bodies, one trained to the use of arms and provided with them, and another untrained to the use of arms and not provided with them?

6511. MR. KENNEDY.—Yes. The unarmed police are however trained to hit a target six times or more out of ten. They do not drill with arms.

6512. SIR W. MEYER.—So that when they have once learned to hit the target, they practise no more and probably forget what they have learned?

6513. MR. KENNEDY.—Yes; they have no regular practice.

6514. SIR P. LAKE.—What classes do you enlist?

6515. MR. KENNEDY.—Muhammadans, Marathas, Brahmans, Rajputs, Kolis, Bhils, a few Sikhs, some Parsis, Jews and native Christians and several other minor castes.

6516. SIR P. LAKE.—With reference to the last part of the question (6490) would you say that the police serve in the districts from which they are recruited?

6517. MR. KENNEDY.—Yes, sir; they all serve in the districts in which they enlisted.

6518. MR. CURTIS.—All our armed police in Khandesh are Bhils.

6519. MR. KENNEDY.—I would not say they are all Bhils, because the Bhils have now diminished considerably.

6520. MR. CURTIS.—In Poona the police are Marathas and lower class Muhammadans.

6521. SIR P. LAKE.—Do you enlist Brahmans in the Poona District?

6522. MR. KENNEDY.—Not in the armed police, but there are a few in the unarmed police.

6523. SIR W. MEYER.—I presume they are officers or head-constables?

6524. MR. KENNEDY.—No, not always; they enlist in the hope of rising higher. We have to take a few Brahmans for investigation and scriptory purposes.

6525. SIR P. LAKE.—Then, generally speaking, the police serve in the districts from which they are recruited?

6526. MR. KENNEDY.—Yes, sir.

6527. SIR P. LAKE.—Lord Kitchener's scheme for the redistribution of the army in India assumed the existence of "small reserve forces" of armed police at the headquarters of each district, who would be available for quelling riots or other disturbances. By calling in men from outlying *thanas*, it was assumed to be possible to raise these to a strength of about a hundred men in the event of more serious trouble. By further concentration it was held that battalions of police could be formed if desirable at divisional or other convenient centres. The number of armed police thus available for work in concentrated bodies in the Bombay Presidency was estimated at 2,500 men. How far have arrangements been made for carrying out this scheme?

6528. MR. KENNEDY.—We are both rather opposed to this idea. We think that the withdrawal of the police from outlying *thanas* would be construed as a sign of weakness by the people of the districts. (See Annexure II, paragraph 12)

6529. SIR P. LAKE.—Have any arrangements been made to carry out such a scheme?

6530. MR. KENNEDY.—No, we are both opposed to it as a dangerous policy.

6531. SIR W. MEYER.—Has the Bombay Government ever told the Government of India that it was unable to fall in with this scheme?

6532. MR. CURTIS.—To the best of my recollection the Bombay Government in their reply to the Government of India letter on the subject did not refer to this point. My personal opinion is that we cannot carry out the proposals.

6533. SIR W. MEYER.—Whereas Lord Kitchener's scheme assumed that these concentrated bodies of police would assist the military, the Bombay authorities do not think they could do anything at all?

6534. MR. CURTIS.—They could not: their withdrawal from the *thanas* would cause a conflagration at once.

6535. MR. KENNEDY.—I was at Simla with the Police Commission when the matter was discussed. Colonel Mullaly explained Lord Kitchener's views, and I wrote out my personal opinion on the point, a copy of which I furnished to the Government.

6536. SIR P. LAKE.—Were you against the proposal?

6537. MR. KENNEDY.—I was against it. On a later date my Government forwarded Government of India Despatch No. 8, dated the 8th June 1910* to me for my opinion. I submitted my report, but I have heard nothing more about it. I repeated my previous opinion. I have never heard what view the Bombay Government took of the matter and how they replied to the Government of India.

6538. SIR P. LAKE.—What is the total strength of the reserves maintained at district headquarters?

6539. MR. KENNEDY.—We have no actual reserve for our present strength of police, but we have a small force, 536 in number, armed with rifles. These rifle squads are distributed in the districts and comprise constables and head-constables.

6540. SIR P. LAKE.—We have been told that in other provinces it is considered advisable to maintain a certain number of men at headquarters to reinforce any threatened point. Do you follow that rule?

6541. MR. KENNEDY.—We have no reserves at all at headquarters, simply the men required for ordinary guard duties. When an emergency arises, we leave our guards standing and send away any men that can be spared to where they are required.

6542. SIR W. MEYER.—How do you distribute your armed police? In a district you have of course some police at headquarters, but are the rest scattered about?

6543. MR. KENNEDY.—They guard the treasuries, lock-ups, and many are employed on escort duty and armed outposts in troublesome tracts.

6544. SIR W. MEYER.—But do you want all these thousands of armed police simply for these purposes?

6545. MR. CURTIS.—In the Bombay Presidency the number of local treasuries is about three times that of Bengal and northern India; consequently the proportion of police for guard duties required is very much larger than elsewhere.

6546. SIR W. MEYER.—Is the number of *taluka* treasuries, etc., in Bombay larger than in Madras?

6547. MR. CURTIS.—I think it is. I think that the Bombay *taluka* is much smaller than the Madras *tahsil*.

6548. SIR W. MEYER.—Well then, although the total number of armed police is large, it is not more than is required for the guarding of *taluka* treasuries, lock-ups, etc.

6549. MR. KENNEDY.—No, it is not. I should add that in our proposed strength we have provided for a reserve of sick and leave vacancies. We have no such reserve at present.

6550. SIR W. MEYER.—In times of trouble would you propose to guard all treasuries or would you concentrate your force?

6551. MR. CURTIS.—It would depend on the time of year. If revenues were coming in and there was a lot of bullion, the treasuries would have to be guarded.

6552. SIR W. MEYER.—But in time of trouble would not revenue cease to come in?

6553. MR. CURTIS.—It depends on the hold we have on the country and the nature of the trouble.

6554. SIR W. MEYER.—In some provinces, the scheme is to take away the cash in outlying treasuries, and to bring it up to district headquarters and defend it there, instead of frittering away the police strength by guarding a certain number of detached outposts.

6555. MR. CURTIS.—The transport of the cash might be impossible. By withdrawing the police you at once disturb public feeling. You not only have to consider the cash but the public.

6556. MR. KENNEDY.—In time of trouble we should probably have to strengthen our guards.

6557. SIR P. LAKE.—When Lord Kitchener's scheme was submitted for the opinions of local Governments in 1904, the co-operation of the police on the lines stated above was counted on when the minimum garrisons for areas were fixed. It has been stated that the assistance which the police could render to the troops in the maintenance of internal order was over-estimated in the scheme. What is your opinion on this point, having regard to the present numbers and obligations of the police in the Bombay Presidency?

6558. MR. KENNEDY.—It was over-estimated. (See Annexure II, paragraph 12.)

6559. SIR W. MEYER.—Since 1903 there has been a very large increase in the police force of the Bombay Presidency, I understand?

6560. MR. KENNEDY.—The only addition has been about 932 men, mostly unarmed.

6561. SIR W. MEYER.—I have a statement here which was furnished by the Home Department. In Sind the armed police in 1903 numbered 2,173; in 1912 they amounted to 3,243; in Bombay proper there were 5,652 armed police in 1903, in 1912 there were 8,062. Then as regards unarmed police, the statement shews an increase for the province of about 3,200 men.

6562. MR. KENNEDY.—I know nothing about any increase in Sind or Bombay City. In the Bombay Presidency proper we have added roughly 1,000 men.

6563. SIR W. MEYER.—My figures are given by the Home Department.

6564. MR. KENNEDY.—There must be some mistake in them. I am only referring to the districts and railways of the Presidency proper.

6565. SIR W. MEYER.—Such increase as has taken place in the city police is necessitated by the increase in the population and the possibility of disturbances among the mill hands, I presume?

6566. MR. KENNEDY.—Yes, sir. We have, as I have said, had an increase of about 1,000 men mostly unarmed, in the Presidency districts and railways of the Presidency proper.

6567. SIR P. LAKE.—Have the Bombay police dealt satisfactorily with disturbances of late years? Is there any evidence that sedition-mongers have tried to seduce them from their loyalty?

6568. MR. KENNEDY.—I think the police have dealt very successfully with all disturbances. I include the Bombay city police. We have no specific instances of sedition-mongers trying to seduce the force from its loyalty, but the Press has brought pressure to bear on it and twitted it with remaining true to its salt.

A. 1266.

6569. SIR W. MEYER.—Sir Charles Cleveland told us that these seditionists have made such violent attacks on the police that they have produced a breach between themselves and the police which they cannot bridge over.

6570. MR. KENNEDY.—I would not go quite so far as that, but no doubt the seditionists try to discredit the police with the Government.

6571. SIR W. MEYER.—If somebody had been abusing you, you would not be inclined to trust him as a friend?

6572. MR. KENNEDY.—No, sir.

6573. SIR W. MEYER.—Some years ago Tilak was convicted. How did the city police show up in this connexion?

6574. MR. KENNEDY.—I cannot say; I was not in Bombay city at the time.

6575. SIR W. MEYER.—Then so far as their part in the business was concerned, the police did well?

6576. MR. CURTIS.—Very satisfactorily, as far as I know. I may add that the general line taken by the semi-extremists is to put up the village police against the district police; for this purpose they are utilizing certain expressions in the report of the Police Commission. It was urged by the Commission that the policy of merging village police with district police would be detrimental.

6577. SIR W. MEYER.—In the figures you have given, the village police are not included, I presume?

6578. MR. KENNEDY.—No.

6579. SIR P. LAKE.—It has been suggested that in the event of serious disaffection in the native army, the police generally could not be relied on for use in quelling disturbance. Do you concur in that opinion?

6580. MR. CURTIS

AND

6581. MR. KENNEDY.

} No, sir, we do not concur; they could be depended upon.

6582. MR. CURTIS.—Now that the Bombay army has gone, the constitution of the native regiments stationed in the Presidency has been entirely changed. We have Punjabi and Madras regiments stationed in the Presidency, in fact regiments from all parts of India. If there is trouble in a Sikh

regiment or disaffection in a Madras regiment, it means that the cause has arisen either in the Madras Presidency or the Punjab and does not affect the Bombay police in any way. Troubles nearer home might lead to troubles in the police.

6583. SIR P. LAKE.—Such as an unusual spread of disaffection in the army?

6584. MR. KENNEDY.—Yes, or mutiny among the troops.

6585. SIR P. LAKE.—Would they remain faithful under these conditions?

6586. MR. KENNEDY.—I think so, sir.

6587. SIR W. MEYER.—Among the police there are a certain number of Deccani Muhammadans?

6588. MR. KENNEDY.—Yes, sir.

6589. SIR W. MEYER.—There are also a certain number of Deccani Muhammadans in the army. In the case of disaffection among the Maratha troops it might spread to the Maratha police; would this also be the case as regards the Muhammadans?

6590. MR. KENNEDY

AND

6591. MR. CURTIS.

} We do not think that trouble in the army would react on the police.

6592. SIR P. LAKE.—Is any difficulty experienced now in recruiting for the police? If so, have the difficulties arisen recently? To what causes do you ascribe them? In particular, is there discontent in the force owing to the fact that the avenues of promotion to the higher grades are now very restricted in the case of a man risen from the ranks?

6593. MR. KENNEDY.—Yes, sir; we have more difficulty now in getting educated men of suitable physique. Our difficulties are due to industrial expansion and the shortage of the labour market in Bombay due to plague.

6594. SIR P. LAKE.—Would you ascribe it at all to discontent in the force?

6595. MR. KENNEDY.—No, sir; there is no discontent in the force.

6596. SIR W. MEYER.—Sir Charles Cleveland said that a likely cause of discontent was the fact that a constable could not easily rise to be sub-inspector.

A. 1266.

6597. MR. KENNEDY.—We have to a certain extent departed from that rule.

6598. SIR W. MEYER.—In Bombay has a head-constable larger opportunities for promotion than in other provinces?

6599. MR. KENNEDY.—Yes, sir. We are not adhering strictly to the letter of the recommendations of the Police Commission. In Bombay we are giving a higher percentage of the upper appointments to men risen from the ranks.

6600. SIR W. MEYER.—Do police constables in the Bombay Presidency get more pay than elsewhere in view of the cost of living?

6601. MR. KENNEDY.—In Bombay they start at ten rupees per mensem. In the Punjab they get less. We give better pay to some of our head-constables too. The Police Commission recommended that head-constables should not be paid more than twenty rupees per mensem. These recommendations almost wrecked our force for a time, and we had to go back to the old system under which head-constables get Rs. 25, Rs. 30, Rs. 25 and Rs. 15 per mensem.

6602. SIR W. MEYER.—I understand that the Commission proposed more concentration of the police force. In the Madras Presidency the result of the recommendations of the Police Commission was that some of the out-stations were abolished.

6603. MR. CURTIS.—In Bombay too we have decreased the number of outposts and increased the number of stations.

6604. MR. CURTIS.—Do you want any evidence as to the demand for labour in Bombay?

6605. SIR P. LAKE.—I think it will be sufficient to record that you are suffering from the general shortage of labour.

What do the armed police possess in the way of arms?

6606. MR. KENNEDY.—We have in the Presidency proper 536 Martini rifles in possession of head-constables and constables in Sind we have 195 and in Mahi Kantha and Palanpur 59. The rest of the police are armed with bored out Martinis. Each district has its own rifle squad composed of picked shots. They are intended to deal with dacoits armed with rifles—that was the idea on their formation. There are about twenty or thirty men thus armed in each district, who are the pick of the armed force.

6607. SIR P. LAKE.—Do they meet all your requirements? Would you wish to give the force better arms than they possess now?

6608. MR. KENNEDY.—No, sir.

6609. SIR W. MEYER.—Are rifle squads distinct bodies, or do you interchange the personnel?

6610. MR. KENNEDY.—Yes, we interchange. A man can be moved out if he does not keep up his standard of musketry, etc.

6611. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you think it desirable in time of trouble to serve out more rifles to the unarmed police?

6612. MR. KENNEDY.—The unarmed police have not been trained at the longer ranges with the rifles.

6613. SIR P. LAKE.—What is the general attitude of the people towards the police?

6614. MR. KENNEDY.—It is necessary to take the ignorant and the educated classes separately, and again to sub-divide the educated class into the loyal and the disloyal. Those who are disaffected are certainly very hostile to the police and are always trying to discredit them in every way possible.

6615. SIR P. LAKE.—What is the attitude of the loyal class?

6616. MR. KENNEDY.—The whole of the population is apathetic when it comes to the question of working with the police, but in other respects as far as the law-abiding educated class are concerned, I think they are friendly to the police.

6617. SIR P. LAKE.—We have been told that in other parts of the country the people are not likely to combine with the police. Is that so in Bombay?

6618. MR. KENNEDY.—Yes, sir. I would say that the people think the police are loyal to the Government, and they are suspicious and distrustful of them when it comes to the question of working for the Government.

6619. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you had any cases of retired policemen mixing themselves up with seditious movements?

6620. MR. KENNEDY.—Not a single one.

6621. SIR R. SCALLON.—Have the disaffected people affected your recruiting at all?

6622. MR. KENNEDY.—No, but I think the decisions arrived at by the Police Commission have done so to a certain extent.

6623. SIR R. SCALLON.—I gather that you consider that the present system, which distributes regiments all over India regardless of their recruiting areas, is a sound one?

6624. MR. KENNEDY.—From a military point of view it is, but in cantonments now it is difficult to detect crime committed by military men.

6625. SIR R. SCALLON.—Why?

6626. MR. KENNEDY.—You cannot get any information out of the men. There is a certain amount of crime committed by military men, but when we go over to try and detect these crimes we find it difficult to do so, because the men combine together to keep us in the dark. The class companies are a difficulty, because we cannot get evidence from the men in them. There is not a great deal of crime by native soldiers but we do get cases in large cantonments and some of them are serious. For instance in Poona there was an outbreak of dacoity by native soldiers of one regiment and we found investigation extremely difficult, in fact we could not obtain the evidence in the regiment we wanted.

6627. SIR W. MEYER.—Have you had any experience of class regiments as opposed to class company regiments?

6628. MR. KENNEDY.—No, sir.

6629. SIR P. LAKE.—Is there any co-operation in the Presidency between the civil and military authorities in the matter of collecting and exchanging information and intelligence on the subject of sedition?

6630. MR. KENNEDY.—Copies of information of a political nature are forwarded to the Chief of the General Staff, Simla, and copies of our weekly secret abstract which contains confidential information of a political nature, are sent to the General Officer Commanding the Southern Army, General Officer Commanding Poona Division, General Officer Commanding Belgaum Brigade, Resident, Aden, and the General Staff Branch, Simla.

6631. SIR P. LAKE.—Do they reciprocate in the matter of information?

6632. MR. KENNEDY.—I do not think they do, for we do not often get anything from them.

6633. SIR W. MEYER.—What is it you send to Simla and not to local General Officers Commanding?

6634. MR. KENNEDY.—Nothing. We send off a copy of anything very special to Simla at once, and to the local Generals a weekly abstract.

6635. SIR W. MEYER.—Then, sooner or later, the Generals get all information?

6636. MR. KENNEDY.—Yes, sir.

6637. SIR R. SCALLON.—Have there been any cases of sedition in native regiments in the Bombay Presidency?

6638. MR. KENNEDY.—We have never been able to discover any particular case of sedition. One instance took place in Poona some years ago when Tilak was at the height of his career; a native celebration was going on in Poona city, and three Maratha sepoys from the 103rd Maratha Light Infantry stationed at Belgaum went to see the Parvati Temple. Some Brahmans met them and asked them whether they had seen the big Guru. They said "no" and were directed to the Onkeshwar temple where they saw Tilak. They made obeisance to the god and then to Tilak.

6639. SIR R. SCALLON.—And how was this found out?

6640. MR. KENNEDY.—It was reported by the police on duty at the temple. We afterwards questioned these particular men who said they did not know who Tilak was.

6641. SIR R. SCALLON.—Was there also a case in Belgaum?

6642. MR. KENNEDY.—I cannot recall one.

6643. SIR P. LAKE.—Can you recall any attempt to "get at" the troops?

6644. MR. KENNEDY.—No, sir. Preachers have from time to time been found in regimental lines and have been turned out, but I can recall no real attempt at undermining the loyalty of the troops.

A. 325.

6645. SIR W. MEYER.—A previous witness told us that at Bombay and elsewhere some agitators made the temperance movement a cloak for spreading disaffection among the sepoys? They told them that the Government was making the people drunkards in order to get more revenue?

6646. MR. KENNEDY.—I do not think that this has had any effect on the troops, but it might have had on the general public.

6647. SIR P. LAKE.—Is this line of argument being pursued?

6648. MR. CURTIS.—Yes, sir. It is helped by the utterances of some missionaries and other Europeans who think that the Government has been slack in encouraging temperance.

6649. SIR P. LAKE.—What is your opinion regarding the adequacy of the arrangements for internal security in the Bombay Presidency, as set forth in Army Department letter No. 1802-7 A. D., dated 11th March 1912?

6650. MR. CURTIS.—We are principally concerned about the railways. It seems that there are only eight companies of infantry for guarding the whole of the railways in the Surat-Belgaum area. The fifteen patrol trains allowed for this purpose seem to me inadequate.

6651. SIR P. LAKE.—Then the arrangements for guarding the railways seem to you inadequate?

6652. MR. CURTIS.—Yes, sir. I see that under recent arrangements we are to have one more regiment of cavalry at Poona to assist the eight companies, who would have a very difficult task indeed in guarding the lines. But I doubt whether even this would be enough. I think we could hold our own in Poona itself. Though the place is outside my charge I would invite attention to the necessity of allowing more troops to Ahmadabad and the country round. (See Annexure II, paragraphs 14 and 18.)

6653. SIR P. LAKE.—Could Poona be held by the minimum number of troops allowed?

6654. MR. CURTIS.—We could hold on to the Kirkee post. We want more maxim guns very badly. At present the Volunteers in my division, with the exception of one or two Parsi companies at Poona, are small squads of scattered Europeans. These could be trained in maxim gun duties and would be very useful.

6655. SIR P. LAKE.—Do the civil authorities contemplate being able to help in guarding the railways?

6656. MR. CURTIS.—I think we could help to a certain extent.

6657. MR. KENNEDY.—I think this is where we should be most useful with armed and the unarmed police, the latter having swords. I would not put much trust in village *chaukidars*, but I think we could give effective assistance with the former.

6658. SIR W. MEYER.—You could withdraw some of your police from the *thanas* and put them to guard the railways?

6659. MR. KENNEDY.—Yes, but in their own *talukas* and not for indefinite periods.

6660. SIR P. LAKE.—Of course you want men who would give reliable information apart from other duties?

6661. SIR W. MEYER.—Not merely armed police, but unarmed police would assist, I understand?

6662. MR. KENNEDY.—Yes. We have to do these duties for high officials and we are accustomed to them. I think the police could help very materially in guarding the railways.

6663. SIR R. SCALLON.—Against whom do these railways have to be guarded ; against armed rioters ?

6664. MR. KENNEDY.—Hitherto we have been guarding them against people who might for political reasons try to wreck a train containing some high personage. Our object is to keep the line intact for the passage of the trains.

6665. SIR R. SCALLON.—When the Field Army has left India, shall we have to count on having to deal with armed rioters ?

6666. MR. KENNEDY.—I do not think so. The people are practically all unarmed.

6667. SIR R. SCALLON.—So the police would be really very useful ?

6668. MR. KENNEDY.—I think they would.

6669. MR. CURTIS.—The Brahman student is a source of danger.

6670. SIR W. MEYER.—In Bombay your police used to be district forces ?

6671. MR. KENNEDY.—They are now, but they can be sent anywhere in the Presidency.

6672. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you transfer men a great deal ?

6673. MR. KENNEDY.—Not the rank and file so much. They are sometimes transferred for special duty and return on the completion of it. Sub-inspectors are constantly being transferred.

6674. SIR P. LAKE.—Then on the whole, you are satisfied that the arrangements are adequate, but you are not satisfied that adequate provision is made for the safe guarding of certain important railways ?

6675. MR. CURTIS

AND

6676. MR. KENNEDY.

} That is so.

6677. SIR P. LAKE.—In the Bombay Government letter on Lord Kitchener's scheme in 1904, the following remark was made. "As regards Satara, I am to put on record that it has always been a point of policy that the Satara Fort should be held by a European garrison. The fort in itself, in the absence of artillery, is a very strong place, and there is an ancient local proverb that "whoever holds the fort holds the country" and this feeling among the population is perhaps not one which can be lightly disregarded in any time of disturbance. The country comprised in the districts of Satara and Poona is the area of this Presidency in which any plots inimical to the British are likely to have their origin, but having put this local history before the Government of India, His Excellency the Governor in Council is quite prepared to accept any decision that may be arrived at and to make his own arrangements for local order accordingly, if the necessity should ever arise." In forwarding the scheme to the Secretary of State, the Government of India said, "In regard to Satara, we accept the necessity for a garrison of one company of native infantry there, which should be supplied from an up-country regiment, but we propose to suggest to the Government of Bombay that this fort should be dismantled." Do you consider a garrison for Satara Fort still necessary ? It appears that in the revised arrangements for internal security referred to in a previous question, no obligatory garrison for the fort is contemplated. What is your opinion as to the desirability of dismantling the fort ?

6678. MR. CURTIS.—The direct descendent of Sivaji is now at Satara and there is a considerable amount of sentiment connected with the place. We consider that the fort should be held by a military force.

6679. SIR P. LAKE.—There is some proposal to dismantle the fort. Do you know anything about that suggestion ?

6680. MR. CURTIS.—Until 1904 there were two companies of British infantry at Satara; the Collector protested against their removal, and said

he thought the fort should be dismantled if they were removed. It would be a very difficult place to take if occupied by insurgents.

6681. MR. KENNEDY.—It could be rendered untenable by artillery fire. I think the company of up-country infantry garrisoning the fort should be for preference composed of Muhammadans.

6682. SIR P. LAKE.—Do you consider that a moveable column of two companies of native infantry, based on Belgaum, would be of any material value in time of disturbance? Do you consider Belgaum a place of political importance?

6683. MR. CURTIS.—I think a moveable column with two companies of British infantry would be extremely useful. In time of trouble you might have people coming from Mysore and the Nizam's territory. (See Annexure II, paragraphs 13 and 17.)

6684. MR. KENNEDY.—The Bedars are often very troublesome and a moveable column would be very useful. In Belgaum we are not troubled by people from the Nizam's territory, but the southern Maratha States interlace with and border on our territory. I think a moveable column would be very necessary at Belgaum and I consider it an important centre. (See Annexure II, paragraphs 13 and 17.)

6685. SIR W. MEYER.—Two companies means about two hundred men; do you think that adequate?

6686. MR. KENNEDY.—Yes, sir, they would have the local police to help them.

6687. SIR R. SCALLON.—Do you remember a certain amount of trouble in the Deccan in 1879?

6688. MR. KENNEDY.—I remember the Ramosi outbreak. There was a great deal of trouble then; I think two or three regiments were sent and a large police force was stationed at Purandhar.

6689. SIR R. SCALLON.—Might not circumstances arise requiring the use of a large number of troops?

6690. MR. KENNEDY.—Yes, but I think the Ramosis have quieted down considerably now, and the Bhils, etc., are less martial than they used to be. You never can tell however.

6691. SIR R. SCALLON.—At the period I refer to they did considerable damage in Poona district?

6692. MR. KENNEDY.—Yes, they looted a good deal. Then there was a serious Koli rising when Colonel Daniel was Superintendent of Police at Poona which was suppressed with the aid of troops.

6693. SIR W. MEYER.—Has the present rebellion in Goa raised any echoes on our side?

6694. MR. KENNEDY.—No. We have had police patrols along the frontier, but the rebels know it is to their interests not to cross our border and the rebellion has not excited our people. The rebellion will die a natural death.

6695. MR. CURTIS.—The Goanese authorities claim to have suppressed it already.

6696. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing the Goa Government had to make terms with the rebels, would that react unfavourably on European prestige in Bombay?

6697. MR. KENNEDY.—I do not think so.

6698. SIR P. LAKE.—The military authorities have drawn up detailed schemes wherewith to meet emergencies; are analogous arrangements made by the civil administration? Have plans been drawn up for concentrating the civil population at defensible posts in time of danger?

6699. MR. CURTIS.—No, not as a general rule. As regards Poona, we know we have to go to the Kirkee post. Efforts have been made to convert

all the European civilians into Volunteers, but the question of where to store their arms is a difficult one.

6700. SIR P. LAKE.—In most districts are there reserves of arms for arming Europeans in case of emergency?

6701. MR. KENNEDY.—We have spare arms for the police, but I do not know what we shall have when the reserves which have been asked for are sanctioned. We store the arms of the district Volunteers in our armouries except where there are regular armouries.

6702. MR. CURTIS.—I do not think there are reserves of arms apart from those provided for the Volunteers.

6703. SIR P. LAKE.—In times of disturbance what do you consider the principal centres in the Bombay Presidency from which danger is to be apprehended?

6704. MR. CURTIS.—The principal danger in Bombay is from the homogeneous mill population, and there is also danger at Poona, Nasik and Satara. The population in Baroda might also give trouble. The mill population of industrial centres are a cause of anxiety to the authorities.

6705. SIR W. MEYER.—Of what classes is the homogeneous mill population of Bombay composed?

6706. MR. CURTIS.—They are nearly all Marathas. The Muhammadan element that gave us trouble in 1897 were people from Patna and up-country.

6707. MR. KENNEDY.—They are rather cut up into watertight compartments which militate against combination.

6708. SIR P. LAKE.—Is there any special danger in Sind?

6709. MR. CURTIS.—I could not say.

6710. SIR P. LAKE.—What is your opinion of the present state of efficiency in the Volunteer force in the Bombay Presidency?

6711. MR. CURTIS.—Well, I myself hold a commission in the Volunteers. I do not suppose that the state of efficiency is anything very grand outside Bombay city except in the railway corps. We have a volunteer unit in Poona, with outstation squads which take in most of the European population. I think every civilian should be compelled to be a Volunteer.

6712. SIR R. SCALLON.—Can you give any information as to the number of civil officers who hold commissions in the Volunteers?

6713. MR. CURTIS.—I think there are in my division four revenue officers with commissions. It is rather difficult for civilians to do much volunteering because they travel so much.

6714. SIR R. SCALLON.—Would it be a good thing to give district officers a sort of dormant commission?

6715. MR. CURTIS.—Yes, I think it would.

6716. SIR R. SCALLON.—So that they could take military command of any available armed bodies, other than regular troops in case of a rebellion or other serious disturbance?

6717. MR. CURTIS.—I quite agree. Of course rank might constitute a difficulty; I am only a captain myself, whilst one or two junior officers in my service hold superior rank.

6718. SIR P. LAKE.—The fact that members of the Indian Civil Service hold commissions in the Volunteers gives prestige to the force?

6719. MR. CURTIS.—Yes, we have one or two Parsi officers, but no other natives of India.

6720. SIR P. LAKE.—To what extent could the Volunteers be utilized in localities distant from their homes?

6721. MR. CURTIS.—I do not think they would be utilized to any great extent. (See Annexure II, paragraph 20.)

6722. SIR P. LAKE.—Would it not depend largely on the nature of the emergency? Given emergency conditions, I presume they would go wherever they were wanted?

6723. MR. CURTIS.—Probably.

6724. SIR R. SCALLON.—Do you mean they would not be willing to go?

6725. MR. CURTIS.—No, not all.

6726. SIR W. MEYER.—How many of the Volunteers are Eurasians?

6727. MR. CURTIS.—There are a considerable number.

6728. SIR W. MEYER.—Railway Volunteers are largely Eurasians, are they not?

6729. MR. CURTIS.—Yes.

6730. SIR W. MEYER.—Would they be willing to go away from their homes?

6731. MR. CURTIS.—No, they would be fully employed on their own lines.

6732. SIR W. MEYER.—You speak of Parsi Volunteers; are there other natives in the force?

6733. MR. CURTIS.—There are one or two Musalmāns and a few Jews, also some Armenians, but the latter are reckoned as Europeans.

6734. SIR W. MEYER.—Would it be possible to encourage the enlistment of native Christians on whom we could depend?

6735. MR. CURTIS.—Possibly, but as it is they come in largely as Eurasians with European names. As regards Parsis, I am doubtful about the expediency of enlisting them though we cannot withdraw the privilege of volunteering in Poona, because they value it very highly. It is unjust to allow their enlistment in Poona and not in Bombay.

6736. SIR R. SCALLON.—Are you against enlisting Parsis in the Volunteers on account of physical or political reasons?

6737. MR. CURTIS.—They are absolutely loyal, but their enlistment is objectionable from the point of view of privileges under the Arms Act and so on. It is very hard to apply one principle in Poona and another in Bombay. The introduction of Parsis has rather thrown out the European element. They are good shots, and we could get as many as we wanted but I should not be in favour of allowing their enlistment if the question were to come up again.

6738. SIR W. MEYER.—Are there any men now in the Indian civil service who have been in the Officers' Training Corps at Home?

6739. MR. CURTIS.—One or two have been in the Officers' Training Corps. I think it would be a very good thing to insist on that as a qualification for the competitive examination, just as we insist on certain qualifications in regard to riding, etc.

6740. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you know anything about the Volunteer artillery at Bombay?

6741. MR. CURTIS.—There are companies at Bombay, Poona and Ahmadabad.

6742. SIR W. MEYER.—What sort of guns have they?

6743. MR. CURTIS.—They have 15-pounders at Poona.

6744. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you consider them efficient?

6745. MR. CURTIS.—I could not say.

6746. SIR P. LAKE.—Have you had any opportunities of judging of the efficiency and training of the Imperial Service Troops maintained in Kathiawar or of the local State troops? If so, what are your views regarding them?

6747. MR. CURTIS.—I have never seen them. The Bombay Government will answer that question.

6748. SIR P. LAKE.—Are there any other Chiefs in your Presidency who maintain Imperial Service Troops?

6749. MR. CURTIS.—No combatant units.

6750. SIR P. LAKE.—What are the most important societies at work in the Bombay Presidency with political or quasi-political objects in view?

6751. MR. CURTIS.—It is rather hard to answer the question because the societies are so kaleidoscopic in character. The most active one is Mr. Gokhale's Servants of India Society. (See Annexure II.)

6752. SIR W. MEYER.—I thought that on a public occasion about two years ago, His Excellency Sir George Clarke rather commended this Society?

6753. MR. CURTIS.—On the occasion referred to Sir George Clarke was opening the Ranade Memorial Technical Institute and he, if I remember right, commended the action of the society in the matter of encouraging physical research. That is all. Besides this society, there is the Bombay Presidency Association which is largely controlled by Parsis; the Poona Saravajanik Sabha now out of date; the Deccan Sabha; the Mitramela at Bombay; the San Mitra Samaj; the Mitramela at Poona, and the Temperance Association. I do not count the Congress.

6754. SIR P. LAKE.—Which of these requires the closest watching?

6755. MR. CURTIS.—The Servants of India Society.

6756. SIR W. MEYER.—You said the Servants of India Society was dangerous.

6757. MR. CURTIS.—It is aggressive, but not dangerous. Its activities are at present apparently concentrated on a number of wholly harmless, I might say beneficial, objects. But their ultimate aims are unquestionably political and in so far as their endeavours to advance social welfare tend to the expansion of their influence generally, they are dangerous. Tilak is now in prison, but if he comes out some of these societies might spring into importance.

6758. SIR W. MEYER.—Can you tell us anything of the Anti-cow-killing Society?

6759. MR. CURTIS.—It is practically dead.

6760. SIR R. SCALLON.—What classes of people belong to the Servants of India Society?

6761. MR. CURTIS.—Mostly Chitpavans though they have managed to capture a few Madrasis and up-country men.

6762. SIR P. LAKE.—Is the Arya Samaj active in the Bombay Presidency generally, and, if so, among what classes? Are its branches numerous, and do retired members of the Indian army belong to the Samaj?

6763. MR. CURTIS.—No, in Bombay the Arya Samaj has a small membership and is composed mostly of respectable and law-abiding members of society.

6764. SIR W. MEYER.—We have been told that the Arya Samaj goes hand in hand with sedition.

6765. MR. CURTIS.—We have nothing of that sort in Bombay.

6766. SIR W. MEYER.—The original founder came from Kathiawar?

6767. MR. KENNEDY.—Yes, its strong hold is in Gujarat and Sind but the membership is extremely small. There is nothing to fear from it at all in Bombay, because our Presidency is very caste-ridden.

6768. SIR R. SCALLON.—Was any society connected with the Nasik murder case?

6769. MR. CURTIS.—Yes. The Abhinava Bharat, an off-shoot of India House, London. Most of the members are now in jail.

6770. SIR P. LAKE.—Did the deportation of Lajpat Rai in 1907, and the subsequent incarceration of Tilak exercise any influence on the political activities of anti-British agitators in Bombay?

6771. MR. CURTIS.—The deportation of Lajpat Rai was not felt much because Punjab politics hardly affect Bombay. Tilak's removal had great effect, he is a born leader, and we anticipate trouble when he is released.

6772. SIR W. MEYER.—You regard Tilak as a danger to British interests?

6773. MR. CURTIS.—Most dangerous. He is a man of violent temper, and his incarceration was a good thing. There is no real leader except him.

6774. SIR P. LAKE.—What influence have the Ganpati and anti-cow-killing movements and the Sivaji cult in the Bombay Presidency?

6775. MR. CURTIS.—The Ganpati movement was started in 1894. It has a certain amount of influence and we have been employing restrictions which have tended to weaken it. We shall not have much trouble with it in future. This remark does not apply to the Sivaji cult.

6776. SIR P. LAKE.—But is not the Ganpati cult connected with the Sivaji?

6777. MR. CURTIS.—Yes, it is an off-shoot of it.

6778. MR. KENNEDY.—Poona is the centre of the Ganpati movement. We have imposed very strict prohibitions there which may eventually kill it.

6779. SIR P. LAKE.—Do you consider the Maratha Brahmans to be a dangerous class? Is there an undesirable proportion of them in Government service?

6780. MR. CURTIS.—Yes. There are a large number of Chitpavans in Government service and they are most certainly anti-British. There is a distinctly undesirable proportion of them in the telegraph offices and I would lay special stress on that. There is also an undue proportion of them in the postal service and the traffic departments of the railways. (See Annexure II, paragraph 19.)

6781. SIR W. MEYER.—I understand that the Bombay Government issued orders some time ago to officers warning them against undue employment of any one class in Government offices?

6782. MR. CURTIS.—Yes, a strong order went out which was directed mainly against the Chitpavans, and we now insist on evidence of the loyalty of Chitpavan candidates for employment. Of course Chitpavans are already in very large numbers in our Revenue Department. We are, however, trying to reduce them as much as possible.

6783. SIR W. MEYER.—In the offices under the control of the Bombay Government, has there been real evidence that the orders regarding the more limited recruiting of Chitpavans have been acted upon?

6784. MR. CURTIS.—There is a distinct movement against them at present. The higher posts are filled entirely by nomination. There is a tendency on the part of Collectors to avoid recruiting Chitpavans, if they possibly can.

6785. SIR W. MEYER.—I presume that applies to the clerks as well as to the higher executive posts? Take the branches not under the control of the Bombay Government; have the Bombay Government made any representations to the Government of India about these?

6786. MR. CURTIS.—Yes; but I am not quite sure that steps have been taken as regards the traffic departments of the various railways. Employés get very little pay on the railways, the traffic manager is not usually an expert on questions of caste, and the first applicants that offer are generally taken.

6787. SIR W. MEYER.—You were once in the Postal Department?

6788. MR. CURTIS.—Yes; but in that capacity I was only for three months in Bombay.

6789. SIR W. MEYER.—Can you say definitely whether Chitpavans were largely recruited there?

6790. MR. CURTIS.—When I was Postmaster-General we did not trouble ourselves much about the question. I believe that they are now recruited but that careful enquiries are made as to their antecedents.

6791. SIR W. MEYER.—As regards these Imperial Departments, I presume the orders about the recruitment of Chitpavans are not so closely observed as in the provincial offices?

6792. MR. CURTIS.—I do not know. Attempts are now being made to enforce these orders more strictly in our offices.

6793. SIR W. MEYER.—Are similar attempts being made in the Imperial Offices?

6794. MR. CURTIS.—Not to my personal knowledge. I speak of the railway traffic branches from what I saw as Collector. I found that the whole of the traffic staff on some of the railways were Chitpavans. I represented the matter officially, and I was told that on the Great Indian Peninsular Railway they had to take what they could get.

6795. SIR W. MEYER.—You are of opinion that they have been employed to a dangerous extent on the railways?

6796. MR. CURTIS.—Yes.

6797. SIR W. MEYER.—When a Chitpavan gets into a high position in an office, he gets his relatives in as well, does he not?

6798. MR. CURTIS.—Yes.

6799. SIR P. LAKE.—You would describe the Chitpavans as anti-British?

6800. MR. CURTIS.—Yes. The present generation remember that less than a hundred years ago the Chitpavan Brahmans exercised absolute ruling powers, unlike Brahmans in any other part of India. The ruling Chiefs in the southern Maratha country are to this day all Chitpavans, except Kolhapur and Jath.

6801. SIR P. LAKE.—The Chitpavans exercise a good deal of influence I take it?

6802. MR. CURTIS.—Enormous influence.

6803. SIR R. SCALLON.—What form would their action take if it were directed against the British Government?

6804. MR. CURTIS.—As they predominate in every branch of the administration their opposition paralyzes our action.

6805. SIR R. SCALLON.—Is there a risk of their combining in the Presidency?

6806. MR. CURTIS.—There is an enormous risk. I remember putting a perfectly loyal Chitpavan on to an inquiry which tended to incriminate other Chitpavans. Owing to Chitpavan opposition he was useless. He could discover nothing. With regard to their aims and ambitions, I think they contemplate asking our soldiers to remain and keep the peace while they administer the Government as Peshwas.

6807. SIR W. MEYER.—Reverting to Mr. Gokhale and his Servants of India; on the surface there is a considerable amount of difference of feeling between Mr. Gokhale and Tilak is there not?

6808. MR. CURTIS.—Mr. Gokhale by his latest utterance has committed himself to making a push for colonial autonomy very soon. This Public Service Commission is a way of bringing that ideal nearer.

6809. SIR W. MEYER.—There is not very much to choose between Mr. Gokhale and Tilak in your opinion?

6810. MR. CURTIS.—I do not think Mr. Gokhale has that intense and absolute hatred for the white man that Tilak has. Gokhale is willing to work with the white man, but Tilak is so bitter that you cannot parley with him.

6811. SIR P. LAKE.—Would the Chitpavans be capable of trying to organize a movement against us by force of arms?

6812. MR. CURTIS.—I do not know where they could get the arms.

6813. SIR W. MEYER.—Supposing we were engaged in war with Russia, however the agitators dislike us, they would look on the prospect of Russian domination with still greater apprehension, I take it?

6814. MR. CURTIS.—I do not think they have considered the matter. They do not take any other foreign Power except ourselves seriously into consideration. In such a contingency as you describe they would make themselves as disagreeable as possible. There would probably be a run on the savings bank with the object of giving us trouble.

6815. SIR P. LAKE.—It has been stated that Tilak and the other agitators have made distinct efforts to seduce the army from its allegiance. Have you any knowledge on this point?

6816. MR. CURTIS.—No, I do not believe that they have. By their agrarian policy in 1896 they tried to rouse the agrarian population, but they did not succeed, and I cannot conceive their doing much harm to the Government through the army.

6817. SIR W. MEYER.—They must realize that without the native army they cannot do much harm?

6818. MR. CURTIS.—Possibly. The undermining of the loyalty of the army must be their principal aim. (See Annexure II, paragraph 21.)

6819. SIR P. LAKE.—Then you have no knowledge or indications as to their line?

6820. MR. CURTIS.—No.

6821. SIR P. LAKE.—Does Tilak still exercise any of his former influence in the country?

6822. MR. CURTIS.—Tilak's influence is unimpaired.

6823. SIR W. MEYER.—Surely his imprisonment has damaged him?

6824. MR. CURTIS.—No. When he is released he will be received with the greatest possible enthusiasm. I think there is an extraordinary feeling for Tilak among the people. Even now whilst he is in prison some of his supporters go over to see him at short intervals.

6825. SIR P. LAKE.—What do you consider the attitude and political importance of the National Congress in Bombay? Is there any marked cleavage there between the so-called moderates and extremists?

6826. MR. CURTIS.—The importance of the National Congress has declined considerably since the reorganization of the councils. Ever since the promulgation of the Morley Scheme the Congress has suffered from lack of interest.

6827. SIR P. LAKE.—Does any marked cleavage exist?

6828. MR. CURTIS.—Well, I think there is a large portion of Desh Brahmans and some Chitpavans now on the moderate side.

6829. SIR W. MEYER.—But the bulk of the Chitpavans may be classed as extremists ?

6830. MR. CURTIS.—I adhere to that opinion.

6831. SIR P. LAKE.—Do you consider that the complete local autonomy advocated by the Congress is a serious aspiration ? Who, in your opinion, are the most active and dangerous extremist politicians ?

6832. MR. CURTIS.—Yes, I do consider the complete local autonomy advocated by the Congress a serious aspiration. It is being preached very largely by Gokhale.

6833. SIR W. MEYER.—Do the educated classes want local autonomy ?

6834. MR. CURTIS.—They did not formerly, but things have gone very quickly of late years. The most active and dangerous extremist politicians are in my opinion Moreswar, Gopal Deshmukh, and the Poona editors ; also Khadilkar, Khaparde and Dev. Tilak is at the head, but he is in jail.

6835. SIR P. LAKE.—And what influence do they exercise over the younger generation ?

6836. MR. CURTIS.—They exercise great influence. Education in Poona is largely in the hands of the advanced Indian school. For instance the Fergusson College has 800 students, whilst the Government Deccan College has only 300. The former is non-official entirely.

6837. SIR W. MEYER.—Have any of these dangerous politicians been in jail ?

6838. MR. CURTIS.—No, Dev was convicted and let off by the High Court.

6839. SIR W. MEYER.—Was there not an attempt at one time to start national schools ?

6840. MR. CURTIS.—Yes, but they did not succeed ; the Government suppressed one of them.

6841. SIR W. MEYER.—Do you think the extremists have any material hold on the educational staff ?

6842. MR. CURTIS.—We hope that the education authorities will be as strict as they can and thus prevent that. We hope to see a careful watch kept in order to see that extreme views are not preached to the students. There are a very large number of Brahmans in the Education Department.

6843. SIR W. MEYER.—Do these orders about the recruiting of Brahmans apply to the Education Department, or is the pay so low there that they take anybody they can get ?

6844. MR. CURTIS.—The orders apply in theory but in practice are hard to carry out.

6845. MR. KENNEDY.—A Deputy Collector expressed his opinion that schoolmasters were a very dangerous factor. He said there should be an inspector in every district belonging to the Criminal Investigation Department to inquire into the character and teaching of the schoolmasters. This idea is worth consideration. (See Annexure II, paragraph 22.)

6846. SIR R. SCALLON.—Do you find any anti-British feeling in the districts ?

6847. MR. CURTIS.—Very little. I occasionally come across "*bande mataram*" chalked up in a temple.

6848. SIR R. SCALLON.—One witness told us that in northern India he was surprised to find the children disaffected.

6849. MR. CURTIS.—I have not noticed it. In one or two places they may be so, but I do not think extremism has reached the districts at all.

6850. SIR W. MEYER.—Another witness told us that the women of the higher classes were exercising a very considerable anti-British influence?

6851. MR. CURTIS.—Certainly many of them are anti-British; they are the power of the future. We ought to try and get at them as far as possible, for they seem to exercise an enormous influence. Mrs. Ranadé in Poona is a powerful force, but she is not an extremist.

6852. SIR P. LAKE.—Do you consider that there is any effective co-operation as between the anti-British leaders in Bombay, Bengal, the Punjab and elsewhere? Could there be any real co-operation between the Poona Brahmans and the Arya Samaj?

6853. MR. CURTIS.—In Bombay, the only co-operation is between our Brahmans and those of Berar. I do not think as regards the rest of India there is any co-operation at all.

6854. SIR W. MEYER.—Was there not a certain amount of co-operation between the Arya Samajists in the Punjab and societies in Poona?

6855. MR. CURTIS.—No; they are too distrustful of each other.

6856. SIR P. LAKE.—Does Sivaji's descendant at Kolhapur exercise any great influence? Who is the most influential Maratha leader?

6857. MR. CURTIS.—Kolhapur. He is absolutely loyal, and on that account has a great deal of trouble with the Brahmans in Kolhapur.

6858. SIR W. MEYER.—Kolhapur is at loggerheads with the Chitpavans. How do the Maratha *Kunbis* view this?

6859. MR. CURTIS.—I do not think they regard it as of much importance.

6860. SIR W. MEYER.—Has the Gaikwar much influence in the Bombay Presidency?

6861. MR. CURTIS.—I could not say.

6862. SIR P. LAKE.—Has the Press Act had any effect?

6863. MR. CURTIS.—It has had an excellent effect. (See Annexure II, paragraph 22.)

6864. SIR W. MEYER.—The seditious papers are run largely by Chitpavans, I believe?

6865. MR. CURTIS.—Yes.

6866. SIR P. LAKE.—What deposit do they put objectionable papers under?

6867. MR. CURTIS.—Up to Rs. 5,000. It is an excellent Act.

6868. SIR W. MEYER.—I understand that plays are put on every now and then which contain references to current events?

6869. MR. CURTIS.—Yes. We have had a great deal of trouble with them because the actors "gag" continually. The censorship of printed or manuscript copies of the plays is thus rendered useless on account of this "gagging."

6870. SIR W. MEYER.—Speaking generally, do these plays exercise much influence?

6871. MR. CURTIS.—Some time ago they did, but they are now censored as far as possible.

6872. SIR P. LAKE.—How would you compare the present state of feeling in the Bombay Presidency with the conditions obtaining in 1904 and 1907?

6873. MR. CURTIS.—It is much quieter than in 1907. (See Annexure II, paragraphs 5 and 6.)

6874. SIR P. LAKE.—Is public feeling quieter than in 1904?

6875. MR. CURTIS.—Yes. The forest policy has been changed and the land policy is now most liberal.

6876. SIR W. MEYER.—In 1904 was not the native population excited by the Japanese victories ?

6877. MR. CURTIS.—There was a little excitement.

6878. SIR P. LAKE.—Did the Morley Scheme exercise a good influence ?

6879. MR. CURTIS.—Yes. There is now a very good feeling in Council and, on the whole, it has had a very good effect.

6880. SIR W. MEYER.—Has it led to a division of interests ?

6881. MR. CURTIS.—Yes, it has given the politicians something to think about.

6882. SIR W. MEYER.—Is there any danger of a movement against the payment of land revenue ?

6883. MR. CURTIS.—A movement was tried in 1896-97 and failed. The agitators might have tried it with more success ten years ago, but they did not. Our old system of recovering land revenue in bad years has been withdrawn. Under the Bombay system, the revenue of the *inamdars*, is collected by the revenue authorities on the same terms as the Government revenue, and any movement to withhold Government revenue would result in loss to the *inamdars* or higher classes.

6884. SIR P. LAKE.—Can it be said that the movement in favour of political assassination has been abandoned ? If so, to what would you ascribe its abandonment ?

6885. MR. CURTIS.—It has been abandoned, but you can never tell when it will come up again.

6886. MR. KENNEDY.—It is a weapon, which was used for the murder of Rand in 1897, and it came up again in the murder of Mr. Jackson.

6887. SIR W. MEYER.—Would you say that the assassinations that have taken place have been the work of a definite centrally organized body, or have they been the work of local agencies ?

6888. MR. KENNEDY.—The last murder was engineered from India House, London. (See Annexure II, paragraph 21.)

6889. SIR W. MEYER.—Would it be correct to suppose that the police have been able to stop assassinations which would otherwise have taken place, thus leading to the abandonment of the policy ?

6890. MR. CURTIS.—Yes. I think the effect of these Nasik cases has been marvellous. If you talk to natives of the educated classes now, they express the opinion that the police have a thorough grip of the situation.

6891. SIR W. MEYER.—In 1910 somebody threw a bomb at Lord Minto's carriage. Was not that a serious outrage ?

6892. MR. KENNEDY.—It is questionable whether what was thrown was a bomb or not. I think the police finally came to the conclusion that the "bomb" had not been thrown at Lord Minto.

6893. SIR W. MEYER.—The bombs were there, were they not ?

6894. MR. KENNEDY.—They were found where they could not have fallen had they been thrown at Lord Minto.

6895. SIR W. MEYER.—They might possibly have been put on the road with the idea that the horses' hoofs might set them off ?

6896. MR. KENNEDY.—They were not found on the road.

6897. SIR P. LAKE.—Are there many *sadhus* in the Bombay Presidency, and is there any reason to suppose that they exercise a maleficent influence ?

6898. MR. CURTIS.—There are a number of them, but they are not influential. I do not think they are connected with any political propaganda.

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6899. SIR W. MEYER.—We have had evidence to the effect that extremists got themselves up as *sadhus* in order to inflame the people?

6900. MR. CURTIS.—I have heard nothing about this in Bombay.

6901. SIR R. SCALLON.—Our information is that educated men put on the garb of *sadhus* in order to be able to “get at” the troops?

6902. MR. CURTIS.—Nothing has come out to that effect in Bombay.

6903. SIR P. LAKE.—What is the present attitude of the Muhammadan community in the Bombay Presidency? Is the Young Muhammadan party active in the Presidency?

6904. MR. CURTIS.—They are absolutely loyal right through. There is nothing to fear from them.

6905. SIR P. LAKE.—Is there any likelihood of their combining with the Hindu agitators?

6906. MR. CURTIS.—None, so far as the Bombay Presidency is concerned.

6907. SIR W. MEYER.—I see that Sir Pherozeshah Mehta has proposed the Aga Khan as President of the Congress; is that a serious move, and is it an attempt at union between Hindus and Muhammadans?

6908. MR. CURTIS.—It depends upon the axe he is going to grind. The emigration question is the first and foremost, and the Aga Khan is very keen on it. Pherozeshah Mehta may have put him up on purpose to work it.

6909. SIR W. MEYER.—Does the Aga Khan carry many with him?

6910. MR. CURTIS.—He has no great influence in Bombay among the Muhammadans as a whole. Even among his own followers there is a tremendous amount of dissension.

6911. SIR P. LAKE.—We have been told that in northern India Hindu agitators are making efforts to persuade the Young Muhammadans that their aims and efforts are the same?

6912. MR. CURTIS.—That is not so in Bombay.

6913. MR. KENNEDY.—I would say the breach between them is getting wider.

6914. SIR P. LAKE.—Has the Pan-Islamic movement spread among the Muhammadans of Bombay? Have the Turco-Italian war, events in Morocco, and the state of affairs in Persia had any influence on Bombay Muhammadans?

6915. MR. CURTIS.—I do not think that the Turco-Italian war, etc., have had much effect beyond giving rise to a few boycott meetings, and a certain amount of academic discussion. It is conceivable, of course, that as education spreads, and newspapers are more generally read, there will be more solidarity of sentiment among the Musalmans of the east and a greater inclination to act jointly for the benefit of Musalmans in general. (See Annexure II, paragraphs 7 and 8.)

6916. MR. KENNEDY.—The educated minority discuss the war because they are interested in it. I would like to add in respect to Morocco, Persia, and the Tripolitan war that educated Muhammadans are asking why Great Britain cannot intervene to protect Muhammadans now as in years gone by when Turkey was threatened. They seem, however, to realize that the European situation is not now quite what it was then, but do not seem fully to appreciate the delicacy of the present situation and the extent of our difficulties. (See Annexure II, paragraphs 7 and 8.)

6917. SIR W. MEYER.—Are there Muhammadan papers of any importance?

6918. MR. CURTIS.—No. Our Muhammadans are rather a hybrid lot. There are Deccani and Konkani Muhammadans, and they are rather looked

down on by the up-country Muhammadans. I know nothing of the Muhammadans of Sind.

6919. SIR P. LAKE.—It has been suggested that the Muhammadans of India have no real community of interest and are not a homogeneous body. What are your views on the subject as regards the Muhammadans in the Bombay Presidency?

6920. MR. KENNEDY.—I should say that the first part of the question accurately describes the situation. They are of course one in religion, but not in habits; for instance, a Bombay Muhammadan would not marry his daughter to a Madras Muhammadan. (See Annexure II, paragraph 8.)

6921. SIR W. MEYER.—Are they disturbed about Lord Curzon's partition of Bengal being revoked?

6922. MR. KENNEDY.—Not a bit.

6923. SIR P. LAKE.—What would their attitude be in the event of a war with Afghanistan, the frontier tribes, or an outside Muhammadan power?

6924. MR. KENNEDY.—It depends upon whether they regarded it as a war of aggression or not. They hold the Amir in great respect.

6925. SIR W. MEYER.—Whom do they respect the most, the Amir or the Sultan of Turkey?

6926. MR. KENNEDY.—The Sultan, I think. They would probably not object to the British Government taking Persia and Morocco under their control.

6927. SIR W. MEYER.—How would they look on a partition of Persia between Russia and ourselves?

6928. MR. KENNEDY.—The mass of the people would not be very seriously perturbed. They feel that if a tottering Muhammadan State must be swallowed up by a stronger Power it is better that we should be that Power than any other. But it is possible that the Nizam and Native Rulers generally might be perturbed on seeing an important Oriental Kingdom absorbed by two Western powers.

6929. SIR P. LAKE.—Would the Muhammadans of Bombay be likely to move against us in common with the Hindus?

6930. MR. CURTIS.—There is no likelihood whatever of such a combination.

6931. SIR P. LAKE.—Do you consider that the working of the Arms Act is satisfactory in Bombay? Has any recent census of arms been taken in the Presidency?

6932. MR. CURTIS.—Yes. There has been no census, but we have become much more strict about arms since the Jackson murder than we used to be. In my division no rifles are licensed except by the Commissioner.

6933. SIR W. MEYER.—Are Europeans and Eurasians exempt?

6934. MR. CURTIS.—Yes. It might be desirable, I think, to make us all take out licenses for arms. There should be no exceptions. Of course, we should not prevent the possession of guns by those legitimately entitled to have them, but there should be no leakage in the application of the Arms Act, and we should apply it to ourselves. We ought to know exactly what arms there are in the country. This policy was strongly urged by one of my district magistrates.

6935. SIR W. MEYER.—Such a policy would largely take off the bitterness of the Arms Act, would it not?

6936. MR. CURTIS.—Yes. The registration of arms should be either free or a small fee should be charged to cover its working.

6937. SIR R. SCALLON.—Would it stop the selling of arms?

6938. MR. CURTIS.—Yes. An officer in Poona once presented his .45 bore sporting rifle to his butler. There was considerable trouble about it. There have been one or two cases of rifles being given to old servants and I think the universal enforcement of the Arms Act would be a very good thing.

6939. SIR W. MEYER.—Has this proposal been put before the Government of India?

6940. MR. CURTIS.—I think it quite possible that it has gone up to the Government.

6941. SIR P. LAKE.—Are you able to exercise any control over revolvers?

6942. MR. CURTIS.—Yes, they were called in after the Nasik business.

6943. SIR W. MEYER.—Is there any considerable proportion of arms smuggled in?

6944. MR. KENNEDY.—There are many more arms than are covered by licenses. I have heard of revolvers being imported from France and Belgium in boxes with false bottoms. Forty-two revolvers were sent out in this way in connection with the Nasik conspiracy.

6945. SIR P. LAKE.—Do you think there is a large importation of revolvers from Goanese territory?

6946. MR. KENNEDY.—I think it would be possible to import them through Goanese ports.

6947. SIR P. LAKE.—Is any attempt made to prevent this?

6948. MR. KENNEDY.—Yes, we have our preventive staff on the frontier.

6949. SIR W. MEYER.—Take the other side—Bhavnagar for instance, is there any danger there?

6950. MR. CURTIS.—No, there are more efficient means taken to prevent it.

6951. SIR W. MEYER.—You remember that there is a clause in the Arms Act which gives the Government the power to take a census of arms?

6952. MR. KENNEDY.—Yes. My experience is that some magistrates are very particular in interpreting the Act, but there are some who grant licenses very freely.

6953. SIR P. LAKE.—Those are all the questions, but perhaps the witnesses have points they would particularly like to place before the Committee?

6954. MR. CURTIS.—I desire to invite the attention of the Committee to one very important point. From the questions put by the Committee it appears that the composition and efficiency of the police force and the loyalty of its members is a subject to which the Committee has devoted a good deal of consideration. I desire to place before the Committee my personal views that, while I have undoubted faith in the loyalty of the force and I consider that its efficiency and *moral* have distinctly improved of late years, my belief in its continued efficiency and loyalty is contingent on the higher posts remaining in the hands of Europeans as they are at present. I have yet to find the native of India who is fit to be entrusted with the duties of district superintendent of police and I desire to place on record my opinion that, if the higher posts in the force are to be given to natives of India, the concession will diminish so materially the value of the force that the whole question of the extent of assistance, which it could be relied on to give in time of trouble, would have to be reconsidered. Both the confidence of the public in the force and that of its members in one another depend on the way in which they are handled, and it is unfortunate, but at the same time true, that the native of India, who possesses the degree of education necessary for the post of district superintendent of

police, has not the intuitive knack of handling a large body of subordinates. He is as a rule deficient in nerve and he does not inspire trust in the public. The admission of natives of India to the higher posts in the police must mean that the demands on the army for support in the event of any rising will be far more exacting, and the whole scheme of the internal defence of the country will have to be revised. The same remarks apply with almost equal force to the admission of Indians on a more extended scale to the higher posts in the civil service, more particularly the posts of collector and district magistrate. However well educated the Indian may be, however competent to carry on the ordinary routine of a collector's office in times when all is peaceful, he has yet to prove that when trouble comes, he has the courage and nerve to meet it, and that he is endowed with the personality and character which will inspire confidence and enable him to enforce obedience. I believe that, if search were made in the records of popular emeutes in which Indians holding the positions of collectors or assistant collectors have been concerned, it would be found almost invariably that they were found altogether wanting or that the trouble assumed more serious proportions and required a larger force and more drastic measures for its suppression than if a European were in command. Not the least serious feature in the situation is the attitude habitually adopted by Indians of the higher classes towards the police. To the Indian collector the police force is only too often an object of aversion; in any case it is an excrescence on the administration, which is indeed necessary but which must constantly be reminded of its dependence on himself as the pivot of the administration and which can expect nothing but contemptuous toleration. A force which is conscious of this feeling on the part of its superior can never be expected to work honestly and whole-heartedly. Personal loyalty must be wanting, personal respect will be present only in a very slight degree and the unswerving fidelity and devotion which, history tells us, will be freely given to a leader in whose character the force has confidence, must, it is feared, be absent in a great measure. (See Annexure II, paragraphs 9, 10 and 11.)

It follows from the above remarks, that considered from the point of view of internal and external defence, any proposal to increase the number of purely Indian heads of districts must be regarded with great apprehension. And there are special reasons in this Presidency which intensify the danger to be anticipated from this course. In this Presidency there are now in all 24 district charges, 19 of which are in the Presidency proper and 5 in Sind. Now at the present moment no less than four of these charges are held by Indians, two of them covenanted civil servants, two statutory civilians. The latter number may be, it has been ruled, and have been, increased to three. So that it is quite possible that no less than five out of the twenty-four charges may be held by natives of India. But that is not all. As a matter of practice no district in Sind is ever placed in the charge of an Indian collector, the reason being that local men fit to hold the post are not forthcoming and that natives of the Presidency proper cannot stand the climate and are incapable of controlling the people. The result is that they are massed in the Presidency proper and form an altogether excessive proportion of the total number of collectors. At the present moment the Panch Mahals with the Rewa Kantha Political Agency and Kaira with Cambay State are both in charge of Bengali Collectors. To the South of these districts comes the large and powerful state of Baroda. South of that again comes West Khandesh which is in charge of a Parsi Collector with an Indian covenanted assistant of the Sonar caste. So that the country both north and south of the state of Baroda is at this moment administered by natives of India, only one of whom can be considered as even approaching the European standard of efficiency. There can be no question but that if there was a mutiny throughout India tomorrow this area as at present administered would be the scene of the first trouble and that the first steps which would be necessary would be to send all these collectors away on compulsory leave.

There may be considerations of a different nature which necessitate the employment of Indians as collectors on an extended scale but it should be clearly recognized that if this policy is followed the demands on the army for support in times of trouble will be increased fourfold.

6955. MR. KENNEDY.—I entirely endorse all the Hon. Mr. Curtis has here stated

In estimating the military requirements for the internal safeguarding of the country in time of trouble, the loyalty and efficiency of the police and the personnel of the district officers belonging to the Imperial services are most important considerations, the latter of which will most assuredly have an important bearing on the former.

Experience has shown that the Indian civil officer with all his good points and admirably equipped for routine administration under settled, normal conditions, in a tight place and in the face of a crisis, lacks initiative, is apt to be swayed by different counsels, is sometimes wanting in personal courage and generally timid of responsibility, is prone to half measures and does not inspire confidence in others—in short he is deficient in the training, character and qualifications of a leader and the essentials for dealing successfully with an emergency. Unlike the British officer, as a rule he is usually not good at field sports, games and athletic pursuits and does not actively associate himself in any way, except perhaps here and there in a half-hearted manner, with the sports and pastimes which the officers of the police encourage among their men or interest himself in the recreation, physical training and general welfare of the force. So he does not get to know the men and does not command their respect and admiration in the way the British officer does.

It follows then that in times of stress the Indian civil officer will certainly neither wield the influence nor inspire the confidence nor the personal allegiance and loyalty of the police in the manner the British officer will.

When, if ever, trouble comes every district officer, to whatever department he belongs, will no doubt be required to take an active part, as a Volunteer or in association with the police force and other local resources, in the task of securing the peace of his district and in keeping the flag flying.

Indian experience clearly demonstrates, I think, that success in these primary objects will depend entirely on the extent to which the British element in the superior cadres of the services preponderates, and I am sure that so far as the attitude and effective co-operation and value of the police at such a time are concerned, these would be largely influenced thereby.

In connection therefore with the very important questions under deliberation by the Committee, I regard it as of the utmost importance that there should never be any weakening of the British element in the personnel of the Imperial Civil Services from which the district staffs are manned more particularly in those of the Indian Civil Service and the police. (See Annexure II, paragraphs 9, 10 and 11.)

In regard to the native army I am informed that the men are not altogether satisfied in respect of their pensions. They compare the military pensions of the native army with the pensions earned by men of similar standing in civil employ, to the detriment of the former.

It is of course the case that in some respects the terms for men in the native army are easier than for those in civil employ, *i.e.*, native soldiers can earn a pension sooner than men in civil employ. But the native soldier dislikes premature retirement on a small pension. He would prefer to serve longer and at the end of his service to secure a better pension, one that more nearly approximates the emoluments he drew while in active employ. Any effort to meet his wishes in the matter would, no doubt, involve a considerable increase to military expenditure, but for what it may be worth, I place before the Committee that which I understand is regarded as a grievance, in case the matter may be regarded as deserving of consideration.

As regards the police of the Presidency with which I have been closely associated for over 35 years, I can confidently state that enormous improvement has taken place in their efficiency and *moral*. Their pay, allowances, prospects and pensions have considerably improved, the British and other superior cadres have been increased, supervision is much closer and more effective now and the police as a body I believe to be loyal and dependable.

Their attitude and work during the past few years in dealing with political unrest and crime establish this, I think. They are also, I believe, in spite of the many obvious difficulties they experience in the efficient discharge of their duties, the attentions of a hostile section of the native Press guided and controlled by disaffected persons, an actively or passively obstructive or apathetic attitude on the part of the people generally and a campaign of indiscriminate abuse, the echoes of which are heard even in Parliament, actuated by a determination to be true to their salt and will continue so especially if suitable opportunities are availed of for publicly conveying the confidence of the Government in the force. Every endeavour must of course be made, and continued, to purge the force of abuses, mete out stern treatment to those who misuse their authority and to get rid of undesirables. But it is now the thing with a certain section of the public and Press to make the police, as a body, the butt of sweeping allegations and to pillory them in public by indiscriminate calumny. Much of this unfair treatment is undoubtedly due to the loyalty of the force to the Government. In regard to the wholesale denunciation by ignorant, interested or unscrupulous parties, whose object would be promoted could they succeed in discrediting the force with the Government, I would point out that it is calculated to make the police discontented and unpopular as a service and to render it inefficient as a detective and preventive agency by driving the members into an attitude of colourless routine in the discharge of their duties lest they should become victims of false charges by unscrupulous persons. Against such treatment the police are powerless to defend themselves. They therefore not unnaturally look to influential quarters for vindication and support when opportunity offers.

I have ventured to make the above remarks because I believe they have a bearing on the question of the general contentment and efficiency of the force, factors which will be of supreme importance should serious trouble in the country ever arise.

(The witnesses then withdrew.)

ANNEXURE I.

(See Question 6561 *et seq.*)*Strength of the armed and unarmed police in the Bombay Presidency.*

The figures of strength for the years 1901, and 1902 as given in the comparative statement below showing the strength of the $\frac{\text{armed}}{\text{unarmed}}$ police in the Bombay Presidency in the years 1901, 1902 and 1910, seem to have been compiled from statement F (columns 6 to 10) accompanying the Annual Administration Reports for those years, while those for the year 1910 are apparently taken from Statement E accompanying the Administration Reports (Bombay City and Presidency) for that year in respect of the armed strength only, the figures for the unarmed strength being arrived at by deducting the figures in columns 7, 8 and 9 Statement E (Armament of the force) from those in columns 3 and 4 (sanctioned strength). Thus it will be seen that the figures for 1901 and 1902 and those for 1910 have not been compiled on a uniform basis so no correct deductions can be drawn from them.

2. The figures of sanctioned strength given in columns 2 and 3 of Statement F accompanying the Police Administration Reports for 1901 and 1902 and those shown in the comparative statement showing the strength of the $\frac{\text{armed}}{\text{unarmed}}$ police in the Bombay Presidency in the years 1901, 1902 and 1910 from the armament figures in columns 6 to 10 Statement F do not quite tally (*vide* Statement A attached). The discrepancies cannot, however, be reconciled now. At the same time, statement E accompanying the Administration Reports for 1910 does not supply figures of unarmed strength separately, so, for the purpose of arriving at the unarmed strength, the sanctioned strength in columns 3 and 4 of the statement appears to have been taken into account and here the only difference noticeable is 24, representing the armament figure for the Criminal Investigation Department which appears to have been omitted from all calculations.

3. The correct excess in the figures of sanctioned strength in 1910 over those for 1901 and 1902 is as under.

Rajputana-Malwa Railway units have been eliminated from the sanctioned strength of 1901 and 1902 below for purposes of comparison because the Rajputana-Malwa Railway was transferred to the Rajputana Agency in 1908 and the strength of 1910 does not therefore include them :

				Sanctioned strength as shown in the annual statistical statements.
(1)	Entire Presidency including Sind and the City of Bombay for 1901 but including our Agency Police	23,569
(2)	Entire Presidency including Sind and the City of Bombay for 1902 but excluding our Agency Police	23,775
(3)	Entire Presidency including Sind and the City of Bombay for 1910 but excluding our Agency Police	26,478
<hr/>				
(a)	Difference in 1910 over 1901	2,909
(b)	Difference in 1910 over 1902	2,703

The excess of 2,909 over 1901 figures is distributed as under :—

Presidency proper	1,198
Sind	1,360
Bombay City	351
<hr/>					
Total					2,909

The excess of 2703 over 1902 figures is distributed as under :—

Presidency proper	1,102
Sind	1,258
Bombay City	343
Total					2,703

The foregoing figures include all police officers from police inspectors downwards.

Where in my reply to question No. 6561 I have said, speaking from memory, that the excess in the districts and railways of the Presidency proper exclusive of Sind and Bombay City was about one thousand, I was thinking particularly of *rank and file* only and I find that my estimate was a very close one. Apart from the rank and file we have of course added a good many inspectors and sub-inspectors to the cadres.

1901

	Total sanctioned strength columns 2 and 3 of Statement F.	ARMAMENT OF THE FORCE.		Remarks.
		With fire arms columns 6, 7 and 8 of Statement F.	Not with fire-arms columns 9 and 10.	
1. Presidency Proper (including Railways) (R. M. Railway also 652 units).	17,797†	5,564	12,210	† This includes 652 units of the R. M. Railway which has since been transferred to Rajputana.
2. Sind	4,308	2,207	1,907	
3. Bombay City	2,116	148	1,968	
Total ...	24,221	7,919	16,085	
		24,004		

1902

1. Presidency Proper (including R. M. Railway 610 units).	17,851*	5,634	12,183	* This includes 610 units of the R. M. Railway which has since been transferred to Rajputana.
2. Sind	4,410	2,280	1,920	
3. Bombay City	2,124	148	1,976	
Total ...	24,385	8,062	16,079	
		24,141		

1910

	Columns 3 and 4 of Statement E of 1910.	Columns 7, 8 and 9 of Statement E of 1910.	Unarmed Strength.	Remarks.
1. Presidency Proper (including Railways, Criminal Investigation Department and Police Training School but exclusive of the R. M. Railway).	18,343	7,676	...	
2. Sind (including Sind Railways)	5,668	3,248	...	
3. Bombay City	2,467	405	...	
Total	26,478	11,329	15,149	

Comparative statement shewing the strength of the ^{armed}/_{unarmed} police in the Bombay Presidency in the years 1901, 1902 and 1910.

Division.	1901	1902	1910	Increase.		Decrease.	
<i>Armed.</i>				over 1901.	over 1902.	since 1901.	since 1902.
Northern	1,767	1,788					
Central	2,265	2,289					
Southern	1,485	1,51	8,062	2,350	2,250
Bombay City	148	148					
Railways	47	42					
Sind	2,207	2,280	3,243	1,036	963
Total	7,919	8,062	11,305	3,386	3,243
<i>Unarmed.</i>							
Northern	3,105	3,081					
Central	4,039	4,036					
Southern	2,817	2,797	13,049	1,129	1,110
Bombay City	1,968	1,976					
Railways	2,249	2,269					
Sind	1,907	1,920	2,100	193	180
Total	16,085	16,079	15,149	3,579	3,423	1,129	1,110
Net increase, armed and unarmed:	2,450	2,313

ANNEXURE II.

No. 212-P., dated Bombay Castle, the 4th October 1912.

From—The Acting Secretary to Government of Bombay,

To—The Secretary, Army in India Committee, Simla.

In continuation of Judicial Department letter No. 158-P., dated the 30th September 1912, I am now directed to reply fully to your letter No. 125-3, dated the 27th August 1912, with which you forward, for review by His Excellency in Council, the evidence of Messrs. Curtis and Kennedy, as recorded before the Army in India Committee. Such of the questions as it was in the opinion of His Excellency undesirable should be answered by these officers are fully disposed of in the paragraphs which follow.

2. The letter under reply has been made the occasion, by the Government of His Excellency Sir George Clarke, for a reconsideration of the views expressed on the measures concerted in 1904, in connexion with the distribution of the army in India. The restricted nature of the reference in that year caused the then Bombay Government to confine their criticisms and remarks to the sole question then submitted to them, *viz.*, the sufficiency of the minimum garrison then proposed, in the light of the circumstances at that time existing, for the preservation of internal peace and order in the areas for which the Government of this Province is responsible. As a preliminary therefore, to noticing the evidence recorded before the Army in India Committee, I am to advert, as briefly as possible, to the general political situation as it has developed in the past eight years and to indicate the manner in which these developments affect the consideration of the enquiry now being made by the Army in India Committee.

3. As Field Marshal Lord Nicholson's Committee are aware the question referred to local Governments in March, 1904, was to "ascertain the lowest limits to which, by improvements in organization and distribution, and by co-ordinating the several forces, regular, volunteer and police, at our disposal, the forces required for the maintenance of internal security can be reduced."

The conclusion that the very large reductions which were ultimately effected could with safety be contemplated was based upon the assumption that the "problem of external action has superseded that of internal defence"; and it was stated to be a "recognized fact that, owing to the improved condition of the civil administration in India, combined with increased facilities for the rapid concentration of troops, and the decreasing military power of Native States, the maintenance of large forces to hold the country in detail against internal rising is a less vital matter than in days gone by."

4. In accordance with this assumption, the scheme provided for the permanent retention of obligatory garrisons for Sind, Bombay and Poona *plus* moveable columns as detailed in paragraphs 59 and 60 of the Redistribution Scheme, while the suppression of internal disturbances was designedly left in the first instance to the Volunteers and the armed police. (Appendix F attached to the Scheme).

5. The conditions obtaining in the Bombay Presidency in 1904, in common with the rest of India, were characterized superficially by profound tranquillity, and it was with a regard to those conditions, which had continued for a considerable number of years, that the Redistribution Scheme was framed and the views of the local Governments were based. The spirit of unrest which commenced to manifest itself in 1905 was as disturbing as it was unexpected, and the events in which it culminated, necessitating special restrictive legislation and executive proceedings of an unusual character, have indicated clearly that the assumptions, or some of them, which formed the basis of the proposals of 1904 were not entirely justified by the true facts of the situation. Avoiding unnecessary detail, I am to explain that the two main factors which, in the

See answer
6873.

opinion of this Government, combine to render necessary a revision of the opinions held in 1904 so far as this Presidency is concerned, are :—

(a) the Hindu revival as manifested in the active political campaign organized, *inter alia* in Baroda, the Deccan and the southern Maratha country; and

(b) the pan Islamic movement, as influencing the whole trend of political thought on the part of a large and increasing proportion of His Majesty's Muhammadan subjects in India.

Item 6751.

See answer
6873.

6. The Governor in Council thinks that it is unnecessary to enlarge upon the development of the former movement; since its history is well known; but he

Item 6873.

desires emphatically to express his opinion that it would be the gravest possible error to assume that the relative tranquillity and the diminution of political crime and overt agitation which have been the result of the repressive measures, legislative and administrative, to which the Government of India have been obliged to resort, denote any real change in the attitude of the more active and extreme politicians in India. The causes which have led to the manifestations of violence in 1906 and subsequent years are still, from the nature of the case, in existence, and the absence of overt symptoms of unrest cannot as yet, or for many years to come, be relied upon as an indication that these causes have disappeared.

7. From the point of view of the enquiry upon which Field Marshal Lord Nicholson's Committee is engaged, however, the Government of His Excellency Sir George Clarke regard the pan-Islamic movement as of special importance. In the first place, history has plainly shown that the Muhammadan religion is capable of overriding differences of race and hereditary traditions of hostility and of combining its heterogeneous followers in a common movement to an extent which is possible to no other religion. If a lead is ever to be taken in India in a united national movement, that lead must almost inevitably proceed from—or, at least, be dependent upon the support of—Islam. Sectarian differences, however numerous, and racial prejudices, which in India are profound, may be sunk in a combined movement under Muhammadan leadership; but it is almost impossible to imagine a combination of circumstances which would render joint action under Hindu leadership and organization remotely conceivable. In fact, in so far as the problem concerns Indian conditions alone, it is likely that, while isolated and disjointed political unrest and disturbance will usually be the work of Hindu malcontents, organized and widespread disaffection on a large scale may, in favourable conditions, result from Musulman influence.

See answers
6915 and
6916.

Ditto.

See answer
6920.

8. The possibilities of Muhammadan unrest depend largely on circumstances external to India, and the Bombay Government believe that it is difficult, at this moment, to exaggerate the great and growing importance in their effect upon Musulman opinion and feeling in certain parts of India of current events in Europe and in Persia. Owing to the relatively restricted sources of information available to them, Messrs. Kennedy and Curtis, in their evidence before the Committee, attached too little importance to this problem. There is every reason to believe, and the belief is borne out by definite items of information, that the events of the Turco-Italian War, and the progress of anarchy in Persia, are the topics of comment in many quarters where Muhammadans congregate. Difficulties in Turkey and Persia are likely to increase and whatever steps may be taken by Great Britain or other Powers, wholesale misrepresentation must be expected and Hindu malcontents will make use of their opportunities. The growth of a homogeneous sentiment among Muhammadans is a factor which will become increasingly important as time goes on, and it is one which cannot safely be ignored in any reasonable forecast of the measures necessary for securing internal peace in the various provinces of India, whenever either external menace is present or local troubles occur.

9. I am now to refer to another factor which, though it primarily concerns the civil administration of the country, has an indirect bearing of grave import-

ance upon the problem which is under the consideration of Lord Nicholson's Committee. The preservation of internal peace and order throughout India still depends, as it did fifty years ago, in very great measure upon the personality of its civil administrators, of whom the backbone is the chief civil officer of the district. All the estimates which from time to time have been made of the military and other armed forces, deemed to be necessary to support the civil authority in the maintenance of order and the repression of disturbances, proceed upon the assumption that the superior civil administrative staff is not only thoroughly efficient, but retains the prestige and personal authority which tradition, based upon past experience, rightly assigns to it. His Excellency in Council does not question the possession, by the great majority of His Majesty's civil servants, of the qualities here referred to; but it would be culpable folly to ignore the fact that it is, in the nature of things, an impossibility for civil servants, who are natives of India, to wield the authority and exert the personal influence over the people of a district which is expected to be an inherent quality of the Indian Civil Service. The Governor in Council does not in the least underrate or depreciate the administrative capacity, or the loyalty, of those Indian members of the Civil Service who have risen by merit to the charge of a district or even to higher executive posts. Many of them are as capable as European Collectors of a high degree of efficiency in the discharge of their ordinary administrative duties. Nor does this Government desire to suggest that such officials do not possess the courage and resource which would have to be looked for in an emergency. The simple fact is that the Indian population of a district do not, yet, accord to a native of India, whatever his race or creed, the same respect as they do to an Englishman. Nor do they pay the same regard to his rule. He is, generally speaking, as much a foreigner as the Englishman is, in the district in which he serves; but he has not that aloofness which should set him above the suspicion of susceptibility to influence nor the prestige which attaches to the British officer; with the result that his authority is never regarded as above question. Consequently it is far more difficult for an Indian to secure and maintain that hold over his district which in times of disturbance would be supremely important. The Governor in Council endorses all that fell from the Hon. Mr. Curtis on this subject both with reference to the charge of districts and to the command of the police of each district.

See answers
6954 and
6955.

10. In ordinary times the administration may not suffer materially from the presence in a province of a proportion of Indian Collectors. It is always possible, if disabilities make themselves manifest, (as they sometimes do) to effect transfers. But there are, in this Presidency, certain districts to which a native of India could not, as yet, safely be posted, while the whole of the Muhammadan province of Sind has hitherto been regarded as an area in which it is most desirable that the head of the district should invariably be a European. The Governor in Council considers that this is not the moment at which to discuss the limit to the number of the 19 districts in the Presidency proper to which it is, in normal times, safe to post natives of India; but he desires to

Ditto.

- * 2 in the Northern Division.
- 1 in the Central Division.
- 1 in the Southern Division.

point to the fact that four* of the districts in the Presidency proper (excluding Sind) are at present in the charge of Indians;

and the probability that the number will, in course of time, increase, has a momentous bearing upon the conditions in which the civil power in the Presidency can undertake, in times of stress, to maintain order, and upon the degree in which reliance must be placed upon military co-operation.

11. As an illustration of what is here meant I am to refer to the existing situation in Gujerat. The Districts of Kaira and the Panch Mahals, situated, respectively, on the north-west and northerly borders of Baroda, happen to be in charge of two Bengali members of the Indian Civil Service, while the district of West Khandesh, which abuts upon the eastern border of Baroda, is in charge of a Parsi. Under the Kitchener scheme, adopted in 1904, (*vide* paragraph

Ditto.

* Incidentally it should be noted that the opening of the Nagda-Bara-Muttra branch of the Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway has, apparently, vitiated part of the argument in paragraph 59 of the scheme.

59) the general defence of the area of this Presidency northward of the Tapti would* depend upon the moveable column (responsible for this area and for Rajputana and

Kathiawar) consisting of:—

- 1 battery, horse artillery.
- 1 regiment, native cavalry.
- 1 battalion, British infantry.
- 3 regiments, native infantry.

In addition to this force there are available, in the area in question, only 911 Volunteers and (according to assumption* upon which the Redistribution Scheme was based, as indicated in Appendix F) 500 armed police at Ahmadabad. And it will not be forgotten that, in the words of paragraph 59 of the scheme, "the real centres to be watched are Baroda and Indore." I am to say that, if an emergency occurred in the area in question, the situation would be very materially affected by the existing personnel of the three districts bordering on Baroda. It may be said, obviously, that, if that be the conviction of the Government of Bombay they must have been lacking in discretion in the selection of the districts to which the Indian Collectors have been posted. To this the reply is that, in normal times, the considerations which dictate the postings of officers to districts are so varied that regard cannot always be had to the remote possibility of an emergency; and that the location of Collectors depends upon divers considerations connected with the ordinary problems of administration in the various districts and upon the personal qualifications of individual officers. The actual distribution of Indian officials at the present time would, therefore, aggravate the possible difficulties which have to be contemplated in dealing with the problem of internal defence.

12. It is necessary, in His Excellency in Council's opinion, to offer another criticism of a more detailed character of the basis upon which the scheme of 1904 rests. In section V of Appendix F, attached to that scheme, was given a forecast of the numbers of armed police believed to be available in this Presidency for mobilization under the scheme of police reorganization. The

† Ahmadabad	500
Dhulia (West Khandesh)	450
Satara	400
Poona	150
Belgaum	500
Hyderabad (Sind)	300
Sukkur	200
Total	2,500

assumed total was 2,500 distributed at the centres shown in the margin.† I am to explain, for the information of Lord Nicholson's Committee, that these were purely arbitrary figures based on an imaginary reorganization scheme drawn up on rule of thumb calculations as prescribed by the Police Commission. The figures

included reserve units who, it was apparently thought, might be made available for mobilization from Sind, the railways and the Agencies under this Presidency as well as from the districts. At this moment there are, as explained by Mr. Kennedy in his evidence before the Committee, no police reserves properly so called, in the Presidency; and even when the police reorganization scheme (in contemplation in 1904) is sanctioned by the Secretary of State there will be available, in the Presidency excluding Sind, as reserves, only the following:—

	Head constables.	Constables.
Rifle squads	47	420
From the Armed (Sick and Leave) reserve§ about	580
Total ...	47	1,000

§ On a basis of 15 per cent. of the whole force.

See answer
6528.

See answer
6558.

To these might, in an emergency, be added about 1,000 sick and leave reserves of *unarmed* constables and head-constables. The Governor in Council suggests that this comparison of actuals with the estimates given when the

scheme of 1904 was devised indicates the tendency to exaggerate the means at the disposal of the civil authority for the organization of internal defence, and (as pointed out in the earlier paragraphs of this letter) to minimize the political considerations which should have inculcated caution in denuding the country of the available military forces on a too sweeping scale. A reference to the terms of the reply of this Government to the Government of India No. 3042, dated the 10th May 1904, will show that, recognizing the importance which the Government of India attached, on wide grounds of policy, to the initiation, if it could possibly be brought about, of the Redistribution Scheme elaborated by Lord Kitchener, this Government displayed a keen desire to meet the Government of India's wishes and undertook, on certain assumptions, the maintenance of internal order in the Presidency in the event of a general mobilization. One of these assumptions was that the reserves of police indicated in Appendix F would be available "under European inspectors and superior officers." That assumption, as has been shown in the last preceding paragraph, has not materialized; and on that ground alone the Governor in Council feels justified in suggesting a partial reconsideration of the scheme.

13. Briefly summarized, the distribution, or mobilization, of the regular troops for defence of the Bombay area excluding Aden is as follows:—

See answers
6683 and
6684.

(1) *Moveable columns.*

A—*For the area from Ajmer and Jodhpur to the Tapti* (including also the whole of Rajputana south of Ajmer, as well as Gujarat). 1 battery of horse artillery.
1 regiment, native cavalry.
1 battalion, British infantry.

3 regiments, native infantry.

B—*From Surat to Belgaum* ... 4 field guns.

1 regiment, native cavalry.

$\frac{1}{2}$ battalion, British infantry.

2 regiments, native infantry.

(2) *Obligatory garrisons.*

Sind ... 2 companies, garrison artillery.

1 battalion, British infantry.

1 regiment, native infantry.

Bombay ... 2 companies, garrison artillery.

1 company, native artillery.

1 battalion, British infantry.

2* regiments, native infantry.

Poona and Kirkee ... 2 field guns.

$\frac{1}{2}$ battalion, British infantry.

1† regiment, native cavalry.

Now it seems clear to His Excellency the Governor in Council that, seeing the extent to which the scheme has denuded large and important centres, such

* (1 battalion from Jubbulpore.)

† (Brought from Jubbulpore.)

as Ahmadabad and Poona, of regular troops, its framers not only placed almost exclusive reliance upon the co-operation of the Volunteers and police*, underesti-

* *Vide* paragraph 12, *ante*.

mated the possibility, and ignored the political importance, of widespread local popular risings resulting in the temporary loss of control over considerable tracts of country. It is, of course, perfectly true that a (largely) unarmed population could make but an ineffective resistance to disciplined troops, but His Excellency in Council conceives it to be the duty of the administration, not only as a defensive but as a strategic and political measure, if possible to arrange for the *prevention*, as well as for the ultimate suppression, of popular risings; and while this Government admit it to be arguable that the distribution of the fixed garrisons, as detailed above, would suffice for the ultimate suppression of popular risings, they cannot but apprehend that the forces provided are inadequate to the prevention of possible temporary chaos in large tracts of country, the political effect of which in other parts of India would be lamentable and would react in largely enhanced difficulties in connection with the maintenance of order in other provinces.

See answer
6652.

14. I am to cite, for the sake of example, the case of Gujarat. Ahmadabad will shortly become a city of some 300,000 inhabitants, and already has a population in mill hands approximating to 30,000. It commands the whole of Gujarat from the Tapti to Mount Abu both politically and geographically and, from the point of view of the railway system, strategically. Making every allowance for the utmost that Volunteers could effect in the protection of the railway line, nothing would be simpler to effect than the interruption for several days, through the destruction of a few culverts and bridges, of the whole of the communication of a province the geological formation of which has rendered good road communications impossible. During those days the moveable column from Ajmer would be powerless, while the whole of the country, with its European population, would be completely at the mercy of the unarmed population. It requires no argument to demonstrate that a calamity of such wide extent would, with the exiguous forces arranged for, take a very long time to retrieve, and that its political effects would be of a character disastrous to the rest of the area for whose internal peace the Governor in Council is responsible.

In the modifications which will now be suggested for the northern area His Excellency has taken the above possibilities into account, and, while still keeping in view the military necessities of the case, has had in mind the supreme importance, if internal control is not to be seriously jeopardized, of being in a position, in case of a rising, to take prompt measures of suppression.

15. Special allusion has already been made, in paragraph 11 and the foregoing paragraphs, to the defencelessness, on mobilization, of the area between the Tapti and Ajmer. But even for normal times the garrison seems to be inadequate. At Ahmadabad, the growth and importance of which has been alluded to, there is now only the headquarters of one native infantry regiment, and the nearest available reinforcement (omitting Baroda from account) is the regiment now at Deesa but shortly to be removed to Rajkot. In comparatively recent times, when the population and importance of Ahmadabad both from a railway and industrial point of view was less than half what it is now, the garrison consisted of—

- 1 regiment, native infantry;
- 2 companies, British infantry;
- 1 battery, field artillery.

The Governor in Council is fully alive to the drawbacks, on military grounds, to disintegration of units of British troops; but he is nevertheless most strongly convinced of the cardinal importance of the presence at Ahmadabad of the quota of British troops above detailed as a minimum obligatory garrison for Gujarat. Whether the British force should be one complete battalion, without any artillery, or a battery with the necessary minimum of British infantry, is a matter which his Excellency is content to leave to military experts, though he would prefer the presence in the province of an artillery unit; but he conceives it to be his duty, in the discharge of his

responsibility for the safety of the territories under his control, to indicate the absolute necessity of strengthening the forces of Gujarat by stationing a body of British troops at Ahmadabad. There are barracks available and the initial expenditure in providing quarters would therefore not be excessive.

16. Turning now to the area south of the Tapti, with its obligatory garrisons at Bombay and Poona, and its very small moveable column (*vide* paragraph 14 *ante*), the Governor in Council desires, in the first instance, to draw the attention of the military authorities to the many miles of bridging on the Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway between Bombay and Surat, the efficient guarding of which would be impossible to the available Volunteer forces. In the next place he feels compelled to advert to what he regards as the grave inadequacy of the forces available for the defence of Bombay and the Poona area. The garrison allotted to Bombay City (paragraph 14 *ante*) which, on mobilization is to be strengthened by one native infantry regiment from Jubbulpore is, in His Excellency's opinion, the bare minimum of force required. As Lord Nicholson's Committee is probably aware, it has not infrequently been necessary even in times of peace, to draw on Poona for the prevention or suppression of local disturbances in Bombay. The garrison stationary at Poona, omitting the moveable column, will, on mobilization, be gravely depleted* while the moveable column itself will consist of the inadequate force of—

* 2 field guns.
 ½ battalion British infantry.
 1 regiment native cavalry.

4 field guns.

1 regiment native cavalry.

½ battalion British infantry.

2 regiments native infantry.

17. The Governor in Council observes that, in their examination before the Committee, Messrs. Kennedy and Curtis were asked whether, in their opinion, two companies of British infantry, available from Belgaum, would be of service in preventing disturbances in the Southern Division. It is not quite clear, from the context, whether the proposal was that these two companies should form an addition to the obligatory garrison of Belgaum, and be available for this special duty independently of the moveable column referred to above. Nor is it entirely free from doubt whether British or native infantry were meant. His Excellency the Governor in Council desires to add his testimony to those of his witnesses in support of the view that two companies of British infantry, based on Belgaum, and available as proposed independently of the moveable column, might be most valuable in the southern Maratha country. The moveable column for this area would, in an emergency, not improbably find itself fully occupied in the central Deccan,—i.e., in the Nasik, Poona, Satara and Ahmadnagar Districts—and it would be unsafe to assume that it would be adequate also for the maintenance of order, or immediate suppression of disturbance, in Maratha country to the south.

See answers
 6683 and
 6684.

18. The Governor in Council believes that he has now dealt with the more important aspects of the subjects; but he desires, at the risk of repetition, again to emphasize his conviction that, when the army was redistributed in 1904, too much reliance was placed upon the added strength of our position consequent upon the development of railways and telegraphs. In a sense, of course, Lord Kitchener was justified in placing the change to the credit side of the account; but His Excellency in Council believes that the South African War demonstrated in no uncertain way the extreme vulnerability of railway communications, while the reliable forces, other than regular troops, available for the protection of the Indian railway systems are, as has been shown, so exiguous that the utmost they could be relied upon to accomplish would be the defence of certain sections which it would be vital to hold.

See answer
 6652.

19. Another consideration, which seriously qualifies the protective value of railways and telegraphs, has been referred to in the evidence of the Hon. Mr. Curtis. Nearly all the clerical employes of the Great Indian Peninsular Railway, and practically all the telegraph operatives within the central area of

See answer
6780.

this Presidency belong to the Brahman—largely the Konkanasth Brahman—caste. This is a condition of affairs outside the control of the Bombay Government, which can be remedied, gradually, only by the Imperial Department and the Railway Administrations concerned ; but it is certainly a factor which discounts to no small extent the improvement in the safety of the country as a consequence of the increased facilities of communication ; and Mr. Curtis's remarks on this head are completely endorsed by the Governor in Council.

See answer
6721.

2. I am now to sum up the views of this Government in regard to the questions of internal defence. Although, at the present moment, there is an apparent cessation of the revolutionary movements of the last few years, it must not be supposed that activities of this nature have been permanently abandoned. On the contrary, there are signs that seditious organizations are only in abeyance and that, if at any time political agitation is revived, anarchist outrages will follow in its train. In the meantime, it must be assumed that the attempt to bring local centres of sedition into touch still proceeds. Such conspiracies as that at Nasik may, therefore, recur, and we must depend upon secret information to suppress them before outrages have been committed, or we must deal swiftly and sternly with the conspirators if we fail to obtain such information.

21. Sedition in India may be said to have three objects :

See answer
6888.

(1) The assassination of Government officials with the idea of intimidating the Government into making political concessions. Conspiracies with this object may be either local or may have ramifications all over India ;

See answer
6818.

(2) a propaganda of disloyalty in the native army ;

(3) attempts to stir up the civil population to revolt, which if not promptly quelled might spread to serious dimensions.

All these objects may be actively promoted at the same time, and from the point of view of the local Government (2) and (3) have mainly to be considered, and (3) could not be serious in ordinary times if (2) proved unsuccessful. If a great part of the army were mobilized the fidelity of the native units left as station garrisons would be extremely important because the withdrawal of British troops would leave large areas at the mercy of revolted native forces, who could be opposed only by Volunteers and police. The vital necessity of securing the arsenals is thus apparent and has doubtless received full consideration from the Committee. Complications in Europe are the main hope of the seditious party in India and even if the situation at Home was not really critical, wild exaggerations brought to bear upon an ignorant population which had been previously prepared, might produce dangerous unrest. In this case, the prestige of the district officers would be a most important factor. Good British civilians would probably be able to check the first signs of revolt and to maintain order, while Indian officials would almost certainly fail. If comparatively small forces of British troops were available as moveable columns to act rapidly in disturbed areas without drawing unduly upon station garrisons, the advantages would be great, since the earliest possible action would be preeminently desirable. Failing such forces, the local Government would employ the police reserve which, as already explained, it is intended to create.

See answers
6845 and
6862.

22. Lastly, I am to draw the attention of the Committee to the fact that causes now actively at work must tend to produce a steady increase of disaffection which would instantly declare itself if British Rule were considered to be in danger. The schools and colleges annually turn out a large number of youths into whose minds hostility has been instilled and who have been led to believe that they could and ought to assume the government of the country. And further, the great spread of primary education which is taking place will in no long time render a far greater proportion of the population accessible to seditious propaganda than at present. Full advantage would be taken of the enlarged opportunities by the persons who have—for this reason—agitated for the

adoption of universal free and compulsory education. The necessity for retaining the present powers of controlling the Press are, therefore, manifest. These powers do not in the least prevent legitimate comment and criticism. They can, however, restrain the preaching of race hatred and check efforts to bring the Government into dislike. Sound policy demands that we should keep these powers, to reimpose which at a time when our difficulties may be greater than at present would arouse violent opposition.

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